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ABSTRACT 
Christopher Roberts
 Towards a Genealogy of Sacrificial Rhetoric:
 The Discursive Construction of Authority in Luther, Hegel and Weber
(Under the direction of Ruel W. Tyson, Jr.)
This dissertation addresses the historical role played by “sacrifice” in shaping conceptions of 
the self, society and history. It traces a genealogy of “sacrificial rhetoric” that begins with the 
Christian reconfiguration of the pagan ritual both doctrinally (through the Crucifixion and 
Eucharist) and practically (through ascetic substitutions like chastity, poverty, and 
obedience). In contrast to sacrifice in ancient and indigenous cultures, where the destruction 
of life or wealth ritually enacts a hierarchy of values (the lower is sacrificed to the higher, the 
gift to the source, the creature to the creator), Christian “sacrifice” became less a matter of 
ritual than of discourse. To develop the heuristic resources of “sacrificial rhetoric” as a com-
parative, critical concept, an introductory chapter situates this rhetorical analysis in relation to 
the treatment of sacrifice in social scientific discourses. This chapter also relates sacrifice to 
gift, theft, and exchange, elaborates seven “axes of variation” to compare sacrificial variations 
across cultures and through history, and isolates two primary discursive effects of sacrificial 
rhetoric, disaggregation and consecration. Individual chapters examine how the pivotal Ger-
man writers Luther, Hegel, and Weber continue the Christian process of sacrificial trans-
formation as they strategically deployed the term to demarcate both between sacred and 
profane and between self and other. At critical junctures “sacrificial rhetoric” allowed each of 
these writers to break with modes of subjectivity defined by the ancient allegiance to the 
polis, or the medieval bonds of fealty, in favor of a subject of the modern nation-state defined 
in relation to worship, reflection, and labor. 
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 1. Sacrificial Rhetoric: Resources for a Comparative Concept
 Introduction 
This study seeks to construct a novel object of scrutiny, “sacrificial rhetoric,” and 
explore influential instances of its employment in history. As I understand it, the primary 
burden of this work is to construct this object in such a way that it both explains phenomena 
in the world and sets the concept on a sound foundation by building upon existing scholarly 
resources. Foremost among the innovations I propose is to utilize social scientific theories of 
religion, ritual and sacrifice in conjunction with literary analysis to explore the rhetorical 
effect achieved when people speak of phenomena in terms of “sacrifice.” To explore 
instances of sacrificial rhetoric that will have the greatest illustrative and comparative value, I 
chose three figures—Luther, Hegel and Weber—who are related by linguistic, religious and 
national affinities and who each self-consciously drew upon their expertise to contribute to 
nation-building at the broadest level. 
The danger of dealing with three such figures, of course, is the amount of specialist 
attention they have garnered. Indeed, exploring the conditions and consequences of their 
sacrificial rhetoric would have been impossible without the immense labors of generations of 
devoted scholars. I can only hope that the affinities that I find between these three figures, the 
scrutiny I bring to their rhetorical strategies, and the hypotheses I draw might serve to begin 
new avenues of inquiry that the specialists will be best equipped to pursue. In the final 
analysis, this comparative project will have been successful if it contributes in some small way 
to the spirit of cross-disciplinary conversation and reciprocity upon which the ideal of the 
university—and, by extension, society—depends.  
  
  
 Disembedded Religion and the Public Sphere
 For Karl Polanyi, the emergence of the market as an amoral mediator between humans 
competing for resources was as important a factor in understanding economics comparatively 
as the rise and fall of subsistence economies or the emergence of capitalism. Polanyi’s 
historical hypothesis was that modern societies are defined in relation to a market structure 
that has become disembedded from other social structures, such as kinship and political 
authority (1944). In a similar way, a religious sphere disembedded from the rest of society and 
circumscribed within its proper domain has come to serve as a hallmark of a developed, 
democratic society.1  In many contemporary societies, religion has become a phenomenon 
regarded as mostly private and thus amoral, beyond sanction or judgment. In this new 
millenium, however, like few times in history, global events have put this détente between co-
existing socio-cultural spheres into question. As if to mirror the heightened tensions between 
nations that followed all too quickly on the heels of the Cold War and the post-Perestroika 
thaw, within nations as well a new bellicosity has come to mark the relations between the 
social space claimed by religions and other spaces reserved for cultural, economic, political and 
juridical phenomena. Even if one argues that these developments are but the latest stages of a 
process that is cyclical in nature, the socio-economic pressures that have pressed the religious 
strata of diverse social pheno-mena to the surface stands as a complicating challenge to the 
narratives of rationalization and secularization that have defined the liberal-bourgeois world 
view since the Enlightenment.
Whether it is natural law’s putatively transcendent ground, prophetic calls for socio-
economic justice, or authoritative appeals to divine sanctions, disparate cultural and social 
fields remain haunted by a nearly unavowable religious source. Of course, there are few 
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________________________
1 Although first encountering this notion of institutional disembeddng in Polanyi, it is worth noting 
that Bremmer too has found it useful in reference to Greek religion: “Whereas most Western countries have 
gradually separated church and state, the example of other societies, such as Iran and Saudi-Arabia, shows that 
this is not so everywhere. In ancient Greece, too, religion was totally embedded in society—no sphere of life 
lacked a religious aspect.[…] Embeddedness went together with the virtual absence of private religion, since in 
classical Greece the notion of a private sphere was still in an early state of development” (1994, p. 2).
objections to recognizing how historically contemporary social structures emerged from modes 
of sociality more completely saturated with religious elements—in fact, narratives of 
rationalization and secularization depend on this.2  But beyond ideological or antiquarian 
interests, these religious aspects remain difficult to assess because the putatively “original” 
religiosity invoked by these narratives only remotely resembles what we have since come to 
know as religion. Religion’s circumscribed and relegated social sphere itself constitutes a mere 
remnant of the more vertiginous sacrality that Durkheim described as “collective 
effervescence,”3 the transfiguration that the aboriginal Australians produced in their festivals 
and flashes of which emerge in Holderlin’s lyrics, Nietzsche’s leaps and Artaud’s theater. 
Aside from a merely historical interest in an uncircumscribed, embedded notion of 
religion, there are fundamentalists of various stripes who would reverse this history of 
disembedding under the guise of a project of cultural and religious recovery. Others, more 
chastened by the sad history of those who have sought various “lost” origins and objects, reject 
such returns and teach an accomodationism to the demands of the present. At any rate, despite 
the recent and much-debated intrusion of robust and unaccomodating religious factions onto 
the international scene, it is too much to say that we are witnessing either a fundamentalist “re-
enchantment” of the world or the rise of an anti-institutional “spirituality”, for the world was 
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2 Locke, Jefferson and Madison are certainly key figures in the American tradition of this narrative, 
and the major social scientific theorists of these trends are Weber (1978) and Berger (1969).
3 According to Durkheim’s last formulation on the topic, “the faithful are not mistaken when they 
believe in the existence of a moral power to which they are subject and from which they receive what is best in 
themselves. That power exists, and it is society.” This is so because “religion is first and foremost a system of 
ideas by means of which individuals imagine the society of which they are members and the obscure yet 
intimate relations they have with it.[...] And although this representation is symbolic and metaphorical, it is not 
unfaithful. It fully translates the essence of the relations to be accounted for. It is true with a truth that is eternal 
that there exists outside us something greater than we and with which we commune.”Against the objection that 
this ultimate referent of religious symbols and practices is based on “a certain delusion,” Durkheim regarded 
this “collective effervescence,” during which devotees “believe they have been swept up into a world entirely 
different from the one they have before their eyes,” as essential to religion’s affective dimension. Accordingly, 
“[i]f, for this reason, it can be said that religion does not do without a certain delirium, it must be added that a 
delirium with the causes I have attributed to it is well founded. The images of which it is made are not pure 
illusions, and unlike those the naturists and the animists put at the basis of religion, they correspond to some-
thing real” (1995, p. 227-228). 
only disenchanted and secularized for a small—though disproportionately influential—portion 
of the world’s population in the first place. In fact, insofar as we can speak of these processes 
at all, I would suggest that enchantment and disenchantment, sacralization and secularization, 
all are much more dialectically related than any linear historical narrative can describe.4  Given 
the apparent and escalating contradictions besetting the modern world system, these linear 
narratives of rationalization and secularization must be recognized for what they are: myths 
that have oriented the actions and affect—or their interface, the habitus5—of the 
revolutionizing and culture-bearing European bourgeoisie and their correlates in developing 
nations. Surely it is too soon to announce the collapse of the democratic, secular state, just as 
announcements regarding the end of capitalism or of ideology were optimistic, or at best 
premature, and now appear motivated by a milleniallistic hope more religious than scientific. If 
the religious aspects of contemporary struggles are not merely misrecognitions of actual 
conditions, and if, even to the degree that they are, these misrecognitions themselves have 
functional, even fateful consequences, might it be that, for all the contempt that the skeptical 
elements of the Enlightenment heaped on religions, the redescription of many superficially 
secular social phenomena as imbued with religious connotations reveals more truth about the 
phenomena than any putatively objective, ostentatiously rationalistic account? Might it also be 
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4 Berger’s critical return to his secularization thesis, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent 
Religion and World Politics (1999), arguably makes his earlier linear narrative into a Vico-esque ricurso. What 
is needed instead is a more nuanced, dialectical notion of simultaneous secularization and desecularization. 
Examples of this dialectical relationship could include both of the great signal events of secularization in mod-
ern Western history. First, as Marx argued, the Reformation led to the expropriation of church land and prop-
erty, and this secularization proved a key moment in the primitive accumulation of the European bourgeoisie. 
These various disenchanting processes were quickly re-enchanted as this class gradually disguised the naked 
class interests at work in these events with the myths of primitive accumulation that various economists pro-
duced and Marx exposed to scornful scrutiny. A more synchronic case, the French Revolution, involved the 
third estate’s toppling of the first and second estates of aristocracy and clergy, respectively, and, eventually 
Robespierre’s calendrical and liturgical reform culminating in Christianity’s substitute, the religion of reason.
5 This is the concept Bourdieu developed to account for both the determining effects of society and the 
sense of agency individuals experience. The habitus is precisely the interface between structure and agency as it 
has become embodied by individuals within society. It attempts to account for the way that individuals, through 
acculturation, come to inhabit their class position and act in ways that oscillate, both consciously and uncon-
sciously, between determination and spontaneity. On this, see Bourdieu (1990, p. 87-94) and Hillier and 
Rooksby (2005).
the case that, far from constituting primitive survivals doomed to extinction, phenomena 
grouped under the concept of “religion” remain a provocative surplus that forecloses any 
possibility of totalizing a set of elements that would bear the name “society”, and that these 
phenomena thus open that assemblage to an uncertain and undecidable future?  
At the very least, I would suggest that the relations between religions and societies are 
far more complicated than the notion of secularization would allow. To begin to rethink these 
relations, it is clear that, as with any relation, circumstances and agendas determine whether 
one stresses the distance or the proximity between the linked elements. Thus, to some 
theologians, such as John Milbank and Rowan Williams, the relation between religious and 
extra-religious phenomena has come to seem vital, a link that forms the omphalos of all that is 
meaningful in the contemporary world. Such an apologetic claim is not a premise for this 
investigation, but a historicizing variant of it is. Since the Protestant and Catholic 
Reformations, the Wars of Religion and the rise of Enlightenment naturalism, western elites 
have experienced a period of secularization, rationalization, and increasing objectivity 
regarding the role of religion in developed and developing societies, largely as a result of 
comparative studies in the social sciences, classical and religious studies.  At this point, under 
the pressure of historical events, it is time to turn the fruits of these studies back onto the same 
societies that produced them. In other words, after the provocation of encountering other 
religions over the past several centuries, the resources developed in the course of these 
encounters can now return to help analyze the complicated role of religion in Western history 
and society. 
As for the problem raised by the putative “return of religion,” one of the axioms that 
defines the structuralist paradigm seems especially relevant: in a social system, as in language, 
the relation between elements is more fundamental, or “real”, than the abstracted, second-order 
elements that it relates.6  With this sense that even developed, secular societies are not yet 
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6 Saussure is the proximate source for this perspective, but I would also trace it to Marx’s definition of 
human nature as the “ensemble of social relations” in the “Theses on Feuerbach” (1972c, p. 109). In the 
finished with religions, the developmental distance between societies with embedded and those 
with disembedded religious spheres decreases, making it possible to turn the resources of 
anthropology and ethnology back onto the societies that produced these discourses.  That is, it 
is now more than ever possible—and, indeed, imperative—to cast a cold eye on the sometimes 
obscure role that religion has played and continues to play in Western or developed societies. I 
stress the obscurity of this role because when religious phenomena migrate beyond their proper 
sphere, they often undergo a disfigurement or transformation that makes them hard to 
recognize, and, again, this possibility of misrecognition itself has momentous consequences. 
To complicate these linear narratives of secularization, this investigation will trace the 
consequential function of religious phenomena in the articulation of that which the great social 
theorists (Smith, Marx, Durkheim and Weber, especially) each considered the defining element 
of modern societies: namely, a dynamic and interdependent division of labor. Though 
Durkheim alone developed this topic alone into an extended study (1964), the importance of 
the division of labor was central to each of these theorists. For Smith, it was the source of the 
efficiencies that best promoted a nation’s wealth; for Marx, it was both the cause and 
consequence of alienation from production processes and their products, and also the condition 
for a future of plenty and leisure; for Weber, it was the objective counterpart to the subjective 
sense of a “calling” that the modern individual was bound to heed if life was to have any 
meaning at all. In particular, the dispersion of a peculiarly authoritative type of labor, that of 
uttering proclamations regarding the nature of reality itself, required a highly charged type of 
religious discourse in order to legitimate the transmission from one position in the social field 
to another. As positions of social authority have multiplied to include not only the prophet and 
the priest but also the pastor, the philosopher, the scholar and the scientist, in each instance of 
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twentieth century this insight has migrated from linguistics, that is, from the study of language as a system, to 
any system, even society as a whole. An alternative lineage could trace back to Nietzsche’s figure of language 
as an army of metaphors (1989, p. 250), not a collection of names. The problematic epistemological status of 
Nietzsche’s figure of figurality underscores the nature of metaphor not only as an extention of literal language, 
but, more fundamentally, as a relation of displacement. 
the series a quasi-religious struggle, a reformation of sorts, took place in order to make way 
for the emergent position. In the course of these struggles, the figures I address utilized the 
religiously-inflected language of their predecessors to facilitate the necessary social transaction. 
It is little wonder, then, that the transaction involved the most charged and troubling of all 
social and religious phenomena, ritual sacrifice. 
  Sacrifice Against “Exchangism”
On many fronts, ritual sacrifice constitutes the unavowable origin of every social 
transaction. Classics scholars such as Louis Gernet (1981) and Richard Seaford (1994, 2004) 
have illustrated the way that, in ancient Greece, the articulation of animal sacrifice towards 
votive offerings formed the nexus necessary for the emergence of the notion of value and 
coined money as an instrument of exchange. As a result of this historical differentiation, 
sacrifice as a costly or risky expenditure has come to serve as the contrary of the notion of 
exchange, where the latter is understood as a process of mutual and simultaneous 
appropriation and expropriation marked by equivalence and equilibrium. When the transaction 
takes place under coercion, or manifests a gratuity and extravagance that attempts to mark the 
transaction as driven by motives other than self-interest, then one enters the realm of sacrifice.7 
Although, as Bataille has argued, sacrifices are not non-economic, but rather function 
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7 Both Smith and Marx refer to sacrifice repeatedly but, as one might expect, for entirely opposed pur-
poses. When Smith speaks of sacrifice, it is almost always in reference to political interventions in market 
mechanisms. For example, mercantilism is fundamentally flawed because it imposes policy on the market: 
“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be 
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly 
self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the con-
sumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not con-
sumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce” (1976, p. 660).  Thus, to Smith, public 
figures who protected domestic industries by imposing tariffs would sacrifice lower prices for this protection. If 
the political would leave the economic alone, by implication society would transcend the need for sacrifice. For 
key passages in Smith where one can find this nearly compulsive turn of phrase, see p. 188, 267, 539, 584, 594, 
617, 660-2, 722, 762. To Marx, by contrast, whether one operated the economy according to laissez-faire prin-
ciples or not, capitalist relations of production themselves entailed the utter self-sacrifice of the proletariat.  For 
explicit passages in the Economic and Political Manuscripts (1964), see p. 110-111. For his redescription of 
Smith’s labor theory of value as sacrifice in the Grundrisse (1972), see p. 610-616.
according to different principles within a more general economy that includes exorbitance and 
wastein many contexts sacrifice remains the exotic and excluded other of market-based, 
economic phenomena.8 
Despite the prevalence of economic language and models in the social sciences, it is 
nonetheless often the case that language borrowed from contemporary economic phenomena 
strains under pressure when applied to other socio-cultural transactions. In these cases the 
neutrality of “exchange” is too flat to convey the marked or charged nature of the situation in 
question. For instance, consider the following remarks. In a discussion regarding meaning and 
the problem of warrant in general, George Steiner observes that “[t]he critic, the interpreter, 
the committed reader draws, as it were, on the bank-credit of theology, on the ultimately 
theological re-insurance of the very concept of meaningfulness, without offering in return the 
collateral of an avowed faith” (1984, p. 21). What is most remarkable in this passage is 
Steiner’s deployment of economic language to describe a situation that seems particularly 
unamenable to such terms. If a typical market transaction is marked by reciprocity and 
facilitated by an implicit framework of equivalence, Steiner’s scenario involving the secular 
critic and a theologically-grounded meaning entails non-reciprocity and the duplicitous use and 
disavowal of the credit that theology extends. Embezzlement is one possible label here, yet 
Steiner avoids a criminal description in favor of an account of failed or faulty commerce. 
Surely for rhetorical purposes the disenchanted language of market-exchange strikes the 
appropriate note of scandal in his description, but to understand exactly how this language is 
apt for his purposes, one must ask what kind of contiguous description his language brushes 
against, and thus unconsciously connotes.
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________________________
8 The debt this investigation owes to Bataille is multiform and diffuse. Perhaps no author has so 
provocatively employed the notions of sacrifice and expenditure to demonstrate the closed and constructed 
nature of economistic notions of exchange and production (1985, 1990, 1992).
One pre-supposition of the recent disciplinary move towards the discussion of “lived 
religion”9 hinges on the notion that it is more productive for scholars to attend to the 
movement of deeds, gestures and words between people than to the beliefs or convictions they 
singly hold fast. With an emphasis, then, on the social work of circulating discourses, of 
performed gestures and executed actions, religious studies places at its heart questions of how 
best to investigate and describe these events that take place between individuals in a shared 
social milieu. 
In the context of religious practices, two types of interpersonal events have had a long 
history: gift and sacrifice. However, a remarkable fact about these two concepts is that, despite 
the impression that they refer to two clearly distinct phenomena, in practice they tend to mingle 
together, which has led scholars to search for a third term to account for them both.  In 
reference to a typical expiatory sacrifice, such as the Hebrew ‘olah, one might describe the 
ritual as an exchange that takes place in two moments: that of the human penance or expiation 
paid, and the divine forgiveness or restoration bestown. This description, which is very close to 
that of a commercial transaction between deity and human, has a long heritage: in the 
Euthyphro, Plato’s Socrates spoke of Greek rites as patently economic in nature (1997).10 
Thus, to bring clarity to these co-implicated phenomena, structuralism offers the notion of 
“exchange” as a master-concept explaining social phenomena as disparate as marriage 
practices and mythological discourses. 
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9 Many prominent scholars of religion, such as Robert Orsi (1997) and David Hall (1997), have pro-
moted this development, which seeks to challenge a perceived Protestant emphasis on the interior states of iso-
lated individuals which has long dominated the field. Insofar as this trend develops counter-elite perspectives 
and incorporates ethnographic materials and methods, it is a salubrious contribution to the field. Of course, this 
is not entirely novel, as Diversities of Gifts (Tyson, Peacock, and Patterson, 1988) and other texts form impor-
tant precedents.
10 Gift and sacrifice constitute events within a moral economy which conditions such expiations. Ken-
neth Burke, for one, argues that notions of sacrifice are integral to any notion of a functioning order (1970). In 
light of Heidegger’s radical reading of the Anaximander fragment, I for one would suggest that the pre-Socratic 
ruminations on order attest to Burke’s claim. On the linkage between morality and economy, the locus clas-
sicus of this insight has to be Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1967), where Schuld (guilt, debt) is 
traced back to the importation of economic notions of compensation into the moral sphere, so that, as retribu-
tion, the pleasure of inflicting suffering compensates for having suffered. 
 The structuralist notion of exchange is modeled in part on the noiseless exchange of 
signifier for signified in Saussurian linguistics, as well as the frictionless flow of the chain of 
signification and the costless transactions between signifiers in the synchronic structure of la 
langue (Saussure, 1966).  When Lévi-Strauss extended structuralist principles beyond 
linguistics into the other social sciences (1963, 1966, 1969, 1976), exchange became the key 
term in a new lingua franca of socio-cultural description. Unfortunately, the very neutrality of 
this concept of a zero-degree transaction presents problems of its own. 
First, a great many interpersonal events cannot be deciphered without attending to the 
costs paid and the benefits reaped, the credit extended and the debts borne. The extension of 
this frictionless linguistic exchange to all of social life performs a crippling ideological 
obfuscation, for at a stroke the exchange of equivalents becomes the norm for all social 
transactions, and costly and risky variants become deviations from this norm. If all exchanges 
are of equivalents, and all are performed freely, exchange as a master-concept of social 
behavior ignores circumstantial and structural pressures of coercion, and blanches the fact of 
power from the field of social life. 
Another problem stems from the fact that Lévi-Strauss never interrogates the 
production of value. According to the structuralist arche-binary of nature versus culture, social 
things, by the very fact that they are not natural but cultural, bear values as constituents of 
semiotic systems. Structuralism, then, tracks the transformations that various elements undergo 
as they are exchanged, but does not attempt to account for the generation of values 
themselves. While this might seem plausible in what Lévi-Strauss calls the “cold” or traditional, 
non-literate societies, the structuralist framework seems insufficient when confronted with the 
massive generation and inflation of values in “hot” societies like contemporary America 
(1976a, p. 29-30). 
The critique of the scientism that is endemic to structuralism is typical of the broad 
movement known as “post-structuralism”, which includes Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and 
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Guattari. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari took explicit aim at the hegemony of 
“exchangism” that had overtaken the social sciences in the wake of structuralism. Against this 
language of exchangism, which divests social transactions of affect and conflict, Deleuze and 
Guattari rejected the economic notion of “need” and restored a fundamental role for the 
unconscious and desire in social production. Indeed, they insisted categorically that “[d]esire 
knows nothing of exchange, it knows only theft and gift” (1977, p. 186). One could easily 
translate Steiner’s scenario into a description using these terms, so that, depending on the 
motivation of the agents involved, one either faces the secular critic’s theft of the theologian’s 
meaning, or the former’s reception of the latter’s gift. In either case, the absence of reciprocity 
and equivalence are better captured by Deleuze and Guattari’s language than by Steiner’s, 
though, again, rhetorically, the cold language of the markets fits Steiner’s purposes quite well. 
Nonetheless, in a sense all three terms utilize a secularized language to describe the 
transaction. What language might the theologian employ to account for what has taken place? 
Would she reserve sacrifice for human-divine transactions, or could it apply here as well? Is it a 
sacrifice when the valued object (in this case, meaning, broadly construed) moves from the 
religious to the secular sphere? Can one sacrifice to a thoroughly disenchanted recipient? Do 
the agents involved come to the transaction with their status fixed, or could it change? If the 
latter, would the recipient then undergo transformation, and in some fundamental way become 
sacralized? Depending upon the rhetorical purposes of the critic, one could take the argument 
in several different directions, but this topic raises a typological issue of primary importance. 
This investigation shares Deleuze and Guattari’s concerns regarding the hegemony of 
“exchange”, but would take their contribution one step further. How does “sacrifice” relate to 
their triad of exchange, gift and theft? What relations define their semantic space? 
 Gift, Theft, Exchange, Sacrifice
To analyse the terms gift, theft, exchange, and sacrifice, the first issue to address is 
their nominative form, which runs the risk of focusing too exclusively on the object and not the 
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agents of the transaction.  Although theft demands that attention be paid to one agent’s 
relation of ownership to the object that another agent violates, the other three terms can easily 
slip into the “fetishism” that involves taking what is actually a relation between people as a 
relation between types of things.11 Instead of this object-centered approach, it is important to 
note that agents use objects to define relationships with other agents as much as they pursue 
them as objects of need or desire. In addition, one must address the various ways that the 
agent-object relation changes in different situations. The primary term to denote this is the 
degree of alienability that marks the agent-object relation. As one might imagine, exchanges 
are marked by the highest degree of alienability, while sacrifices are marked by the least.12 
The point to carry forward here is that the distinctions between these four terms are 
important but relative and shifting. In Mauss’s investigation into the form and function of the 
gift, he argued against the view that economic notions such as value and exchange were absent 
in traditional societies and only emerged in modern western ones. Such notions have long been 
in effect, but not in the “pure” or disembedded form familiar to economists. Regarding the 
economic precocity of traditional societies, Mauss argued that
the notion of value functions in these societies. Very large surpluses, speaking in 
absolute terms, are amassed. They are often expended to no avail, with comparatively 
enormous luxury, which is in no way commercial. These are the signs of wealth, and 
kinds of money are exchanged. Yet the whole of this very rich economy is still filled 
with religious elements. Money still possesses its magical power and is still linked to 
the clan or to the individual. The various economic activities, for example the market, 
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11 Marx developed the notion that this kind of projection represents a problem analogous to a religious 
fetish. According to this analogy, as the relation between the devotee and the deity gets projected and reified 
into an inanimate object, the fetish, so people living under capitalism tend to mistake their relations with other 
humans as the relations between the inanimate objects known as commodities. As with all projection theories of 
religion, this critique of capitalist social relations both acknowledges a limited truth to the folk view (people 
truly are related to one another by the relations between commodities) and offers a more developed perspective 
(the folk view is at best a limited perspective, at worst a misrecognition, for the more fundamental relation is 
that between human beings). For Marx’s development of this critique, see Capital (1954, p. 76-87).
12 The theme of “alienability” that has assumed great importance in post-Maussian economic 
anthropology. According to the contemporary economic notion of complete alienability, which assumes an 
absolute distinction between the subject and the object, when one sells or buys a good on the market, the pre-
vious owner severs all ties to the object. In most societies, however, one is more likely to find degrees of aliena-
tion, as is the case with all gifts. With heirlooms and other objects whose history matters, complete alienability 
is not the norm, but the exception. On this topic, see Godelier (1972, 1977, 1999) and Wiener (1985). 
are suffused with rituals and myths. They retain a ceremonial character that is 
obligatory and effective. They are full of rituals and rights (1990, p. 72).
With the modern, linear narrative of economic emergence complicated and the origin of 
economic value receding into prehistory, Mauss criticizes the framework that has come to 
dominate much of developmental economics. Instead of seeking for ways to liberate economic 
initiative in developing societies, Mauss felt that the problem that economic anthropologists 
confronted was not in the socio-cultural obstacles of such societies, or in the motivation of its 
people, but in the typology of transactions developed by economists and anthropologists. 
Regarding “[t]hese concepts of law and economics that it pleases us to contrast: liberty and 
obligation; liberality, generosity, and luxury, as against savings, interest, and utility—it would 
be good to put them into the melting pot once more” (p. 73).This study takes this suggestion 
seriously, and attempts to develop a place for the topic of sacrifice.
From out of this melting pot I propose to mark out the relationships between these four 
terms using the semiotic, or Greimas, square. Its strength is that it not only allows one to note 
the different modes of distinction at work between the four related terms, but it also provides a 
flexible model for noting their changing relationships over time.  The problem here is the 
question of which term to place in the initial, posited position. Historically one could make the 
case that sacrifice preceded each of the others. On the other hand, a Hobbesian myth of the 
transition from the state of nature to the state of culture would have theft mark the initial 
condition of nature from which humans would progress towards evermore civilized 
transactions, ending with exchange. Though both sacrifice and theft are plausible enough initial 
positions in the Greimas square, I will begin with the Maussian hypothesis that the gift is the 
fundamental social transaction, the one without which society as such could not exist.13 As the 
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13 Mauss argues against the economic view of “natural economies” which would posit barter at the 
origin of society, with the development of money eventually interceding to mediate between barter’s direct 
exchange of objects. For Mauss, “Apparently there has never existed, either in an era fairly close in time to our 
own, or in societies that we lump together somewhat awkwardly as primitive or inferior, anything that might 
resemble what is called a 'natural' economy” (p. 5). Instead, one notes the prevalence of gifting and counter-
gifting instead. 
primary way that moieties bind one another together into the extra-familial grouping that 
marks the advent of social life itself, as well as source of cohesion that keeps society from 
dissipating in the face of powerful centrifugal forces, the gift will serve as the initial, posited 
condition of this square (See Appendix 1).
The relations between gift and theft depend upon the relationship to social sanction in 
general. In certain agonistic gift-cycles, such as the Kwakiutl potlatch, a gift often works to 
rob the recipient of prestige, which causes the characteristics of gift and theft to mingle in 
regard to either of the agents involved in the transaction. Still, participants will typically 
downplay such intermingling in practice, and even in what Mauss calls “agonistic exchange” 
(p. 7) the giver will emphasize his own generosity even as he robs—or rather, in order to 
rob—the recipient of prestige. 
In Mauss’s wake the relations between gift and exchange have drawn wide scrutiny. 
Smith’s analysis of the positive social effects of exchange that far exceed the intentions of the 
individuals involved also underscores the wide social effects that cycles of exchange generate. 
Gift would then relate to exchange in a similar way in reference to social effects, with the 
difference that gifts entail reference to the intentions of the participants, while exchanges 
specifically exclude any moral connotations from the transaction. The mutuality and reciprocity 
of gift and exchange are both integral, as opposed to theft, but the former will necessarily 
involve temporal delays,14 while exchange will always be immediate, for even if the delivery of 
goods or services involves delay, a contract is necessary to bridge the gap, as opposed to the 
gift’s charged time of indebtedness and obligation. 
The relation between sacrifice and exchange raises different issues. Clearly, despite 
Socrates’ critical observation, whatever return a sacrifice garners, it does not involve a simple 
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14 While gifting can involve the simultaneous transaction of gift and countergift, far more typical is 
the necessity of a delay, what Derrida (1992) calls the “time of the gift,” which is the delay between gift and 
countergift. According to Bourdieu (1990), among the Kabyle too hasty a return would ruin the very spirit of 
the gift, as part of the process involves enduring the weight of the obligation, and the loss of prestige that 
receiving the gift incurs. In many ways, this topic touches on the heart of Mauss’s investigation, which was to 
examine the nature of the “obligation to return” the gift. 
substitution or equivalent. That is, if one sacrifices a head of cattle, it is not only to have that 
replaced, but to guarantee one’s good standing with the source of such blessings, and 
secondarily to secure the continuity of the blessings themselves. Indeed, one can only elicit the 
bestowal of divine favor by means of a coin in a different, more terrestrial currency. 
Alternatively, on the moral as opposed to the magical side, both employ the coins of 
intentionality, where the sacrifice manifests the devotee’s good intentions as a prefiguration of 
those of the divinity. 
The relation between sacrifice and gift is much more complicated. In the square 
(Appendix 1), I note that the most common difference between gift and sacrifice is the status 
of reciprocity between the agents. While with a gift one necessarily leaves the reciprocity 
unclaimed in order to produce the effect of generosity and not exchange, with sacrifice in many 
instances one denies the reciprocity in order to affirm the difference in status between the 
devotee and the divinity. How does this difference entail a certain type of relation to the object 
that relates the two participants? Here we come upon the issue of alienation. Exchange is the 
only term that entails the complete alienability of the object. After putting one’s product or 
property on the market, once it is bought all claims to it are relinquished. Because of the 
extreme degree of alienability entailed by market transactions, the object of exchange has 
virtually no history. Of course, this is only true in an ideal-typical sense, because the history of 
an object’s circulation often does contribute to or detract from its value.15 Still, in relation to 
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15 Against the marxian focus on production as the source of economic value and consequent rejection 
of circulation as a value-adding process, Arjun Appadurai turns to exchange, but in a manner that emphasizes 
not individual instances but the general process of exchange as a flow so that exchange and circulation inter-
mingle. Building on the work of Georg Simmel and his Philosophy of Money (1978), Appadurai argues that, 
contrary to the classical economic view that labor produces value, in fact it is circulation itself that generates 
the value humans attach to socio-cultural objects. Certainly, the changing of hands has much to do with the 
social sense of value, and the velocity of circulation plays an important element in “bubbles” such as the Tulip 
Mania of 17th century Holland and the Dot.com boom of the Nineties. It is an open question, though, whether 
Appadurai offers a compelling account not only of the mechanisms of the circulation of pre-given values, but 
also the actual generation of these values through circulation. Also, he tends to focus on the special case of 
more prestigious items of exchange, on objects like heirlooms that inhabit a liminal space between gift and 
exchange economies. His approach forms a welcome complement to production-based, marxian analyses, 
though not a replacement, as he suggests. On this see his introduction to The Social Life of Things (1986).
the other types of transaction, the object is virtually without history, whereas with gift, theft 
and sacrifice the contact with the previous owner becomes determinative of the object’s status. 
These permeable distinctions often lead to a conflation of gift with sacrifice. With each, 
the object is ultimately inalienable because the object does not enter into the dehistoricizing 
matrix of market transaction. Yet we can distinguish gift and sacrifice according to the degree 
that this inalienability can be acknowledged. When one reads scenes of gift-giving in Homer, 
what we find is an articulate description of the gift-object itself, which often has a civic status 
all its own, in addition to its history of ownership.16 Here, because the object bears traces of its 
past, it is not completely alienable, though the donor maintains the pretense that it is to 
produce the effect of generosity and minimize the sense that he self-consciously gives in order 
to indebt the other. By contrast, with sacrifice the relation of ownership is the critical tie that 
makes a sacrifice sacrificial. Indeed the sacrificial agent often goes to great lengths to 
emphasize the inalienability of the animal.17 As stated below, the animal is already closely 
identified with the sacrificial agent, but there is apparent anxiety that the object is alienable to 
any degree at all. Hence, on this issue of alienability, we see polar opposite behavior: although 
neither gifts nor sacrifices are wholly alienable,18 with the gift the inalienability is downplayed, 
while with the sacrifice the inalienability is stressed. As indicated in the square (Appendix 1), 
the relation of reciprocity is minimized with gifts, but actively denied with sacrifice.
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16 Gernet attributed great importance to the prestigious gifts and treasured objects (αγαλμα and  
αγαλματα) that circulated among aristocrats in ancient Greek society. The fact that value accrues to these 
objects as they circulate between esteemed peers supports Appadurai’s renewal of interest in the question of cir-
culation. In fact, according to Gernet, this economy played a decisive role in the emergence of the notion of 
economic value in ancient Greece. Beidelman has written an incisive essay taking a Maussian perspective on 
agonistic exchange in Homer (1989).
17 Evans-Pritchard has shown that the Nuer identify with their cattle, which is their chief sacrificial 
object, in a variety of ways, such as scarification and marking with ashes (1956). 
18 This is in contrast to exchanges, where the equivalent is exchanged immediately or by contract at a 
future date, and no honor is at stake in a successful transaction, only in the case of deceit.
 These distinctions between gift and sacrifice hold for a great many examples, but can  
become fuzzy as we move to different contexts.19 A sacrifice has gift-like aspects (a valuable 
good is “offered”; as the object is destroyed the deity is assumed to accept it; there is the 
strong implication that blessings will come in return—each element congruent with Mauss’s 
three obligations that constitute the gift-cycle: the obligations to give, to receive, and to 
return), and a gift has sacrifice-like aspects (the gift must be valuable in order to demonstrate a 
proper attitude of generosity; as Godelier argues, the gift is not marked by a lack of obligation, 
but rather a lack of calculation, so mitigations are frequent but disguised [1999, p. 5]). To 
distinguish the gift from a single exchange with a delayed return, elements of sacrifice are often 
included, just as in sacrifice the expectation and even demand for return is never far from the 
surface. In other words, again, there are gift-like aspects of sacrifice and sacrifice-like aspects 
of the gift.  And this is so not only in practice but in theory as well. That is, though Hubert and 
Mauss argue that sacrifice cannot be understood strictly under the rubric of gift because it 
involves not only the exchange of value but also its production,20 Mauss later argued that, 
though gifts most always elicit a counter-gift, the initial gift will often emphasize the costly, 
sacrificial nature of the gesture in order to earn an appropriate amount of honor. Hence, to 
understand the generation of prestige in gift-economies, the theorist must come to terms with 
the desire to make an expenditure without return, even if a return always befalls the gift.21 In 
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19As an extreme example, Strenski, building on Lévi-Strauss’s distinction between restricted and gen-
eral exchange (the former, more reciprocal, involves only two agents or groups, while the latter, more diffuse, 
involves more agents and complicated circuits of exchange), claims that alms given to Buddhist monks mark a 
shift away from restricted exchange toward general exchange and brings one into the sphere of sacrifice (1993).
20 Mauss and Hubert insist that Tylor’s gift-theory of sacrifice, which explained sacrifice as a develop-
ment from an original process of giving to spirits, “described accurately the phases of the moral development of 
the phenomenon, [but] it did not account for its mechanism [les phases du développement moral du 
phénomène, elle n'en expliquait pas le mécanisme]. On the whole, it did no more than reproduce in precise lan-
guage the old, popular conceptions. Doubtless it had in itself some historical basis of truth…. But it was not 
sufficient to note the fact; it was necessary to account for it [il fallait en rendre compte]” (1964 p. 2; p. 194). To 
Mauss and Hubert, this “mechanism” about which it was necesary to render an account involved the specific 
interaction between ritual, myth and imagination in the history of religions. 
21 In her essay on “Sacrifice” in Critical Terms for the Study of Religion (1998), Jill Robbins’ analysis 
mimics many of Derrida’s maneuvers in Given Time (1992). Derrida illustrates the paradoxes at the heart of 
the same way, the subservient gesture typical to sacrifice cannot escape the charge of banking 
on reciprocity.
This section has attempted to bring sacrifice into current social scientific and literary 
discourses that seek to analyze the interrelated transactions that coalesce around the concept of 
exchange. Analyzing sacrifice in relation to other transactional terms such as gift, theft and 
exchange, the complicated factors that constitute each come more clearly into focus. Returning 
to speak of sacrifice specifically, the range of folk and scholarly usage I examine will now 
appear not as the variability of unlicensed improvisation, but as reflecting the complexity and 
variability of the term itself. In fact, we will begin with the typological complexity at the level 
of scholarly reflection.
 Sacrifice in the History of Religious Studies
Of all the problematic notions that the scholar of religion must negotiate, few have 
provoked as much anxiety and reflection as sacrifice.  Not only does the phenomena raise 
complicated issues regarding the role of violence in religious history as well as the changing 
relationship between morality and religion, it also demands reflection regarding the nature of 
religious transformation in general. Concerning the field of religious studies as a scholarly 
enterprise, the topic of sacrifice presents a troubling challenge to the promise of its 
comparative project. As a ritual whose provenance ranges across the religions of the world, 
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folk notions of the gift by arguing that the gift as such in fact never takes place, because such a disinterested act 
is impossible, not as a result of a flawed human nature, but as a consequence of the structure of the gift-event 
itself. This is so because, despite the best intentions of the agent, she always reaps some recompense for the 
generous act, even if the gift is given to a person who is unable to reciprocate, as happens in Baudelaire’s 
prose-poem. Such recompense might take symbolic forms such as the social prestige of the benefactor or the 
self-satisfaction of the pious. At any rate, however extravagant the gift (and those that are too exorbitant risk 
becoming exorbitant and oppressive), it always crashes upon the rocks of the return which it cannot pre-empt. 
In an analogous way, Robbins argues that no sacrifice is truly “sacrificial” since every sacrifice takes place 
within a general economy of recompense and blessing. With some type of currency returning to compensate the 
sacrificer (be it righteousness, salvation, material blessings, social prestige, etc.), ultimately, self-interest is an 
irreducible aspect of sacrifice. Although I would distance my stance from Robbins’, I do so not on the grounds 
that self-interest is not a component of sacrifice, but on the grounds that, though the folk notion of sacrifice is 
in need of critique, this is a far cry from arguing that the sacrifice as such is impossible.
both small-scale (so-called “native” or “indigenous” religions) and the universalizing or 
“world” religions, with a suitably flexible definition sacrifice in the history of religions 
represents a near or quasi-universal. The scholar’s definition of sacrifice might remain socio-
culturally specific, or expand to include any number of traditions, depending upon the methods 
and goals of any particular scholarly project. The cost of too broad a definition of sacrifice, 
however, is that one then includes every type of religiously framed effort, for this flexibility 
entails including such related ritual acts as offering, consecrating, and a variety of other 
sacrifice-like rites, both across and within the religious traditions of the world.22  The 
comparative utility of inter-religious versus religiously specific notions of sacrifice remains an 
open question.
Faced with a quasi-universal like “sacrifice”, which might include a range of 
phenomena such as ritual feasts, symbolic offerings, charitable giving, tithing, and asceticism, it 
is tempting to make a move analogous to J. Z. Smith’s turn indicated in his influential essay, 
“Religions, Religion, Religious” (1995).23  Here Smith examines the early expansion of 
“religion” from a self-referential term used by European Christians to one deployed by 
colonializing Europeans to make sense of the vast amounts of new data coming from the 
periphery. Very quickly the use-value of this term became apparent, as it allowed colonial 
powers to circumscribe certain ethical givens prevalent among the societies under rule and 
subject them to critique. As scholarly inquiry into religions gradually—and many would say, 
still incompletely—rejected this colonial project and develped new projects for the concept, the 
  
 19 
________________________
22 Any number of works, such as Beer’s Women and Sacrifice: Male Narcissism and the Psychology of 
Religion (1992) and Kristeva’s Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1982), draw on a wide, 
psychoanalytic sense of sacrifice. Ruel, by contrast, insists on a specific sense of sacrifice, to the point that he 
would distinguish some types of ritual killing from sacrifice (1990).   
23 Smith noted how Hume raised “the issue of the adjectival form ‘religious.’ What sort of primary 
human experience or activity does it modify? What constitutes its distinctive secondary interpretation? How 
may religious interpretation be assessed in relation to other sorts of interpretation of the same experience or 
activity? The 'religious' (the unknown that the scholar is seeking to classify and explain) becomes an aspect of 
some other human phenomenon (the known)” (2004, p. 185). As opposed to “religion” or “religions”, investi-
gating the ascription of “religious” aspects to various phenomena avoids the leap to otherworldly perspectives 
and situates the analysis in the context of other social phenomena. 
scope and consequences of the colonizing usage gradually became more apparent. Since so 
many phenomena which native practitioners consider religious do not fit into the colonial 
concept of religion, Smith examined how scholars move from the nominal to the adjectival 
form to enable them to track aspects of disparate phenomena in light of their religious 
connotations
The non-overlapping semantic domains of colonizing and native notions of religion 
present many problems of imposition and distortion for the scholar that the colonial powers 
could ignore—or, rather, count on as a means of exploitation and socio-cultural expropriation. 
In the same way, when one moves from the study of particular sacrifices to the theoretical 
construct of “sacrifice”, one finds that it is also necessary to note the tendency of phenomena 
typical to “religion” and “sacrifice” to seep out beyond any circumscribed social domain. In 
other words, because of historical processes of displacement and condensation,24 to study 
“sacrifice” in general leads one to the study of the “sacrificial” aspects of a wide variety of 
phenomena. In moving from the nominal to the adjectival form, one can then track the myriad 
ways that people have invoked this religious ritual to shape the historical understanding of 
diverse social phenomena, both sacred and putatively profane. 
A further benefit of scrutinizing the ascription of “sacrificial” aspects to multiple 
phenomena25 is that one can then treat the various discourses about “sacrifice” as themselves 
important components of the rite’s social history. In this way, one can go beyond some of the 
problems that have beset the study of sacrifice in anthropology, religious and classical studies.  
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24 I cite here the chief mechanisms of Freud’s “dream work” to indicate a Maussian insight into the 
role of the imagination in the history of sacrificial transformation (1965).
25 This isolation of a “sacrificial” aspect is not only common when the term strays beyond the confines 
of religion. In the history of many religions it was precisely this tactic of singling out the sacrificial aspect of a 
complex ritual process that led to ritual and religio-moral transformation. Examples are legion, but perhaps the 
most influential, insofar as it proved decisive in the history of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is the “Aqeda”, 
or the “Binding of Isaac.” Here, the “sacrificial” aspect shifts from the slaughter of the victim to the attitude of 
the ritual agent. Typically, the Jewish interpretation of the narrative hinges upon the shift in object, while 
Protestant readings tend to read the shift from human to animal sacrifice as teaching, in novo, the utter 
indifference of the sacrificial object. Though the literature on this topic is immense, Spiegel and Kierkegaard 
(1983) offer important contributions on this topic. 
For instance, it is no longer necessary to treat various descriptions or explanations of sacrifice 
as mere windows onto the rite and its significance, or as wholly different and opposed 
instances of cultural production.26  Moreover, one can considerably complicate the relationship 
posited by the Cambridge Ritualists such as Jane Harrison (1955, 1962) and Gilbert Murray 
(1951), who tended to treat myths as “scripts” for rituals.27 Furthermore, no longer is there the 
need to search for sacrifice as a delimited and discrete object. By shifting the focus from 
sacrifice as a reification to the multiple processes—somatic, dramatic,28 discursive and 
more29—that coalesce in the production of the “sacrificial”, one can move from a focus on the 
singular, objective “sacrifice” and begin to do justice to the multiple and contested notions of 
“sacrifice” and the “sacrificial” at play in any given socio-historical conjucture. 
However, perhaps the most salient and salubrious aspect of this turn to the adjectival 
form and the inclusion of discursive aspects of sacrifice is that it complicates the dichotomous 
treatment of religions that would divide them between indigenous and world, traditional and 
modern, tribal and universal, magical and ethical.30 Since such dichotomies dissect religions in 
a way that is troublingly isomorphic with the self-conception of the “world” or “ethical” or 
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26 Levi-Strauss in The Naked Man (1981) argues that ritual pursues a wholly different agenda than 
myth: whereas myth attempts to totalize phenomena and give a holistic account of the world, ritual attempts to 
parcel out experience, and, in this pursuit of meaning at the micro-practical level, represents a futile endeavour.
27 Inspired in part by Nietzsche’s reading of Greek culture through the lens of their dramas, members 
of the Cambridge school of myth and ritual, such as Jane Harrison (1955, 1962) and Gilbert Murray (1951)  
sought to look at myths with the same dramaturgical lens, as scripts for the rituals and other lived behavior.
28 By the “dramatic” I would indicate not only the spectacle of the ritual itself, but also the historical 
connection between the Greek festival of Dionysos and the concomitant rituals, and the eventual rise of tragedy. 
29 This more complex notion of sacrifice that incorporates the discursive element, including the speech 
acts during the course of the ritual, the mythical narratives concerning the religious personages the rite 
involves, as well as the ongoing commentary on the rite’s significance in priestly, prophetic and poetic dis-
courses, owes a great deal to Hubert and Mauss’s study of sacrifice. Also, on the importance of language and 
ritual speech-acts in sacrifice, see Das (1983).
30 Examples of the typological fervor that scholars bring to the topic of sacrifice is perhaps only out-
done by the same will to typify conjured by rhetoric and figural language. In the history of its study, treatments 
tend to diverge along two, non-exclusive agendas: the desire to define the singular function of sacrifice, and the 
embrace of diversity that allows one to draw up complex tables of sacrifice. 
“universalizing” religions themselves, any scholarly typology that complicates such distinctions 
would take distance from the ideological colonialism of the world’s more dominant religions. 
  The Ambiguity of American Sacrifice-Talk
If the scholarly pursuit of typologies and definitions has produced little agreement and 
much obscurity, when one turns to folk usage the result is even more ambiguous. This can be 
seen in the present situation in American religion and culture. Many religious Americans define 
the nation’s identity as the carrier of a universalizing, post-sacrificial religious tradition that 
draws on the moralization of sacrifice, a process that began among the Hebrew prophets and 
continued with the Christian interpretation of Jesus’s death as the sacrifice of a being so 
morally perfect it would serve as the fulfillment of all sacrificial requirements forever. From 
this perspective, the ritual sacrifice of living creatures has been completely replaced by ethical 
injunctions to overcome self-interest and “love one’s neighbor.” As if impelled by this narrative 
of America’s moral and religious origins, American civil religion31 has taken this post-
sacrificial ethos as a key component of the individualism and liberalism that an expansionist 
American foreign policy ostentatiously (and sometimes even sincerely) seeks to promote in 
other parts of the world. 
Despite this flattering national self-image, and as if in unconconscious counterpoint, 
today in contemporary America there are no rituals of sacrifice in the public square, and yet 
one finds a prodigious amount of sacrifice talk. Indeed, over the last several years the nation’s 
airwaves have fairly crackled with talk of sacrifice. During the prosperity of the Nineties the 
term had a much lower profile, and with the utopian promises of an “information 
superhighway” leading to a “new economy” which would make crises and crashes things of the 
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31 This term derives from Robert Bellah’s provocative observations about the religion-like aspects of 
American patriotism (1967). However guarded scholars have been about extending religion this far beyond the 
historical religions, I would say that it is undeniable that in American, in particular, because the notion of reli-
gious freedom is so interwoven with the American form of patriotic self-regard, for any American citizen who 
is religious there is a strong tendency to extend this religiosity to include the nation-state since that is the 
ultimate guarantor of the right to practice that religion.  
past, one might have guessed that we had finally entered the “post-sacrificial” era, long 
foretold. However, in the period since the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York at the 
hands of suicidal terrorists or self-sacrificing religious martyrs, depending upon one’s 
interpretation of events, there has been an efflorescence and quickening of “sacrifice-talk”, to 
the point that hardly a day goes by that some public figure does not speak of a “sacrifice” that 
“we” need to make, or that “others” have already made. President George W. Bush, for 
instance, uses the term in its positive, consecrating sense when discussing the costs involved in 
his “War on Terror.”32
This is hardly a new phenomenon. In his speech after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, 
Franklin Roosevelt concluded with the statement that “we must work and sacrifice [...] for 
victory.” In contrast to Bush’s univocal use of “sacrifice,” however, in this same speech 
Roosevelt employed the term not only in the positive sense of a costly expenditure for a just 
cause, as above, but also in the negative sense of an exorbitant, excessive or wasteful loss. 
When he explicitly disavowed the notion that the austerities on the homefront will constitute 
unjust or unnecessary hardships,33 Roosevelt insisted, in effect, that the costs of war would be 
worth the victory, that austerities for peace were a just exchange, and not a sacrifice. 
While political leaders often employ “sacrifice” when discussing the high-stakes 
consequences of decisions of state, ranging from rationing, taxation and wage-freezes to 
mutilation and death, parents too will often describe familial bonds in starkly sacrificial terms.34 
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32 “America is a strong nation, and honorable in the use of our strength. We exercise power without 
conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers.” The rhetorical parallelism of the American people’s 
sacrifice in one period, and God’s gift in the next, (“Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the 
right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is 
God's gift to humanity.”) deploys tropes invoking an American civil religion. Text at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
33 “As I told the Congress yesterday, ‘sacrifice’ is not exactly the proper word with which to describe 
this program of self-denial. When, at the end of this great struggle, we shall have saved our free way of life, we 
shall have made no ‘sacrifice.’” Text at www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1942roosevelt-sacrifice.html.
34 One can find especially rich investigations of such usage in the novels of Henry James, particularly 
The Awkward Age. Susan Mizruchi has placed a reading of this text’s sacrificial imagery at the heart of her 
book, The Science of Sacrifice (1998), discussing the role played by sacrifice in both social scientific and 
Indeed, as soon as one begins to pay attention to this idiom, one finds oneself surrounded by 
talk of sacrifice. In contemporary American society, people from parents to the President use 
the term “sacrifice” to evoke charged and irreducibly conflictual relations between self, family, 
and society.  Be it through direct or indirect means, in the context of family relations or state 
institutions, one can find “sacrifice” at the ready to exalt an expenditure or lament a loss. 
Serving, therefore, as a term of both praise and blame, of affirmation and rejection, sacrifice 
becomes a literally pivotal term with connotations that resonate in different keys in relation to 
different contexts, all the while uniting these contexts in reference to a social practice of nearly 
universal recognition. As I will suggest, this polyvocality and value-reversibility35 stems from 
the many participants involved in the rite (agent, victim and recipient, at least), each one of 
whom has a distinct perspective on its significance, as well as the differing interests in society 
at large regarding the contested meanings of this ritual and its history of transformation. 
This phenomenon, “sacrifice-talk”, that resonates on multiple levels across a number of 
possible applications which span the entirety of social positions. Certainly, as follows from its 
ritual origins, “sacrifice” still echoes with its history of orchestrated acts of violence, and it is 
this history that makes contemporary usage of the word so strangely problematic. Granted that 
there are no public rituals of sacrifice in contemporary American society, the question 
becomes, how has “sacrifice” come to play such a prominent rhetorical role? Instead of a 
contemporary analysis, this investigation will seek the historical preconditions of these 
developments. As an initial hypothesis, I would contend that it is precisely because the ritual 
has largely disappeared that “sacrifice-talk” has become so ubiquitous.
Because my initial examples drew from American presidents speaking of sacrifice, 
sacrificial rhetoric, one might wonder if this is primarily an American, or Anglophone, 
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35 Structuralism as practiced by Lévi-Strauss provides rich resources for tracking reversible symbols 
and values through many transformations. Another text inspired by these developments, The Reversible World 
(1978), also contributed to this perspective, as did Bakhtin’s notion of the “carnivalesque” (1984). 
phenomenon. At a superficial level, in reference to the specific term, “sacrifice”, the answer is 
yes, but other authors have explored the use of translatable terms in other languages and 
nations.36 Given the international scope of this type of rhetoric, its use has less to do with the 
peculiarities of any one language or region, and much more to do with broad historical changes 
in the consitution of the modern nation state, the consolidation of global capitalist hegemony, 
and an emergent notion of human nature that underpins the regnant set of international 
institutions, from the United Nations, to the World Trade Organization, to various NGOs. 
Therefore, this study will take a historical view to examine the discourses that have contributed 
to the development and use of “sacrifice-talk” in the emergence of the nation-state. 
  The Turn to Discourse in the Study of Sacrifice
Since this project takes as its object a discursive phenomenon, I want to forestall the 
objection that I thereby move from the objective and public realm of ritual sacrifice to the 
ethereal and subjective realm of consciousness or even belief. In the better studies of sacrifice 
one question often arises: what makes a sacrifice differ from mere butchering? How is it that 
one can distinguish wanton destruction from the sacrifice of an object? Certainly the degree of 
ritualization is often a marker, but non-sacrificial acts of destruction can be highly ritualized, 
just as the ritualism of sacrifice can reduce to a minimum. Rather, over and above the manner 
in which the action is performed, which can vary by infinite degrees along a vast spectrum 
(even to the degree that at one end the rituals of preparation themselves come to absorb such a 
vast expenditure of effort that they constitute the whole of the sacrifice), there is always an act 
of denomination by means of which the act becomes a sacrifice. Thus, it was a great step 
forward when Hubert and Mauss broke with the scholarly fallacy of divorcing discourses from 
rites by noting that every rite invokes mythological elements by way of the invocation of 
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36 For sacrificial rhetoric in France from the Ancient Regime to the twentieth century, see Strenski 
(2002); for Italy, see Ferrari (2003); for America, see Mizruchi (1998); for Germany, see Evans (1996). 
mythical beings and the utterance of speech acts describing the rite in mythical terms.37 
Nonetheless, from this lead we must go further and clarify that the discursive element is 
not a simple supplement to the rite, as if one could say that the non-discursive aspects of the 
rite are isolatable in theory but ultimately inextricable from the discourse in which one finds it 
embedded. Instead, I would venture the much stronger claim that the rite is not a rite without 
the performative speech acts by which the rite gets recognized as a sacrifice. In this sense, 
ritual sacrifice has always already been a discursive process. In short, “sacrifices” are not “out 
there” in the world awaiting discovery. Instead, it is through the very act of naming, of 
denominating a phenomenon a “sacrifice,” that sacrifices come to be. By way of performative 
speech acts that announce what they enact, given the necessary authority, to speak of an act or 
event as a sacrifice is to make it so. 
It is possible thus to speak of every sacrificial phenomenon as a hybrid occupying a 
position along an axis whose endpoints—a purely material and a purely discursive sacrifice—
are asymptotic ideals. Any social instance of sacrificial phenomena will thus constitute a 
complex with discursive and non-discursive elements, provided that one acknowledges the fact 
that the non-discursive elements must first become discursive objects before they can even be 
discussed. We can thus denominate this constitutive axis of ritual sacrifice as the practical-
axis, in that the weight of practices involved in the ritual range from various speech acts to the 
physical manipulation of objects in space, often understood as a dramaturgical choreography of 
the physical counterparts or symbols of the concepts to which the discourse refers.
After opening the topic of sacrifice to its discursive components, many distinctions will 
be necessary before we can begin to deal concretely with the phenomena. Certainly there is a 
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37 Mauss and Hubert explain that “[o]ur main efforts will be especially directed towards determining 
the considerable part that mythology has played in this development” (p. 77). Throughout their work they insist 
that myth and ritual stand together in reciprocal dependence. And not only do they refer to one another, but 
each dynamically involves the other in processes of mutual elaboration: “though mythology has elaborated the 
representation of the divine, it has not worked upon arbitrary facts. The myths preserve traces of their origin: a 
sacrifice in more or less distorted form constitutes the central episode and, so to speak, the heart of the 
legendary life of the gods that arose from sacrifice” (p. 82).
great deal of difference between the class of priestly scribes who delimited the proper type of 
sacrifice in the Rg Veda or the Hebrew Bible, and the contemporary citizen or political figure 
who invokes sacrifice to describe charged or troubling social facts. This difference goes much 
deeper than the differences between the referents of the claim, or the authority behind the 
respective claims, although the latter remains decisive in that the performative speech act owes 
less to the felicity conditions of its utterance than the demonstrated and achieved authority of 
the speaker.38 Where in the former case there is an observable rite to which the claim refers, in 
the latter case there is often a putatively secular, quotidian occurrence that one describes using 
the hyperbolic language of sacrifice. This sense that talk of sacrifice is somehow “hyperbolic” 
touches upon the proportional or economic problem39 involved: to speak of sacrifice is perhaps 
one of the most hyperbolic, exorbitant modes of speech that one can employ, which raises the 
issue of the general economy of figuration—in other words, a poetics.40
Because of this economic connotation, a skeptic might well insist that, where once the 
discourse of sacrifice was properly sacrificial, in the contemporary world such speech becomes 
simply a matter of “loose” or figurative discourse. From this perspective, describing a soldier’s 
death as a sacrifice is a mere metaphor, because such a death, though the most extreme gesture 
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38 Against Searle’s treatment of speech acts, Bourdieu argues this convincingly in his Language and 
Symbolic Power: “In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the 
monopoly of legitimate naming as the official—i.e. explicit and public—imposition of the legitimate vision of 
the social world, agents bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles” (p. 
239). If Bourdieu opens the sociological treatment of speech acts to the Aristotelian mode of ethos, Derrida 
confronts Searle as well and insists on the inexcludability of non-normative language games such as fiction, 
quotation, and figural language in general (1988).
39  The notion of economy functions in two registers on this topic. First, there is Plato’s Socrates in the 
“Euthyphro” dialogue, who wondered if all religious interactions boiled down to base economic exchanges. 
Second, economy could describe the practice of rhetoric, insofar as, in the process of exchange, certain modes 
of equivalence and justification must be maintained without trangression, or, more expansively, the transgres-
sion must not be too transgressive. For hyperbolic language like sacrificial rhetoric this last point is especially 
crucial if the performance is to be persuasive.
40 I draw upon Todorov’s work for this concept (1981). I treat sacrificial figuration as an instance of 
poetics because, as with Aristotle’s sense of poetry, there is an imitation in play since the ritual remains the 
absent referent and the figure has to work within the mise en scene of the ritual. Of Aristotle’s three modes of 
persuasion, poetics would thus examine the logos, the level of the utterance. Once the analysis incorporates 
ethos and pathos we will reach the level of a fully developed rhetoric.
possible, is not prescribed or sanctioned and thus not a literal or “real” sacrifice. With these 
strictures the transition from literal to figural sacrifice is so decisive that one might think that a 
categorical shift has taken place, to the point that such sacrifice-talk is a mere residue which is 
destined to pass, or, to employ E. B. Tylor’s concept, a “survival” which remains despite the 
passing of its proper social milieu.41 
Currently, when one speaks of sacrifice, one possibly refers to phenomena as diverse as 
1) an altruistic act, 2) a gift given that one would have liked to keep, 3) a soldier dying for his 
or her country (or even enlisting, and thereby exposing oneself to the possibility of death), 4) 
the opportunity cost of choosing to purchase one desired good instead of another, 5) devoting 
more resources to one activity instead of another (more time given to a job than to a family or 
vice versa): all these in addition to the specific referent of a religious ritual involving the 
destruction of a valuable good or the negation of self-interest that would cling to worldly 
objects. The prescriptive semanticist might oppose the breadth of this term's extension, but 
common usage cannot be simply dismissed. The diversity and frequency of this term’s uses in 
everyday discourse indicates a certain necessity: that of describing quotidian actions in terms 
that deny—or at least complicate—self-interest. It is certainly true that any number of 
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41 Despite the longevity of Tylor’s notion of religious “survivals” from a past that are doomed to 
eventual extinction, for the scholar firmly situated in an interim period between the vital religious life of the 
past and a rational, scientistic future, it is difficult to ignore Tylor’s utopian overtones of a future state where all 
the “survivals” have finally become extinct. In addition to these problematic hypotheses, there are also socio-
political consequences of this theory that are difficult to resolve. For example, here is Tylor on the British colo-
nial bête-noir, widow-burnings, or suttee: “To treat the Hindu widow-burning as a case of survival and revival 
seems to me most in accordance with a general ethnographic view of the subject. Widow-sacrifice is found in 
various regions of the world under a low state of civilization, and this fits with the hypothesis of its having 
belonged to the Aryan race while yet in an early and barbarous condition. Thus the prevalence of a rite of suttee 
like that of modern India among ancient Aryan nations settled in Europe, Greeks, Scandinavians, Germans, 
Slavs, may be simply accounted for by direct inheritance from the remote common antiquity of them all. If this 
theory be sound, it will follow that ancient as the Vedic ordinances may be, they represent in this matter a 
reform and a reaction against a yet more ancient barbaric rite of widow-sacrifice, which they prohibited in fact, 
but yet kept up in symbol. The history of religion displays but too plainly the proneness of mankind to relapse, 
in spite of reformation, into the lower and darker condition of the past. Stronger and more tenacious than even 
Vedic authority, the hideous custom of the suttee may have outlived an attempt to suppress it in early Brah-
manic times, and the English rulers, in abolishing it, may have abolished a relic not merely of degenerate 
Hinduism, but of the far more remotely ancient savagery out of which the Aryan civilization had grown” (p. 50-
1). The intricate tensions here between Vedic and British authority, Aryan and Indian savagery, the arc of civi-
lization and the temptations of relapse all make talk of “survivals” quite dangerous for the scholar of religion.
categorical shifts have taken place since the days when a priestly caste could prescribe and 
proscribe certain sacrifices in its attempt to monopolize religious authority, and the shift from 
priestly codes of sacrificial propriety to quotidian sacrifice-talk is but one of them. 
Nonetheless, to describe this “sacrifice-talk” as metaphorical, and thus merely ornamental to 
the real work done by strict denotative and referential speech is too strong a claim to stand. 
As a first response, at the level of the study of language in linguistics, philosophy and 
literary studies, there has been a broad but decisive move away from the prescriptive to the 
descriptive treatment of language. That is, in a departure from received wisdom regarding the 
universality of reason and the logical structure of grammar, the comparative study of language 
has clarified the cultural and linguistic specificity of rules of reason and grammatical propriety. 
In addition to linguistics, where figures such as Sapir (1921, 1956) and Whorf (1973) clearly 
formulated these views of language and championed the descriptive study of language, there is 
in philosophy also a turn toward the study of “ordinary language,” with Wittgenstein (1958, 
1972) and Austin (1970, 1975) being only the most prominent representatives of this trend. 
Influenced by the historicity and specificity of reason and the relativity of grammar,42 the 
proper semantic domains of words now clearly derives from actual practice, and is thus 
contested in quotidian speech instead of deduced from extra-linguistic principles. In the same 
way, sacrifice remains a contested term, with the propriety of its usage determined by the 
specific language community in question.
A second response to the treatment of the topic as “merely metaphorical” could 
reference the impact of Freud and the treatment of figurative language as symptoms of tension 
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42 In regards to the contemporary academic discourse widely known as “theory”, Jameson links the 
immanent critique of reason and language to its emergence: “I believe that theory begins to supplant philosophy 
(and other disciplines as well) at the moment it is realized that thought is linguistic or material and that con-
cepts cannot exist independently of their linguistic expression. Now critique becomes a critique of language and 
its formulations, that is to say, an exploration of the ideological connotations of various formulations, the long 
shadow cast by certain words and terms, the questionable worldviews generated by the most impeccable defini-
tions, the ideologies seeping out of seemingly airtight propositions, the moist footprints of error left by the most 
cautious movements of righteous arguments” (2004, p. 407).
and contradiction.43 Where correct or literal usage slips into the figural, there one can search 
for the seeds of the neuroses that afflicts the patient. Thus, under the aegis of psychoanalysis 
this  attention to the details of spoken language can help to reveal the types of social tension 
that beset the individual who speaks of sacrifice in ways that extend beyond any conscious 
sense of the problem or its symptomatic traces. 
But even beyond this pathological situation, literature has always taken the 
counterfactual and the figural as important objects of study, primarily because such language 
stimulates thought and persuasion in ways that literal or strictly logical language cannot. What 
is more, these metaphors are not mere tools that poets and rhetoricians employ to achieve 
distinct and isolated purposes. In many senses, figural language in general “speaks us” in that 
we are more beholden to the thought-pictures they evoke than we can know.44 It is precisely 
this hold that figural language has over us that led philosophers as different as Hegel and 
Wittgenstein to conceive of philosophy as primarily a therapeutic tool to overcome the 
bewitchment of language.45 In some small way, perhaps the study of sacrifice as an instance of 
highly provocative figural language can also serve such a purpose. 
A third and final response to the skeptic’s claim is to reject the assumption that, when 
one speaks of sacrifice without referring to an actual ritual, one uses the connotations of the 
word to describe a thoroughly and properly non-sacrificial phenomenon as metaphorically 
sacrificial. Such an objection rests on the assumption both that there is a simple and direct 
referent for “sacrifice” from which sacrifice-as-metaphor departs, and also that there are 
aspects of society that have no connection to sacrifice whatsoever. If one builds upon the 
Durkheimian tradition as Mauss inflected it in his monumental study of the gift, the very realm 
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43 Žižek has developed the theme of the Marxo-Freudian symptom (1989).
44 Lakoff, one scholar enjoying a current vogue, aptly named one of his early volumes that argued this 
position Metaphors We Live By.
45 In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein claims that “[p]hilosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (1958, #109, p. 47).
of “non-sacrificial” social phenomena begins to shrink. In addition to treating the gift and not 
exchange as the primary social transaction, it also has sacrifice figuring along with the potlatch 
as a distinct mode of gifting in many societies, with sacrifice conceived as a species of gift. 
Although this departs significantly from his and Hubert’s treatment of sacrifice in their earlier 
essay, there is a new moment here which significantly develops upon the earlier study. Mauss 
argued that the gift’s social importance derives from its status as a “total social fact.”46 With 
this claim Mauss indicated the way that the processes of prestation and counter-prestation do 
not constitute isolatable social spheres. Instead, they are “total” in the sense that in them every 
sphere of society—religious, moral, juridical, economic, and familial—intersects. If this is the 
case with gifts, it is, by extension, also the case with sacrifice. Because so many aspects of 
society intersect in the notion of sacrifice, this can explain why the scope of sacrificial usage 
cuts across dichotomies like public and private as well as between sacred and profane, so that 
the certainty that certain phenomena are completely non-sacrificial begins to waver. 
Furthermore, as a total social fact, changes in the significance and function of sacrifice 
not only reflect but also determine other transformations in the social structure. This is the case 
not only for relatively proximal aspects of society such as relations between the laity and the 
clergy or prevalent notions of religious and moral injunctions, but also in the nature of social 
relationships, especially when considered under the rubric of the exchange. Sacrifice thus 
haunts every desacralized moment of exchange,47 for while once the term was moored to a 
specific and delimited ritual, demarcated to the point that it often served as the primary mode 
of social demarcation,48 now the ascription of sacrificial aspects to multiple phenomena makes 
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46 “In these ‘total’ social phenomena, as we propose calling them, all kinds of institutions are given 
expression at one and the same time—religious, juridical, and moral, which relate to both politics and the fam-
ily; likewise economic ones, which suppose special forms of production and consumption, or rather, of perform-
ing total services and of distribution” (p. 3). 
47 The contemporary struggle over water rights in the global south takes place precisely on the terrain 
of linguistic typologies: is relinquishing one’s claims on land and water a market exchange or a sacrifice that 
one might willingly or unwillingly perform? 
48 In Greek sacrifice, structurally relate the gods, men and animals. In his The Ancient City, Fustel de 
sacrifice a nomadic marker of tension and contradiction in the network of social relations.49 Far 
from this fluidity of ascription denoting a decrease in the significance of sacrifice, it indicates 
the changing ways that societies have problematized sacrifice throughout history. 
The payoff for taking seriously the occurrence of sacrifice talk, or the ascription of 
sacrificial aspects to diverse social phenomena, is the new impetus it provides to the study of 
sacrifice. To this day there is no consensus in scholarly circles concerning the definition of 
sacrifice despite years of effort and enterprise. Because there is no single accepted cross-
cultural definition of sacrifice, there is no direct relation between the occurence of a rite and its 
status as a sacrifice, with the result being that its description as a sacrifice depends upon the 
observer’s religious or theoretical presuppositions. Since normal or authoritative usage is now 
rightly seen as always already contested, the notion of sacrifice-as-mere-metaphor can only 
make sense if we understand metaphor in a way other than as a deviation from normal usage. 
One such sense follows from expanding metaphor beyond the notion of an ornamental 
supplement to normal usage, and instead treating the use of figural language as a primary 
medium of persuasion, that is, as an instrument of rhetoric, as a practice concerned equally 
with affecting one’s interlocutors, transforming social conceptions, and describing the world. 
 Theories of Sacrifice
After justifying the examination of “sacrifice-talk” against the charge that it is merely a 
metaphor and thus less important than literal, denotative speech, another mode of discourse 
that has monopolozed the approach to this topic appears on the scene. Sacrificial theories also 
attempt to speak about sacrifice in a way that unveils the truth of the practice. Since this truth 
depends in part on the authority of scholars in general, the production of sacrificial theories 
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Coulanges recounts the role played by sacrifices to the Roman god Terminus.
49 As indicated above, both Smith and Marx speak of sacrifice in order to lodge a protest against 
prevailing practices, yet because each understands the market to function in completely opposite ways, the same 
negative sense of sacrifice gets ascribed to entirely opposed sets of practices. 
contributes to the construction of the scholar’s authority and prestige. Propriety and 
normativity, then, are produced through discourse even as they serve as the conditions of 
possibility of any given discourse. Beyond the general difficulties of delimiting sacrifice as a 
theoretical object,50 however, it is important to note the differences between sacrificial 
rhetoric, as I intend to study it, and discourse about, or theories of, sacrifice. Since “sacrificial 
rhetoric” can closely resemble other types of discourses that take sacrifice as their object, it is 
imperative at this point to distinguish sacrificial rhetoric from the use of sacrifice as a 
metaphor, and both of these from theories of sacrifice. After further distinguishing theories of 
sacrifice from sacrificial rhetoric, it will be necessary to establish their mode of relationship. 
That is, which is the more inclusive term, or, to make the heirarchy explicit, which is the 
species, and which a genus?
One can distinguish theories of sacrifice, such as those we encounter in anthropology, 
classical and religious studies, from sacrificial rhetoric in the following way. Many fields 
discuss sacrificial practices, and the hallmark of each, especially when they strive to capture the 
indigenous meanings of the practices, is a translation of the native idiom of sacrifice into a 
metalanguage. For instance, when Nancy Jay (1991) discusses the patriarchal subsumption of 
women’s reproductive powers into a cosmos that is produced by male-officiated sacrifice, she 
is translating the ideological function of sacrifice from this indigenous cosmology into one 
familiar to western scholarship. With Jay sacrifice remains exterior to the metalanguage she 
employs. By contrast, when the contested nature of public conceptions of sacrifice get 
disguised and misrecognized as natural, given or revealed, one can then be sure that this is 
rhetoric performing its primary work.
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50 As noted above, sacrifice as a “total social fact” cuts across all social phenomena, which means that 
one must necessarily examine sacrificial practices in light of their religious, juridical, economic, political and 
social aspects. In fact, even to speak of sacrifice as a singular noun takes great liberties. For the scholar, then, 
every theory of sacrifice is ultimately unsatisfying, for sacrifice embraces an assemblage of untotalizable 
phenomena, and there is no way to circumscribe the possible relevant conjunctions of sacrifice with other social 
phenomena. For this reason, theorizing about the nature or essence of sacrifice confronts the impossibility of 
constructing a delimited—and thus viable—theoretical object. 
Yet this disenchanting work of translation is not solely confined to theories of sacrifice. 
The very fact that such a work of translation appears to be the proper treatment of sacrifice 
means that a different regime of persuasion has supplanted a previous one. Where once priestly 
scribes and prophetic critics engaged one another in an agon over the hegemonic notion of 
sacrifice, gradually philosophers and scholars emerged to play greater parts in this same 
struggle. Although there are qualitative distinctions between priestly codes, prophetic critiques, 
and scholarly theories, each meets the other on the terrain of sacrificial rhetoric, even when one 
insists that sacrifice as such does not exist, or has no legitimate place in society.
To situate theories of sacrifice in the context of a rhetoric of sacrifice, and, further, to 
treat science as itself rhetorical, and, finally, to level the epistemological status between theory 
and rhetoric: all this follows from the final chapter of Durkheim’s Elemental Forms of 
Religious Life.51  There Durkheim treats the emergence of scientific discourse as dialectically 
related to the specific doxic regime that is hegemonic in any given social conjuncture. For the 
public to accept scientific claims as truth, this can only happen when within that society there is 
a prevailing opinion that scientific discourse itself has become a privileged or at least possible 
locus of truth. Furthermore, a sociological treatment recognizes thereby the play of interest at 
work in the social field, with the consequence that even among scientists there is still a social 
subculture in play, who seek to monopolize the means to epistemic production in the same way 
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51 Durkheim claims that “even when constructed in accordance with all the rules of science, concepts 
are far from taking their authority from their objective value alone. To be believed, it is not enough that they be 
true. If they are not in harmony with other beliefs and other opinions—in short, with the whole set of collective 
representations—they will be denied; minds will be closed to them; as a result, they will be and yet not be. If 
bearing the seal of science is usually enough today to gain a sort of privileged credibility, that is because we 
have faith in science. But that faith is not essentially different from religious faith. The value we attribute to 
science depends, in the last analysis, upon the idea we collectively have of its nature and role in life, which is to 
say that it expresses a state of opinion. The reason is that everything in social life rests on opinion, including 
science itself. To be sure, we can make opinion an object of study and create a science of it; that is what sociol-
ogy principally consists in. Still the science of opinion does not create opinion, but can only clarify it and make 
it more conscious of itself. In this way, it is true, science can lead opinion to change, but science remains the 
product of opinion even at the moment it seems to rule opinion; for as I have shown, science draws the strength 
it takes to act upon opinion from opinion itself” (1995, p. 439-440). 
that religious specialists have for millenia.52 What changed first in western cultures was that the 
conditions of persuasion shifted towards scholarly and scientific discourse, to the point that at 
the height of the early anthropological studies of sacrifice evolutionism and scientism had 
become hegemonic, both of which flattered the self-conception of these Euro-American 
cultures. Scientism as objectification that fails to account for its own mode of objectification, 
and which thus remains ideological, has been subjected to decisive critique in contemporary 
critical theory despite its residual currency in political science and developmental economics. 
Aside from helping to account for the emergence of sacrificial theories as instances of a 
particular discourse whose presuppositions and purposes matched a regnant episteme in the 
nations where anthropological thought emerged, there are other benefits that follow from 
adopting the notion of sacrificial rhetoric. First, what has become a stagnating condition for 
theories of sacrifice—the lack of a convincing cross-cultural definition of sacrifice that unites 
disparate instances of the ritual according to sound and specific criteria53—is no longer an 
obstacle to inquiry. Indeed, the multiplicity of social phenomena that incorporate sacrificial 
aspects no longer serves as an index of the failure of the theoretical project, but becomes, for 
rhetorical analysis, its ground of proliferation, even its condition of possiblity.
As this reversal from multiplicity-as-blockage to multiplicity-as-condition-of-possibility 
indicates, a shift from theory to rhetoric reverses the valence of many of the elements under 
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52 Latour (1988) and Shapin (1994) both underscore the importance to scientific discovery of a 
scientific culture, and specifically the networks of social relations and the acculturation into laboratory life 
necessary to produce scientists. 
53 While one could argue that a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” type of definition (1958, #67, p. 
32) might work for sacrifice, I would argue that, while this is in fact the de facto type of definition at work in 
ordinary language, for a topic like sacrifice, whose semantic domain tends to expand and contract much more 
than ordinary words, the very pursuit of a definition becomes a language game of dubious utility. To use the 
language of Wilfred Sellars, with such an “accordion term,” the expansion and contraction of which makes the 
music of scholarly discourse, one would quickly face a project of discussing sacrifices that ranged from the 
ritual killing of animals, to Kant’s sacrificial opposition between duty and interest, to Freud’s “sublimation” as 
the sine qua non of civilization itself. Since such a narrative arc seems, despite its audacity, to have already 
been told once or many times before, it remains isomorphic with narratives of the moralization of human-kind 
and the progress of civilization that are too seductive to compel the skeptical scholar. Instead of relying on fam-
ily resemblance, then, it seems far better to shift the goals of the project entirely away from a search for such a 
definition, however construed. 
scrutiny. Without ritual sacrifice bleeding into diverse social phenomena and making possible at 
best a family-resemblance definition of sacrificial aspects, sacrificial rhetoric would not have 
the polyvocal resources necessary for the diversity of claims that define its field of deployment. 
The turn to sacrificial rhetoric thus allows one to embrace not only the multiplicity but the 
mutability of sacrificial phenomen as well, and escape the temptation to utter the final word on 
the topic, for any instance of sacrificial rhetoric is not syllogistic but enthymemic, and thus 
ventures into the open-ended play of multiple plausabilities. 
This shift from the theorization of sacrifice to the study of sacrificial rhetoric further 
entails a shift in the object of scrutiny. No longer will it be necessary to offer a totalizing claim 
regarding the true nature of sacrifice across time and cultures. Now it will be possible to study 
not the truth of sacrifice, but its problematization—that is, the way that individuals and 
institutions have come to recognize the topic of sacrifice as a problem, and have deployed 
resources to naturalize, critique, or dismiss sacrifice in the context of the socio-cultural issues 
of the day. Insofar as any position in this ongoing process leads to multiple responses, so that 
the naturalizing claim summons its critique and refutation inevitably, one cannot simply move 
to an “outside” of this problematic54 without participating in the recursive function of this 
discourse. Thus, in addition to negotiating the treacherous waters of sacrificial ambivalence 
(because of the perspectival plurality of the rite, the question might always arise, with what 
person in the sacrifice does one identify?), another key element of sacrificial rhetoric will be 
this simultaneous rejection of sacrifice in one register, and a redeployment in another. 
The last consequence of turning to sacrificial rhetoric involves a salubrious leveling 
effect among the various discursive modes that take sacrifice as their organizing topic. The 
goal of  definining the proper nature of sacrifice now emerges not as a problem solely for 
scholars, but becomes a long-standing problem for every discursive agent with a stake in its 
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54 I use this term in a way derived from Althusser (1978), i.e., to address the ambiguous state of 
resolution and openness that scholarly production faces when it assesses the resources and problems of its 
precedents. The key point is that the field of scholarly production is both open and structured, and the term 
“problematic” addresses that ambiguous state of affairs. 
definition. In the long sweep of archival history that moves from the poetic narrative in the J 
document that recounted the travail of Abraham and the change in sacrifice from the first-born 
to an animal substitute, to the priestly codes of Leviticus and Deuteronomy that delineated the  
factors of conversion for acceptable sacrifices, to the scholarly scrutiny of sacrifices among 
various societies with the goal of theorizing the nature and function of the ritual, sacrificial 
rhetoric can engage them all as the products of particular positions within the social field of 
authority. Precisely by treating sacrifice as a privileged topic for the social construction of 
authority, the study of sacrificial rhetoric can account both for its predecessors and the 
conditions of possibility of its own emergence.
 Theoretical Resources For a Sacrificial Poetics
Given this protean object of study at the interface of extra-discursive practices and 
discursive production, the selection of methods is of primary importance.  The type of methods 
employed stands in a dialectical relationship with the hermeneutical project that one 
undertakes. As already indicated, sacrificial rhetoric emerges as a starkly agonistic field, for in 
it one observes a sort of boot-strapping process whereby one accrues the authority to define 
the proper nature of sacrifice in the very act of issuing statements regarding its nature. This 
takes us far beyond the theoretical questions that have preoccupied scholars of religion, 
classics, and anthropology, who have sought, first, a congenial definition of sacrifice in order 
to, second, understand the social function that it plays.  In fact, the very form of the question—
“What is the function of ritual sacrifice?”—calls for a fixed, static answer that holds for a 
variety of religions across multiple periods of time. Nonetheless, as already suggested, the 
mutability of sacrificial phenomena frustrates every attempt to provide a fixed criteria for 
definition, especially since such a fundamental social phenomena as sacrifice shifts in relation to 
one’s initial notion of the nature of society itself. 
Across the historical diffusion of sacrificial aspects, then, theories of sacrifice have 
sought invariant answers to questions concerning the social function of sacrifice. The answers 
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to these questions have ranged from the emic (for instance, sacrifice as an offering, gift, or 
tribute to a divine personage meant to express obedience or deference)55 to the etic (such as 
sacrifice as a spectacular staging of hierarchical imposition, and thus a primary means towards 
social reproduction).56 Between these extreme options of transcendent and wholly immanent 
answers, positions vary primarily in relation to changing conceptions of the proper nature of 
social explanation itself. These debates often center upon the role that subjective motivation 
plays in such inquiries, for one’s answers will change drastically if one seeks an objective 
analysis of social relations, as opposed to the acculturated sense of obligation and motivation 
that the subjects interiorize. Nonetheless, between these options one quickly comes against an 
antinomy, for the transcendent account of sacrifice might accord with the subject’s own view 
but it is logically unfalsifiable, while the latter, given the presuppositions of the structural-
functionalist framework, is strictly tautological, for whatever occurs within a given society 
must function in some minimal way to reproduce that society, or else it would not continue to 
occur.57 This transcendent-immanent dichotomy, isomorphic as it is with dualisms such as 
subjective-objective and emic-etic, all too clearly remains within the dynamics of interreligious 
critique which have continued for eons. With the theorist of sacrifice appearing as but one 
more outsider to eye skeptically the accepted practices of the society in question, the rhetoric 
of insiders and outsiders remains too beholden to a picture of societies as self-consistent and 
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55 Tylor sees three stages of sacrificial development: “The ruder conception that the deity takes and 
values the offering for itself, gives place on the one hand to the idea of mere homage expressed by a gift, and on 
the other to the negative view that the virtue lies in the worshipper depriving himself of something prized. 
These ideas may be broadly distinguished as the gift-theory, the homage-theory, and the abnegation-theory” (p. 
461-2). Mauss and Hubert’s critique was that Tylor’s theory was too emic, in that “it did no more than 
reproduce in precise language the old, popular conceptions” (p. 2; p. 194). 
56 Vernant and Detienne offer the most convincing exposition of this type of robust, etic theory of 
sacrifice in their structuralist readings of Greek accounts of sacrifice. See especially Vernant’s “At Man’s 
Table: Hesiod’s Foundation Myth of Sacrifice” (1989).
57 Radcliffe-Brown provides the clearest example of these presuppositions (1945, 1963). As I will 
argue in a future chapter, this logical straightjacket in which structural-functionalist anthropology is trapped 
suggests one of the reasons that Hegel proved such an immensely suggestive social thinker. As a comparative 
analyst of social systems, Hegel, and Marx after him, is open not only to the possibility of social dysfunction, he 
insists upon it in even the most well-attuned society. 
self-identical wholes without heterogeneity or contradiction. Sacrificial rhetoric can better 
examine the way that every society includes its a produced outside in the form of heterodox 
positions whose attitudes and conceptions of sacrifice are viable but not regnant. 
Of the two explanatory goals that theories of sacrifice have sought—a definition of 
sacrifice that can allow scholars to track changes in form, and a notion of its function that 
explains both the former ubiquity of the rite and its subsequent near-disappearance—the goal 
of speaking scientifically and authoritatively on the subject of sacrifice has blinded theorists to 
a fundamental function of sacrifice throughout history. Far from the simply tautological claim 
that the function of sacrifice is to reproduce society (which is as much as to say that the 
function of sacrifice is to function), it has often served the role of providing the anomalous 
phenomena that authoritative discourses define for the ultimate reason of both exercising and 
illustrating their authority to define this phenomena. It is thus in the very moment of explaining 
the function of sacrifice that the theorist of sacrifice misrecognizes its function, precisely 
because the theorist’s own behavior so closely mimics that which she studies. If the function of 
sacrifice has been to serve as the object about which authority must speak, and about whose 
definition the sovereign authority must decide,58 the theorist is in no way outside this function, 
and thus cannot objectify this function while performing it—i.e. pronouncing the true function 
of sacrifice. For these reasons, the very rules of the scholarly game regarding the treatment of 
the topic of sacrifice need to be redefined. 
It is this project of redefinition that clarifying the topic of sacrificial rhetoric will 
achieve. The labors that have gone into tracking sacrifice through all its variations in order to 
gain a sense of its essence somewhere beyond its appearances need not be wasted effort, since 
the appearances and variations now become the resources that sacrificial rhetoricians employ 
to ply their trade. While the various theoretical searches for the social function of sacrifice also 
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58 The echoes of Agamben here are quite deliberate, in that his treatment of the sovereign as the figure 
who decides those whom the law will include and those it will exclude, an inclusive exclusion, is precisely the 
dynamic of defining the “sacrificeable” (1998).
contribute to these resources, the totalizing and exclusive claims that define it and explain its 
function themselves represent a case of sacrificial rhetoric, in that they too invoke specific 
conceptions of society, human nature, and their inter-relations, which is exactly what the 
sacrificial rhetorician seeks to transform. 
As a transition between sacrificial theories and sacrificial rhetoric, the various 
theoretical analyses of sacrificial function, change and variation can contribute to an 
intermediary discourse, a sacrificial poetics. Taking the cue from the term’s etymology (poesis) 
and Aristotle’s sense that poetry pursued imitation while rhetoric pursued persuasion, a 
sacrificial poetics would focus on the way that certain statements regarding sacrifice refer to 
the sacrificial scene as enacted in the history of various religions. Thus, this poetics draws on 
Todorov’s definition of poetics as a discourse that “aims at a knowledge of the general laws 
that preside over the birth of each work,” and “it seeks these laws within literature itself” 
(1981 p. 6). In a similar way, a sacrificial poetics would seek out the function of each figural 
use of sacrifice in reference to its status as an imitation of the sacrificial rite itself. At times this 
derivation will be explicit, and in others it will be more abstract. In fact, at times it will take 
leave of the ritual altogether, and sacrifice as a figure will become the occasion to generate a 
narrative, a process that Koelb has defined as the “rhetorical moment.”59  The relations are as 
follows: as the rite provides the source for the figure, and the figure a resource for a 
persuasive account, sacrificial theories and a sacrificial poetics would both play integral 
parts in a sacrificial rhetoric, which would need to address, within the instance of sacrificial 
rhetoric, the implicit theory of sacrifice it employs, the figurality of its reference to sacrifice, 
as well as the social context and consequences of this rhetoric. 
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59 On the rhetorical moment, “I use the word ‘moment’ both with the usual meaning of ‘instant’ and 
in the relatively technical sense of ‘cause or motive of action,’ the latter in order to refer to the initiatory aspect 
of this kind of reading. The moment or instant of understanding is to be viewed not as the end point in a pro-
cess of reception but rather as the beginning of an act of poetic activity. It is rhetorical because it considers the 
text before it to be legitimately comprehensible under two interpretive conventions at once. Because the charac-
ter of the reader/writer is as important to the process as the character of the text being read, we may understand 
it as a kind of dialogic interaction in which the rhetoricity of an existing text is exploited to produce a new text, 
a rhetorical construction” (1988, p. 24).
In exploring the variations in sacrificial rhetoric, any theory of sacrifice is inadequate 
alone, but many offer resources for taking an analysis of sacrificial rituals and sacrificial 
rhetoric beyond the straight description of the phenomena at hand, especially if one 
supplements these works with other texts on gift-exchange and production. Provided that one 
incorporates each as a provisional hypothesis, the various typologies that theorists have 
developed remain useful resources despite their ultimate failure to define and totalize sacrificial 
phenomena. The very impossibility of a unified definition has provided a much greater heuristic 
resource: a multi-sourced conception of the many axes along which sacrificial phenomena 
might vary. These axes will provide the framework for tracking the transformations in notions 
of sacrifice that various rhetoricians of sacrifice employ. After working through these types of 
tranformational axes, the variations that theorists of sacrifice have tracked through and 
between multiple socio-religious complexes will here serve as the background for reading the 
shifting rhetorical deployment of sacrifice as a figure. That is, we can use theories to map the 
diversity of the figure of sacrifice, and thereby employ theories as resources for a poetics of the 
figure. By then moving to examine the socio-cultural conjuncture which the discursive 
performance engages, which will also involve an examination of the expectations the audience 
brings to the event, one can the develop a properly rhetorical treatment of the text.       
 Axes of Sacrificial Variation
In addition to the practical-axis already discussed, along which sacrifices range from 
the ritual to the discursive, the other axis that is most familiar involves a series of movements 
of inflation and mitigation that have shifted the risks and costs of sacrifice through the ages.60 
These shifts along the object-axis of sacrificial transformation take place both synchronically 
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60 Weber is only one of the historians who has traced this mitigation, which one could schematically 
trace in the following way: from multiple public Greco-Roman rites to the singular sacrifice of Jesus; martyr-
dom as the imitation of Christ; asceticism and monasticism with its corporal rigors as attenuated, graduated 
sacrifices; corporal hardships replaced by financial offerings. In this way, a sacrificial surplus of signification 
diffused into the totality of worship, leaving no element untouched. Aside from this quantitative mitigation, a 
further, categorical transformation was achieved: the collapse of the sacrificial agent into the sacrificial object. 
and diachronically, and involve changes in type and quantity. While instances of the latter 
include such well-known events as the poetic narratives concerning the  substitution of a ram 
for Isaac and a deer for Iphigeneia,61 the former include the priestly codes of conversion such 
as those found in the book of Leviticus in the Hebrew Bible, whereby practitioners of every 
economic class could sacrifice a different type of object to demonstrate a devotion appropriate 
to their social standing. Such synchronic substitutions also include more ad-hoc instances such 
as the Nuer sacrifice of a cucumber in place of a head of cattle, which is legitimate so long as it 
is addressed exactly as if it were a head of cattle.62 Here, as is typical, this substitution along 
the object-axis also entails a shift along the behavioral-axis, for the weight of the rite’s efficacy 
comes to reside more in its speech-acts than in the ritual behavior.  
Another axis of variation I derive directly from the work of Hubert and Mauss. In their 
essay they observe that the ritual process of sacrifice can have different valorizing effects on 
the ritual agent and object depending upon their initial condition. One undertakes ritual 
sacrifice in a negative condition which the ritual itself will rectify.  According to the 
Durkheimian insight regarding the ambivalence of the sacred, Mauss and Hubert claim that if at 
the outset the ritual agent or object is in a profane condition, the ritual will act to sacralize 
them (p. 52). By contrast, if at the outset one has a negative sacred charge, in the sense that 
one is polluted with a sacred taint, sacrifice will act to desacralize them (p. 57). In the two 
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61 Such poetic accounts of object-transformation often constitute pivotal moments in cultural trans-
formation. In Porphyry’s On Abstinence and Against the Christians, the topic of sacrifice serves as a key 
moment in his schematic treatment of cultural history. 
62 In his influential study of Nuer religion (1956), Evans-Pritchard observed that “[w]hen a cucumber 
is used as a sacrificial victim Nuer speak of it as an ox. In doing so they are asserting something rather more 
than that it takes the place of an ox. They do not, of course, say that cucumbers are oxen, and in speaking of a 
particular cucumber as an ox in a sacrificial situation they are only indicating that it may be thought of as an ox 
in that particular situation; and they act accordingly by performing the sacrificial rites as closely as possible to 
what happens when the victim is an ox. The resemblance is conceptual, not perceptual. The ‘is’ rests on 
qualitative analogy. And the expression is asymmetrical, a cucumber is an ox, but an ox is not a cucumber” (p. 
128). Of special note here is the requirement that the ritual, including methods of handling the object and terms 
of address and ritualized speech patterns, all need to remain unchanged, whether the object is an ox or a 
cucumber. This gives a snapshot of the proliferative nature of sacrifice as a ritual. Even the most important 
aspects of the ritual may undergo transformation so long as other important elements remain unchanged. 
senses invoked here, sacrifice is either a sacralizing or desacralizing ritual. However, in the 
sense that there might be transmission of pollution, for example, from the agent to the object, 
as was the case in the ancient Hebrew scapegoat ritual, there are both sacralizing and 
desacralizing effects at work. Because of this, the dichotomous view that Hubert and Mauss 
propose I will replace with the valence-axis, along which one finds varying proportions of 
sacralizing and desacralizing effects. 
The next axis builds on the passages in E. B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture cited above, 
where he offers an evolutionary theory of sacrifice as derived from the gift. In doing so, Tylor 
takes seriously the worshiper’s claims that the sacrifice is intended for some sort of 
supernatural being. Since this is almost universally performed in a feeling of gratitude, as well 
as an expectation of future blessings, the process presents features that are analogous to 
quotidian gift-exchange, albeit with one participant with the capacity to return much greater 
gifts. Although Tylor offers only a crude model of gift-exchange, his gift-theory remains 
convincing for many rituals, even as sacrifice shades into rites of commensality where, as is the 
case in many Greek sacrifices and as Robertson Smith hypothesized regarding an ur-ritual of 
ancient Hebrew sacrifice,63 the participants invite god as a favored guest at a ritual feast. 
A commensality-theory thus stands as a variation of the gift-theory that emphasizes the 
social reproduction of rank and status more than the relationship established with a deity.64 
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63  According to Robertson Smith, “Unfortunately the only system of Semitic sacrifice of which we 
possess a full account is that of the second temple at Jerusalem; […] the system as we have it dates from a time 
when sacrifice was no longer the sum and substance of worship. In the long years of Babylonian exile the 
Israelites who remained true to the faith of Jehovah had learned to draw nigh to their God without the aid of 
sacrifice and offering, and, when they returned to Canaan, they did not return to the old type of religion[…]. 
The worship of the second temple was an antiquarian resuscitation of forms which had lost their intimate con-
nection with the national life, and therefore had lost the greater part of their original significance” (Smith, 
1956, p. 215-6). By making commensality such a central focus of a primordial Hebrew ritual, Robertson 
Smith’s theories bridge the distance between Judeo-Christian apologetic treatments of the unique nature of 
monotheistic sacrifice, and Vernant and Detienne’s examination of the role of commensality in Greek 
polytheistic sacrifice.
64 A question therefore arises whether sacrifice-as-commensality represents a mere variation of a gift-
theory of sacrifice, one according to which the only difference is that a meal is offered instead of a discrete 
object? Insofar as Robertson Smith treats the ur-sacrifice of the Hebrews as a joyful congregation, it would seem 
to differ in intent and effect from a Greek sacrifice more concerned to apportion the world into its discrete 
Among the shortcomings of Tylor’s model is that it lacks an explanation for the ubiquity of 
destruction in sacrificial rites. A great majority of rituals involve processes of elaborate 
preparation and destruction, and a simple gift-theory of sacrifice offers few resources for 
explaining this emphasis, except insofar as destruction can stand for a dematerialization that 
makes the offering appropriate for a spiritual being.65  It was this lack of explanation that led 
Hubert and Mauss to develop a competing theory of sacrifice. Instead of a gift-theory, which 
takes little distance from  the native conception of a co-present divinity, they construed 
sacrifice as a species of consecration, or the production of sacred objects or effects of 
sacralization, instead of a gift. In this way, one can focus more upon the actual operations 
involved with the material objects, and less upon the psychology of the practitioners and the 
deity they invoke. A further consequence is that, instead of constructing a model of the 
circulation and distribution of offerings and blessings, with sacrifice as a species of 
consecration one enters the sphere of production, which foregrounds the objective or material 
as opposed to the psychological conditions of the ritual.  Building with these developments on 
Tylor’s contributions, we can posit an production-axis, along which the rite might vary from a 
gift-exchange that produces and sustains relations to a consecration-construction that 
produces sacred objects and effects of sacralization and desacralization. 
Another axis involves the many ways in which the sacrificial agent relates to the 
material object or victim of the ritual. At one extreme one focuses on the agent, with overtones 
of asceticism, and at the other the rite telescopes the term from the ritual process to the object, 
which results in a stark reification. The extreme positions marked out by the ritual process and 
the object demarcate the transformational-axis, which varies from a focus on the 
transformation of the object to the transformation of the condition of the agent. The 
transformational-axis thus addresses the multiple avenues of change that a sacrifice includes, 
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levels of mortal, immortal and animal. 
65 The ’olah, or complete consumption sacrifice in the ancient Hebrew ritual, would be one possible 
example of this type of transformation.
from the material, ritualized processes of object transformation to the psychological and 
somatic processes of subject transformation, or subjectivation as a whole. Because sacrifice is 
a that pivots decisively around a  transformation be it objective (from life to death, existence to 
non-existence, etc.) or subjective (from polluted to pure, sinful to holy, etc.), this axis can lead 
to changes that are locally framed in the ritual (shifts on the micro-level of the ritual process) 
to those that are more broadly and historically construed (shifts in the cultural or historical 
significance of the ritual). For example, Christianity tended to interiorize sacrifice to such an 
extent that this self-sacrifice collapsed the sacrificial agent and the object together, which broad 
cultural and historical effects regarding the moralization of sacrifice and worship as a whole. 
The transformational-axis, then, provides the context by means of which socially and 
historically determined notions of change themselves might undergo transformation. 
Perhaps the axis that has garnered the most attention from both religious and scholarly 
commentators is the process of moralization as sacrifice has moved along the efficacy-axis. 
Weber depicts of sacrifice as an inherently magical ritual which affects nature and is destined to 
give way to ascetic practices which develop a moral state of being appropriate for devotion to 
an ethical being. Along this evolutionary arc one can place a wide range of rituals, from Nuer 
cattle sacrifice to the Aqedah in the “J” document to the Crusades as a sacrificial expenditure. 
If one abstracts away from this evolutionary axis, though, one is left with the two antipodes of 
magical and ethico-moral sacrifices, and every sacrifice partaking of some portion of each. The 
efficacy-axis is often keyed to the transformational-axis since the shift from magical efficacy to 
moral efficacy connects to a shift from an objective to a subjective process as the point of the 
ritual. These transformations also connect to the struggle over the site of the ritual in social 
space, as ad hoc and household altars give way to centralized sites in temples and urban 
settings which promote the monopolization of sacrifice by a priestly caste. 
At last we turn to the most radical transformational axis, which is in essence a return to 
the transformed notion of sacrifice developed earlier in this introduction. Because all of the 
  
 45 
discourses that accrete around the physical ritual of sacrifice have largely been treated as 
extraneous to that ritual and thus relegated to secondary status, I have argued, along with 
Mauss and Hubert, that speech-acts are not only important to the rite, but performatively 
constitutive of the rite as sacrifice. In light of the heterogeneous nature of the rite as both 
discursive and extra-discursive, I suggested that any particular instance of ritual sacrifice, 
depending on the relative weights of the components, will take its place along a continuum 
defined in relation to asymptotic endpoints of pure discursivity and pure extra-discursivity. 
Ranging along this practical-axis, the proportion between the discursive and extra-discursive 
components of the rite here becomes a valorized inflection of sacrifice. That is, with this axis 
we move from a quantitative to a qualitative distinction, and thereby reach the referential-
axis, along which one ranges from the direct indication of an acceptedly sacrificial phenomena 
to the provocative, experimental or ideological designation of an erstwhile or hitherto non-
sacrificial or even non-religious phenomena as a “sacrifice.” The flexibility of ascription at 
work correlates with the semantic parameters prevalent among a given language community. 
Because of this flexibility, as the referential speech act moves from the indicative to the 
performative, the risk courted by the linguistic agent increases proportionately.  This is the 
case because the plausability of taking the event or phenomena as sacrificial depends upon the 
conditions of persuasion at work in the culture at the moment.66 At the interface between the 
iterative nature of ritual and the open-ended flux of historical events, the closer one approaches 
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66 Many examples of this accrue around the developments of the Crusades in the 11th to 13th 
centuries. There the actual historical linkage between ancient sacrifice and the sacramental structure of the 
church led to the extrapolation from pilgrimage to sacrifice, a return to the origin. According to Robert the 
Monk’s version of the speech, Pope Urban II uttered the following peroration in his call for his auditors to 
undertake the First Crusade: “Whoever, therefore, shall determine upon this holy pilgrimage and shall make 
his vow to God to that effect and shall offer himself to Him as a, living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, 
shall wear the sign of the cross of the Lord on his forehead or on his breast. When, truly, having fulfilled his 
vow be wishes to return, let him place the cross on his back between his shoulders. Such, indeed, by the twofold 
action will fulfill the precept of the Lord, as He commands in the Gospel, ‘He that taketh not his cross and fol-
loweth after me, is not worthy of me’” (Munro, 1895, p. 5-8). Such a provocative correlation, between the  
sacrifice of Christ and contemporary historical events, is hardly rare, but this should not prevent one from ack-
nowledging it as an incredibly risky rhetorical gesture. Perhaps less risky was the denomination of the massacre 
of thousands of Muslims at Acre as a fit sacrifice to God.
the performative side the more one witnesses the “becoming-rhetorical” of sacrifice, one can 
trace the increasing role played by ad hoc and ex post facto descriptions of phenomena as 
sacrificial in order to justify, normalize or eternalize the irruption of events. 
[For a summary of the axes of variation, see Appendix 2.]
To carry foward these insights into sacrificial variation across cultures and through 
history, it is important at this point to return to the beginning regarding the problem posed by 
acknowledging the discursive element of ritual sacrifice. To embrace change on two levels of 
social reality (the material and the discursive) one needs to keep the two levels in relation and 
tension, which means treating them as two ends of a spectrum: every ritual has its discursive 
element, and every discourse its ritual element. To avoid a scenario of simple inverse 
correlation, it is important to note that the “weight” of each element implies that there will be 
multiple instances of each involved in the ritual process, so that both the discursive and the 
extra-discursive are always co-implicated in sacrificial change. Hence, sacrificial rhetoric has 
always constituted a part of the ritual, but also the shifting weight of elements has led to 
developments whereby sacrificial rhetoric has come to constitute almost the whole of the 
ritual’s continuing relevance. 
Adopting the notion of sacrificial rhetoric brings the entire range of sacrificial 
discourses all into the same discursive field, including distinct language games such as poetic 
narratives of transformation, priestly codes of prescription, prophetic calls for reform, and 
scholarly typologies and theories. Such a move breaks down the divides between theory and 
practice as well as between emic and etic conceptions of human nature, religion and society. 
As a first approximation towards the functional dynamic of a sacrificial rhetoric, one can 
already indicate some hypothetical relationships. For example, in regards to sacrificial rhetoric, 
speech-acts like description and denomination have become disembedded from the rite. That is, 
an aspect of the practice of ritual sacrifice has become dislodged from the cultic matrix, leaving 
the term free to describe as sanctified many of the specific costs of general social reproduction. 
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It is thus precisely to the extent that the term’s referential employment denoting a specific 
religious ritual has become effaced, that the scope of usage has expanded. In addition to this 
covariational relationship, one should not let talk of “disembedding” obscure an essential 
continuity between sacrificial rites and sacrificial rhetoric—namely, the political act of naming 
something a sacrifice, which rarely happens all at once, and thus entails an entire rhetorical 
economy. Because sacrifice is a total social fact, it touches upon the whole of social 
classificatory systems, with the classes of the “sacrificeable” and the “unsacrificeable” affecting 
the political status of every other class of objects or persons. Because we deal here not only 
with isolated speech-acts but also social classifications in general, one must analyze the 
response to particular social conjunctures in order to analyze the ensemble of practices and 
strategies that constitute a “sacrificial rhetoric.” 67 
 The Turn to a Sacrificial Rhetoric
Between theological exegeses of sacrifice, and scholarly analyses of sacrificial rituals, a 
third form of hybrid discourse exists that deserves scholarly scrutiny. Forming a phenomenon 
that I will speak of as “sacrificial rhetoric,” this discourse does not treat sacrifice as a given 
religious or social fact, nor does it take the rite and native statements about the rite as its 
objective or theoretical objects. Instead, sacrificial rhetoric utilizes “sacrifice” or related terms 
(crucifixion, martyrdom, asceticism, offering, etc.) to intervene in the reproduction of received 
notions of self, society, worship and work, and it does so by means of a social prestige that 
involves claims of expertise, authority and legitimacy. 
Why turn to “rhetoric” instead of a general term like “discourse”?  Strenski, for 
example, speaks of sacrificial discourse to bridge the gap between apologetic and critical 
treatments of sacrifice in the francophone university (2002, 2003). This term is useful in that it 
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67 Although Chaim Perelman, in his multi-work project of a “New Rhetoric,” addresses sacrifice as a 
figure common to rhetoricians through the ages, the descriptions of the usage are very straightforward. To 
explore the pragmatic complexities of the term in various contexts, the multitude of sacrificial theories, from 
those of Burkert and Girard to Hubert and Mauss, can contribute a great deal.
addresses the way that no one invents this language game out of whole cloth, but one always 
receives the term from a tradition and inherits established modes of exegesis. I speak of 
rhetoric instead because discourses are very open human institutions, open to reversals and 
inversions that keep them beholden to an outside that is beyond representation but the very 
source of their dynamic existence. One could thus think of a “discourse” as a field, but 
“sacrificial rhetoric” as a strategy or practice one might deploy within that field. With sacrificial 
rhetoric, then, its outside is not inhabited by “theories of sacrifice,” for calling into question the 
legitimacy of a speech act which states, “X is a sacrifice,” is merely one move in the ongoing 
language game. Even if one called into question all such statements and the form of the 
statement itself, one would still be involved in sacrificial rhetoric, since one would still be 
speaking of sacrifice in such a way to accrue authority to the speaker’s position (in this case, 
the scholar or theorist) within the discursive field. If one sought to call into question the 
validity of sacrificial rhetoric in general, in all cases, it would appear as if one would thereby 
step outside of sacrificial rhetoric and engage in a discourse that aspires to disenchant itself of 
this rhetoric. Of course, this leap beyond all talk of sacrifice seems much like an attempt to 
“sacrifice sacrifice.” This leap would then be the founding event in the creation myth of a 
discourse that would not escape the figural domain of sacrifice at all. I would only suggest, at 
this stage of the investigation, that this study of sacrificial rhetoric takes this phenomena as its 
object of scrutiny, but cannot extricate itself completely from every vestige of the phenomena 
that it would examine.  
With a topic such as sacrifice, to speak of its employment in rhetorical projects 
conjures all the specters of the Platonic critique of the relativistic, self-interested, mercenary 
sophists in favor of the disinterested and truth-loving philosopher. While there is a provocative 
aspect to the notion of sacrificial rhetoric, perhaps no other figure so needs a reading that 
incorporates the interested social position of the speaker as one that has come to stand for 
selflessness itself. In other words, to begin the study of sacrificial rhetoric, it is imperative that 
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we gain some critical distance from colloquial senses of sacrifice. Nothing would betray this 
investigation more quickly than a commitment to the sense of sacrifice as absolute loss 
untertaken for a higher purpose. As a first complication, the rhetoric of sacrifice itself, insofar 
as it invokes a disavowal of self-interest, is highly esteemed, so that there is a recuperation of 
the loss in another coin, that of honor, prestige, or appreciation.68  Hence, as a first principle, 
we can note that a rhetoric of sacrifice articulates the often incommensurate regimes of gift and 
exchange, devotion and self-interest, sovereignty and avarice. 
On the other hand, as the previous explication of the importance of quotidian 
“sacrifice-talk” made clear, a rhetorical study such as this cannot simply dismiss prevailing 
conceptions as irrelevant. Instead, one must situate oneself directly in the charged field where 
common sense and its critique engage in an ongoing agon, which emerged, according to 
Heidegger, with the very birth of philosophy: 
in the same period in which the beginning of philosophy takes place, the marked 
domination of common sense (sophistry) [Herrschaft des gemeinen Verstandes (die 
Sophistik)] also begins.
 Sophistry appeals to the unquestionable character of the beings that are opened 
up and interprets all thoughtful questioning as an attack on, and unfortunate irritation 
of, common sense (1977, p. 138; 1978, p. 196). 
A sacrificial rhetoric, then, will have to address the role played repeatedly and markedly by its 
other, sacrificial sophistry, as the constructed and negated other that the authoritative 
discourse of the rhetorician. 
Because this investigation situates itself in a highly charged and agonistic field, it builds 
upon a robust conception of rhetoric. In no way connoting a sense of “mere” rhetoric as 
opposed to statements of fact, or rhetoric as ornamental finery supplementing straightforward 
truth-claims, rhetoric in this study must be understood in the much more expansive sense as the 
strategic employment of language for the purpose of effecting social change. With specific 
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68 Kierkegaard’s analysis in Fear and Trembling (1983) contends with this possibility, as does Derrida 
in Gift of Death (1995) under the rubric of the secret. Perhaps if one sacrificed to a wholly private ideal, leaving 
one without any return on the cost, we would have a “true” sacrifice in the sense of wholly without self-interest. 
But here we come close to the private langauge argument of Wittgenstein—because one of the desiderata of a 
value is its publicity, to speak of a private value one courts the paradoxical. 
reference to sacrifice there is an essential role played by rhetoric in any conceivable sacrificial 
rite, especially but not limited to the authorized denomination of the rite as a sacrifice. Because 
such speech-acts are not descriptive (there is nothing “in the world” that makes a specific ritual 
act a sacrifice) but performative, a referential model of language use, which posits an objective 
world of physical objects and events that is more real than the world of discourse, here will not 
suffice. An initial principle of this investigation is that sacrificial rhetoric is every bit as “real” as 
any ritual phenomena.
Despite the emphasis thus far on the agonistic nature of the discursive field in which 
sacrificial rhetoric takes place, with this wide conception of rhetoric as forming the very ether 
of society in general, a countervailing perspective comes into view. It is good to remember the 
Ciceronian description of rhetoric as the “moderatrix of force.” With rhetoric thus understood 
as the pursuit of persuasion and not coercion, it is clear that there has never been nor could 
there be an entirely coercive society, with the result that the art of persuasion forms at least a 
minimal element of every society.
 Moreover, treating the terrain of rhetoric as the amniotic fluid of social existence is 
especially appropriate when one considers the origin and development of rhetoric as a specific 
discipline in the juridical and political settings of the ancient world. As religions transformed 
and became institutionalized, it became imperative to clarify the proper nature of rituals such as 
sacrifice in order to exercise the perogative of religious monopoly.69 This concern with 
defining a proper sacrifice accords with the very nature of rhetoric, which traces its (perhaps 
apocryphal) origins as a practice of persuasion to the adjudication of competing property 
claims after the deposition of two Sicilian tyrants around 485 BCE.70 Like the speakers in the 
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69 This sense that religious specialists are engaged in an ongoing battle to monopolize the scarce reli-
gious capital I take from Bourdieu’s programmatic essay, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field” 
(1991). As sacrificial rhetoric extends beyond the Church into disparate sites of authority, I would add that, 
however many positions of authority emerge in the social field, there is still only so much prestige and authority 
available for these agents. Hence, though with this multiplication of positions the possibility of achieving a 
monopoly on religious capital decreases proportionately, the struggle for that monopoly increases in intensity. 
70 Because these tyrants deported and expropriated large numbers of people to pay for their mer-
law-courts of Syracuse where rhetoric purportedly first originated or became isolated as a 
specific discipline or art, this transition from confusion and conflict to a resolution defined by 
the restoration of the proper and the just forms perhaps the fundamental motif of rhetorical 
practice. Just as, at its origin, rhetoric concerned itself with determining “proprietorship” and 
the very notion of the “proper”, religions face the perennial problem of affirming who will 
become the proprietor of its capital, its doctrines and rituals, sacrifice chief among them.71  
Hence, in addition to underscoring the rhetorical nature of sacrificial discourse, this study 
explores the socio-political work performed by the discursive deployment of the figure of 
“sacrifice.” 
With this widened sense of the field of rhetoric, it is possible to develop a comparative 
rhetoric. Indeed, rhetoric was already comparative at the outset, in that its categories and 
classes never claimed the universal content that philosophy or religion did, but were formal-
procedural in nature. Thus, with the traffic between mainland Greece and the colonies forming 
the context that gave rise to this critical reflection on the art of persuasion, a comparative, 
cross-cultural aspect of rhetoric has been evident from the outset. When we add to this the 
self-evident notion that what persuades an audience in one socio-historical milieu differs 
greatly from another, this context-dependent element of the practice makes rhetoric, and the 
specific mode of rhetoric I propose, a viable comparative notion.     
 Sacrificial Rhetoric: Modes of Persuasion and Social Functions 
In this section I describe some of the formal characteristics of sacrificial rhetoric. This 
will serve both as a resource and an object of elaboration once I turn to the specific instances 
of sacrificial rhetoric that form the content of the next three chapters. To approach the specific 
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cenaries, after their deposition the city had to adjudicate competing claims for seized lots of property. The job of 
the rhetorician was to persuade a panel of citizens whose novel role was to decide each case (Barthes p. 16). 
71 The history of rhetoric is a complicated one, most specifically because at the outset this “art” came 
into conflict with a similar discourse with scientific aspirations, namely, philosophy. For authoritative accounts 
of this history and its vicissitudes, see Pfeiffer (1968, 1976) and Vickers (1988).
features of sacrificial rhetoric, it will help to define some of the minimal features of rhetoric in 
general. Although certainly not the last word on the topic, Aristotle usefully separated the art 
of rhetoric into three distinct modes of persuasion: “The first kind depends on the personal 
character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the 
third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself” (1984, 
I.1356a13, p. 2155), historically indicated by the terms ethos, pathos, and logos.  
Taking these three modes of persuasion as organizing elements, I will now examine the 
way that each contributes to the efficacy of sacrificial rhetoric. To begin with  ethos, we have 
already spoken about the authority that accrues to those who speak convincingly about the 
truth of sacrifice. Simply to speak of sacrifice is not enough, for the audience inevitably comes 
to the event with traditional senses of the term in mind. As Aristotle explained, 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so 
spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more 
readily than others.[...] This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by 
what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to 
speak.[...] [H]is character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion 
he possesses (I.1356a14, p. 2155)
 Thus, to speak of such a term as sacrifice in an authoritative way persuades through the mode 
of ethos. However, instead of ethos alone, this topic actually haunts the interface between 
statement and speaker. Considering the tendency to search out and applaud novelty in the 
history of discourse, it is important to note that rhetorically persuasive novelty can only emerge 
as an articulation of a tradition and not a break with it. In this sense, the sacrificial rhetorician 
emerges as a figure who approximates that of the prophet, as, in fact, they were historically 
united in such figures as Amos, Hosea and Isaiah. Yet this articulation of the tradition has to be 
constructed or (superficially) rejected anew in each instance of persuasion.  
Even when one encounters prophetic overtones regarding a new revelation concerning 
the true nature of sacrifice, the difference in conception between the sacrificial rhetorician and 
the audience will not be so great that the process of rhetorical persuasion cannot commence. 
That is, the intrinsic interest in the process of deploying sacrificial rhetoric does not depend on 
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the absolute novelty of the deployment. To the contrary, the deployment must be an 
articulation of received notions of sacrifice that the audience is able to recognize as legitimate. 
Bourdieu offers a similar description of the prophet’s rhetorical persuasion in practice, and as 
Bourdieu describes the religious prophet, we can extrapolate to the rhetorician, and the 
sacrificial rhetorician in particular. 
To Bourdieu, prophetic rhetoric is not distinguished by a wholly unprecedented 
revelation or irruption in the processes of social reproduction. In fact, “The success of the 
prophet remains incomprehensible as long as one stays within the limits of the religious field, 
unless one invokes a miraculous power, that is, an ex nihilo creation of religious capital, as 
Max Weber does in some of his formulations of the theory of charisma” (1991, p. 34). Against 
the rhetoric of prophetic charisma and revelation that invokes the irruption of the novum, 
Bourdieu offers a more discursively realistic sense of the prophet’s work, and, by extention, 
that of the sacrificial rhetorician:  
To do away once and for all with the representation of charisma as a property attached 
to the nature of a single individual, in each particular case one must again determine the 
sociologically pertinent characteristics that allow an individual to find himself socially 
predisposed to test and express, with particular force and coherence, ethical or political 
arrangements already present implicitly among all members of the class or group of its 
recipients (p. 35)
 Whatever charisma and authority accrues to the sacrificial rhetorician, it will be a function of 
the recognition and legitimacy conjured by the rhetorician’s canny articulation of the tradition. 
As we move now to Aristotle’s second mode of persuasion, pathos, it will become 
apparent why sacrificial rhetoric has become such a viable and important object of scrutiny. As 
Aristotle explains, “persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their 
emotions” (I.1356a14, p. 2155). For obvious reasons, sacrifice offers immense resources for 
the rhetorician to channel emotional responses in the audience. I would not go so far as to 
argue in favor of a model of rhetoric according to which the movement of persuasion leads to a 
radical de-origination of the utterance, as with Longinus, with the result that the audience 
believes they have produced the utterance themselves and a state of emotional identification 
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ensues.72 Yet with this as an asymptotic conception of the ideal workings of rhetoric, it is 
worth noting that the Christian conflation of sacrificial object and agent offers an immense 
opportunity for the rhetorician to dramatize the significance of sacrifice in a way that vivifies 
the risks and costs of a peculiarly Christian sense of the rite. 
Turning finally to Aristotle’s third mode of persuasion, logos, we will delineate two 
distinct functions produced at the level of the utterance. Regarding this mode, Aristotle 
observed that “persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or 
an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question” 
(I.1356a36 p. 2155). I would suggest that the suitability in reference to sacrifice involves not 
only orthodox interpretations of the ritual. In addition, the ritual itself hovers in the 
background, and esteemed instances of the rite, such as the Aqedah, the Crucifixion, and the 
Christian martyrs must all stand in accord with the utterance in question. Since these actual 
rites form the basis for the various interpretations, the axes of variation developed out of the 
various theories of sacrifice will illuminate the specific ways that sacrificial rhetoric both 
continues and articulates received notions of sacrifice. 
As for the specific sense of sacrifice employed in rhetoric, Burke, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca all suggest that any type of moral economy involves some sense of sacrifice, 
in the sense of an ontological operation that objectifies a system of values and actively 
instantiates a hierarchy among the values. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue convincingly 
that this term performs discursively what the ritual performs materially—namely, a 
disaggregation of values and the imposition of a valorized hierarchy.  That is, beyond the 
indication of a “realm of values,” each of which could, by definition, become a possible object 
of sacrifice (as opposed to mere res, materiality, matter, which could not), an employment of a 
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72 “Our soul is naturally uplifted by the truly great; we receive it as a joyous offering; we are filled 
with delight and pride as if we had ourselves created what we heard” (1957, p. 10). Such a description of the 
rhetorical sublime remains as a limit case, for here rhetorical success most clearly makes any possibility of 
domination into an issue of legitimacy and recognition..
sacrificial ritual or sacrificial rhetoric would differentiate among the values and single some out 
as not merely possible but actual objects of sacrifice. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatment of “argument by sacrifice” comes under the 
category of “argument by comparison,” which has the general form that, “[i]n every weighing 
of alternatives, the two terms determine each other.” In this particular case of “argumentation 
by sacrifice, the sacrifice is a measure of the value attributed to the thing for which the sacrifice 
is made” (1969, p. 248). The action of the ritual as destruction or offering, and the intention 
that it attempts to demonstrate, the renunciation, disavowal, or negation of one value in favor 
of another, gives some sense of the way that this ritual—as well as this interpretive description 
and rhetorical invocation—actually disaggregates the nebulous sphere of values and orders 
their relations into hierarchies, strata of related terms, and distinct spheres of exchange.  
Barthes defines rhetoric as a “metalanguage,” and, in particular, one “whose language-
object is ‘discourse’” (p. 12).  Insofar as rhetoric thus seeks to effect the nature of language 
itself, this is also true of the practice of sacrificial rhetoric: through the practice of rhetoric an 
authorized speaker intervenes in the circulation of the term and seeks to shift the usage of 
some in a way more in keeping with the discursive position s/he hopes to authorize. In 
reference to sacrifice in particular, whether by reversing the valence of the rite, by redefining its 
operation, or by employing the term to stage the ritual scene and insert different agents and 
objects into it, sacrificial rhetoric does not mention the term simply to reproduce it as a reified 
social fact, but seeks to problematize and redistribute its significance.Within the logos as a 
mode of persuasion, this disaggregation of values forms one of the two primary functions of 
the statements uttered by the sacrificial rhetorician.
The second primary function of the logos-mode works both in concert with the first 
and also to counteract some of its untoward effects. This is so because there is a certain 
sleight-of-hand involved in this argument, in that, even as one disaggregates the values under 
question, and achieves a hierarchical change where once there was mere contiguity, the 
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argument depends upon creating the impression that the totality of values are in fact inherently 
stable. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain,
To measure something by sacrifice presupposes that there are constant elements placed 
in a quasi-formal framework, elements which in fact are subject to variation. [...] And 
does not the very fact of renouncing something work by a kind of recoil to change the 
value of what is being renounced? Clearly we find ourselves confronted here by a 
quasi-logical argument, since the term of reference has no fixed value, but interacts 
constantly with the other elements.
  The value of the end which is sought by sacrifice is likewise modified during the 
action by the very sacrifices themselves (p. 249)
In this light, sacrificial rhetoric fixes the relations between the limited number of values under 
discussion, but there is a simultaneous destabilization of the general sphere of values of which 
the specific values are only a part. To confront this problem, sacrificial rhetoric also functions 
to consecrate the sphere of values, social structures, and social taxonomies with all their 
hierarchies. 
As with any figural usage, “sacrifice” as an element in a greater sacrificial rhetoric 
involves a carrying-over and a leaving-behind, with the result that certain elements are 
intensified and others are diminished or euphemized. Thus, in the modern world where few 
people have ever witnessed a sacrifice (even the killing of criminals, which once provided the 
occasion for sacrificial festivals, is done in private and without any sense of sanctification 
[Foucault 1979]), the material event of destruction has been effaced in favor of the process of 
sacralization, which is the way “sacrifice” is used when political leaders speak of soldiers’ 
deaths). And yet, just beneath the surface of “sacrifice” as a metaphor stands the rite which 
constitutes the topic of innumerable narratives and still manages to elicit a shudder. Thus, for 
the speaker to hear sacrifice as a dead metaphor is to participate in the euphemization of the 
real suffering of social reproduction, where one group of marginalized people suffer costs 
while others enjoy the benefits. This rhetoric functions through the simultaneous capacity for 
recognition and misrecognition, and its capacity to sanctify or consecrate the status quo. 
In addition to the general sanctification that a religious description of social phenomena 
achieves, sacrificial rhetoric’s function of disaggregation itself achieves effects of consecration, 
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for the very act of instantiating a hierarchy among values creates a sense of order and 
systematicity. As an extention of the general power exercised by authoritative interpretations, 
Bourdieu suggests,
The effect of consecration (or legitimation) exercised by explanation also causes the 
system of dispositions toward the natural world and the social world inculcated by 
conditions of existence to undergo a change of nature, in particular transmuting the 
ethos as a system of implicit schemes of action and appreciation into ethics as a 
systematized and rationalized ensemble of explicit norms. Thus, religion is predisposed 
to assume an ideological function, a practical and political function of absolutization 
of the relative and legitimation of the arbitrary.[...] (the effect of consecration as 
sacralization by “naturalization” and eternalization) (1991, p. 14, emphasis in original).
This level of consecration is typical of religious discourse in general, in that its function 
depends upon a reserve of prestige and honor that esoteric knowledge accrues at the expense 
of the exoteric and the doxic. As for the rite of sacrifice itself, it is hardly arbitrary that Mauss 
and Hubert rejected Tylor’s gift-theory of sacrifice in favor of a more material, productive 
notion of consecration. 
Hubert and Mauss observe that “sacrifice always implies a consecration” because “in 
every sacrifice an object passes from the common into the religious domain” (p. 9). Yet 
consecration is a practice whose “effects are limited to the consecrated object, be it a human or 
a thing” (ibid.). Sacrifice, by contrast, is a special kind of consecration in that its effects are not 
restricted solely to the object at hand.73  Since with this type of consecration the effects extend 
to other objects and particularly to “the moral person who bears the expenses [les frais] of the 
ceremony” (ibid; p. 201), sacrifice not only produces sacred objects but also communicates or 
mediates the effects of sacralization towards other entities, even—indeed, especially—society 
as a whole.  
Taking into account this specific notion of sacrifice as a species of consecration, as a 
rite devoted to the production of the sacred, or, better, effects of sacrality, the following 
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73 This is a significant departure from Robertson Smith, for whom the sacrificial object comes to the 
rite with an inherent sacred quality because of his presumption that the animal had totemic or kinship status. 
For the connection drawn between the victim as a totem and the categorical view of kinship in contrast to a 
quantitative view, see 1956, p. 273-7. 
description of religious effects holds especially true of sacrificial rhetoric:
Religion exercises an effect of consecration in two ways: (1) It consecrates by 
converting into limits of law, through its sanctifying sanctions, the economic and 
political limits and barriers of fact and, in particular, by contributing to the symbolic 
manipulation of aspirations, which tends to ensure the adjustment of actual hopes to 
objective possibilities. (2) It inculcates a system of consecrated practices and 
representations whose structure (structured) reproduces, in a transfigured and therefore 
misrecognizable form, the structure of economic and social relations in force in a 
determinate social formation (p. 14).
This second logos function of consecration thus helps to mitigate the destabilizing effects of 
the disaggregation that sacrificial rhetoric also create. With these complementary functions of 
disaggregation and consecration, sacrificial rhetoric can transform received hierarchies in the 
sphere of values, while at the same time disguising these articulations of the received traditions 
as restatements or recoveries. With attention paid to all three of Aristotle’s modes of 
persuasion, and special roles acknowledged by the functions of disaggregation and 
consecration, sacrificial rhetoric as a topic of scholarly scrutiny now has enough resources to 
turn to specific instances of the practice and develop a comparative treatment where diverse 
instances help to illuminate the scope of the practice. 
  Selection of the Cases
Moving from the construction of sacrificial rhetoric as a theoretical object, now I will 
discuss the cases of sacrificial rhetorizing that I will analyze, and the justifications for their 
selection.  This investigation examines the historical role played by notions of sacrifice in the 
hands of rhetoricians who transformed received conceptions of self and society. To bring these 
issues into focus, I trace a genealogy of “sacrificial rhetoric,” or the simultaneous emergence 
and use of “sacrifice” as a rhetorical figure in the elaboration of a mode of subjectivity defined 
not by the ancient allegiance to the polis, or the medieval bonds of fealty, but by the strategic 
deployment of demarcations between self and other. With the framework for the analysis of 
sacrificial rhetoric developed, and several heuristic notions to test on specific cases, the 
question now becomes, which set of sacrificial rhetoricians will best illustrate the comparative 
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potentiality of this concept of sacrificial rhetoric, and how do I intend to situate them in 
relation to one another? 
 Several studies of sacrificial rhetoric employed in the service of the modern nation-
state have appeared in recent years (Evans, 1996; Mizruchi, 1998; Strenski, 2002), making it 
clear that traditions of this rhetoric are legion.  Since any comparative project needs to limit the 
number of variables in play in order to focus attention on specific and discriminable elements, 
working within a single vernacular language seems preferable. That is, instead of addressing 
sacrificial rhetoric as a form of sacrificial mitigation or translation typical to the current epoch 
(be it “modern,” “capitalist,” etc.), I have drawn my cases from a single language, a single 
nation, and, arguably, a single discursive tradition. Because the discourse about scholarship, 
religion, and ritual in deutschophone discourse is so rich, this investigation focuses on 
sacrificial rhetoric in the German language.74 This will allow me to chart the course of 
sacrificial rhetoric in a given segment of a single nation’s discourse, and also demonstrate 
economically some of the diverse effects this rhetoric can produce. 
I want to situate this study of sacrificial rhetoric in relation to the emergence of the 
nation-state for many reasons. First, in terms of correlation, it is remarkable that historically, 
both the city-state and the empire have deployed public rituals of sacrifice for a variety of 
purposes, yet the nation-state only describes some events or functions as sacrifices, or, better, 
ascribes to them sacrificial aspects. This rhetoricalization of sacrifice is not the end of sacrifice, 
but an uncanny articulation within a long history of spiritualization and moralization. For these 
reasons, the following passage, which narrates a movement from a territory’s patrimonial body 
to a spiritual national identity, marks out events of direct relevance to this study: 
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74 A study of German sacrificial rhetoric has to address the way that the terms das Opfer and opfern, 
though false cognates with the English “offering” and “to offer”, do still carry connotations of gift and 
exchange, as one can discern from der Opferstock (“offertory box”), einem Gotte opfern (“to pay homage to or 
worship God”), and sich für etwas opfern (“to devote or dedicate one’s life to ...”). As opposed to the Latin 
sacrificium, which accords better with a sense of consecration, the German Opfer accords better with a sense of 
gift or tribute. For these reasons, both Tylor’s and Hubert and Mauss’s theories are important resources. Fur-
thermore, the theorist must constantly attend to the proximity between gift and exchange, and, finally, the liter-
ature on sacrifice must be complemented with works on gift and gift exchange. 
The transformation of the absolutist and patrimonial model consisted in a gradual 
process that replaced the theological foundation of territorial patrimony with a new 
foundation that was equally transcendent. The spiritual identity of the nation rather than 
the divine body of the king now posed the territory and population as an ideal 
abstraction. Or rather, the physical territory and population were conceived as the 
extension of the transcendent essence of the nation. The modern concept of nation thus 
inherited the patrimonial body of the monarchic state and reinvented it in a new form  
(Hardt & Negri, p. 94-95).
As the territorial body gave way to the spiritual nation, sacrificial rhetoric was on hand to 
disaggregate fixed values and consecrate emergent structures in the emerging nation-state. The 
question now becomes, which nation-state’s sacrificial rhetoric would offer the best occasion 
for scrutiny? 
I have drawn each of my case-studies from German-language writers because, of all the 
nations of Europe, the emergence of Germany offers one of the most complex narratives. Out 
of the many sub-regions that would eventually form the modern nation of Germany, one finds 
an exceptionally rich arena where the transformation from feudal-agricultural to capitalist-
industrial social relations was always in question and surrounded with an air of anxiety and 
occasional crisis. Furthermore, while there were many periods of gradual meliorism as was also 
the case with England and France, Germany lacked the decisive revolutions experienced in 
these other countries. Such revolutionary periods tend to quicken and radicalize the flows of 
sacrificial rhetoric, and, my initial studies suggested, produce sacrificial coinages whose wide-
ranging circulation tend to overdetermine the employment of sacrificial rhetoric for years to 
come.75 As opposed to this, Germany’s lack of a social revolution left sacrificial rhetoric with 
more play than elsewhere. Furthermore, the gradual nature of German social, economic, and 
political development meant that heterogeneous social processes often took place 
simultaneously, and the transformations underway were often decisive but disguised. Since, in 
contrast to England and France, little of German social transformation took place in the streets 
in the period in question, critical social effects were as likely to originate from texts as from 
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75 Strenski’s analysis of French “sacrificial discourse” before, during and after the Revolution depicted 
a sacrificial notion of citizenship that has become a familiar component of civil religion in America as well 
(2002). 
political factions. This was certainly the case with Germany’s first and only “revolution”, the 
Reformation that took place over issues that were decidedly sacrificial in nature. 
Once restricted to the world of deutschophone discourse, the possible cases are still 
dizzyingly large. For reasons I will make clear, this investigation will explore the deployment 
and transformation of sacrificial rhetoric in the texts of three of the most important figures in 
the modern world: Luther, Hegel and Weber. Although few would contest the historical 
significance of these figures, it is not the magnitude of their prestige that has guided my 
selection. I have instead delimited the scope of this study for more strategic reasons. How did I 
arrive at this choice of figures to exemplify the operations of sacrificial rhetoric?
Despite the lack of a revolution and the kind of upheavals that inaugurated modernity 
almost at a stroke in England and France, in Germany historical irruptions still figure 
prominently in the life of these figures. In fact, each lived in times that were provocative and 
troubling enough that each experienced these contemporary events as challenges and demands 
to which they had to respond.  What Bourdieu says of the prophet one could also say of them: 
“the prophet is less the ‘extraordinary’ man of whom Weber spoke than the man of 
extraordinary situations, about whom guardians of ordinary order have nothing to say, and 
with reason, since the only language which they have at their disposal is that of exorcism” (p. 
35). Each faced their times as men conscious of extraordinary situations, as each figure directly 
responded to felt or perceived historical crises, and in times of dynamic social change one can 
expect that sacrificial rhetoric will quicken as agents instrumentalize sacrifice as a figure of 
radical transformation. 
As is appropriate for a study of sacrificial rhetoric, this study begins with the 
Reformation. Although a decisive break in a rather continuous tradition of sacrificial 
transformation, the Reformation came at the end of a long process of sacrificial mitigation and 
diffusion. Through the detours of the Christian doctrine of the Eucharist and ascetic 
substitutions like chastity, poverty, and obedience, “sacrifice” had been attenuated and 
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individualized to the point that its “rhetoricalization” was simultaneously its “privatization”, 
and to these developments Luther contributed the final break. With Hegel, the French 
Revolution provoked a profound re-evaluation of the Enlightenment and its notions of science 
and truth that deemed it necessary to wage war on religion and custom in the name of a 
transformed society. Finally, with Weber, the solidification of the nation-state that Hegel lived 
through and helped champion becomes at last the occasion for a crisis of values. From the 
midst of this crisis Weber wrote the first text I will analyze, and after the catastrophic events of 
the first World War Weber wrote the text that will conclude this investigation.  In addition to 
sharing this comparative constant—that each wrote in direct response to world-changing 
events—these figures also stand together because felt within themselves not only the duty but 
the capacity to use this rhetoric and  to situate themselves and their people in relation to their 
unique place in world history. 
Given the similarity of these contexts, it will become all the clearer that for each 
sacrificial rhetorizing achieves quite different, and often even contradictory, effects.  For this 
reason, my dissertation will demonstrate that, as Luther contributed to the dissolution of feudal 
social relations, as Hegel contributed to the formation and legitimation of the Prussian state, 
and as Weber articulated the ethos of the modern scholar ensconced in the University setting, 
each figure relied upon sacrificial rhetoric in order to surpass the previous position of 
discursive specialization and articulate the emergent social relations for which they felt 
responsible. 
Nonetheless, again, despite these differences, what distinguishes the sacrificial rhetoric 
at work in writers such as Luther, Hegel, and Weber is that, although on one level they seek to 
critique or even debunk received notions of sacrifice, they are each eager to redeploy the term 
in line with their own strategies.  In fact, this notion is key to my method, in that it best 
illustrates the ethos mode of persuasion in action through the use of sacrificial rhetoric. In 
achieving this auto-authorization, each projects a negative image of their own practice and then 
  
 63 
negates that projected other. Hence, the rhetorical nature of this project is explicit and integral 
to their aims. Each figure is quite self-conscious about addressing a group of like-minded 
people and inaugurating a distinct set of roles and rights that will constitute a new position in 
the discursive division of labor. In other words, as I suggested earlier, it might be that, far from 
a situation where one could seek out an authority who would inform others of the proper 
meaning of sacrifice, in fact the invocation of proper and persuasive notions of sacrifice, and 
sacrificial rhetoric in general, serves to constitute authority itself. The connection needs to be 
examined in historical contexts, but a working hypothesis here is that, inasmuch as authorities 
define sacrifice, sacrificial rhetoric in turn  helps to install authority. 
Aside from the similarities and differences between these three figures, my readings 
demonstrate some of the textual effects that writers like Luther, Hegel and Weber can achieve 
with sacrificial rhetoric. Equally important, however, are this rhetoric’s extra-textual effects. 
Each of these figures makes strong ontological claims regarding the nature of the world and 
the society of their day. My working thesis is that sacrificial rhetoric has played a seminal role 
in the explication and legitimation of a modern, capitalist conception of the disciplined 
individual. More specifically, Luther, Hegel and Weber marshalled sacrificial rhetoric to 
legitimate and render inevitable the emergence of their own social positions as authorities in 
Christendom, the German nation and the university. In reference to these specific contexts, 
sacrificial rhetoric played a crucial role at key junctures in the articulation of social 
differentiation, state legitimation, and disciplinary specialization. Hence, a provisional 
subsidiary thesis of this investigation is that sacrificial rhetoric has proved an essential means in 
the transmission of authority from priest to pastor, philosopher and scholar, as well as the 
emergence of religious studies in the modern secular university and public sphere.
Finally, while the sphere of influence in this single discursive tradition narrows with 
each successive figure, this is in fact an effect of their own contributions to the specialization of 
scholarly disciplines and the division of labor, processes to which their sacrificial rhetoric 
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contributed.  For this reason, the endpoints of my analysis are the two social positions that this 
sacrificial rhetoric bridged: the priest and the scholar. To track this change I analyze the use of 
sacrificial rhetoric as this transformation of social authority and its transmission from the 
Church to the University and the public sphere took place. Hence, in addition to tracking social 
changes from feudalism to capitalism, and the emergence of the scholar from out of the figure 
of the priest, this investigation narrates an alternative genesis of the field of religious studies, 
one that locates its kinship far beyond the nineteenth century, as too many place it, back to the 
social heterogenization concomitant with the first rumblings of the Reformation. 
  Preliminary Remarks on the Selected Cases of Sacrificial Rhetoric
As befits his reputation as one of the most robust writers in the German language, 
Luther’s use of sacrificial rhetoric is the most overt of the cases I analyze. Out of the mass of 
Luther publications, I focus primarily on his “Lectures on Galatians” (LG). Here Luther 
employs “sacrifice” and related terms (“crucify”, “martyr”, etc.) as elements in a complex 
rhetorical effort to delineate his Pauline notion of faith. With these rhetorical figures Luther 
depicts various social and psychological phenomena as the agents and objects of sacrifice. The 
subject’s “other” is defined here not only as other subjects and objects, but also as aspects or 
faculties of the subject that stand opposed to its highest and best interests. The faculty of 
reason is foremost among these faculties, which Luther alienates and depicts as a belligerent, 
bestial, and even Satanic opponent.   
In the decisive move in his sacrificial rhetoric, Luther stripped reason from the soul and 
ascribed it to the body. And not only this, he then employed a robustly religious term—
“sacrifice”—that allowed him to “enact” the differentiation, disaggregate their values, and 
recast the distinction as a clash and the struggle between them as the inevitable sacrifice of 
reason by faith. Furthermore, to facilitate the use of “sacrifice” in his description of the relation 
between faith and reason, Luther bestialized reason, which in Thomistic thought, for instance, 
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had hitherto served as the distinguishing feature of the human species. By making reason an 
aspect of the body and faculty of works, Luther made certain that it would be feared and 
despised as a proud and contemptuous antagonist of faith. Once reason had been bestialized, it 
could become the proper object of sacrifice. By preserving the active role in the religious life 
for a sacrificing faith and the passive role for a sacrificed reason, the two faculties, once 
complementary and roughly equivalent, get redistributed into a hierarchy of values that 
instantiates a vision of the new social order. 
As one turns to Hegel, any study must come to terms with the incommensurable 
relations between present conditions of scholarly production and the titanic nature of Hegel’s 
ambitions. Because Hegel attempted to consolidate the entirety of knowledge existing in his 
time and systematize it within a rational framework, this analysis engages his oeuvre on the 
following, limited terrain. 
Hegel’s use of sacrifical rhetoric hinges upon the paradigmatic value of the free 
conscience, which he understands as his inheritance from Luther. Luther’s devaluation of 
material works, including the assemblage of ritual practices that fall into the category of 
sacrificial mitigations, sacrificed the certitude that such works produced in favor of a new but 
alienating mode of freedom. Because this freedom is based upon the knowledge that works are 
empty, at the most fundamental level Hegel posits the process of knowing as itself sacrificial, in 
that the familiarity of immediate conditions must inevitably become alienated in order to 
constitute them as objects of knowledge. Thus, it is at the price of a direct and immanent 
relation with the other, society and the world that the sacrifice of knowledge can take place. 
Taking his cue from Luther’s sacrifice understood as the movement of consciousness itself, 
Hegel modeled the function of discourse in general on this movement and rearticulated 
Luther’s insight in philosophical language to assure Germany its central place in world history. 
This Hegelian interpretation of Luther’s legacy forms the pivot of my analysis. In this light I 
trace the way that Hegel reconceives reason so that it is no longer the enemy of faith and 
freedom. Instead, reason well employed is essential to any true emancipation.  
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For Hegel, given the centrality of freedom, sacrificial rhetoric should prove 
problematic, for at some level sacrifice involves a degree of compulsion or even coercion. To 
see how Hegel negotiated this difficulty, I will examine his historical contextualization of the 
Reformation and the French Revolution in the vicissitudes of European Christianity. In light of 
this history Hegel avoids the coercive reading of sacrifice by conflating the sacrificial object 
and the agent in a way that depersonalizes the sacrificial scenario altogether. In the last pages 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG), which will constitute the core of my analysis, Hegel 
describes the final approach towards Absolute Knowing, the dialectical expenditure of Spirit’s 
forms that takes shape as a continuous and self-reproducing sacrifice. By employing a 
dialectical method that is starkly sacrificial (the dead weight and dross of outmoded forms of 
knowledge are cast away as the spirit contained within is liberated), Hegel claims to continue 
what Luther started by translating what was reasonable about religion into the language of 
philosophy. 
 Turning to the last of the three, although Weber has been a mainstay with scholars of 
religion due to his vast erudition and historical imagination, many of the studies have focused 
too exclusively on either his typology of religious agents or his historical hypotheses 
concerning rationalization and secularization Instead of treating them separately, I examine 
how they work together. Of the many types Weber isolated, I will treat two who are pivotal in 
making his historical hypotheses persuasive. The two primary types that Weber describes in 
reference to sacrificial rhetoric are late products of the historical division of labor, the 
entrepreneur and the scholar, for whom Weber serves as a philosophical spokesman. 
According to the analysis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PESC), the 
entrepreneur stands at the end of a long history of ascetic transformation. The entrepreneur 
breaks with the immediate relation to natural desires. Living in a state of constant and rational 
self-sacrifice, the entrepreneur does not enjoy the fruits of his labor, but ascetically avoids 
consumption in order to reinvest the capital in his ventures. But it is only by way of sacrificial 
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rhetoric that Weber is able to cast the discoverers of a new form of voluptuous pleasure, the 
accumulation of capital, as the stoic agents of heroic self-denial. In describing the “heroic age” 
of entrepreneurial capitalism in reference to asceticism and sacrifice, Weber rhetorically 
negotiates the exigencies of religion and economics. 
As I turn from the entrepreneur to the scholar, it is clear that Weber was painfully 
aware of the contradictory status of the scholar’s position. As both a meritocratic achiever and 
a cog in a machine, Weber examines the many ways that the guild-like aspects of the discipline 
stood in conflict with evaluations prevailing in modern societies (especially, he thought, in 
America, whose universities Germany’s were resembling more and more). Weber’s 
disenchanted view of the truth as a function of discourses embedded in institutions provides a 
starkly material basis to his description of “Science as a Vocation” (“SaV”). Because the value 
of all production in capitalist society is determined by market forces, the scholar’s output is 
bound to seem ephemeral and unimportant, especially since the march of science will soon 
make even the most provocative advance obsolete. This commodification of knowledge-
production contradicts both a labor theory of value, which apportions value according to the 
amount of labor that went into the production, as well as an aristocratic or priestly mode of 
valuation, which acknowledges the ephemeral nature of the production and thereby values it 
even more, precisely because of these sacrificial qualities. As if in protest against the iron cage 
of market forces, Weber spoke of the “intellectual sacrifice” that defines the scholar’s 
relationship to the value commitments that give comfort and orientation to the non-scholar. 
Because this sacrifice defines the minimal condition for non-prejudiced, objective work, an 
additional and in some ways contradictory sense of sacrifice comes into play in this essay. 
Needless to say, Weber’s attempts to cultivate an ethics of specialization by means of sacrificial 
rhetoric still speak to the contemporary scholar, and to the scholar of religion perhaps foremost 
of them all.  I examine how Weber employs a sacrificial rhetoric to inculcate in his auditors a 
mode of self-valorization tailor-made for the paradoxically prestigious but marginal figure of 
the scholar. 
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  Linking the Cases: A Genealogy of Sacrificial Rhetoric 
This investigation consists not only of a series of case studies, for, as noted above, 
these figures share more than a reliance on sacrificial rhetoric. Each casts a wary eye on their 
position in society and history, and for each the status of Germany in the world was a key 
issue. But even more important, each figure transformed the discursive resources at his 
disposal and transformed the position his group occupied in the social structure. What binds 
these figures even more tightly together, then, is that each deployed sacrificial rhetoric in a 
process of what one might call “auto-authorization,” in the sense of taking received discursive 
resources and effecting a displacement in the discursive field, creating thereby a new place 
from which to speak. The broad transformation from priest to scholar marks the endpoints of 
the more local displacements that each performed. 
Because each of these adjustments involved, not the incremental development of a 
continuing trend, but the revision, reversal, contestation and usurpation of positions in a 
heterogeneous social field, in addition to close readings of acts of sacrificial rhetorizing this 
work pays close attention to socio-historical context in order to trace the broader implications 
of the interventions that each writer performs. With this I take my distance from such concepts 
as enlightenment, rationalization, and secularization, grand abstractions that tend to generate 
unilinear, monocausal historical schemas.76 Schemas such as these, which one finds in 
providential or developmental conceptions of history that posits origins and ends and hence 
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76 Lest it sound as if I here reject historiography outright, I will here relate my position to Lyotard’s 
rejection of a Hegelian “philosophy of history.” Lyotard writes, “The grand narrative has lost its credibility, 
regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is speculative narrative or a narrative of 
emancipation” (1984, p. 37). I will certainly not disagree with this statement, but when he generalizes and 
rejects all “grand narratives,” one wonders how “big” the narrative can be without becoming “grand.” The 
problem with this stance is that grand or metanarratives continue to exert a world-historical force, even if we 
have become suspicious of unifying movements like “evolution” and “decadence.” As retrospective creations, as 
so many fabricated paths of necessity to the present, we still need to deal with metanarratives, if for no other 
reason than to discover their exterior principles, the anxious pressures that shape them are all but unlocatable 
in terms of the metanarratives themselves. Most importantly, Lyotard cedes too much ground here, in my 
opinion, as if metanarratives were once acceptable, and even correct, and only now have become obsolete. 
Lyotard’s position seems bound up with an epochalism (the “post-modern condition”) that is only a variant of 
another providential metanarrative. 
view history as a teleological process, have produced a great deal of historiographical insight. 
They have allowed historians to think in terms of recursive processes and historical laws 
instead of the continual irruption of singular and unforeseeable events. However, their hold on 
historical inquiry has not gone unchallenged. As a way to foreclose the possibility that this 
investigation will succumb to a unilinear and monocausal narrative arc concerning broad 
patterns in the deployment of  sacrificial rhetoric, for purposes of exposition I will employ 
aspects of the “genealogical method” as pioneered by Nietzsche and formalized by Foucault.
In an essay that was to become a programmatic statement for his theory of genealogy, 
Foucault examined in Nietzsche’s work a project other than the excavation of origins 
(Ursprünge) or the recovery of an identity. In perhaps his most influential book, Nietzsche 
attempted to trace the descent (Herkunft) or genealogy of morals. Foucault wrote this essay to 
offer a counter-method to “[a]n entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) [that] 
aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity—as a teleological movement or a 
natural process” (1977, p. 154).  Instead of an organic kernel in which a whole developmental 
arc was held in pure potentiality, the tracing of descent necessarily breaks with a monocausal 
theory of development dependent upon a fixed conception of the nature of humanity, history, 
society or culture, for “[t]he search for descent is not the erecting of foundations”; instead, “it 
shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (p. 147).  Since with 
sacrificial rhetoric what changes in its authoritative deployment is precisely such notions as 
human nature, the course of history, the structure of society and the meaning of culture, a 
method like genealogy is especially promising in that it explicitly seeks to trace the history of 
those phenomena that are supposed to have no history. 
As opposed to a view that, though sacrifice as a practice has certainly changed, and the 
formulations of sacrificial rhetoric have changed in response to changing cultural contexts, the 
sentiment of generosity and self-abnegation that sacrifice enacts is surely universal and 
timeless, Foucault argues against the notion “that feelings are immutable,” and insists that 
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“every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history” (p. 153).  Even 
in regard to the body, which would certainly form the “unity of last resort” for a humanism that 
would narrate history in terms of universals, Foucault insists that the body itself is always 
“molded by a great many distinct regimes” and, against this, “it constructs resistances.” For 
these reasons, “Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis 
for self-recognition or for understanding other men” (ibid.).  With this knowledge comes a 
task: the traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing 
the past as a continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must 
dismiss interpretations that encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge, even 
under the banner of history, does not depend on “rediscovery,” and it emphatically excludes 
the “rediscovery of ourselves.” History becomes “effective” to the degree that it “introduces 
discontinuity into our very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, 
multiplies our body and sets it against itself” (p. 153-4).  
In many ways, genealogy as a method builds upon fundamental principles of social 
scientific practices: that culture consists of an assemblage of sign systems, each of which is 
arbitrary and contingent; that social phenomena are irreducibly historical; that acts of 
denomination and description are irreducibly rhetorical, and thus political. These are all 
generally accepted premises of cultural studies. There is an additional element to the 
genealogical method, however, which derives directly from Nietzsche, and that is a sensitivity 
to the role of strategies in the non-determined play of interpretation. Hence, genealogy takes as 
its object the struggles to master an agonistic field of intersecting historical forces and agents, 
no one of which gains a pure expression or mastery unaffected by others in the play of 
engagements, reversals and transformations. In short, beginning with the presupposition that 
each individual element involved at any given zone of play is always already the construct of 
hegemonic, residual and emergent hybrids, the historical recognition and recovery of identities 
must give way to the tracing of trajectories of descent. Thus, this study of a genealogy of 
sacrificial rhetoric attempts 
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to follow the complex course of descent [...]; to identify the accidents, the minute 
deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and 
the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have 
value for us; […] to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know 
and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (p. 146).
It takes explicit guidelines such as these to resist the mesmerizing interpretation that casts the 
emergence of the scholar as necessary, sacrificial rhetorization as natural, and the emergence of 
religious studies in its modern form as the salubrious product of this best of all possible worlds. 
It is with the steadfast attention to the play of interpretation as an instance of discursive power, 
the sensitivity to the significance of reversals and contestations, that this genealogy builds on 
the basis provided by close readings of sacrificial rhetoric.
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2. Social Conflict and Sacrificial Rhetoric:
Luther’s Discursive Intervention in the Religious Division of Labor
 Introduction
Luther’s influence, not only among Protestants, but throughout Europe, and indeed the 
world as a whole, is rivaled by only a few figures in history. This is the case not only in terms 
of religious practices, whether as an influence or an irritant, a modern prophet or a schismatic, 
but also in terms of linguistic and discursive developments. Luther’s translation of the Christian 
Bible into the vernacular German established at a stroke the standard German dialect for 
centuries to come,1 but even as this consolidated German culture,2 Luther’s discursive 
production, spread by waves of text issuing from a thousand print shops throughout the 
Reformation, led to the unprecedented and lasting fragmentation of Christendom. Luther 
proved quite adept at exploiting the burgeoning print culture, yet he also recognized what a 
loose, even dangerous evangelical instrument the printed text could be.  The meaning of the 
Bible might be filled with mysteries, but, as Luther proved, the social risks and costs of 
teaching it were just as hard to fathom. Luther reacted to these social imponderables, and his 
reaction took the form of sacrificial rhetoric. Over the pastor would be able to discriminate as 
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1 The imprint of Luther’s lexical choices on the German reception of the Christian Bible, and its role 
in formulating medieval ecclesiastical Latin in the vernacular, comprises a topic of innumerable studies. On 
this, see Bluhm (1965), Gritsch (2003) and Raeder (1983).
2 According to Febvre and Martin, “Luther made a language which in all domains approaches mod-
ern German. The enormous diffusion of his works, their literary quality, the quasi-sacred character which 
belonged in the eyes of the faithful to the text of the Bible and of the New Testament as established by him, all 
this soon made his language a model. Accessible immediately to all readers, [...] the term employed by Luther 
finally conquered, and numerous words used only in medieval German were finally adopted universally. And 
his vocabulary imposed itself in so imperious a fashion that most printers did not dare to diverge from it in the 
least” (1950, p. 483), quoted in McLuhan (1965, p. 230).
he mediated between the Word and the congregation. As a living communicant of the word, 
the pastor could preach the gospel of faith’s sacrifice of reason with a message tailored to the 
particular needs of his congregation. 
To address the discursive influence of a figure with such a long and eventful career, this 
chapter will address Luther by means of a specific conjuncture. Among the factors involved, 
one finds, first, that Luther displayed a canny sense of the strategic potentials latent in the 
relationship between Latin and the vernacular, as well as oral and print culture. Second, Luther 
developed a principle of sola scriptura based on a constructed sense of the Christian Bible as a 
transcendent object of devotion, which in many ways protected the text against its sudden loss 
of aura as vernacular printed copies became virtually ubiquitous.3 Third, the doctrine of sola 
fides, or “by faith alone,” led to a new status of reason in the Protestant model of human 
nature that was to have profound influence on the scholarly examination of human behavior. 
Finally, Luther exercised lasting influence in developing an articulation in the religious division 
of labor whereby the authority of the religious leader derived from fundamentally different 
sources: as opposed to the priest, the pastor’s authority drew less from historical succession 
than from a vertical relation of expertise in transmitting the immaterial spirit of Scripture. In 
light of these factors, this chapter will examine the way that Luther's exegetical work 
rhetoricalized sacrifice, and, in doing so, constructed a new discursive position, the pastor as 
anti-sophist, or parrhesiast, in the religious division of labor. 
 Approaching Luther’s Historical Significance
In Luther’s text a discursive deployment takes form that will have a long and complex 
future. Because in Luther’s thought every ritual, as a mitigated sacrifice, comes under critique, 
so that neither monastic asceticism, sacramental expenditure nor alms-giving remain properly 
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3 This reference echoes Benjamin’s thesis regarding the art object’s loss of aura in the age of mechan-
ical reproduction (1969). If this took place with art, I would suggest that it also took place with scripture, and 
Luther’s exegesis developed in a way that contructed a reserve of the sacred beyond the printed text.
sacrificial, it would appear that only Jesus’s crucifixion and Christian martyrdom (both ancient 
and contemporary4) count as sacrifices.5 For this reason, it is all the more remarkable to read 
Luther speak of faith in the violent idiom of sacrifice. By focusing upon specific passages 
where this “sacrifice of faith” takes place, I will show how the violence of the imagery serves 
as an inverse indicator of the degree to which “sacrifice” has become interiorized, a problem of 
proper conceptualization, and thus a matter of rhetoric. His sacrifical rhetoric encapsulates all 
the ambivalence of Luther’s personality, and the violence and fury of Luther’s vituperative 
language goes to great lengths to mask the fact that this sacrifice is purely rhetorical. It is 
rhetorical because outside of the speech acts that describe the actualization of faith as a 
sacrifice, there is nothing phenomenal in play at all, but only a hypothetical conflict of the 
human faculties. Having stripped away the ritualized practices that rooted sacrifice in the 
medieval world of experience, Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric is set free, to the point that a 
“sacrifice” becomes nothing more than a discursive effect—yet a discursive effect with wide-
ranging, extra-discrusive effects. In addition to the role that Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric played 
in constructing the role of the pastor, I will suggest how its depiction of what is properly 
human survived into the modern world.
Even the most scholarly studies of Luther tend to focus on the psychological or 
hermeneutical locus of Luther’s insight or conversion to the doctrine of sola fides. As Luther’s 
response to the mercenary practices of simony, indulgences, and other clerical abuses 
(Dykerma and Oberman, 1992), this doctrine, and the intransigence with which Luther 
preached it, has long obsessed scholars who would trace it causally to its influences and 
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4 Gregory suggests that Luther accorded utter reality to the significance of contemporary martyrs, to 
the point that “Luther himself seems to have struggled with the fact that other evangelicals were being martyred 
instead of him” (1999, p. 104). Oberman notes that Luther viewed contemporary martyrdoms as signs of the 
success of the Reformation (1989, p. 265-9).
5 Even the eucharist, for Luther, was not a sacrifice, for Luther “decisively violated the incarnational 
ordering of reality by his rejection of transubstantiation as well as his understanding of the mass as a testament 
and not a sacrifice” (Headley, 1987, p. 31). 
source. Such a focus on a conversion or metanoia, however, tends to give it singular status in 
an investigation, and  makes other transitions, reversals or inversion into determined and 
necessary responses to this singular historical event. A genealogy, however, needs to address a 
wider set of such transformations, both psychological and discursive, exegetical and 
institutional. For this reason, this study sets out to study a much later, and much less noticed, 
reversal, a change less in the content of the doctrine than in its its expression: the turn to 
sacrificial rhetoric late in Luther’s career. 
For a genealogy to locate the emergence of sacrificial rhetoric in Luther’s historical 
context, the scholar cannot adopt the topos of conversion, inspiration, revelation or 
hierophany.6 To do so would situate this investigation on a theological and not a genea-logical 
terrain. Far more important here is to examine the way that Luther achieves this 
rhetoricalization of sacrifice, and delineate the strategies he utilizes to make it effective. 
For these reasons, this chapter will not pursue the matter of the triggering event or 
singular irruption which marked a break between any set of epochal pairs, either between the 
truly catholic Church and the diversity of schismatic Christianities, the enlightenment of the 
Renaissance and the retrenchment of the Reformation,7 or the Medieval and Early Modern 
periods.8 Instead of reading Luther and the Reformation through the lens of this singular 
irruption coded as the doctrine of “by faith, not works,” this chapter will trace the paradoxical 
discursive consequences as Luther returns to a pre-eminent form of “work”—namely, 
sacrifice—in other to legitimate a certain view of human nature and authorize a transformed 
figure—the pastor—on the terrain of the religious division of labor. 
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6 As a first complication, a treatment of Luther’s pedagogical and psychological preparations for his 
“insight” would need situation in reference to the anti-clericalism that was endemic in Luther’s day. On this 
topic, see Dipple (1996). 
7 After a period where Nietzsche viewed him as a nationalist hero, he later viewed Luther as a reac-
tionary, medieval figure opposed to the Renaissance. On this topic, see Bluhm (1956).
8 For the foremost proponent of the view that Luther should be examined as a late medieval, and not 
proto-modern, figure, see Oberman (1974). 
Social historians and other commentators have suggested repeatedly that the 
Reformation marks a watershed moment in European history,9 but for reasons drastically 
different than the religious and theological motivations that one might expect. Although to 
Luther his production was important because it recovered the original message of Christianity, 
that it is by faith alone and not by works that the Christian is justified, the radical transform-
ation that ensued had as much to do with formal discursive changes as it had to do with the 
content. That is, though the message or content of the doctrine was clearly important as an 
impetus to its circulation, the fact that it was widely circulated in the vernacular, along with 
most of Luther’s writings as well as those of many others, both supporting and opposing his 
positions, marks a change that is at least as decisive.  As much as the content of Luther’s 
theological position, the radical change that the Reformation brought meant that discourse in 
Europe would now take place in multiple media, languages and fora.10 When faced with 
fundamental doctrinal and devotional challenges, no longer would the Christian Church 
maintain a monopoly on theological positions by means of appropriation and incorporation (as 
was the case with Franciscan movement, which was subsequently brought under the umbrella 
of the church as a third type of order, the mendicant friars [Rosenwein & Little, 1974]) or 
rejection and extirpation (as was the case with the Waldensians and the Albigensians, who 
were excommunicated as heretics and subsequently eradicated in the course of the Fourth 
Crusade). With Luther’s challenge taken up by pamphleteers and printers across the region, a 
synergy between doctrinal contestation and discursive production occurred that impelled the 
Reformation farther and far more intensively than had previous counter-Church and reform 
movements.
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9 There is still considerable variation in opinion concerning the historical status of the Reformation. 
Baeumer presses the question whether the Reformation was a Revolution (1985).
10 Habermas has written the most important work assessing the importance of this discursive prolifera-
tion, eventually constituting what he calls the “public sphere” (1989). Mattelart’s work deals more specifically 
deals with media developments (1985). Wohlfeil (2001) puts the origins of this development firmly within the 
sphere of the Reformation.
To explore Luther’s contribution to the development of the public sphere, and his use 
of sacrificial rhetoric to construct the pastor as an agent to counteract some of its ill 
consequences, this investigation draws on the work of Bourdieu (1991), whose work has not 
yet been widely accepted into the canon of Religious Studies. Because I analyze the way that 
discourse and rhetoric leads not only to hermeneutical change, but also to shifts in the division 
of labor, Bourdieu’s work provides many resources. In particular, to analyze the impact that 
the changing discursive terrain had on Luther’s writing, I must avoid a simplistic dichotomy 
between a Church monopoly and an emerging free market of discourse known as the public 
sphere. Here I do not speak of “free markets” as the proponents of rational-choice methods 
do,11 primarily because there is no such thing. A market is impossible without a wide gamut of 
implicit and explicit regulations, with the result that there are degrees of regulation in any given 
market environment, and never can one adequately deal with the factors at play in these 
milieux with a binary typology of free and unfree. Aside from the rhetorical dividend that 
describing the American “religious marketplace” as “free” accrues among the ideologues of 
economism, it is incredibly detrimental to analysis for it blinds the scholar to the very real 
regulations that are always in effect, as well as the never-ending struggle to monopolize the 
scarce social resources of legitimacy and authority. Hence, in speaking of monopolies and 
markets I follow Bourdieu in seeking only to describe the flow of transactions between agents 
in a given socio-cultural milieu.
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11 To speak of markets and capital need not entail all the assumptions of rational-choice theory, nor 
lead to the type of analyses that bear the mark of Nobel-laureate Gary Becker’s influence (1965, 1993). Stark, 
Finke and Iannacone have been the most prominent religious studies scholars to promote this method. They 
each tend to employ a notion of “sacrifice” that is as far as possible from the approach developed in this study. 
While their analyses have provided some interesting reversals of conventional wisdom, the shortcomings of 
their approach are legion. 
 Luther’s Effect on the Structure of the Religious Field
Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone had radical consequences for the 
devotional life of the committed Christians, for it entailed a complete break with the authority 
and ritual traditions of the Christian church. In reference to the status of the eucharistic mass, 
the keystone of the Church’s structure of authority, although still committed to the “real 
presence” of the Eucharist,12 for Luther this reality no longer depended upon the priest as a 
guarantor of ritual efficacity by means of apostolic succession traced back to Jesus’s 
transmission of authority to Peter. Because they transformed relations between secular and 
sacred spheres, the division of labor and social reproduction in general, Luther’s doctrines 
effected a radical transformation in social typologies of many kinds. After this radical break, 
Luther returned later in life to correct the reception of his doctrines. If the early Luther broke 
with the sacrificial basis of Church sacraments, the later one employed sacrificial rhetoric to 
transform received notions of worship and devotion, thereby making Christian sacrifice more a 
matter of rhetoric than ritual. Whether as the initiator of the Reformation or the conservative 
voice opposed to its radicalization, Luther effected social change in a way that a merely 
political revolt could not have accomplished. Luther did not initiate the practice of sacrificial 
rhetoric, but he did take it in directions that were unprecedented in the history of Church 
dogma. 
Because rituals were the sole provenance of priests who administered them under the 
auspices of apostolic succession, Luther directly challenged the importance of ritual and 
doctrine as a monopolized means toward salvation. In moving from a monopolized means of 
salvation toward a marketplace of doctrines, Luther fit his pastor for this new state of the 
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12  Drawing from Luther’s two early (1520) texts, Treatise on the New Testament, that is, the Holy 
Mass and The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, Davis argues that “Luther makes the theological move from 
the mass as a sacrifice and a good work to the position that a proper and Christian mass is the proclamation of 
Christ's testament (the forgiveness of sins) by means of the Words of Institution” (1999, p. 325). Also, see 
Osborne (2002) for the nominalist background of Luther’s position, and Chilton (1992, 2002) for deep back-
ground in early Christianity.
religious field. This is not to say, of course, that this is what Luther sought at the outset of the 
Reformation. Indeed, he insisted that he was only recovering the Church's true and original 
doctrine of justification from under the sophistical accretions of power-hungry popes and 
priests. Thus, like so many tectonic social transformations, this one took place behind the 
backs of its agents, accomplishing ends far different from those they set out to achieve. Indeed, 
this defines the very nature of market transactions, the system-wide impact of local actions that 
leads to the production of unintended consequences. 
It is important to reiterate that this breakdown of the Church’s religious monopoly did 
not take place only in the realm of dogma and sacrament. The proliferation of doctrines and 
practices beyond any possible synthesis or systematization was facilitated by the rise of 
vernacular literacy and printing (Davis, 1960; Edwards, 1994). Thus, Pettegree argues that 
“the Reformation dates not from the publication of the ninety-five theses in October 1517, but 
from Luther's decision the following year to publish a defence of his views in German” (2005, 
p. 163). Not only, then, does the Reformation move from a monopolized elite language to a 
demotic one, but this is also a move from restricted discursive production to a wider, print-
mediated regime of vernacular production and distribution. 
As this process proceeded, Luther inevitably became aware of its dangers. Already in 
the early years of the Reformation Luther was wary of antinomian and anarchistic 
interpretations of his doctrines. Since Luther’s challenge to sacred authorities depended 
ultimately upon the support of secular rulers, he was often very explicit in defending his 
doctrines against such conclusions. Furthermore, Luther remained wary of the powerful media 
he exploited since in his first letter to a publisher of his pamphlets Luther remarked that these 
are not the best way to “instruct the public” (Pettegree, p. 164). By the time he was at work on 
his “Lecture on Galatians” (LG)13 the unintended consequences of his challenge to Tetzel and 
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13 In epistolam S. Pauli ad galata Commentarius, in German translation, Vorlesung über den Galater-
brief. These were Luther’s oral lectures that were copied by his secretary and then countersigned as official. For 
this reason, although they consist of commentaries on Paul’s letter, I will speak of them as lectures to under-
Rome was obvious: innumerable antinomian prophets led heretical sects into violent uprisings, 
all under the banner of Luther's Reformation. Hence, there are two reasons to focus on 
Luther's lectures. First, with them we encounter many of the issues that arise between author 
and audience. Luther he delivered these orally in Latin, but with occasional German 
interjections, and subsequently oversaw their translation and, in the case of many, 
countersigned them as authoritative. For this reason, they serve as emblems of Luther’s 
discursive production, and touch upon most of the various strategies and means he employed 
to influence the spread of doctrines and the course of historical events.  Thus, Luther’s lectures 
on scripture can serve as a synechdoche of Luther's reformation experience, and allow this 
analysis to track, within a single document, the discursive transition from guild-monopoly to 
market-system. 
Because these commentaries are quite late, we will discover some developments that 
Luther employs to regulate the anarchy of the market. Even as Luther employs sacrificial 
rhetoric to authorize his doctrine against the contending ones of scholastics and humanists, he 
employs a polemically defined conception of reason to construct the figure of the pastor whose 
role it is to protect the congregation against the sophists at the gate. In addition to more 
traditional descriptions of the pastor as shepherd, here it is not safekeeping and guiding in 
general that define the work of the pastor, but defending against the more specific and 
impending dangers personified in the figures of the humanists and the scholastics.
 Luther and the Christian Tradition of Sacrificial Rhetoric
The overarching question for this inquiry is, how did a particular religious ritual like 
sacrifice come to serve as such a widespread rhetorical figure? When faced with the immense 
historical distance between, first, the public destruction of wealth or butchering of an animal, 
and, last, a speech act describing non-ritual phenomena as a sacrifice, one measures the 
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score the rhetorical setting from which they issued. 
distance not only in years but also in religious and cultural transformation. In this section I 
briefly account for the way that, historically, sacrifice began as a delimitable public rite and 
then diffused throughout all Christian worship, with the consequence that, when Luther broke 
with works, he was at root breaking with sacrifice. 
Arguably, the rhetoricalization of sacrifice traces back to the Hellenistic cultural milieu 
wherein Greek, Roman and Judaic religious and philosphical reflection intermingled, and the 
topic of sacrifice emerged as a contentious intercultural topic. From out of prophetic and 
poetic speculations regarding the true meaning and function of sacrifice, enough answers were 
produced to allow for great flexibility in the ascription of sacrificial significance to a wide 
variety of behavior. That is, in the dialectic between received cultural practices, which tend to 
be inherently conservative, and attitudes and conceptions concerning these practices, which can 
change quickly and abruptly, the transformation of sacrifice and its significance was inevitable. 
From the assignation of sacrificial significance to the crucifixion of Jesus, early 
Christians had to acknowledge this unique sacrifice and, at the same time, negotiate the 
connotations received and expectations imposed by other religions in the Hellenistic milieu.14  
There were always great tension in Christianity between the strong sense in Greco-Roman 
religion that the sacrifice was a type of gift which could assume the sense of tribute or even a 
bribe, and the Judaic sense that sacrifice served as an homage to a transcendent deity from 
whom one could never expect, much less demand, a relation of reciprocity.15  Between bribe 
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14 Many canonical, early Christian letters and sermons translated the death of Jesus into a sacrificial 
idiom. By means of dichotomies such as human and animal, singular and cyclical, as well as living and dead,  
in these texts Christ’s sacrifice replaced and surpassed the public ritual cycles of offering dead animals in 
sacrifice with a single living sacrifice of the most perfect possible being. In Hebrews 10.10, we read: “εν ω 
θεληματι ηγιαsμενοι εsμεν δια τηV προsφοραV του sωματοV του ιηsου χριsτου εφαπαξ [And it is by God’s 
will that we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all]” (all English 
translations are from the New Revised Standard Version, NRSV). This Luther translates as “In diesem Willen 
sind wir geheiligt auf einmal durch das Opfer des Leibes Jesu Christi.”
15 Young explains that the Christians were the sole religious group in the Roman empire to reject all 
public sacrificial rituals. This is not to say, however, that they decisively rejected and broke with the received 
importance of sacrifice, for the early Christians embraced many of the sacrificial notions prevalent among both 
Jews and pagans, even as they rejected the public practices of both (1983, p. 46). 
and homage, Christians tried a third way by diminishing the importance of the sacrificial object. 
In short, along the processual axis early Christianity shifted the focus from the transformation 
of the object toward the transformation of the agent. There were salubrious echoes of the 
sacrifice of Jesus to encourage this shift of focus. In Hebrews 9.11-14, the writer stresses the 
singular and sufficient nature of Christ’s sacrifice by emphasizing not only the superiority of 
human over animal blood, but also the identity between the sacrificial agent (the “high priest”) 
and the sacrificial object (the “blood offering”). While in no way unique, I would suggest that 
this identity between the sacrificial object and agent16 leads to the spiritualization of sacrifice 
and provides an element of flexibility to sacrificial rhetoric in the Christian tradition. 
To specify a method to achieve this spiritualization or rationalization of sacrifice, in 
Hebrews the author adopts the prophetic moralization of sacrifice as he enjoins his followers 
“continually offer a sacrifice of praise to God” and “to do good and to share what you have, 
for such sacrifices are pleasing to God” (Hebrews 13.15-16).17 As a result, in the earliest days 
of Christianity one can find a radical redeployment of ancient sacrificial themes, and a novel 
conjunction of transcendent and quotidian notions of sacrificial practices.
 The Fathers of the early Church, including Barnabas, Tertullian, Hilary, Chrysostom 
and Cyprian, reiterated this description of the crucifixion as a sacrifice. Even when Tertullian 
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16 With the identity of sacrificial agent and object in Christ, it was necessary to transmit this priestly 
authority to the Church. The passage where Jesus calls Peter his “rock upon which the Church will be built” 
achieved this, as did the Church fathers who spoke of sacrifice in many different ways so as to generate priestly 
authority. According to Pelikan, “Chrysostom also spoke of ‘the Lord being sacrificed and laid upon the altar 
and the priest standing and praying over the victim,” summarizing the sacrificial language about the Eucharist 
which has also become accepted practice. Therefore the apostles, too, were represented as priests” (1971, p. 25).
17 “15 δι αυτου ουν αναφερωμεν θυsιαν αινεsεωV διαπαντοV τω θεω τουτεsτιν καρπον χειλεων 
ομολογουντων τω ονοματι αυτου  16 τηV  δε ευποιιαV και κοινωνιαV μη επιλανθανεsθε τοιαυταιV γαρ θυsιαιV 
ευαρεsτειται ο θεοV [Through him, then, let us continually offer a sacrifice of praise to God, that is, the fruit of 
the lips that confess his name. Do not neglect to do good and to share what you have, for such sacrifices are 
pleasing to God (NRSV)],” which Luther translated as “So lasset uns nun opfern durch ihn das Lobopfer Gott 
allezeit, das ist die Frucht der Lippen, die seinen Namen bekennen. Wohlzutun und mitzuteilen vergesset nicht; 
denn solche Opfer gefallen Gott wohl.” The Greek term Paul used for sacrifice, thusiai, is one of many Greek 
terms for sacrifice. This particular rite most often consisted of a burnt victim directed toward the Olympian 
gods.   
spoke of the crucifixion in terms of a “satisfaction” which echoed Roman private law, the 
overtones of sacrifice were not lost (Pelikan, p. 146-7).  In Ignatius of Antioch’s Letter to the 
Romans (beginning of the second century CE), martyrdom is not only accepted as a sacrifice, it 
is actively sought. Once the persecutions ended in the post-Constantine era, the exemplary 
nature of the martyrs needed to find a new form of expression. Soon there developed a more 
sublimated disciplinization of the will that pulls back from the extreme of a suicidal passion and 
attempts to harness the martyr’s prestige to quotidian and rational pursuits. As one scholar of 
this transition describes, “When the age of the martyrs had passed, it became necessary for the 
Christian to express his desire to imitate Christ in some other way.[...] [T]he ascetical life came 
to be looked upon as a martyrium cotidianum, and the concept of spiritual martyrdom was 
born” (Malone, p. vii). As these quotidian martyrdoms developed their scope outpace doctrinal 
sanction, yet the Desert fathers set the ascetics example, and soon whole communities devoted 
to ascetic practices developed, and the monastic ideal was born. As Malone explained, “There 
was no conscious effort on the part of the Fathers of the Church to discover or set up a new 
ideal of perfection as a substitute for martyrdom as the ideal of perfection.” Nonetheless, 
Spiritual martyrdom became the vocation of the monk, only when the ascetical life 
became a fixed vocation with the establishment of the monastic institute. Gradually the 
ascetic, and then the monk came to fill the place that had been left vacant by the martyr. 
The martyr had been the great champion of the Christian host, the athlete of God, the 
leader in the militia spiritualis which the Church employs against the forces of evil. 
These ideas were eventually transferred to the monk as the one who most nearly 
emulated the heroism of the martyr (p. vii-viii). 
The place of the martyr was left empty as the drama of persecution gave way to the routine of 
institutionalization. Though the positions, duties and exemplary function changed, the fact that 
the church needed such an exemplary figure marks the continuity between martyrdom and 
asceticism. On this continuity between sacrifice and monastic asceticism, we have no less an 
authority than Gregory making the following prescription: “We ought to immolate to God [...] 
the daily sacrifice of our  tears, the daily offerings of His flesh and blood” (quoted in Pelikan, 
p. 356) Monastic discipline thereafter would constitute a quotidian, routinized sacrifice. 
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Certain problems beset any exemplary religious specialist. For asceticism to serve as 
form of sacrifice, natural desires must be renounced, but in these communities it was 
impossible to prevent a distinct prestige economy from emerging, with the result that the 
rigorous discipline of natural desires led to the desire, not only for the discipline itself, but also 
for the esteem among one’s peers and superiors that such discipline could garner. Asceticism 
construed as a sacrifice thus faces a fundamental paradox, in that, with the mobility of desire, 
temptations do not stay rooted in only a natural mode, but soon develop in unforeseen ways to 
constitute a second-nature that can be as corrupting as the first. Even the desire to be 
exemplary itself can become corrupting, yet the cost of renouncing, not only the natural 
pleasures, but the pagan virtues of honor and courage as well, would be to deny the desire for 
honor and prestige as an engine of ethical development. The desire for esteem and recognition 
in the eyes of one's peers must be despised, and yet Church writers acknowledged the 
exemplarity of asceticism both within and without the monastery. To square this circle, the 
monastery had to cast ascetic exemplarity as purely educational, and in no way enmeshed in the 
worldliness of a local prestige economy. Hence the monastery quickly became less a refuge 
from the world than an early form of the schola, and the chief pedagogical institution bridging 
the ancient and the medieval worlds. Above all, the monasteries provided a pedagogy in 
paradoxes, which brings us to the case of Martin Luther. Though this  institution produced 
Luther, its paradoxes also led him to turn against it, not because he could not adhere to its 
strictures, but because he pushed them to their breaking point. 
Although the transformation from priestly sacrifice to martyrdom and asceticism might 
appear to be a strange and unexpected path, one could argue that all these developments were 
apparent in novo in the New Testament. For Christianity, and Luther, perhaps, in particular, 
few events in this history of sacrificial transformation have been as decisive as Paul’s 
interpretation of the relationship between the Hebrew “Law” and Jesus’s crucifixion. In a way 
that links to the conflation of the sacrificial agent and object in Hebrews, Paul’s directive in 
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Romans enjoins such a conflation as the supreme worship for all Christians . In what was to 
become a pivotal moment in the history of Christian dogma, Paul argued that the death and 
resurrection of Jesus had “fulfilled” the Law of Moses, and beseeched others to “present your 
bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship” 
(Romans 12.1).18 This formulation, which endorsed the incorporation of the public ritual of 
sacrifice into the worshiper's body, led to an intensive focus on both physical and doctrinal 
purity. In conjunction with his rejection of circumcision and other acts of ritual piety, or 
“works”, Paul shifts the emphasis from the Torah’s complementary conception of faith (pistis) 
and works, to focus more decisively on the former.19 Hence, the rhetorical redefinition of 
“sacrifice” informed the pursuit of individual holiness through the transformed sacrificial 
practices of martyrdom and monastic asceticism. 
This background constitutes the dual-channeled heritage of sacrificial transformation 
that Luther encountered in the monastery. As an Augustinian monk Luther soon adopted 
Paul’s emphasis on faith over works and became the most vociferous critic of monastic 
  
 86 
_________________________
18 Romans 12.1 “παρακαλω ουν υμαV αδελφοι δια των οικτιρμων του θεου παραsτηsαι τα sωματα 
υμων θυsιαν ζωsαν αγιαν ευαρεsτον τω θεω την  λατρειαν υμων [I appeal to you therefore, brothers and 
sisters, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is 
your spiritual worship (New Revised Standard Version)].” Luther translated this as follows: “Ich ermahne euch 
nun, liebe Brüder, durch die Barmherzigkeit Gottes, daß ihr eure Leiber begebet zum Opfer, das da lebendig, 
heilig und Gott wohlgefällig sei, welches sei euer vernünftiger Gottesdienst.” Here we do not have the equi-
vocation in the English translation between “spiritual” and “reasonable” or “rational.” In German, Luther opts 
for a sacrifice that connects to vernünftiger (sensible or reasonable) and thus Vernunft, or reason, which will be 
decisive for his later deployment of sacrificial rhetoric. 
19 At the end of a pivotal passage from Romans 2:25–9, we read that “real circumcision is a matter of 
the heart–it is spiritual and not literal.” In Romans 4:9–12, Paul asserts that Abraham, who “received the sign 
of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness that he had by faith while he was still uncircumcised,” is there-
fore “the ancestor of all who believe without being circumcised and who thus have righteousness reckoned to 
them.” In Romans 4.24–5, Paul brings righteousness, faith, and sacrifice into one formulation: “[Righteous-
ness] will be reckoned to us who believe in him who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was handed over 
to death for our trespasses and was raised for our justification.” Unlike the passage from Hebrews, the passive 
construction of this last passage indicates that, for Paul, God was the agent and Jesus was the passive but will-
ing object of this sacrifice. In the early days of Christianity, then, there was still a great amount of play in 
regards to these sacrificial interpretations. 
practices, dismissing them as “works” of the “Law.”20 As befits Luther’s critique of works, in 
his 1516–7 (pub. 1519) exegesis of Galatians there are few mentions of sacrifice, yet in his 
1531 (pub. 1535) version the text is suffused with sacrificial rhetoric. Although Paul's “Letter 
to the Galatians,” which deals specifically with the status of Jewish law and ritual in the still 
forming Christian churches, provided fertile opportunity for Luther's discussion of sacrifice, 
because of this difference in the editions we cannot explain the emergence of sacrificial rhetoric 
as simply the consequence of his exegetical object. One can, however, hypothesize that, as the 
Reformation took shape and proceeded, and proved an unwieldy movement for one leader to 
steer, one of Luther's rhetorical goals was to clarify the proper nature of Christian sacrifice, 
and thereby construct a new type of religious specialist. 
 Sacrifice and the Critique of Works 
In formulating Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric as an object of scrutiny, I am taking a 
different trajectory than much Luther scholarship.21 Indeed, because Luther came to reject 
what he saw as the abuse of allegory22  and insisted on the literal truth of scripture, a rhetorical 
treatment could seem an inappropriate approach to Luther's text. Since my focus here will be 
on Luther's “Lectures on Galatians” this analysis will shift the rhetorical study of Luther from 
his sermons, which has garnered some attention (Edwards, 1983; Hobson, 2002; Matheson, 
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20 On Luther’s part in the reformation, Harnack claims that, “judged by its religious kernel,” it is “a 
restoration of Pauline Christianity in the spirit of the new age” (1957, p. 541). 
21  Because Luther was an Augustinian monk, and Augustine himself entered public life as a 
Quintillian-influenced professor of rhetoric, Luther's rhetorical practices have gained some attention, but most 
often in regards to his pastoral practice of employing epideictic discourse in his sermons.
22 According to Cranz, “The firm tie between the literal sense of the Bible and its spiritual reality, 
threatened by humanism and nominalism, is reestablished by Luther as the literal and the anagogic senses coin-
cide in faith” (p. 102). Reinke connects this to the impact of printing: “Luther's shift from allegory to metaphor 
involves precisely the kind of psychic transformation occasioned by sustained exposure to the printed text, and 
that the structure of the Reformation ‘word-faith’ theology may be grounded in this transformation. If so, the 
freedom about which he writes is not so much that of a Christian man as of a literate man, and his reform pro-
gram shares a great deal more in common with sixteenth-century iconoclasts and defenders of the printed page 
than is usually granted” (p. 395).
1998; Oberman, 1988; Vickers, 1988), to his scriptural exegesis, where debate usually centers 
upon the theological cogency of his arguments. To insist on the rhetorical nature of Luther’s 
commentary already suggests a skeptical attitude towards any exegesis that attempts to “speak 
the truth” of a given text.23  Nonetheless, in speaking of Luther's commentaries as rhetorical 
performances, one does not necessarily negate the theological truth-claims, but one does 
inevitably bring different resources to bear on the theological claims. These are quite amenable 
to rhetorical study, as they directly bridge the transition from speech-event to public text. 
Indeed, my reading will highlight the degree to which Luther's exegesis of Paul uses Scripture 
as a point of departure for addressing wider social tensions in early sixteenth-century Europe. 
That is, like any good rhetorician, with one eye on the received tradition and the other on his 
heterogeneous audience of readers, Luther sought social change through the primary work of 
reformulating the fundamental categories of existence. 
Finally, this rhetorical treatment of the theological plausibility of Luther’s truth-claims 
will allow us to focus on the categorical infrastructure that forms the condition of possibility of 
the text’s truth-effects. In other words, through the lens of rhetoric we can examine how 
Luther attempts to persuade his audience regarding the truth of sacrifice. A rhetorical analysis 
provides a more promising framework for this topic because, since Luther strove to empty 
most rituals of religious significance, I contend that “sacrifice” itself thereby became solely a 
matter of rhetoric. That is, with Luther, sacrifice becomes a solely discursive effect, a 
consequence of the way that one talks about an act or event.24 I will further show how this led 
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23 In the preface to The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes, “Commentary questions discourse as to 
what it says and intended to say; […] in stating what has been said, one has to re-state what has never been 
said.” Ultimately, commentary “tries to transmit an old, unyielding discourse seemingly silent to itself, into 
another, more prolix discourse that is both more archaic and more contemporary.” In this project lies “con-
cealed a strange attitude towards language: to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified over 
the signifier; a necessary, unformulated remainder of thought that language has left in the shade—a remainder 
that is the very essence of that thought, driven outside its secret—but to comment also presupposes that this 
unspoken element slumbers within speech (parole), and that, by a superabundance proper to the signifier, one 
may, in questioning it, give voice to a content that was not explicitly signified” (1973, p. xvi). 
24 Davis argues that, despite Luther’s defense of the “real presence” of the Eucharist, he never strayed 
to Luther's disenchantment of reason and the authorization of the pastor as a figure with new 
duties in the religious division of labor. 
Given the emergence of Luther's sacrificial rhetoric in the 1535 “Lectures on 
Galatians,” one could hypothesize that, as the Reformation took shape and proceeded, it 
became imperative to clarify the proper nature of Christian sacrifice. This concern with 
defining a proper sacrifice accords with the very nature of rhetoric. As noted in the 
introduction, the transition from confusion and conflict to a resolution defined by the 
restoration of the proper and the just forms perhaps the fundamental motif of rhetorical 
practice. Just as, at its origin, rhetoric concerned itself with determining “proprietorship” and 
the “proper”, we can see that Luther was bedeviled by the question: Of the competing factions 
in Christendom, which will become the proprietor of sacrifice? 
To recapitulate, after Paul it was no longer necessary for a Christian to undergo 
circumcision, sacrifice at the Temple, or observe other ritual markers of Hebrew identity. What 
remained was an emphasis on holiness which, combined with the early exemplary martyrs, 
moved along several variational-axes (the practical, towards rhetoric; the transformational, 
towards the subject; the referential, towards the performative) to create a dual idiom of 
sacrifice: both an extreme form, to the point of self-annihilation in the case of martyrdom, and 
a more “rational” or mitigated form in the case of asceticism. It was in this context that Luther 
set forth key dichotomies, such as Law versus Gospel and active versus passive righteousness, 
that defined his critique of “works.” This critique he never abandoned or significantly modified, 
but in the later commentary on Galatians there is significant novelty in regards to his treatment 
of the topic. 
Early in his 1535 “Lectures on Galatians,” Luther states that “Christian righteousness 
[Iustitiam christianam] […] is heavenly and passive [coelestis et passiva].[…] We do not 
perform it; we accept it by faith, through which we ascend beyond all laws and works 
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from the notion that the Word was more fundamental than the Mass (1999). 
[ascendimus supra omnes leges et opera]” (LG, p. 8; p. 46). Later, Luther presents a short 
conversion narrative wherein he personifies the devotee of active righteousness. After casting 
himself in the role of the sacrificial agent, Luther laments, “I crucified Christ daily in my 
monastic life [Ego in monachatu Christum quotidie crucifixi]. […] I observed chastity, 
poverty, and obedience.[…] Nevertheless, under the cover of this sanctity and confidence I 
was nursing incessant […] blasphemy against God” (LG, p. 70; p. 137). Luther’s routinized 
ascetic crucifixion of himself sought to repeat and thus replace the one sacrifice, and becomes a 
usurpation of Jesus’s sacrifice. As is typical of the genre of conversion narratives, Luther 
stages a dramatic inversion of values. As opposed to an Occamist or humanist reliance on the 
will, as would befit his education, to Luther the human will is completely corrupt as a result of 
the Fall,25 making the ritual observances that depend upon the agent's contrite will worse than 
useless. Thus, a doctrine that accords a place for human agency in the work of salvation is not 
only misguided; by diverting hope from its rightful object, namely, God’s grace, it places one 
on the side of Satan.26 How, then, can sacrifice escape this critique and serve as the figure for 
the full actualization of Christian righteousness? 
 Through the course of events, Luther employed sacrificial rhetoric to accrue the 
authority that, since antiquity, he who defines or administers sacrifice garners. In a sense, he 
could not sacrifice sacrifice, but had to appropriate it, especially since, as the Reformation 
continued and both spread and intensified, Luther came to acknowledge that the truth of 
Christian dogma and worship would henceforth become an object of contention. Thus, despite 
his critique of works and rejection of the quotidian and routinized sacrifices that he had 
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25 Luther makes this abundantly clear in his debate with Erasmus (Erasmus/Luther 1969). For more 
on Luther’s “grammar of the will,” see O'Rourke Boyle (1985).
26  Soon thereafter one reads: “For Satan loves such saints and treats as his own beloved those who 
destroy their own bodies and souls, and who deprive themselves of all the blessings of the gifts of God.[...] 
[S]uch saints are the slaves of Satan.[...] But these men, far from acknowledging that their abominations, 
idolatries, and wicked acts of worship are sins, actually declare that they are a sacrifice pleasing to God 
[acceptissimum Deo sacrificium]” (LG, p. 70; p. 138). 
practiced in the form of monastic asceticism, Luther was driven back to claim a form of 
sacrifice for his own position. 
This is even more problematic when one considers that, since Christian sacrifice had 
completely dismissed the use of a sacrificial object, and had collapsed the sacrificial agent and 
the object into one, the will to sacrifice had long served as the default object of sacrifice. That 
is, through asceticism, one negated the natural will, the will towards natural desires, and 
promoted the contrite will, the will towards sacrifice and devotion. Luther, however, in his 
polemical exchange with Erasmus, had totally rejected the notion of free will. If one could not 
bring one’s will to the altar, how could one still speak of sacrifice at all? Despite these 
problems, my hypothesis is that Luther was driven to this by polemical necessity. If this is the 
case, to understand Luther’s deployment of sacrificial rhetoric it is necessary to understand 
those who Luther regarded as his antagonists. 
In addition to a choleric temperament that served him well in the theological disputes of 
his day, Luther's deployment of the grammatical quantifier sola to isolate fides from leges in 
his translations of Paul entailed a remarkable combativeness towards any position that would 
combine his “solisms”27  with any other desiderata of righteousness. Among these, the 
positions of humanists and scholastic theologians particularly earn his scorn.  Both camps 
looked to Greek and Hellenistic texts as resources for contemporary issues, with the 
scholastics incorporating Aristotelian developments into established neo-Platonic elements of 
Christianity, and humanists seeking to recover classical learning in a more holistic sense. Of 
course, there were many contentious issues separating Luther's opponents. For example, in 
matters of scripture and practice the humanist rallying cry was “ad fontes!” Because this return 
to the sources had the consequence of circumventing the continuity of Church tradition, the 
humanists thereby challenged scholastic, and especially Dominican, hegemony. Nonetheless, 
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27 Rublack employed the collective term of “solisms” to describe Luther's closed the set of authorita-
tive resources: “sola gratia, sola Christus, sola fides, sola scriptura” (1985, p. 31). 
although there was much tension between humanists and scholastics, what they shared—and 
what damned them in Luther's eyes—was an admiration for virtuous pagans and a central role 
for reason in the Christian life. 
To Erasmus, for example, virtuous pagans like Aristotle and Cicero had, through the 
right use of reason, approximated many of the moral teachings of scripture. In his debate with 
Luther on the nature of the will, Erasmus asserted that even “in those who lack grace […] 
reason was obscured but not extinguished.” Believing that the right use of reason can take one 
very far along the path towards righteousness, Erasmus could argue that, among the pagans, 
“philosophers, without the light of faith, and without the assistance of Holy Scripture, drew 
from created things the knowledge of the everlasting power and divinity of God, and left many 
precepts concerning the good life, agreeing wholeheartedly with the teachings of the Gospels” 
(1969, p. 49).28 To Luther, such a statement did little more than insult the divinity’s revelation 
by mingling it with the tepid moral admonitions and specious metaphysics of benighted pagans. 
The very idea that reason could help make one moral was preposterous, since, as a result of 
the Fall, humans were mired in their own iniquity with God’s grace as their only vehicle of 
righteousness. However, this conflict concerning the status of pagan authors was itself but the 
effect of a more fundamental rift. 
For both humanists and scholastics, humans were created by a benevolent creator, who 
endowed each person with the faculties necessary to attain some limited knowledge of the 
divine. As a result, revelation and reason enjoyed a complementary relation. To Aquinas, 
it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature, are most true, so 
much so that it is impossible to think them to be false. Nor is it lawful to deem false 
that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing then that 
the false alone is opposed to the true, as evidently appears if we examine their 
definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those 
principles which reason knows naturally (1924, p. 14). 
 To Aquinas, there were complementary modes of truth, and neither the truths of reason nor 
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28 For excellent discussions of the relations of dependence and antagonism between Luther and 
Erasmus, see Rummel (1995 and 1999).
the truths of faith could be false. Nonetheless, since it was “reason” that authorized Erasmus's 
admiration for Cicero and Aquinas's admiration for Aristotle, Luther decried this extension of 
prestige beyond the Christian world. 
Yet Luther’s antagonism to these schools was not total.  Despite the hostility that 
Luther displayed both to scholasticism and, more sporadically, humanism, he certainly took 
what he needed from both movements, and the debt is often deep indeed. The number of texts 
that underscore Luther’s relationship to humanism, especially in its northern variant as 
embodied in the work of Erasmus, are increasing rapidly year by year. Whether the devotio 
moderna emphasis on lay education as a critical component of proper Christian devotion,29 the 
preference for rhetoric over scholastic dialectic, or the importance of language study as a tool 
for scriptural exegesis, on many fronts Luther shared the humanist outlook. Certainly Luther’s 
Bible could not have been translated without the groundwork laid both by Erasmus on the 
Greek New Testament, and by Reuchlin on the Hebrew language and scripture. What is less 
often noted is Luther’s tendency to employ scholastic distinctions and motifs in order to 
persuade his audience. That is, Aristotelian, Thomistic and Scholastic elements provided key 
rhetorical resources for Luther, which he used despite his express position on their pedigree, 
and his rejection of scholasticism as an example of a theologia gloria, a theology that glorifies 
human beings and robs God of his proper praise.30 
 Luther’s Rhetoricalization of Worship
Before examining the hyperbolic polemic of Luther’s later sacrificial rhetoric, I want to 
suggest that, though seemingly paradoxical in light of his critique of works, its emergence is 
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29 On this see Oberman on the distinctiveness of the via moderna movement as it opposed a con-
structed via antiqua position (1987).
30 From early in his teaching career Luther taught Aristotle. He did so conscientiously, though he 
quickly resented the place the scholastics claimed for Aristotle in the church. As I argue, though, Aristotelian 
ethical and metaphysical precepts shaped Luther’s thought more deeply than his public statements would lead 
one to believe. On this topic, see Spitz (1996).
actually in keeping with principles he espoused early in his career concerning the persuasive 
capacity of worship. In “The Freedom of  a Christian,” as Aristotle often introduces a topic by 
listing what esteemed predecessors have said about it, and noting the contradictions, Luther 
begins this work with a paradox: “A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all [freier Herr über 
alle ding] subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all [dienstbar Knecht 
aller ding], subject to all” (FC, p. 344; p. 21). Though Aristotle would then proceed to seek a 
resolution, Luther leaves the paradox in place as a provocative test of reason. Further on, 
Luther makes many references to Aristotelian distinctions regarding the four fundamental types 
of cause, which help him distinguish the primary modes of devotion from secondary and 
tertiary ones.31 In addition, the following is very close to an Aristotelian ethical program: 
Although, as I have said, a man is abundantly and sufficiently justified by faith inwardly, 
in his spirit [...], [i]n this life he must control his own body and have dealings with men. 
Here the works begin; here a man cannot enjoy leisure; here he must indeed take care 
to discipline his body by fastings, watchings, labors, and other reasonable discipline 
[messiger zucht32] and to subject it to the Spirit so that it will obey and conform to the 
inner man and faith and not revolt against faith and hinder the inner man, as it is the 
nature of the body to do if it is not held in check (FC, p. 358; p. 30).
The notion of “reasonable” discipline seems to accord a primary role to reason one’s ethical 
development, and will appear incongruous in relation to Luther’s later depiction of reason’s 
role in Christian life. 
Still, one would not want to overstate the proximity between Aristotle and Luther. 
While the gap here between the pagan and Christian pursuit of virtue is indeed minimal, this is 
not to say that they are identical. Take the following for instance: “these works reduce the 
body to subjection and purify it of its evil lusts, and ourwhole purpose is to be directed only 
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31 “Illustrations of the same truth can be seen in all trades. A good or a bad house does not make a 
good or a bad builder; but a good or a bad builder makes a good or a bad house. And in general, the work never 
makes the workman like itself, but the workman makes the work like himself. So it is with the works of man. 
As the man is, whether believer or unbeliever, so also is his work—good if it was done in faith, wicked if it was 
done in unbelief. But the converse is not true, that the work makes the man either a believer or an unbeliever. 
As works do not make a man a believer, so also they do not make him righteous” (p. 361; p. 32-33).
32 Luther’s German echoes Aristotle even more closely: the semantic domain of messiger includes 
measuring and gauging, and Zucht means discipline, but also cultivation and breeding.
toward the driving out of lusts. Since by faith the soul is cleansed and made to love God, it 
desires that all things, and especially its own body, shall be purified so that all things may join 
with it in loving and praising God” (FC, p. 359; p. 30-1). For Luther, the Pauline heritage of 
purity, itself derived from Hebrew rituals, still determined the nature of Christian ethics. With 
Aristotle, by contrast, there is only the pursuit of virtue as the mean between vicious extremes, 
and no sense that one could rid oneself completely of natural desires. Luther’s ethics with its 
goal of perfection thus differs markedly from Aristotelian phronesis. 
Nonetheless, not much later one finds Luther depicting exactly this kind of “practical 
wisdom” as the goal of the Christian as well: “In this way everyone will easily be able to learn 
for himself the limit and discretion, as they say, of his bodily castigations, for he will fast, 
watch, and labor as much as he finds sufficient to repress the lasciviousness and lust of his 
body”(FC, p. 359; p. 31). Luther here advises a kind of middle way between an asceticism that 
weakens the body and one that pursues ecstatic castigations. Just as many humanists rejected 
any extreme emotionalism in worship, so too Luther rejected the pursuit of both ecstatic and 
weakened states by means of ascetic rigors: 
But those who presume to be justified by works do not regard the mortifying of the 
lusts, but only the works themselves, and think that if only they have done as many and 
as great works as are possible, they have done well and have become righteous. At 
times they even addle their brains and destroy, or at least render useless, their natural 
strength with their works. This is the height of folly [große Torheit] and utter 
ignorance of Christian life and faith, that a man should seek to be justified and saved by 
works and without faith (FC, p. 360; p. 31). 
He connected this with mistaking the proper ends of worship, and taking bodily discipline not 
as a means but as an end in itself.  All this indicates that the influence on Luther is evident, 
though their stature in the Church he explicitly rejected. Regarding the principles to employ 
that would avoid the pitfalls of devotion, Luther borrows markedly from both humanist and 
scholastic discourse.
In regards to the method of illustrating his points, Luther comes close to a specific 
reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the four types of causes (FC, p. 358-362; p. 30-3).  
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On another point, the role of rhetoric in education, Luther might well have been channeling 
Quintilian when he depicts worship as more directed towards others than to establishing a 
relation with God: “For a Christian, as a free man, will say, ‘I will fast, pray, do this and that as 
men command, not because it is necessary to my righteousness or salvation; but that I may 
show due respect to the pope, the bishop, the community, a magistrate, or my neighbor, and 
give them an example. I will do and suffer all things, just as Christ did and suffered far more 
for me’” (FC, p. 370; p. 37). Here we see a growing concern indicated by a shift: if as a 
consequence of the critique of works the Christian no longer believes that worship earns 
salvation, but instead justification is an unmerited gift of divine grace, then devotional practices 
should be rejected. But we must also be wary of teaching false opinions of faith and works to 
others. The pressure of sociality itself, and the possibility of misunderstanding the critique of 
works and the gospel of faith, affects the type of worship that one pursues.  It is a direct 
consequence of the critique of works—our worship earns nothing, but they do have social 
effects in convincing others of one’s living faith. Indeed, one could say that Luther takes the 
exemplary function of the monk and, as he did with the calling, secularizes this exemplarity and 
enjoins all Christians to become an example unto others. What is remarkable, though, as we 
will see, is that Luther in effect makes worship itself rhetorical, in that we should repeat the 
example that Christ set. Since this example was conditioned by the society in which he lived, 
and the people to whom he preached, Christian devotion  should have the same kind of 
targeted effect. For someone who was so intransigent on so many matters, and who insisted on 
the literal truth of scripture, this promotion of a middle way might seem surprising. My point 
here is that it should not be, and the late turn to sacrificial rhetoric is another case of Luther’s 
pragmatic, pedagogical perspective. 
This rhetoricalization of worship becomes even clearer later in the text. Luther was 
very cautious against misinterpretations. “There are very many who, when they hear of this 
freedom of faith, immediately turn it into an occasion for the flesh and think that now all things 
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are allowed them. They want to show that they are free men and Christians only by despising 
and finding fault with ceremonies, traditions, and human laws” (FC, p. 373; p. 38). Against this 
antinomian interpretation which interprets the critique of works as a doctrine of anti-works, 
Luther reiterates this position: “Our faith in Christ does not free us from works but from false 
opinions concerning works, that is, from the foolish presump-tion that justification is acquired 
by works” (FC, p. 373; p. 38). But the possibility of false opinions concerning worship means 
that one cannot simply act in such a way that does not take one’s neighbor into account. 
Luther therefore argues that he is opposed to the role that works have come to play, but not 
that he is against any role that the might play, in particular, a rhetorical one. It is this that 
pushes Luther to make worship itself rhetorical.
If forms of worship are to be rhetorical, a fixed form like monastic asceticism will not 
suffice. Like any successful attempt at persuasion, here one must know one’s audience. 
Against the extremes of ecstatic and flagellant asceticism, and the fixed form of monastic 
regimentation, Luther insisted that “the Christian must take a middle course” (FC, p. 373; p. 37 
). What is most remarkable here, however, is that Luther describes this as a middle course, but 
under the cloak of the familiar Aristotelian precept, Luther advises an oscillation depending 
upon who it is that observes one’s worship. The Christian
will meet first the unyielding, stubborn ceremonialists who like deaf adders are not 
willing to hear the truth of liberty [Ps. 58:4] but, having no faith, boast of, prescribe, 
and insist upon their ceremonies as means of justification. Such were the Jews of old, 
who were unwilling to learn how to do good. These he must resist, do the very 
opposite, and offend them boldly lest by their impious views they drag many with them 
into error. In the presence of such men it is good to eat meat, break the fasts, and for 
the sake of the liberty of faith do other things which they regard as the greatest of sins 
(FC,p. 373; p. 37).
In the face of these observers, Luther recommends, not to pursue a middle way, but ot offend 
boldly, to engage in the same antinomian behavior that he had proscribed earlier, but now it is 
condoned because it is rhetorically effective. This antinomianism is positively exemplary, just 
as in antiquity the Cynics taught by means of the demonstrative and shocking gesture. Hence, 
in this case I think one could not say that the Aristotelian and scholastic framework was for 
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Luther an unconscious, acculturated inheritance. In this instance, he used scholasticism to pass 
of his radical position as Aristotelian orthodoxy. 
If this is one rhetorical strategy of worship, the other actually endorses a relapse into 
the practice of works. Works here are acceptable to Luther so long as one does not believe 
that they earn salvation. With this rhetorical sense of worship, the payoff is not for oneself, but 
for others. This strategy is adapted to these others,  
the simple-minded, ignorant men, weak in the faith, as the Apostle calls them, who 
cannot yet grasp the liberty of faith, even if they were willing to do so [Rom. 14:1]. 
These he must take care not to offend. He must yield to their weakness until they are 
more fully instructed. Since they do and think as they do, not because they are stub-
bornly wicked, but only because their faith is weak, the fasts and other things which 
they consider necessary must be observed to avoid giving them offense. This is the 
command of love which would harm no one but would serve all men (FC, p. 374; p. 
38).
It is too much to say that Luther here advocates worshiping in a way at odds with one’s faith, 
but he does argue that with the gospel of faith worship is no longer an instrument of salvation, 
and so, in regards to this utmost concern, is a matter of indifference. If worship still matters, it 
is as an instrument of evangelism, not soteriology. In methods and modes of rhetoric there is 
much borrowing and intermingling between Luther and the humanists and scholastics, though 
between them the status of reason emerges as the definitive distinction. 
To look ahead, this overriding concern for instruction links Luther’s rhetoricalization of 
worship, and sacrifice in particular, to his sense of the pastor’s duties in the community’s 
division of labor. Speaking of the the “weak in faith,” Luther insists, “It is not by their fault 
that they are weak, but by that of their pastors who have taken them captive with the snares of 
their traditions and have wickedly used these traditions as rods with which to beat them. They 
should have been delivered from these pastors by the teachings of faith and freedom” (FC, p. 
374; p. 38). These pastors and their work are wicked and misleading. In 1520, it was still 
possible to think that “teachings”, whether spoken sermons or disembodied texts, could correct 
the work of pastors. Luther’s strategy will shift: as rhetorical instruments, texts cannot 
compete with a living being, especially one who exhibits expertise in both spoken rhetoric and 
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the rhetoricalization of worship. For this reason, later in life, even as Luther intensifies his 
rhetoric, he still needs to construct the pastor for fully effective evangelism.   
To Luther, pagan authors offer only a semblance of reason and morality that threatened 
to seduce the scholastic theologian and the humanist philologist away from scripture.33 Against 
his rivals, then, Luther wants to defend his solisms, and the way to do this is to topple reason 
from its place at the pinnacle of human faculties. Indeed, with this goal, Luther's discourse 
becomes the most explicitly rhetorical, for, taking Barthes' definition of rhetoric as a 
“metalanguage […] whose language-object [is] ‘discourse’” (1988, p. 12), Luther’s 
revalorization of reason challenges both the epistemological status of language itself and the 
social prestige that it commands.
In arguing that faith alone constitutes Christian righteousness, like Paul before him 
Luther has to undermine any collaborative or complementary relation between faith and 
reason. Actually, for a writer whose vision was dominated by such stark dualisms as those of 
the two kingdoms (the “Kingdom of Earth” [regnum mundi] and the “Kingdom of Christ” 
[regnum Christi]), as well as the oppositions between the Hebrew “Law” and the Christian 
Gospel, dissolving this collaborative relationship between faith and reason constitutes but a 
single example of a more general strategy. Given Luther’s penchant for dichotomizing, then, 
instances where Luther mediates these dualisms, such as the “Bride of Christ” analogy in 
“Freedom of a Christian,” have drawn much scrutiny.34 With this metaphor, however, it is 
Christ who extends the matrimonial hand, so that Luther depicts the action of grace, an 
unmerited condescencion. With sacrifice, by contrast, one deals with a human action, one that 
has become unnecessary since the Crucifixion. To speak of this most costly gesture instead of a 
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33 Although aware of this danger, Luther did defend the pedagogical, as opposed to the spiritual, role 
of pagan literature.  See Harran (1985) and Lindhardt (1986).
34 For a good example, see Oberman's discussion of perhaps the most celebrated of these instances. In 
Luther’s  Freedom of a Christian he describes the “third incomparable benefit of faith” as “unit[ing] the soul 
with Christ, as a bride is united with her bridegroom. By this mystery, … Christ and the soul become one 
flesh.” For a compelling discussion of this topic, see Oberman (1974, p. 23ff). 
resolution or reconciliation, Luther’s sacrificial mediation between the sacred and the profane 
underscores the violence of the operation. It is as if, by an exigency of Luther’s rhetoric, 
difference almost inevitably entails opposition, and opposition, ineradicable strife. With Luther, 
“sacrifice” as a figure encapsulates this tendency. Furthermore, this correlates with a general 
darkening of the Reformation’s “good news” towards the end of Luther’s lifetime.35
 The Problem of Praising Faith
In his commentary on Paul’s assertion that Abraham's faith was “reckoned to him as 
righteousness,” Luther writes, “With these words Paul makes faith in God the supreme 
worship, the supreme allegiance, the supreme obedience, and the supreme sacrifice [Et Paulus 
hic ex fide in Deum summum cultum, summum obsequium, summan obedientiam et 
sacrificium facit ex fide in Deum]” (LG, p. 226-7; p. 360).36  The question immediately arises, 
how can faith, however understood, in any way resemble the ritual butchering of an animal or a 
public expenditure of some mitigated form of wealth? What is the cost, one might ask, of a 
“sacrifice of faith”? To dispense completely with the expenditure (one almost wants to say, “to 
negate the negation”37) seems to nullify the notion of “sacrifice” entirely. Furthermore, how 
can the writer most trenchantly opposed to all works, the entire spectrum of mitigated 
sacrifices that had filtered into every aspect of medieval life, employ the very figure at the 
foundation of this edifice? One option is to keep with the Christian conflation of sacrificial 
agent and object, so that the cost in terms of a valued object is not entailed at all. Yet this 
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35 It became clear to him that, though he was prepared for the doctrine of sola fides by the rigors of 
monastic asceticism, for those who did not prepare the way with passionate devotion, the message working 
quite differently. On this, McCue on “Luther and the Problem of Popular Preaching” (1985), which makes 
some similar points about the Luther’s rhetoric that I made earlier in regard to the rhetoricalization of worship.
36 Luther follows this formulation with, “Whoever is an orator, let him develop this topic [Qui Rhetor 
est, exaggeret hunc locum …].” Note the way that with this invitation Luther creates distance between himself 
and the rhetorician and thereby disavows the rhetorical nature of his commentary.
37 This Hegelian formulation has informed many more recent interpretations of sacrifice, such as those 
of Bataille (1990) and Nancy (1991). 
raises another problem. If, along the transformational axis, it is  not the object but the subject 
that is sacrificed, how does this avoid involving the will? Luther must empty sacrifice of its 
connotations of voluntarism, of a work that one undertakes, but how is one to divest an act of 
its agent, an action of its spontaneity? 
As Feuerbach argued in his reading of Luther, for the latter the operative distinction 
was not Creator versus the Created, as with the scholastics; rather, it was God versus Man. 
Defined in terms that are both complementary and negating, by means of an implicit scholastic 
attribution of predicates to proper subjects, what God truly possesses, of that humans are 
wholly bereft.  Humans are defined not in relation to their own properties or faculties which 
are the created gifts of God, for since Creation the Fall has intervened. Instead, humans are 
defined directly in relation to God—that is, as precisely not-God, and thus without any of 
God’s characteristics, such as true knowledge and a benevolent will. According to Feuerbach’s 
reading of Luther,  
To every lack in man there is opposed a perfection in God; God is and has exactly what 
man is not and has not. Whatever is attributed to God is denied to man, and 
contrariwise whatever one gives to man one takes from God.[...] The less God is, so 
much more is man; the less man is, so much more is God.[...] The nullity of man is the 
presupposition of the reality of God. To affirm God is to negate man; to honor God is 
to scorn man; to praise God is to revile man. The glory of God rests only on the 
lowliness of man, divine blessedness only on human misery, divine wisdom only on 
human folly, divine power only on human weakness (1967, p. 33).
 The emphasis thereby falls not on how a benevolent God equipped humans to develop a 
faithful knowledge of the divine, but on human limitation, ignorance and weakness. Theology 
therefore turns not on the available links between the human and the divine (the divine light of 
reason, the sublimity and order of nature, etc.), but on the abyss that categorically divides 
them. In this way, Luther can construct an analogy with faith and reason falling on either side 
of the fault line between salvation and damnation: as God is to man, and faith is to reason, so 
salvation is to damnation. Human reason now emerges both as the allegorical representative of 
agency and the author of all the works that lure the Christian away from the true Gospel. One 
can see already in this depiction of the human condition a key moment in the conception of 
agency that will allow for a separation between sacrifice and works.
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With human reason now singled out and abstracted from the complex of human 
faculties, Luther can link reason and works and move the primary locus of the agon between 
faith and reason into the soul of the aspiring believer. This move too is cast as a return to 
origins, but unlike the humanists or scholastics, who Luther accused of treating Greek and 
Roman pagans as authorities, the fontes for Luther’s move is a Hebrew. As Luther explains, 
“[f]aith certainly had this struggle with reason [Istam luctam profecto habuit fides cum 
ratione] in Abraham” (LG, p. 228;  p. 362).38  With faith on God's side, though, the struggle 
could seem unequal. Lest this psychic conflict lack pathos, Luther emphasizes repeatedly how 
especially onerous it is that a thing as low as reason challenges God, who should rightly be 
worshiped and esteemed by all. Reason is such a terrible enemy “because it despises God and 
denies His wisdom, justice, power, truthfulness, mercy, majesty, and divinity”—that is, it 
would ascribe to humans the power to justify themselves by means of works. By contrast, “by 
this same sacrifice [those who by faith reject the pretensions of reason] ascribe glory to 
God.[...] Therefore no greater, better, or more pleasing religion or worship can be found in the 
world than faith” (p. 229; p. 363). The opposition, then, based upon the notion of reason as the 
faculty of work, involves an inverse distribution of the flows of praise. Since human reason 
only seeks to glorify itself (LG, p. 322; p. 462), in performing its works, however apparently 
pious, it despises God (LG, p. 228-9; p. 368).  But there is more to this struggle than the 
challenge of an upstart faculty that does not know its place.
What is the nature of this antagonism between faith and reason? Over what do they 
contend, and on which field of battle? As one might guess, this enmity pivots upon Luther’s 
critique of works. Because works are nothing and grace is all, faith attributes all praise to God, 
but reason, having erroneously deduced the efficacy of works, wants only to praise itself. 
When Luther notes that “Paul makes such a boast of his calling that he despises all the others,” 
  
 102 
_________________________
38 In this passage, Luther speaks repeatedly of either the agent or faith slaughtering [occidit], slaying 
[mactat, mactavit] killing [mortificant], or sacrificing [sacrificavit] reason. In instances like this, the most 
charged religious term among the group lends its sacramental overtones to the other more quotidian terms.
Luther shifts the value of this behavior in order to make a point about the proper attitude of 
worship and devotion: “this style of boasting is necessary. It has to do, not with the glory of 
Paul or with our glory but with the glory of God; and by it the sacrifice of praise and 
thanksgiving is offered up to Him [Ibi gloriatur deus, sacrificatur ei sacrificium laudis et 
gratitudinis]” (LG, p. 17; p. 57). Boasting of faith is not ill-mannered or boorish, it is an 
essential form of worship, praising God. The reversal here is abrupt and complete: despising 
reason and works directly equals the sacrifice of praise to God. The continuity between true 
theology and sacrificial offerings relies not upon the material efficacy of the rite in coercing a 
divine response, but wholly upon the interpretation of sacrifice as a sign (and only a sign) of a 
deferential and worshipful attitude.  Luther presents this sacrifice as a gesture of deference, 
tribute and praise to God. To insist that this is only a sign, a means of communication, seems 
to require some interpretive distance from the Mass as a sacrificial ritual. The sacrifice that 
Luther describes here differs fundamentally from the “real presence” of God in the Eucharist. 
With utter intransigence Luther held this position against the Swiss Reformed symbolic 
interpretation of the Mass, despite the eventual break with Zwingli that this entailed. Luther 
kept the reality of the Mass despite his critique of works by claiming that the Eucharist 
becomes the body of Christ by precisely as a result of divine participation, and has nothing to 
do with human agency, priestly or congregational. Thus, this “sacrifice of praise” is an offering 
that the Christian makes to God, while the Mass is God’s miraculous manifestation among the 
congregants in a way analogous to the God’s bestowal of grace upon the individual. 
Here then is the key to Luther's construction of a sacrifice that circumvents the critique 
of works: by means of a sacrifice that is simultaneously the destruction of reason and the 
manifestation of faith, this operation consists entirely in a communicative gensture that 
indicates a shift in perspective, a reconceptualization. Luther's sense of the impiety of reason, 
as well as the sacrifice of faith, both hinge upon the disaggregating work of correctly defining 
one's concept of the “glorious” and the “praiseworthy.”
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Though Luther’s sacrifice seems to involve a religious labor of reconceptualization and 
the maintenance of proper conceptions, one could still interpret this as ensnared within the 
sphere of works that presume to earn justification. How, then, does Luther walk the tightrope 
between conceiving of a “true Christian sacrifice” and laying claim to it, and resurrecting 
sacrifice as just one more false work? This is an especially acute problem here, for the 
revalorization of received values courts the danger of starting a process that one cannot stop. 
Even if one learns to praise faith and the gift of grace instead of reason and its works, how can 
Luther be sure his auditors will know to avoid praising faith for its sacrifice of reason? Could 
sacrifice become a valiant and praiseworthy but scandalously paradoxical “work” of faith? 
Because sacrifice involves such a violent presentation of agency, how can this rhetoric avoid a 
too-literal reading that takes the action of faith’s sacrifice in the active sense?  With an 
unprepared or uneducable congregation, it might be that all metaphorical depictions of “faith” 
materialize it too much. That is, once moving beyond a quasi-mystical adumbration of divine 
knowledge, we always run the same risk of transforming faith defined as non-work and non-
knowledge into a false reification and a new form of work. Does Luther's conception of the 
“sacrifice of faith” do this as well, but simply brings this problem more clearly to the surface? 
Despite these dangers, I would argue that the flexibility of Luther's sacrificial rhetoric 
allows him to tread this fine line, primarily because of a key innovation: instead of depicting 
sacrifice as an act that one could actively pursue or passively undergo, Luther builds on the 
Christian tendency to conflate the sacrificial agents and object, and makes this sacrifice one 
that is more quotidian than asceticism, and one to perform perpetually. 
 Importing Sacrifice into the Subject
The sacrificial cognates of Eucharist, asceticism, charity, monasticism and scholasticism 
at play in Luther’s time all fell prey to his critique. As opposed to these material, worldly 
works, Luther argued that one did not sacrifice to achieve salvation; instead, salvation was a 
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gift of grace from God, and all one had to do was prepare oneself to receive it. Thus, at the 
level of empirical behavior, sacrifice and “works” were forbidden; the term itself, however, was 
so highly charged that in rhetorical terms Luther found that he could not do without it. Thus, 
when he came to describe the necessity of faith and not works as found in Galatians, Luther 
described the state of receptivity necessary to receive grace as one that is produced through a 
“sacrifice of faith.” Here, the genitive does double duty, for it is both “a faithful sacrifice” and 
“the sacrifice that faith makes.” The question then becomes, what does faith sacrifice?  It is 
reason itself that faith puts on the altar. For this reason, what distinguishes Luther as a 
theologian, at least as much as his exclusive emphasis on faith, is the degradation of reason that 
he performs as a result of assigning it to the realm of the body instead of the soul. Arguably, 
then, what distinguishes Luther as a decisive figure in Christian history is less the increased 
status of faith than the diminished status of reason. 
As is typical of Christian sacrifice, Luther makes the individual subject simultaneously 
the sacrificial agent and object. Yet his split is not between the spirit and the body, but 
between reason and faith. In making “reason” the sacrificial object and thus splitting the 
subject, Luther combines aspects of the martyr and the monk. That is, the sacrificial idiom is no 
longer split between the passive sacrifice of martyrdom (passive because it came to seem 
presumptuous and ostentatious to seek martyrdom actively)39 and the active sacrifice of ascetic 
renunciation (active because construed as the religious will turned against a natural will to 
enact the willful sacrifice of the will). With the passive and the active aspects of sacrifice both 
resonating, Luther synthesizes the dual idioms of sacrifice: both an extreme form, to the point 
of self-annihilation in the case of martyrdom, and a more “rational” or mitigated form in the 
case of asceticism. Thus, far from leaping out of the continuum of Church doctrine and 
practice, Luther rather closes the circle: through the detours of the Eucharist and ascetic 
substitutions like chastity, poverty, and obedience, “sacrifice” had become attenuated and 
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39 Young and Malone both offer good accounts of these developments.
individualized to the point that its two distinct idioms of violent self-annihilation and rational 
mitigation could meet in Luther’s rhetorical deployment, a culmination that was simultaneously 
invisible and absolute.
One consequence of Luther’s deployment of sacrificial rhetoric was to renounce any 
goal of a united or harmonious subject.40 Pitting one element of the psyche against another, 
Luther takes Abraham as his model and imports the spiritual battlefield into the subject.  While 
also recognizable as a practice of monastic asceticism and a stage of conversion narratives, the 
difference here is that this conflict is not chronic or accidental, but essential and absolute. No 
longer do we see Saint Anthony or Benedict tempted by the demonic passions and the bestial 
urges of the body; now, reason itself, that which was most human, that which distinguished 
humans from the animals, becomes the (hitherto praised, henceforth despised) object of 
sacrifice. This is the consequence of the rhetorical work of redistributing phenomena into the 
categories of the “praiseworthy” and the “contemptible”, the “sacrificeable” and the 
“unsacrificeable.” Furthermore, because this rhetorical work is never finished, the sacrifice 
never ceases to take place, for as soon as faith emerges from its agon with reason and, flush 
with battle, misappropriates the outcome and praises its own triumph, one can know that this 
faith is again only reason in disguise, and the battle must continue.  
 The Bestialization of Reason & the Monstrosity of Sophism
With reason cast in the role of a sacrificial object, already this sharp rebuke to its 
pretensions treats it implicitly as something fleshy or even animalistic. Luther does not leave 
this insult implicit, however, but exhibits great glee in bestializing reason. Indeed, though 
Luther depicts reason as a beast unworthy of praise and worthy of sacrifice, reason is not a 
merely natural beast, for to serve as the enemy of God it must appear unnatural, anti-natural, 
  
 106 
_________________________
40 Since both reason and faith contend over the status of works and grace, I suspect that Luther depicts 
this struggle along the lines of the scholastic practice of the quaestio disputata (Lawn, 1993). 
even monstrous. To achieve this, Luther attacks reason, not as a human faculty of overweening 
pride, but as a beast: “faith slaughters reason and kills the beast that the whole world and all 
the creatures cannot kill” (LG, p. 228; p. 362). Going one step further and divesting reason 
completely of all its esteem, Luther insists that we must “exclude all works [exclusis omnibus 
operibus]” in order to destroy “the heads of the beast called reason, which is the fountainhead 
of all evils [capitibus huius bestiae quae vocatur Ratio, quae est fons fontium omnium 
malorum]” (LG, p. 230;  p. 365). By not only bestializing reason, but metaphorically ascribing 
to it characteristics of Hydra, the many-headed monster from Greek mythology, Luther thereby 
casts it into the category of “the sacrificeable” and casts himself in the role of the hero 
Heracles. In this one figure, then, Luther traffics in anti-pagan rhetoric to link, via reason, 
scholasticism, humanism and paganism along an axis of demonization. What is the nature, 
though, of this heroism that defeats Hydra and  champions faith?
Luther radically transformed received notions of worship and authority in dense 
rhetorical passages such as the following: 
Any Christian is a supreme pontiff, because, first, he offers and slaughters his reason 
and the mind of the flesh [offert et mactat suam rationem et sensum carnis], and, 
secondly, he attributes to God the glory of being righteous, truthful, patient, kind, and 
merciful. This is the continuous evening and morning sacrifice [sacrificium vespertinum 
et matutinum] in the New Testament. The evening sacrifice is to kill the reason, and the 
morning sacrifice is to glorify God [Vespertinum: mortificare rationem, Matutinum: 
glorificare Deum]. Thus a Christian is involved, daily and perpetually, in this double 
sacrifice [duplici sacrificio] and in its practice. No one can adequately proclaim the 
value and the dignity of Christian sacrifice [sacrificii Christiani] (LG, p. 233; p. 370).
With the sacrificial mise en scene set, Luther sets reason on the altar.  This passage well 
represents Luther’s intervention: first, define, then redefine the proper channels of a righteous 
economy of prestige. In one passage Luther brings the Pope to the level of Everyman, attacks 
the status of reason, and ends with an aporia, a rhetorical statement affirming the inadequacy 
of language in the face of divine dignity. The attribution of the properly divine predicates 
becomes a gesture of tribute through the rhetorical work of reconceptualization, which must 
take place perpetually.
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Because the only object sacrifice is a subjective faculty, it appears that Luther has 
shifted wholly towards subjectivation along the transformational axis. Though this would 
appear to be a costless sacrifice, and thus a complete mitigation along the object-axis, Luther 
avoids the charge of mitigation by means of hyperbolic language and rhetorical intensification. 
What is rhetorically intensified here is the risk involved in the sacrifice. In most traditional 
sacrifices there is hardly a hint that the sacrificial agent is in danger or that the outcome is at all 
in question. Here, however, perhaps because the paradigmatic Christian sacrifice is filled with 
pathos for the sacrificial object, for the rhetoric to work Luther has to defuse this reaction and 
ensure that his readers side with faith as the sacrificial agent. To do this, he describes reason as 
a satanic, beastly usurper of God’s rightful place. Through reason, humans would achieve 
salvation on their own, and deprive God of his capacity to grant grace. Because reason is 
inherently aggressive and antagonistic, the eventual sacrifice of it can be described as 
completely right and just. 
Between the first edition of Luther’s exegetical lectures on Galatians in 1517 and the 
second in 1531 there was a radical upsurge of references to “sacrifice” in Luther's text. Of 
course, one might expect two versions of scriptural exegesis so separated in time, with so 
many momentous events intervening, to differ in many ways, but one is justified in surmising 
that something clearly happened to Luther's understanding of the status of sacrifice in the 
Christian life.  Perhaps the upsurge of martyrs in the course of the Reformation made it clear to 
Luther that this term had to be appropriated if his cause was to succeed.41 This and more could 
help to explain why there is a metastasis of sacrificial rhetoric in Luther's text. For a rhetorical 
analysis, however, which must pay heed to the surface features of the text, in place of why the 
far more important question is how: how does this sacrificial rhetoric make its appearance?
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41 According to Gregory, as Luther saw things, he “and his contemporaries were living in remarkable 
times. Because Christ had told his followers to expect persecution for his sake (Matt. 24:9, Luke 21:12, John 
15:18-20), and because this was the experience of Paul, Stephen, and other apostolic Christians, persecution 
and martyrdom confirmed Luther's view that he had dared to proclaim the Gospel aright” (1999, p. 149).
To describe this appearance as a metastasis is already the beginning of an explanation, 
for “metastasis” is both the rhetorical term for “rapid transition from one topic or figure to the 
next,” and the clinical term for the manifestation and spread of disease.42 This is appropriate 
here, for in this case of Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric, it appears throughout the text, almost as if, 
to counter the Hydra that grows evermore heads with each decapitation, sacrificial rhetoric 
spreads to combat the rebellion of reason wherever it appears. This life/death struggle takes 
place in this text because the process of exegesis closely resembles the rationalization of a text 
whose very spirit should take one beyond the limits of reason. Within the context of Luther's 
theological presuppositions, the metastasis of sacrificial rhetoric emerges as an effect of the 
genre of scriptural exegesis.
Furthermore, Luther's sacrificial rhetoric had contemporary resonance that helped him 
carve out a discursive position distinct from those of his enemies: defenders of traditional 
Church practices, scholastic theologians, and humanists of differing persuasions. Luther casts 
the struggle not as that between the soul and the body, as it primarily had been since Plato, but 
between faith and reason.  No longer a struggle for mastery between that in the individual 
which is properly human (reason) and the residually bestial (the body), suddenly what for so 
long had been the distinguishing feature of the species becomes the despised enemy that denies 
any role for God. 
In sum, as a key element of his rejection of scholasticism and its relation to monastic 
ascetism which made theological speculation as much a worshipful, sacrificial offering as 
scourging the body or pursuing poverty, Luther bestialized reason by making it an aspect of 
the body and works, and thus to be feared and despised as a proud and contemptuous 
antagonist of faith. With this distinction in place, sacrifice, though on the surface an operation 
and thus a “work,” was rhetoricalized to describe the struggle between faith and reason, with 
reason the sacrificial object and faith the sacrificial agent.
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42 Oxford English Dictionary.
 Martyr, Monk, Friar, Priest, Pastor
To address the polemical context of Luther's textual production, if we take Luther’s 
rhetoric as first and foremost a social practice with social effects, as I propose, we can ask, if 
reason is one’s interior enemy, how does this relate to the innumerable enemies that Luther 
discovered and produced in the course of his dramatic career as a public figure? In these 
lectures Luther identifies reason’s worldly agents whom he saw springing up incessantly, like 
so many heretical heads of Hydra. In a passage where Luther decries the way that reason 
“regards [God’s] Word as heresy,” he condemns “the theology of all the sophists and of the 
sectarians, who measure the Word of God by reason [Theologia omnium Sophistarum et 
sectariorum qui metiuntur verbum Dei ratione]” (LG, p. 228; p. 362). How can one recognize 
these sophists and sectarians who so bedevil Luther’s project?
Edwards argues that Luther employed his scriptural exegeses in ways that interpreted 
his contemporaries in terms of biblical archetypes. In a chapter on “The Mature Luther,” 
Edwards notes that, by the 1530s, “The events and experiences of the last ten years had caused 
[Luther] to view himself differently, to elaborate his characterization of his evangelical 
opponents, and to act in accordance with these new views” (1975, p. 112). Continuing by 
exegetical means the same polemical intensity that marked many of the pamphlets and 
woodcuts produced by both Luther and his opponents, Luther rejected all bounds of decorum 
and targeted his opponents with the greatest vehemence possible. 
 In his lectures on Galatians, Luther took the opportunity to examine Paul’s sharp 
rebukes to the Christian church in Galatia for submitting to “certain false brethren, interlopers 
who stole in to spy upon the liberty we have in Christ Jesus.”43 According to Edwards,
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43 Galatians 2.4-5: “4. δια δε τουV παρειsακτουV ψευδαδελφουV οιτινεV παρειsηλθον καταsκοπηsαι 
την ελευθεριαν ημων ην εχομεν εν χριsτω ιηsου ινα ημαV καταδουλωsωνται  5. οιV ουδε προV ωραν ειξαμεν 
τη υποταγη ινα η αληθεια του ευαγγελιου διαμεινη προV υμαV [4. But because of false believers secretly brought 
in, who slipped in to spy on the freedom we have in Christ Jesus, so that they might enslave us—5. we did not 
submit to them even for a moment, so that the truth of the gospel might always remain with you].” This Luther 
translated as follows: “Denn da etliche falsche Brüder sich mit eingedrängt hatten und neben eingeschlichen 
waren, auszukundschaften unsre Freiheit, die wir haben in Christo Jesu, daß sie uns gefangennähmen, wichen 
Luther repeatedly made comparisons between Paul's experiences with the falseapostles 
at Galatia and his own experiences with evangelical opponents. In some instances he 
used Paul’s experiences to explain his own; in other instances he used his own 
experiences to fill out his interpretation of Paul’s ministry. These lectures show 
convincingly that Luther believed that his and Paul’s experiences were substantially 
alike and that he could legitimately model his own behavior on the example set by Paul 
(1975, p. 112).
On the basis of this perceived connection between his own ministry and Paul’s, Luther expands 
the identification into a complex analogy that paralleled Luther’s message, ministry, 
congregation, and enemies with Paul’s own. Edwards describes this complex and reciprocal 
process of projection and identification:
from his first encounter with evangelical opponents, Luther had equated them with the 
false prophets and apostles who had plagued the true prophets and apostles. In the 
course of his struggles with the fanatics during the 1520’s he found many parallels 
between them and the biblical false brethren. […] In time, these parallels between his 
evangelical opponents and the false brethren of the biblical accounts influenced his view 
of himself.  Finding so many parallels in his own experience, gradually he came to see 
himself as occupying in his time the role occupied by the true prophet or apostle in the 
biblical accounts. This view of himself was sustained by his belief in the unchanging 
struggle between the leaders of the true and the false churches (1975, p.112-113).
In rhetorical terms, against the apostle or true prophet these apostates or false prophets fulfill 
the role played since Plato by the sophist. Just as sectarians sow dissension in the true church, 
sophists multiply truth-claims beyond the confines of the true. At least since Gorgias delivered 
his “Encomium of Helen,” which offered a more sympathetic explanation of her role in the 
Trojan War, the “sophist” has been an orator who has questioned received ideas and communal 
values.44 Although Socrates provoked controversy as well, what distinguished the sophist in 
Plato’s eyes was that, instead of attempting to set conceptions aright, like Socrates, the sophist 
turns values upside down in order to make right appear wrong and the true appear false. 
Luther’s use of the term is no different. Faith and reason are not in contention because they are 
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wir denselben nicht eine Stunde, ihnen untertan zu sein, auf daß die Wahrheit des Evangeliums bei euch bes-
tünde.”
44 Note that this is in contrast to Heidegger’s sense of the sophist as the champion of common sense 
against the esoteric insights of the philosophers (cited in the Introduction, p. 53). This is not uncommon, as the 
sophist serves as a mobile placeholder for whichever enemy a discursive agent requires in a given context. 
equally powerful, but because the individual erroneously understands reason to be equal or, 
worse, superior. Reason itself is culpable for this misrecognition, but the sophist, as reason’s 
agent, contributes greatly to this false image of reason’s power. By alienating reason and then 
personifying it in the sophist, Luther makes it clear that, in the agon of faith and reason, it is 
the sophist who helps reason deceive us that it and its works are supreme and not God. 
Against this rhetorical construction of the contemporary sophist, Luther presents a new 
and distinct function for faith's agent, the pastor. Luther took as his model for this function 
Pauline parrhesia (traditionally translated as “free speech” but cast by Foucault as “fearless 
speech” [2001]), which we have already encountered. In his letter to the church of Galatia Paul 
exhibits a candid and sharp mode of discourse that eschews all pleasantries in pursuit of its 
dogmatic rectifications. In a way that will make epideictic rhetoric key to pastoral work 
(Vickers, 1988), Luther is full of admiration for Paul’s opposition to the “boasting” and 
“pharisaical pride and insolence” of the “false apostles.” Luther applauds how
Paul boldly and with great parrhesia pits his apostolic authority, commends his calling, 
and defends his ministry. Although he does not do this anywhere else, he refuses to 
yield to anyone, even to the apostles themselves, much less to any of their pupils…. In 
addition, he pays no attention to the possible offense but says plainly in the text that he 
took it upon himself to reprove Peter himself, the prince of the apostles, who had seen 
Christ and had known Him intimately (LG, p. 15; p. 55-6).
Modeled, then, on Paul's author-function in his letter to the Galatians, Luther's pastor is 
entrusted with specific social and rhetorical duties, primarily to preach the Word and disarm 
the sophists. 
This specialist does not simply replace the priest in the religious division of labor, for 
Luther decisively rejected the very basis of priestly labor. According to Swanson, 
The ideal medieval priest was a construct. Fundamental was his sacramental duty of 
celebrating mass and thereby confecting the Body and Blood of Christ. The definitive 
advocacy of transubstantiation at Lateran IV gave the consecrated species new 
significance, reflected in increasing eucharistic devotion and the cult of Corpus Christi. 
Priests, the sole authorized performers of the eucharistic rite, en-trapped divinity in 
wafer and wine; they handled—manhandled—God (p. 41).
Instead of a sacrificial agent who administered rituals and represented a distant institutional 
  
 112 
authority, the pastor replaces monk, friar and priest to become a parrhesiast, a fearless speaker 
of truth.  This is not to say that the pastor became a free-lance agent of truth, like the ancient 
philosopher who might move from city to city. Instead, Luther helped install an authoritarian 
structure all over again, but this time under secular protection. 
It was essential that Luther’s pastor serve as a representative of an institution more 
local than the distant Church in Rome. The local and regional “confessional churches” 
(Konfessionkirchen) “were exclusively established, or at least privileged, creeds and 
ecclesiastical organizations within a particular society” (Schilling, 1986, p. 22). These 
churches, with the pastor as their agent, contributed to the process known to European 
historians as “confessionalization.” Among the developments covered by this term, many fell 
under the responsibility of the pastor, especially the inculcation of Christian education that 
would make faith explicit to the believer as opposed to the “implicit faith” of most medieval 
Christians, and, further, the promotion of literacy and education in general. As Schilling 
describes this process,
The term “confessionalization” thus designates the fragmentation of the unitary 
Christendom (Christianitas latino) of the Middle Ages into at least three confessional 
churches—Lutheran, Calvinistic or “Reformed,” and post-Tridentine Roman Catholic. 
Each formed a highly organized system, which tended to monopolize the world view 
with respect to the individual, the state, and society, and which laid down strictly 
formulated norms in politics and morals (p. 22).
In the course of this process the pastor could draw on Luther’s parrhesiastic rhetoric as well 
as “l’homilétique mélanchthonienne” (1999, p. 298-308), Millet’s term for the catechetical 
method of scriptural exposition that Luther developed and his pedagogical partner, 
Melanchthon, formalized. Both the didactic and epideictic modes were thus available to the 
pastor depending on the spiritual needs of the congregation, and this ability to tailor the 
sermon to the needs of the congregation marks the decisive contribution of the pastor. Instead 
of a fixed liturgy that would be the same all over Christendom, here Luther continues his 
rhetoricalization of worship that we examined in “Freedom of a Christian.” Now there is a 
religious specialist specifically entrusted with making this worship persuasive to the audience. 
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Empowered to espouse the Gospel freely and fearlessly, the pastor is entrusted with two 
duties: to shape his flock with epideictic flows of praise and blame, and to protect the feeble-
in-spirit from the sophists at the gate. Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric thus constructs a new 
configuration in the religious division of labor.  In fact, I would argue that the pastor served as 
the primary agent in the long educational and community-building project of transforming the 
feudal subject in the modern citizen.
 A Historical Conclusion
Luther’s deployment of sacrificial rhetoric was a discursive articulation with a long 
future, and not only among the clergy. The pastor’s conjunction of sacrificial rhetoric and 
learning was a critical element of the long transformation that took Europe’s shifting focus 
from the estate to the city, which was already underway, and continued it in the shift from the 
city to the region united by complex relations between language, confession and heritage. 
According to Schilling,
The grand process of state building between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries 
converged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with confessionalization to 
transform the medieval respublica christiana into the early modern European 
landscape of independent powers and states. For at least one century, the link between 
state building and confessionalization was predominant in European history, that is, 
approximately from 1550 until 1650, in both foreign and domestic policy.[...] [I]t was 
religious, that is, confessional, uniformity that at the beginning of the early modern era 
supplied the basis for social integration (p. 23).
All told, the ramifications of this work of confessionalization entrusted to the pastor is difficult 
to overestimate. Since in the pulpit itself many a schismatic and heretical notion was born, and 
congregations persuaded to adopt interpretations of the Gospel that Luther explicitly 
foreclosed, as a principle both of disaggregation and consecration, the pastor and his sacrificial 
rhetoric helped Christendom multiply and divine into diverse Christian communities. 
Hence, it would be too simplistic to describe this as a simple process of confessional 
elaboration and unification.  In other words, despite his construction of the pastor as an agent 
of congregational and doctrinal orthodoxy, Luther contributed greatly to these schismatic 
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tendencies in championing a break with traditional principles of scriptural interpretation and 
trusting too completely in the Bible’s power to forestall heterodox modes of exegesis. Events 
like the Peasant’s Revolt and the apocalyptic events at Leiden made the residual feudal 
aristocrats greatly concerned about the impact that Luther’s heralded “priesthood of all 
believers” would have on political structures. The pastor thus emerged over the next decade as 
if by political necessity to intercede as a religious specialist between the people and the prince, 
for the break with Rome led to a destabilizing emphasis on the logic of local rule. As a kind of 
hermeneutical guard-rail, Luther charged the pastor with forming and protecting the 
congregation’s doctrinal purity, as well as enforcing the community’s self-understanding as a 
community in Christ. 
Towards the end of his life Luther had given up much hope that events would shift so 
that unity would prevail, and could foresee the kind of religious fragmentation that would 
ensue. Because from the Peace of Augsburg there developed the compromise principle of 
cuius regio eius religio  (“whose rule, his religion”), the prince alone established the sectarian 
or denominational creed of his people. Though in some respect aligned with the role of the 
pastor, it would be better to view them as both complementary and opposed. Where the prince 
deployed juridical and military force to enforce doctrinal uniformity, the pastor pursued this by 
means of persuasion. Just as the prince gained refinement through the pastor, the prince added 
force to the pastor’s arsenal. 
Though often most often working as complements, it is important to note that the very 
existence of the pastor mitigated the radical nature of Luther’s proclamation of the “priesthood 
of all believers,” in that now only the reigning figure of a territory could exercise the freedom 
of religious conscience, and could accept or outlaw religious diversity as he saw fit.  According 
to Bickle, these conflicting trends developed into what he describes as two distinct stages of 
Reformation, the “Communal” and “Magisterial” Reformations. This occurred because 
the pressure for increased communal autonomy was—quite rightly—perceived as a 
fundamental threat by the secular authorities, who made sure to contain it as fast as 
they could.[...] The Communal Reformation in town and country, which accelerated the 
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religious changes in Zurich, Bern, Basle, and St. Gall, gave way to a “Magisterial 
Reformation.” [...] Peasants and burghers understood the Reformation essentially as the 
communalization of the Church and the instrumentalization of the gospel.[...] The 
Communal Reformation thus acquired a highly explosive potential—the Princes’ or 
Magisterial Reformation was the necessary response (Bickle, 1998, p. 202-3).
As Luther slowly learned and the princes quickly feared, one could not trust that Scripture 
itself would provide a bulwark against antinomian and anarchistic interpretations of scripture, 
interpretations that called for the radical reformulation of social existence. Reason bridled by 
faith would not suffice if this reason could surreptitiously reconfigure the very relationship 
between reason and faith. For this reason, the role of providing this bulwark had to be 
specialized, and in his “Lecture on Galatians” Luther authorizes this figure not only by means 
of an analogical relationship between Luther and Paul and the false brethren and the radical 
Reformers. In addition, Luther employs sacrificial rhetoric so that his position could make a 
claim on the rite so essential to Christian self-definition. Furthermore, the bestialization of 
reason could be used to denounce those whose interpretation of scripture drifted toward 
conclusions too radical for the territorial princes. Such radical notions were sure signs of the 
presumption of reason, and Luther left the the pastor well-equipped with a rhetorical arsenal 
ready to shout down the sophists and remove the threat from the congregation. In a sense, the 
shift from the Communal Reformation to the Magisterial Reformation simply extended the 
same regulative function served by the pastor as a limit to the universal priesthood, for if the 
pastor is the religious limit to the desire to turn the Reformation into a revolution, the 
Augsberg compromise, which granted the rights to establish the Konfessionkirchen under the 
principle of eius regio cuius religio, formed the political limit on the same desires. 
 A Sociological Conclusion
Even beyond the pastor’s role in the processes of confessionalization, in other venues 
as well Luther’s disenchanted view of reason still exerts great influence, for a reason devoted 
to earthly pursuits dovetailed well with broad changes in the constitution of the modern nation-
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state, and the global consolidation of capitalist markets. In short, this disenchanted rationality, 
joined with a utilitarian notion of human nature, formed a hegemonic framework that today 
passes for common sense.45  Luther’s bestialization of reason ushers in the disenchantment of 
human rationality by divesting reason of its last divine remnant. To split reason, the faculty of 
works, from the rest of the psyche, results in a profoundly alienated model of human nature, 
one that would teach us to despise, and indeed violently attack, that faculty that had hitherto 
been humankind's ownmost, defining property. With this achieved, homo oeconomicus, whose 
every faculty serves self-interest by definition, is near on the horizon. According to this model 
of human nature, we can only serve our passions, or, more neutrally, our self-interest, so that 
even apparent acts of altruism simply serve our desire for the social prestige or genetic success 
that such altruism brings. No longer a divine spark or the differentiating, criterial mark of 
humanity, reason becomes just one more instrument of the body. Luther thus articulates a 
position that would surface again in Hume's critique of rationalism, Marx’s assault on 
bourgeois ideology, as well as the critiques of other hermeneuts of suspicion, such as 
Nietzsche and Freud.
Like these skeptics, the sacrificial rhetorician utilizes the figure of “sacrifice” as a 
means to intervene in the reproduction of received notions of self, society, worship and work.  
Here, by means of a performative discursive act presented as a descriptive designation, Luther 
employs this rhetoric to make a strategic move in the development of the religious division of 
labor. Moving on from martyr, monk, friar and priest, Luther constructs a new position in the 
field of discursive production, the pastor as parrhesiast. Luther’s discourse thereby clears a 
space that is dedicated less to applying logical methods than to putting in play diverse flows of 
affect conjured by the irrepressible emergence of faith's enemies. By preserving the active role 
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45 Though Weber's authoritative voice casts the longest shadow in Religious Studies, the work of 
Nobel-prize winner Gary Becker has opened the way to an economic analysis of every non-economic form of 
behavior through his acolytes, such as Laurence Iannacone (1992). On this, see Becker's Nobel-acceptance 
speech (1993) and the pivotal essay on time allocation (1964).
in the discourse for a “sacrificing faith” and the passive role for a “sacrificed reason,” the two 
faculties, complementary in humanism and scholasticism, get disaggregated into a hierarchy of 
values which both reflects and consecrates a new social order. Hence, Luther's rhetoric works 
on the world, producing effects in a society that will now have a place for a type of religious 
specialist who is neither monk nor friar but a fully embodied male whose worship does not 
consist of the physical asceticisms of monastic poverty or celibacy, but solely of faith’s 
sacrifice of reason.
Luther’s construction of a distinct type of religious specialist marks an important 
transformation in Christendom and European history as a whole. The emergence of the pastor 
had wide-ranging effects on religion, politics and economics. Yet in many ways this articulation 
in the long history of religious specialization repeats patterns and conforms to structures that 
have persisted for millenia. If, after having argued for the novelty of the Lutheran pastor in the 
history of modern Christianity, I will now adopt a more sociological perspective, according to 
which the pastor is simply a religious specialist. In effect, by holding this variable constant, 
other effects of Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric will emerge.  
As Weber articulated them, the priest and the prophet stand as the minimal pair of 
religious specialists, the former entrusted to preserve and augment tradition, and the latter  
eager to reform that tradition through revelation. In Christianity specifically, the monk’s 
separation from society and complete devotion to sanctity made this figure the pre-eminent 
religious specialist, one that reproduced sanctity and doctrine and who thus stood as a figure of 
continuity with the past. Francis of Assisi and other mendicants were the first specifically urban 
religious specialists, figures who would not flee society but seek out the people in the agora 
and sacralize urban space itself. The prophetic forces aroused by these radical movements were 
soon tamed by the Church, though with great difficulty. Whether we persist in looking at the 
longterm effects of the Agricultural and Commercial Revolutions, which began soon after the 
second millenium of Christianity, as effects of an ongoing rationalization, as urbanization 
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proceeded apace, and the prophetic mendicants slowly assumed the status of priestly office-
holders, a new wave of lay piety swept through Europe, which happened to coincide with the 
continuing effects of increasing economic development and the ensuing destabalizations and 
crises of values. Clearly, a new prophetic revelation would come to meet the demands, for, 
according to Bourdieu, “The greatest merit of Max Weber [...] is to have shown that 
urbanization (with its correlative transformations) contributes to the ‘rationalization’ and 
‘moralization’ of religion only insofar as it favors the development of a body of specialists in 
the administration of religious goods” (1991, p. 6). Urbanization and economic development 
would of necessity produce a specialist to negotiate the ensuing crisis of values. 
As the agent of this next revelation, unlike the mendicants this second urban religious 
specialist, the pastor, would come with the opposite economic valence. Instead of embodying a 
continuous reminder of an apostolic ideal (the vita apostolica) that the laity could not meet, 
the pastor represented the same kind of upwardly mobile social position that the rising middle 
class also held, the only difference being the specifically religious sphere that was central to the 
pastor’s aspirations. This pastor could thereby serve as the emblem of social mobility in a time 
when this transformation in the social structure was becoming increasingly common and 
decisive. The pastor thus served as a figure who could align religious and economic 
development, and at the same time divert aspirations away from radical political change.
Luther clearly depicts the pastor’s role as a species of caretaker, one who relieves the 
spiritual burdens of the congregation when possible, and manages their spiritual crises when 
necessary. Certainly, too, this was the conscious content of the now legendary vocation 
specific to the pastor. Yet in creating the position it is again difficult to ignore the fact that this 
is a serious retreat from the egalitarian principle proclaimed as the universal priesthood. Given 
the tendencies towards deference, fealty and the exercise of authorized prerogatives in Luther’s 
day, one could reasonably foresee that the pastor's initial role of service would transform into a 
localized but all-too similar priesthood. Would it be too much to say that this represents an 
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expropriation of the laity's barely won religious independence? This would match Bourdieu’s 
description:
Inasmuch as it is the result of the monopolization of the administration of the goods of 
salvation by a body of religious specialists, socially recognized as the exclusive holders 
of the specific competence necessary for the production or reproduction of a 
deliberately organized corpus of secret (and therefore rare) knowledge, the 
constitution of a religious field goes hand in hand with the objective dispossession of 
those who are excluded from it and who thereby find themselves constituted as the 
laity (or the profane, in the double meaning of the word) dispossessed of religious 
capital (as accumulated symbolic labor) and recognizing the legitimacy of that 
dispossession from the mere fact that they misrecognize it as such (1991, p. 9, 
emphasis in original).
At first glance this describes the religious structure of medieval Christinity quite accurately. 
One important difference between this account and the situation that Luther produced is the 
role of secrecy, which Luther’s pedagogical efforts and vernacular discursive production 
explicitly undermined. In many ways, then, Luther would seem to correct this situation, and 
expropriate the expropriators on behalf of the universal priesthood. However, the figure of the 
pastor complicates this. As would befit a man who embraced paradox, if we take into account 
the farthest authoritarian extremes that the local pastor could take, by constructing the pastor 
as a religious specialist in response to the dangers of the universal priesthood, Luther would 
have lived both to initiate a spiritual revolution and turn that revolutionary movement in 
reverse: from an initial move of expropriating the expropriators, later in his career Luther 
would construct the pastor and commence a reappropriation of religious capital whereby the 
laity would lose the authority and independence they had just won.
Lest this too closely resemble Marx’s account of capital’s primitive accumulation, a 
complex process which included the “secularization” of the monasteries and eventually resulted 
in the enclosure of the commons, the engrossment of the states, and the dispossession of the 
peasantry, there are many factors that point to a more nuanced conclusion. If Luther’s 
prophetic revelation of the “universal priesthood” was a liberation, it was also, like all 
liberations, a tremendous burden as well. Especially when one took into account Luther’s 
understanding of the treacherous nature of reason, and its tendency to usurp the rightful place 
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of grace, how could a person pursue a living in the unforgiving social landscape of sixteenth-
century city and still have time to keep a watchful eye on reason, and sift the speech of one's 
persuasive neighbor for the traces of false doctrine? 
Under the weight of this burden, and from the uneasiness that such popular turbulence 
promoted among the aristocracy, the pastor served functions that could alleviate both. For the 
aristocracy, the pastor served as an office-holder who served the congregation but was 
beholden to prince. For the congregation, they could outsource the doctrinal vigilance that the 
“priesthood of all believers” should have entailed. This is not to say, of course, that the 
congregation did not take the pursuit of Christian righteousness seriously. It did, however, 
mean that the role of pursuing and protecting sound exegesis was more the duty of the pastor 
as a specialist than a duty for all. This freed up a great deal of time and effort for the changing 
economic and political environment which also made great demands on the people of sixteenth 
century Europe. The final consequence of Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric, then, was a 
transformation of the received notion of implicit and explicit faith. With the pastor to serve as 
the congregational guardian of the Gospel, Luther’s sacrificial rhetoric effects a division of 
labor between the people and the pastor, one articulated as a distinction, not between believing 
and understanding, but between believing and preaching.
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3. From the Slaughterbench of History to the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit: 
Hegel’s Sacrificial Rhetoric and Philosophy’s Sublation of Religion
 Introduction
Hegel claimed his space in the pantheon of modern philosophers by pursuing a project 
that would synthesize all the developments in the humanities and the sciences up to his time. A 
student at the University of Tübingen who earned a degree in theology but whose first love 
was philosophy, Hegel never disclaimed that he was a Lutheran, though he shared few 
positions with Luther, and, indeed, pushed every position of Lutheran orthodoxy to its 
breaking point. Hegel both built upon and broke with the Lutheran tradition on a number of 
fronts, and this was criticial to his discursive stategy. Inspired by the momentous revolutions of 
the late eighteenth century and the reformist example of Lessing, Hegel sought to continue 
Kant’s philosophical revolution not only through the critique of reason, but also by developing 
the means to evaluate and validate customary modes of reciprocity and recognition, or “ethical 
substance” [Sittlichkeit].  By making philosophical thought intrinsically historical and 
integrative, Hegel attempted to redraw the borders that had become battlelines both between 
the disciplines and within them among the various schools of thought in his day. The 
Enlightenment, Romanticism, religion and science, all find a place within Hegel’s system of 
philosophy. Through this project, Hegel carved out a new space in public discourse: not the 
pastor, nor the public intellectual, but the philosopher, one who serves the nascent nation-state 
in the important work of social integration.
This chapter will examine Hegel’s multi-faceted treatment of religion in history and in 
thought. In addition, it will analyse his use of sacrificial rhetoric in several places, but most 
  
  
importantly in the concluding paragraphs of the Phenomenology of Spirit. These dense 
instances of sacrificial rhetoric provide a rich hermeneutical resource for understanding Hegel’s 
attempt to validate a great deal of religion’s influence in modern society, but at the same time 
carve out a distinct space for philosophy as its translator in the university and in society as a 
whole.
Although a keen eye will detect sacrificial rhetoric at work in any number of Hegel’s 
texts, this analysis will focus mostly on the passages where Hegel deals explicitly with matters 
pertaining to the relations between religion and philosophy. Of course, one could plausibly 
argue that Hegel’s dialectic is itself sacrificial in form. That is, just as the ritual process and the 
object mediate between the ontological abyss that separates the devotee from the deity, so, 
analogously, Hegel’s dialectic mediates between irreconcilable concepts, positions and 
discourses. The interrelations here are quite intricate, however, and involve such vast 
speculations concerning the ontological and epistemological status of both religious sacrifice 
and speculative dialectic, that one could relate these only at the cost of first separating them by 
means of a sharper dichotomy between philosophy and religion than Hegel’s philosophy would 
allow. In other words, the conceptual relations of continuity and discontinuity are too tight to 
treat the sacrificial rhetoric at work in Hegel’s “system” in a broad way.
 In addition to the conceptual reasons for a more focused approach to Hegel’s 
sacrificial rhetoric, there is also the philological problem of locating Hegel’s fully developed 
“system” within the intertextual network of an oeuvre that includes not only published works 
in multiple editions, but also a great number of lectures and letters that arguably refined his 
system right up to his death.  Finally, from the side of sacrificial rhetoric as an object of 
scrutiny, because I am arguing that the ultimate function of sacrificial rhetoric is more to 
accrue authority than to produce truth-claims (that is, insofar as the latter takes place, this 
perspecive will regard it as a means to the former), it is possible to see this rhetoric more 
clearly at work in Hegel’s historical writings, especially the Philosophy of History and the 
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Phenomenology of Spirit. In the former Hegel approaches and appropriates Luther’s prestige 
by means of complex historical arguments, and in the latter Hegel articulates the relationship 
between religion and philosophy more generally, providing the ladder whereby the reader can 
survey all the truth of religion and then transcend it to reach the level of speculative 
philosophy.  This chapter will demonstrate that, as Hegel attemped to demonstrate this 
movement from religion to philosophy (or, from religion’s viewpoint, to effect philosophy’s 
usurpation of religion’s rightful place in society), he deployed in various ways a sacrificial 
rhetoric that reformulated key notions such as piety, devotion and authority. To achieve this 
change, Hegel had to reformulate the very history of Christianity, and, along with this, notions 
of sacrifice in relation to a rather unorthodox conception of Geist.
 Hegel’s Background1
 Raised in a middle-class family with a history of legal and theological study, Hegel, a 
diligent student from an early age, soon decided that he would follow in the steps of Lessing 
and become the kind of public intellectual who could widely transform the opinions of the 
Deutschophone world, which at the time was in need of every impetus possible if it was to 
become truly “modern” in the sense that Hegel had in mind. Eventually Hegel attended the 
University of Tübingen where he attended the Protestant seminary, or Stift. The University 
itself, however, was mired in corruption and intellectual decadence, primarily because of 
fundamental incoherencies in its social basis and function. As Pinkard observed, “Universities 
remained semifeudal ‘corporations,’ institutions governed by the professoriate, who were far 
more interested in exercising their inherited medieval privileges than in anything else, and who 
thus tended to resist strenuously all efforts to reform the universities” (2000, p. 19). Hence, of 
the two formative settings for the young Hegel, his hometown and his university, the residual 
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1 In this discussion of Hegel’s background and context, my argument owes much to Althaus (2000) 
and Pinkard (2000).
patchwork of semi-feudal and semi-modern social principles led to complications that neither 
mode of social organization could adequately address. 
The historical distance between Luther and Hegel is in many senses precisely the gap 
between the late medieval and the modern world. Luther had no premonition of the rapidly 
increasing scope of human power over the natural world, or of the rise of more egalitarian 
principles of social order: both were just beyond Luther’s historical horizon. The development 
of European colonialism and global capitalism, the rise of monarchical power, the Industrial 
Revolution, all were unthinkable in Luther’s day. Even though one of the decisive 
differentiating factors between Luther’s and Hegel’s worlds, the development of the public 
sphere,2  was an unintended consequence of the rapid confessionalization that Luther’s 
principle of sola scriptura and commitment to public education helped to quicken, the world 
was a quite different one as Hegel reached maturity as a thinker in the late eighteenth century. 
Yet on many fronts there were remarkable continuities between their worlds as well. 
The religious and political fragmentation that has come to define modernity were already in 
evidence at the time of Luther’s death. The rise of cultural and linguistic nationalism as well as 
the humanist revival of a civic ethos had each done its part to erode what tenuous bonds still 
united European Christendom (Perkins, 2004). Despite the hope for unification evident in 
Luther’s prophetic announcement of the “priesthood of all believers,” the ensuing religious 
wars and the cuius regio eius religio (“whose rule, his religion”) compromise of the Peace of 
Augsburg had fragmented Christendom forever. In effect, if Luther had broken the Church’s 
religious monopoly, Augsburg affirmed a more fragmented and localized religious monopoly. 
Once this was intensified by the catechetical endeavours typical of a Europe-wide process of 
confessionalization, an imposed or “positive” uniformity-in-diversity fell across Europe that 
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2 Habermas is the primary theoretician of this important notion (1989). A direct path leads from a 
literacy in the service of educated devotion, the entire confessionalization project in post-Reformation Europe 
which seeks to make implicit faith explicit, and the role of eduction as a means of inculcating citizen 
regardings his rights and duties.
was in many ways as authoritarian as the Church’s broad canopy of doctrinal unity under 
which local inflections and variations could flourish. The result was that, between Luther and 
Hegel, though the role and type of economic and technological forces had been transformed, 
the roles of religion and politics had changed much less. 
While religious diversity was a fact across Europe at the time, in Hegel’s duchy of 
Württemberg, within any typical community, the same religious homogeneity persisted as 
would have prevailed centuries earlier. The political structure was more complicated, but in 
essence quite similar as well. A thriving middle class first began to emerge in European cities in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, so Luther would have been quite familiar with this fourth 
estate that opened the static triangular structure of peasantry, clerics, and aristocracy to an 
open and alien future. By Hegel’s day, the bourgeoisie had solidified its power, but it had not 
yet replaced the age-old claims of the aristocracy to status and power. Indeed, to many in this 
era, despite the rapid flow of historical events that had transformed Europe in the previous few 
centuries, a conservative reaction had settled in and was strong enough, with enough residual 
structures in place to support its claims, that many thought a period of stasis had been reached. 
Württemberg was still within the domain of the Holy Roman Empire, with extensive traditional 
rights and privileges that few of those in authority were willing to relinquish (Pinkard, p. 1-28). 
Thus things stood as a youthful trio of theology students, Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling, first 
started to hear the rumblings of the revolution that was to end the ancien regime in France and 
inaugurate a new period in European political history.
 The French Revolution as Provocation to Thought
The story of the impact that the French Revolution had on Hegel and his seminary 
friends Hölderlin and Schelling involves all the youthful energy and hopefulness that we have 
come to associate with this age. Suddenly, the entire ontology of social life had been 
transformed. With the French overthrow of the aristocracy, it was no longer the case that 
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humans could take only material things as objects of collective labor, but the structures of 
social life were of a permanence and inviolability that made them impossible to transform. At a 
stroke, it was proven that a society could take itself as an object of collective labor, and 
transform social structures along more just and egalitarian lines. The possibility that the sun 
was setting on the German aristocracy compelled these friends to seek reform of their country 
by continuing Kant’s revolution in philosophy. 
This era of optimism soon palled, however, as the Revolution turned into the Terror, 
and the reform of society became the razing of custom, sentiment, and any sense of decency or 
mercy.3 During the course of this transformation of the Revolution into the Terror, Hegel 
began a sustained inquiry that would occupy him for the rest of his career. 
Unlike Burke and de Maistre, for Hegel not the goal but the means constituted the 
primary flaw in the Revolutionary ferment. According to Hegel’s diagnosis, these means 
followed directly from the Enlightenment. Hence, though the diagnosis differed from Burke, 
the interpretive method was similar.4 As O’Regan explains,
given Hegel's acceptance of the classical Burkean line of connection between the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, it is possible for Hegel to simply reverse the 
direction of the reading offered in the earliest period: the Enlightenment is now read in 
terms of the French Revolution, whereas previously the French Revolution was read, at 
least implicitly, in the light of the Enlightenment. The emplotment is such that it also 
highlights the antipathy of Revolution ideology to Christianity by pointing to a pathway 
between Enlightenment critique and revolutionary practice (1995, p. 37-8).
What were the interpretive consequences of this shift in emplotment? For Hegel, it was to blur 
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3 Hegel makes clear in an early letter to Schelling that, whatever his earlier opinions of the 
Revolution, by the winter of 1794 Carrier’s execution convinced him of the “ignominy of Robespierre’s party” 
(1984, p. 29). For a close discussion of this reference to Robespierre’s Schändlichkeit, see Schmidt’s “Cabbage 
Heads and Gulps of Water: Hegel on the Terror.” On Hegel and the French Revolution more generally, see 
Ritter (1982).
4 This tendency to interpret a historical phenomena by retreating in history to its antecedents and 
causes, thereby turning the singular event into a teleologically determined outcome, remained key for Hegel. 
See part III in the “Introduction” of the Philosophy of History, where Hegel discusses, as against change in the 
state of nature, “[t]his peculiarity in the world of mind [which] has indicated in the case of man an altogether 
different destiny from that of merely natural objects—in which we find always one and the same stable 
character, to which all change reverts;—namely, a real capacity for change, and that for the better—an impulse 
of perfectibility” (PH, p. 54).
the boundary between the theory and practice, discourse and action. While not erasing every 
difference, one no longer needed to distinguish discourse and critique from revolt and 
revolution in an ontological register. What others might have to argue—the real-world 
consequences of theory and philosophy—Hegel proposes as a principle for his entire 
philosophical approach. The new issues that emerge all involve the question, what did the 
French Revolution, as a decisive event in modern history, tell about the meaning of modern 
philosophy? 
 This section will begin with the Phenomenology, as it was written as a response to 
issues raised by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. How does Hegel connect the 
Enlightenment to the modern predicament of fragmentation and contention that had begun 
long before it? If the Reformation ended in fragmentation, it was more the result of historical 
contingencies, and the inadequate means of enacting its principles, than any fault with its 
fundamental principles. Almost as if in response to Luther’s bestialization of reason, the 
Enlightenment reversed the valence and promoted an apotheosis of reason. The  problem with 
this apotheosis is its tendency to project reason’s other everywhere, even where it should 
recognize reason at work in the world. For this reason, the problem of the Enlightenment is its 
non-recognition of reason in its multiple forms of life. 
It was precisely this battle of unrecognized inversions that Hegel sought to avoid. 
Hegel frames the apotheosis of the Enlightenment as Spirit’s recognition of its fundamental 
freedom, and its sense that nothing of any actuality stands opposed to it. As Hegel says, “Spirit 
thus comes before us as absolute freedom,” for
[i]t is self-consciousness which grasps the fact that its certainty of itself is the essence 
of all the spiritual ‘masses’, or spheres, of the real as well as of the supersensible world, 
or conversely, that essence and actuality are consciousness’s knowledge of itself. It is 
conscious of its pure personality and therein of all spiritual reality, and all reality is 
solely spiritual; the world is for it simply its own will, and this is a general will (PhG, 
#584, p. 356-7).
Spirit in the Enlightenment appears as autonomous and unfettered, but misrecognizing all else 
as mere reflections and objects of itself, so that Spirit becomes the sole measure and realizing 
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force in the world. Here the reflection is recognizably cast in Rousseau’s terms of the general 
versus the individual will. But the deeper background of the Enlightenment enters when one 
understands that the very opposition between individual and general will is an artifact of the 
kind of separation that Enlightenment reason performs no matter what the object of scrutiny. 
When applied to social practices, Enlightenment philosophical methods and principles of 
reduction and distinction, as most clearly formulated in Descartes’ work, resulted in sharp 
dichotomies that produced irremediable contradictions in the social structure. In isolating 
customary element from their interrelated web of received cultural practices, the dynamic 
processes of self-correction they instantiate and in which they participate disappear from view. 
Hegel not only sought to overcome society’s scission into warring classes and factions; 
in addition—or, in many ways, more fundamentally—he sought to mediate the conflictual 
discourses of philosophical critique and religious traditionalism that had taken over most of the 
heat from the Wars of Religion and continued it during the course of the Enlightenment. With 
the post-Reformation turn to creed, dogma and catechism as not only instruments of cohesion, 
as in the early Christian church, but also as shibboleths for exclusion and religious antagonism, 
Enlightenment reason took an intellectual view of religion, which meant that religion’s business 
was primarily to offer competing truth-claims against science. So misrecognized, the 
Enlightenment set out to wage all-out war on both religion and custom. If one reads the Terror 
not as a perverse outcome derived from the best of intentions, but as the ultimate consequence 
of the Enlightenment critique of religion, superstition and custom, this critique resulted in the 
total war of the Terror. 
Hegel’s interpretation thus underscores both the power of Enlightenment critique to 
clear the brush of custom, and the danger of this critique, as it often clears too much and leaves 
society prey to a vertiginous tyrrany, the reign, as he called in the Phenomenology, of 
“Absolute Freedom and Terror”: 
This undivided Substance of absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world without 
any power being able to resist it. [...]  In this absolute freedom, [...]  all social groups or 
classes which are the spiritual spheres into which the whole is articulated are abolished; 
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the individual consciousness that belonged to any such sphere, and willed and fulfilled 
itself in it, has put aside its limitation; its purpose is the general purpose, its language 
universal law, its work the universal work (ibid.).
 There is no recognition here of otherness, and no acknowledgment of the diversity of claims 
to privilege and right that any society must sustain. Cast in these terms, the reciprocal social  
processes of externalization and internalization (Erinnerung), manifestation and recognition, 
cannot take place.
As a consequence of an initial misrecognition, whereby, to Enlightenment thought, “the 
world is for it simply its own will, and this is a general will” (ibid.), when in practice this 
identity does not hold true, the fragmented elements begin to turn all against one another. 
From this emerges a roaming and nomadic general will without content, which can only 
represent individuality as a fall into particularity. The individual finds itself exiled in practice 
from the general. Once exiled from the general will, the excluded individual begins plotting a 
next usurpation:
Just as the individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this universal work of 
absolute freedom qua existent Substance, so little does it find itself in the deeds proper 
and individual actions of the will of this freedom. Before the universal can perform a 
deed it must concentrate itself into the One of individuality and put at the head an 
individual self-consciousness; for the universal will is only an actual will in a self, which 
is a One. But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed 
and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the actual 
universal self-consciousness. Universal freedom, therefore, can produce neither a 
positive work nor a deed; there is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of 
destruction (PhG, #589 p. 359). 
Work and deed are essential moments of Entaußerung, or externalization and manifestation of 
subjectivity. These are the preconditions of any possible Erinnerung, or comprehension and 
recognition. Where work and deed are impossible, the movement of spirit is impossible.  Hence 
work and deed have special status related to the seriousness of sacrifice, for intention and 
devotion are criterial. By contrast, the destruction produced by Enlightenment is wanton, and 
only the negative image of sacrifice. 
 From the principle of abstract universality every possible counterpart is rejected and 
excluded from relation. The result is the tyrant who speaks for the general will which finds no 
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satisfaction in any existing arrangement. This tyrant thus becomes a placeholder, a soulless 
agent of this wanton and mobile process of negation: 
by virtue of its own abstraction, [that universality which does not let itself advance to 
the reality of an organic articulation] divides itself into extremes equally abstract, into a 
simple, inflexible cold universality, and into the discrete, absolute hard rigidity and self-
willed atomism of actual self-consciousness. Now that it has completed the destruction 
of the actual organization of the world, and exists now just for itself, this is its sole 
object, an object that no longer has any content, possession, existence, or outer 
extension, but is merely this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free 
individual self. All that remains of the object by which it can be laid hold of is solely its 
abstract existence as such (PhG, #590, p. 360).
The will to overcome religion and culture has razed society of its structures for the recognition 
of competing views. The intransigence of Enlightenment critique recreates a virtual state of 
nature whereby every element is bereft of the resources to recognizes its other as its own other, 
and thus negotiate the processes by which they might mutually co-exist. The stage is set for 
terror: 
The relation, then, of these two [abstract universality and atomistic self-consciousness], 
since each exists indivisibly and absolutely for itself, and thus cannot dispose of a 
middle term which would link them together, is one of wholly unmediated pure 
negation, a negation, moreover, of the individual as a being existing in the universal. 
The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has 
no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely 
free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than 
cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water (ibid.). 
This total diremption of death’s meaning is the endpoint of Enlightenment reason. Its truth is 
manifest in the guillotine. It is important to distinguish this from a negative sacrifice, such as 
expiatory or propitiatory ones like scapegoating. These address an initially negative condition 
and perform the rite to make repairs. With these “coldest and meanest of all deaths” we are 
dealing with a non-sacrifice, the ultimate nullity of destruction without significance because 
divested of the received notions of value that impart significance to death and all other aspects 
of life. 
This destruction does not stop at individuals, but turns on itself, for it has no basis or 
justification for existing, and this intransigent mode of critique cannot abide even its own 
irrationality. This is why the Revolution turned into the self-devouring Terror:
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The government is itself nothing else but the self-established focus, or the individuality, 
of the universal will. The government, which wills and executes its will from a single 
point, at the same time wills and executes a specific order and action. On the one hand, 
it excludes all other individuals from its act, and on the other hand, it thereby 
constitutes itself a government that is a specific will, and so stands opposed to the 
universal will; consequently, it is absolutely impossible for it to exhibit itself as anything 
else but a faction. What is called government is merely the victorious faction, and in 
the very fact of its being a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow; and its 
being government makes it, conversely, into a faction, and [so] guilty (PhG, #591, p. 
360).
This cultural catastrophe results in a situation where no rule can last because all the resources 
for the establishment and recognition of legitimacy are lacking. This becomes a problem with 
Enlightenment thought because Hegel reads this through the Terror. Although in this context it 
could appear to be a peculiarly French problem, Hegel goes on to offer a more nuanced 
account.5 
 The Mediation of Faith and Reason
Against this one-sided Enlightenment critique, and the meaningless deaths that it 
produces, where an hypostasized reason sees its other everywhere and fails to recognize itself 
in this other, Hegel proposed a philosophical viewpoint that would take seriously, if not 
uncritically, that which Enlightenment reason despised, namely, religion and custom. To suture 
together again that which Enlightenment reason tore asunder, Habermas underscores the 
importance for Hegel of a philosophical principle of totalization, the absolute, which would be 
reason’s presupposition that allows it to overcome the fragmentation of understanding: 
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5 “The Phenomenology offered an account of ‘Die Aufklärung’ that was seemingly inhabited solely by 
French thinkers.[...]  When Hegel discussed eighteenth-century philosophy in his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, he provided a more nuanced account, stressing that the Enlightenment had both French and 
German branches and that they lead to rather different results. Hence, there is no longer an inevitable path that 
leads from the Enlightenment to the Terror. Likewise, the Lectures on the Philosophy of History emphasized 
the atypicality of the French experience: they were cursed with a philosophy that could not help but remain 
‘formal’ and ‘abstract’ since it sprung from a culture that had never undergone a Reformation. As a result, the 
French Enlightenment was thrown into a struggle against both Church and State, while in Germany 
Enlightenment was carried out ‘on the side of theology’ and was thus more favorably disposed toward the 
political and social order that confronted it” (Schmidt, p. 25). As we will see, Hegel transforms this 
nationalistic account by making all of Christendom essentially Germanic. 
[Hegel] treats the concept of the absolute (which was taken over from Schelling to 
begin with) as a further presupposition under which alone philosophy can resume its 
business. With it, philosophy can make sure of its goal from the outset—the goal of 
exhibiting reason as the power of unification. Reason indeed is supposed to overcome 
the state of diremption into which the principle of subjectivity has plung-ed both reason 
itself and ‘the entire system of living conditions’ (1987, p. 21).
A one-sided pursuit of the “principle of subjectivity,” a view of the subject’s unlimited power 
of comprehension, led the Enlightenment and the Jacobins astray. The Enlightenment was both 
an instrument and an expression of a fundamental historical alienation [Entfremdung] and 
diremption or “sunderedness” [Zerrissenheit] that not only kept society at war with itself, but 
turned each individual into a battlefield where one faculty warred with another. Did religion 
still have any role to play in reconciling these opposing principles? The primary obstacle to 
religion itself playing a constructive role in modern society was an exclusive distinction 
between faith and reason. This dichotomy emerged from out of the exhaustion and decline of 
scholasticism, but external factors also contributed. As sacred texts were translated into the 
vernacular, and the Gutenberg revolution resulted in the loss of aura of religious texts as 
objects. To preserve some semblance of sanctity, religious specialists had to abstract away 
from the material object, and Luther’s sola scriptura in the sense of the spirit of the text served 
as an appropriate medium for the transmission, not of a reasoned faith, but a faith defined as 
the overcoming of a too-material reason—and as the Word relates to the book, so faith relates 
to reason.  
I would suggest that Luther’s demotion of reason to cast it as a mere instrument of the 
body, even a bestialized figure of danger, had a role to play in this, since it led to a model of 
subjectivity whose internal agon was both natural and religiously charged. If Luther’s 
hypertrophied religiosity guided the hand that dealt this wound, might religion help to heal it? 
This exlusive distinction between faith and reason was also derived from opposite 
principles, not in the service of preserving sanctity in the face of an encroaching materialism, 
but from the impetus of materialist critique itself. As Hegel argued, the Enlightenment 
metastasized a radical critique of superstition and custom, to the point that all custom came to 
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seem as oppressive to the reasoning person as superstition was to the skeptical philosopher. 
The desire to uproot superstition and custom led both to their virtual conflation and to a strict 
demarcation between faith and reason, but this time with the other side—reason—serving as 
the valorized term. This reached its apogee in the work of d’Holbach and Sade.6 
The effects of this schematic and undialectical distinction become clearest at two 
extreme points of social upheaval, the Reformation and the French Revolution, when the 
distinction becomes polarized, Manichean, and corrosive.  Though derived from heterogeneous 
social positions and opposed principles, the zealots of both the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment share a faith in a non-dialectical, non-complementary opposition between faith 
and reason, an assessment that more pragmatic philosophers, from Hegel to Wittgenstein, 
reject as untenable. Reason always needs presuppositions in order to begin its work, and 
religion without reason would be a self-negating know-nothingism. The interrelations between 
the given and the derived, the presupposed and the proven, entail inextricable ties between 
religion and other modes of social practice. 
After Kant had set out to establish the proper limit of truth claims whose referents are 
not available to sense-perception, the subsequent generation of philosophers understood the 
setting of limits and ground rules for the proper functioning of distinct spheres and fields as the 
essential prerogative of philosophy. If not determining outright the specific results in other 
fields, philosophy would still ratify and sanction the procedures and methods by which truth 
was to be sought throughout the university.7 The model then would be isomorphic with the 
functioning of civil society. While in many ways an idealist solution, this project does turn to a 
real institution within society as a means of reforming society as a whole. For Hegel, treating 
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6 For two accounts of Sade’s centrality in the Enlightenment, see Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) and 
Foucault (1967).
7 This role is essential to the reform of the German university, which set the stage for making this 
system the premier research machine in the modern world. Of the innumerable scholars and politicians  who 
contributed to this reform, Humboldt and Fichte stand out in relation to Hegel. 
the university as a metonym for society as a whole requires one also to treat philosophy as a 
metonym of knowledge, and religion as a metonym for ethical substance or Sittlichkeit.  This 
project remains focal for Hegel as he promotes unity over scission by having the university set 
an example for society and function as an organ of that unification. 
If it was often the religious individuals and groups themselves who were the most 
vociferous and violent participants in Reformation and Enlightenment polemics, could it be that 
philosophy now had taken over religion’s role in showing these various factions how their 
interests related to the other parts and the whole? The de facto separation of spheres in Locke 
and Montesqueiu tried to render the scission static. But, as the course of the Enlightenment 
ending with the Terror showed, this was impossible, as that which cannot recognize the 
legitimacy of the other cannot then ignore it in peaceful coexistence. Could philosophy take on 
the role of educating religion concerning its proper place and function in society and history, 
just as religion for millenia had been the chief means of turning the isolated individual into self-
consciously attuned members of a community? Could the two together meet, and, each 
contributing, develop a proper remedy for social fragmentation?
Not all of these questions were clearly formulated in the 1790s, but as Hegel turned to 
work on his first mature philosophical work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, this role for 
philosophy, a complete reversal of the medieval sense of philosophy as an ancilla fides, was 
clearly formulated and the guiding principle of Hegel’s professional agenda.  Another  
development of note was Hegel’s transition from Lessing as a model of the public intellectual 
toward a stronger view of the philosopher and his role. Another was a critical reassessment of 
the historical importance of both Enlightenment critiques and their Romantic reaction. Hegel 
strove to incorporate the positive developments of the Enlightenment, yet meliorate the 
components that led to a one-sided view of reason, religion and custom in social life. 
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 Enlightenment and Reformation Critiques of Ritual
When Hegel assessed the aftermath of the Enlightenment battles between faith and 
religion, he encountered two noble powers that had been disfigured in a warfare of 
misrecognition. In doing battle against faith, philosophy’s tenacity in isolating and attacking 
this alien phenomena could not stop there, but eventually cannot help but turn these polemical 
instruments against itself, and note that it too has many faith-claims on which it depends. This 
is true to so great an extent that, citing the master/slave dialectic in reference to “barbarous 
nations” who, though conquered outwardly, in fact conquered the conquerors spiritually. To 
Habermas, 
Enlightened Reason won a glorious victory over what it believed, in its limited 
conception of religion, to be faith as opposed to Reason. Yet seen in this clear light the 
victory comes to no more than this: the positive element with which Reason busied 
itself to do battle, is no longer religion, and victorious Reason is no longer Reason 
(1987, p. 23).  
Reason thus has unexamined positivity of its own to sublate, in the form of residual 
philosophical positions which still convince people of their validity, but which history has 
found wanting and thus should be discarded. In a sense, this is what the Phenomenology sets 
out to do.
Nonetheless, when Hegel adopts sacrificial rhetoric at the end of the Phenomenology, 
Hegel must negotiate a problem, in that his rhetoric there adopts tones reminiscent of 
Protestant iconoclastic rhetoric that both resembles and historically contributed to 
Enlightenment critiques of custom. This underscores the central paradox of Hegel’s sacrificial 
rhetoric: on a fundamental level Hegel took the Reformation and Enlightenment critique of 
ritual, and sacrifice in particular, as true. Hegel makes its attitude to rituals of sacrifice and 
asceticism as fundamentally in accord with Luther’s critique. Speaking affirmatively of the 
Enlightenment’s critique, Hegel explains that 
Enlightenment in its view of the action of faith finds the rejection of enjoyment and 
possessions wrong and purposeless. As to the rejection being wrong, Enlightenment is 
in agreement with faith on this point; for faith itself acknowledges this reality of 
possessing, holding on to, and enjoying, property. In holding on to property its 
behaviour is all the more self-centred and stubborn, and in its enjoyment it is all the 
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more crudely self-abandoned, since its religious act of giving up possessions and 
enjoyment falls on the far side of this reality and purchases freedom for itself on that 
side. This service of sacrifice of natural impulses and enjoyments has, in fact, owing to 
this antithesis, no truth. Retention occurs along with sacrifice; the latter is merely a 
symbol which performs real sacrifice on only a small portion, and is therefore in point 
of fact only a sacrifice in imagination (PhG, #569 p. 347).
This critique is an early forerunner of Derrida’s critiques of the gift and sacrifice (1992, 1995), 
which persistently question if such valorized interactions can ever escape the cunning of 
economic reason. According to Hegel’s interpretation the Enlightenment critique of asceticism 
is largely in accord with the Lutheran critique of works, but with an additional angle. With 
Luther we see a complete doctrinal rejection of all works as intrinsically deceptive and luring 
the believer away from the true doctrine. In addition, the Enlightenment critique attends to 
further nefarious effects on the devotee. It is not only that mitigated sacrifices lead to a feeling 
of license once the ritual is finished and the formal prescription performed, but, further, the gap 
between the self-abandonment of sacrifice and the actual practice of mitigation (one sacrifices 
“only a small portion”—i.e. shifts along the object-axis toward less costly sacrifices) leads to 
hypocrisy. Clearly, then, when we read Hegel speak of sacrifice at the end of the 
Phenomenology, it is a transformed notion of sacrifice that he employs. To understand the kind 
of transformation that has taken place, we will examine the way that Hegel redeems the 
Enlightenment by redefining religion and custom in such a way that it can withstand the 
astringency of Enlightenment critique.8 Might Hegel then be offering a non-ascetic view of 
sacrifice? One that is less ascetic than tragic, in the Greek sense of involving and channeling the 
play of attachment and pleasure instead of denying it outright? A more pagan sacrifice, that 
requires the emotion and attachment instead of demanding negation? 
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8 “Reformation Christianity in general, then, and Lutheran Christianity in particular, has, in a sense, 
both temporal and spatial powers of assimilation. While the latter power is especially evident in the Aufklärung 
in Germany, on the level of logic, if not on the level of fact, the process of Enlightenment in any country, 
notwithstanding Catholic or Protestant cultural dominance, can in a sense be referred to Reformation 
assimilation” (O’Regan, 1995, p. 43-44).  This leads to a treatment in the PhG that treads between fact and 
logic.
To frame this persistent theme in Hegel’s oeuvre, we can turn to an earlier text, 
“Fragment of a System,” that addresses the notion explicitly.9 From an early date Hegel viewed 
the very notion of sacrifice skeptically, to the point that he regarded it as an impossible 
injunction: 
In the religious life both man's relation to objects and also his action were interpreted 
[above] as a preservation of the objects in life or as an animation of them, but man was 
also reminded of his destiny, which demands of him that he admit the existence of the 
objective as objective or even that he make the living being itself into an object.[...] But 
it is necessary that life should also put itself into a permanent relation with objects and 
thus maintain their objectivity even up to the point of completely destroying them 
(1948, p. 315).
This passage, though quite opaque, introduces into religion the problem of the human relation 
to the object. It is imperative if humans are to live in truth that they should test their 
subjectivity by means of a persistent relationship with objects, endowing them with value and 
“life” in order to discover the potentialities and limits of subjectivity. In short, it is the fate of 
subjectivity to explore and prove itself in relation to objects, not by means of pseudo-religious 
flights from the world. 
Hegel next depicts sacrifice as an attempt to master the reign of objectivity by breaking 
with particular objects. Yet objects themselves cannot provide the principle or the means to 
transcend humanity’s paradoxical dependence upon and sovereignty over objects. This paradox 
can only be worked out in practical relationships, not transcended all at once by means of ritual 
gestures. As he continues, 
Even in all the increased religious union disclosed by the above-mentioned acts of 
integration [in worship] hypocrisy may still exist, namely, owing to one's retention of a 
particular property for one's self. If he kept things firmly in his own grasp, man would 
not yet have fulfilled the negative prerequisites of religion, i.e., would not yet be free 
from absolute objectivity and would not yet have risen above finite life. He would still 
be unable to unite himself with the infinite life because he would have kept something 
for himself; he would still be in a state of mastering things or caught in a dependence 
upon them. This is the reason why he gives up only part of his property as a sacrifice, 
for it is his fate to possess property, and this fate is necessary and can never be 
discarded (p. 315-6). 
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9 This discussion owes much to Lukács’ examination of this text in The Young Hegel, p. 173ff. 
This theme of the hypocrisy of mitigated sacrifice remains virtually the same into Hegel’s 
mature texts. Property becomes a fate that the intermittent sacrifice of a portion of one’s 
property cannot transcend. The limited nature of private property cannot provide the means to 
relate to the infinity of the divine life to which one is devoted, so monasteries do not escape 
this hypocrisy. This paradox remains whether one pursues sacrificial rites or the giving of alms: 
In God's sight man destroys part of his property [on the altar]. The rest he destroys to 
some extent by taking away as far as possible its character as private property and 
sharing it with his friends. The destruction of property [on the altar] is an additional 
negation of private ownership because such destruction is useless and superfluous. 
Only through this useless-ness of destroying, through this destroying for destroying's 
sake, does he make good the destruction which he causes for his own particular 
purposes. At the same time he has consummated the objectivity of the objects by a 
destruction unrelated to his own purposes, by that complete negation of relations which 
is called death. This aimless destruction for destruction's sake sometimes happens, even 
if the necessity of a purposive destruction of objects remains, and it proves to be the 
only religious relation to absolute objects (p. 316).
In accordance with religious prescriptions, the useless sacrifice atones for or “makes good” the 
finitude and selfishness of one’s own consumption.  The syntax and meaning makes it unclear if 
the “religious relation to absolute objects” involves a destruction that is purposive or useless, 
but the point could be moot in that the passage acknowledges the weight of prescriptions 
regarding ritual sacrifice, which is the primary source of the problem regarding this paradox, 
since such prescriptions make the supposedly purposeless destruction of objects completely 
purposive, the purpose being to stand justified in regard to the prescriptions.
What I take from these enigmatic early ruminations on the subject by an already 
heterodox student of theology is a frank acknowledgment of the paradoxes and antinomies that 
the practice of sacrifice entails.  Furthermore, there is already the tendency in Hegel to seek the 
extra-religious truths of religious phenomena. Here, one can see how the secular world of 
objects and purposes impinges on the otherworldliness of religion. Already there is a 
transfiguration of religion into politico-economic and epistemological registers. To understand 
that one has “consummated the objectivity of the objects by a destruction unrelated to his own 
purpose,” that is, made the object more completely objective by destroying it in a way opposed 
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to self-interest, entails a sense that quotidian appropriation involves a subjectivation of objects, 
just as the objectification of subjectivity involves an expropriation. In passages like this Hegel 
is already raising issues regarding the differing degrees to which objects are alienable in relation 
to various activities, such as consumption, labor and sacrifice, and working through the notion 
of sacrifice to reach a dialectical vision of the subject-object relation. 
In regard to the close proximity between ritual sacrifice and charity, asceticism and the 
nature of one’s duty towards others, this skepticism regarding the practical viability of sacrifice 
only gets exacerbated as Hegel became a close student of Kant and began a constructive 
critique of his positions. In fact, one of the central notions in Hegel’s system, ethical substance 
or Sittlichkeit, marks a fundamental departure from Kant in that, instead of an appeal to the 
abstract, universal basis of morality, as with Kant, Hegel looks to the role played by locality 
and custom in promoting the ethical life.  In appreciation of Kant’s reformulation of religion, 
Hegel claims in the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind, “As regards the starting-point of [the 
Mind's elevation to God], Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct, when he treats 
belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. For that starting-point contains the 
material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God” (EPG, #551, p. 282). 
Thus, as is typical of Hegel, he takes as true Kant’s sense that, in terms of practical reason, 
morality is the truth of religion, in that the ultimate goal and function of religion is the shaping 
of one’s relations to others within a moral community. But Hegel differs from Kant by insisting 
that a merely rational assent to duty over interest will not suffice, for 
the true concrete material [of the notion of God] is [...] the Mind, the absolute 
characteristic and function of which is effective reason, i.e. the self-determining and 
self-realizing notion itself—Liberty. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which 
these considerations give is by Kant again deposed to a postulate—a mere ‘ought’—is 
the peculiar perversity, formerly noticed, of calmly and simply reinstating as true and 
valid that very antithesis of finitude, the supersession of which into truth is the essence 
of that elevation (ibid.).
Mind as Liberty is the concrete content of God, which stands irremediably opposed to any 
“positive” aspects of religion, and certainly against dogmatic moral prescriptions, or the “mere 
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‘ought’” that here refers to Kant’s notion that duty and interest cannot coincide if an action is 
to be a moral one. Why “mere”? Hegel opposed abstract moral maxims, which he argued could 
only ever remain formal and could not provide the content necessary for truly ethical choices. 
Arguing within the framework of Hume’s “is-ought” distinction, what is, the real, is rational, 
but the ought lacks the reality necessary for motivating individuals in concrete situations. As 
Hegel translated this position into speculative terms,  the infrastructure of reciprocity and 
recognition in society is much moere the basis of morality than any isolated norms or 
prescriptions. 
In response to Kant, Hegel also opposed the sacrificial overtone’s of Kant’s critique.  
Against Kant’s sacrifice of interest to duty, freedom in the play of passion is the engine of 
history itself, as well as the philosophical principle that makes history transparent to reason.  
Religion and morality need the heart, which means that people must be acculturated so that 
they will desire the good, instead of living a sacrificial life that never moves from the base, 
natural desires that one must negate in order to live morally. Thus, while building on Kant’s 
notions regarding the moral basis of religion, Hegel insists by contrast that the true moral basis 
is no longer that of the individual, but of the community. 
If one could summarize Hegel’s treatment of Kant, he makes Kant more Lutheran than 
Kant’s focus on the moral basis of religion would seem to allow, since this would seemingly 
reverse the Lutheran priority of works over faith. To do this, Hegel has to transform the liberty 
that Kant’s critique achieved in regards to the individual’s spontaneous contribution to 
experience, but extended it to the moral sphere. This transformation makes Kantian freedom 
into more of a religious claim, in that this freedom is construed not only epistemologically but  
ontologically in regards to the meaning of history as the movement of Spirit in the world. 
In this same text Hegel  takes up this ontological claim as “the ‘mediation’ which [...] 
that elevation to God really involves,” Hegel reinstates a sacrificial, or at least ascetic, 
connotation to this movement. As Hegel describes this movement, 
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The finite, from which the start is now made, is the real ethical self-consciousness. The 
negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its truth, is the 
purification, actually accomplished in the ethical world, whereby its conscience is 
purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishness of desire. Genuine 
religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life [translation]: religion is 
that life rising to think, i.e. becoming aware of the free universality of its concrete 
essence. Only from the moral life and by the moral life is the Idea of God seen to be 
free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefore it is vain to seek for true religion and 
religiosity (EPG, #551, p. 282-3).
Note the specific connection to sacrificial asceticism. Spirit freeing itself from finititude is  
analogous to a sacrificial movement. What is critical to note here is that this is more 
epistemological than in the religious or ascetic. Hegel ascribes negation, purification, and 
purging to this movement, each of which inhabits the semantic domain of sacrificial 
connotations. However, with this sacrificial process it is the finitude of the limited, self-
centered viewpiont that one must break with, as opposed to a process aimed at purifying the 
body or breaking one’s relation to property.
This investigation will now turn to Hegel’s expansive interpretation of Luther and the 
role of the German Reformation and the French Revolution in history. This will serve  as a 
preparatory analysis for the examination of sacrificial rhetoric in the Phenomenology as a key 
moment in the elevation of philosophy over religion. Hence, before dealing with this 
notoriously complex text, we will turn to Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of History to see 
how he interpreted the French Revolution in the context of other historical events, such as the 
Crusades and the Reformation, and thereby transformed the meaning of each, and religion in 
general, in light of his developing speculative philosophy.
 Crusades, Reformation, Revolution
To begin with a counterpoint to Hegel’s interpretation of the Reformation, remember 
Marx’s lament about the German view of history: 
German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no other nation in the 
whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will again. We have shared the 
restorations of modern nations without ever having shared their revolutions. We have 
been restored, firstly, because other nations dared to make revolutions, and, secondly, 
because other nations suffered counter-revolutions; on the one hand, because our 
  
 142 
masters were afraid, and, on the other, because they were not afraid. With our 
shepherds to the fore, we only once kept company with freedom, on the day of its 
internment (1972, p. 18). 
This sense of German history reduces to a Marx’s claim that “Germany’s revolutionary past is 
theoretical—it is the Reformation” (ibid.) The shortcoming of this revolution, to Marx, was 
that it reinstalled authority at the same moment that it overcame it, for Luther “shattered the 
faith in authority by restoring the authority of faith” (ibid.) Hegel’s view of the Reformation 
could not differ more starkly, and this stems in large part from Hegel’s distinctly philosophical 
interpretation of history. In his series of lectures on The Philosophy of History, Hegel most 
completely expounds his novel view of history. 
 As opposed to a marxian view of history that breaks down into various stages of class 
struggle, Hegel adopts a schema wherein there are three ages of the world which each build to 
the breakthrough of freedom into the world spirit in the German age.  Hegel separates the 
sweep of millenia into a three age structure varying according to the scope of freedom realized 
in the world at the time. In the first, Asiatic age, one, the tyrant, is free. In the second, the 
Greek age, some are free. In the third, the German age, all are recognized as free. These are 
treated as fundamental principles of the ages and societies involved, and not mere indications 
of quantitative freedom. 
In light of this overarching structure in the lectures, to understand how important the 
Reformation as an irruption of freedom in the world was to Hegel, we must first acknowledge 
that “freedom” itself is not simply a characteristic of certain people or certain societies at 
certain junctures in history. Instead, freedom is a form of truth with ontological resonance, as 
Geist’s primary medium of non-coercive interaction. Freedom, woven through the cosmos, 
makes Hegel’s philosophy of history more than an intellectual history, or the history of an idea: 
it is the truth of the movement of history itself.
It would be a mistake, however, to read too much into the apparently monolithic 
“Germanic Age,” i.e., to read it in a Popperian way (1963) as a precursor to German fascism, 
  
 143 
or as a racial concept. Instead, the frame of reference here is more the indigenous tribes of 
Europe who were only slowly Christianized, and retained a taste for the martial virtues of 
courage and honor into the age of chivalry even after they converted from paganism.  It can 
thus be read in cultural terms as referring to the Germanic resistance to Christianization in 
Europe in favor of indigenous notions of freedom, and, conversely, the universalization of 
these notions through their religious sanctification via their infiltration of these notions into 
Christianity. In short, this age serves as a shorthand for both the Christianization of the 
Germans and the Germanization of Christianity. Thus it has less to do with race and more to 
do with a Mediterranean religion spreading to a northern people who in turn, according to 
Hegel, help realize its most important principle—namely, the absolute liberty of the individual 
as the image of God on earth.10  
The outcome of these dual, reciprocal processes of cultural interaction was to strip 
Christianity of its “positive” element and provide the scope of universality to indigenous 
German sensibilities. The culmination of this process revealed itself in the Reformation, and on 
this topic, Hegel speaks in uncharacteristically clear tones when he states, “This is the essence 
of the Reformation: Man is in his very nature destined to be free” (PH, p. 417). The essence of 
Christianity understood as the freedom of conscience, however, gives rise to some 
complications. First, it makes the inside-outside dichotomy complicated, as if this inmost kernel 
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10 This is not to downplay the nationalism found in a great deal of Hegel’s writing. Yet I would reject 
the attempt to read the future problems of German nationalism back into Hegel’s texts. There is nothing in 
Hegel of a nationalism that is more extreme than one can find in any number of texts in other countries at the 
time. Furthermore, it is imperative to keep in view, not only the fact that there was no unified “Germany” yet 
on the European stage, but also, in the years around and after the Napoleonic wars that shaped Hegel’s mature 
thought, the Deutschophone peoples at this time are defeated and scattered. For these reasons, when we read 
such passages as the following: “The time-honored and cherished sincerity of the German people is destined to 
effect this revolution out of the honest truth and simplicity of its heart” (PH, p. 414); “The Reformation 
originated in Germany, and struck firm root only in the purely German nations” (p. 419); and, especially, “the 
pure inwardness of the German nation was the proper soil for the emancipation of Spirit; the Romanic Nations, 
on the contrary, have maintained in the very depth of their soul—in their Spiritual Consciousness—the 
principle of Disharmony: they are a product of the fusion of Roman and German blood, and still retain the 
heterogeneity thence resulting” (p. 420-1), such historical and contextual qualifications are essential for sound 
judgment.
of the Gospel laid dormant until this freedom loving people unpacked it. Furthermore, in this 
last age there is a tremendous obstacle to overcome, in that the insight into universal freedom 
is recognized by most, yet the residual structures from earlier ages prevent the realization of 
this insight in the world. It was Hegel’s—and, from his viewpoint, philosophy’s—overriding 
goal to provide the means whereby such structures could develop in the modern world. That is, 
the insight must be realized, not only in consciousness, but in institutions, customs, and ways 
of life. 
By making the last age German, the Reformation definitive for religion, and philosophy 
in many ways Lutheran, one could argue that Hegel offers these lectures as a Lutheran view of 
history,11 which Hegel relates not only to faith and doctrine, but to broader historical events.  
Hegel views Luther’s Reformation as a decisive element of the German Age in World History. 
In the Germanic age, one can read this historical event as the fulfillment of a people in its 
resistance to Rome12 and its rejection of subservience, both secular and sacred, in favor of 
freedom. In fact, it is not only the emergence of freedom in the world, but the movement of 
history itself that is marked by freedom. 
Nonetheless, as with Luther’s message of faith, Hegel’s paean to freedom could be 
misinterpreted. To avoid a sense that anarchy or antinomianism were the final goals of history, 
Hegel retains a Kantian view of freedom as the reasoning subject’s self-subjugation to the law 
by means of its recognition of law’s legitimacy. To sound the notes furthest from anarchism, 
Hegel writes one of his most infamous passages: 
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11 On Hegel’s tri-partite historical scheme, O’Regan relates this to the suppressed Joachimite tradition 
of Lutheranism, which Hegel in some ways resussitated: “The excess of this view over the view of the historical 
Luther was twofold: apocalyptically inclined investigation of history, a kind of gnosis with respect to history, 
was legitimated; historical investigation was no longer confined, as it was in Luther himself, to the exegesis of 
the great apocalyptic books, Daniel and Revelation, but made some attempt to understand extrabiblical ecclesial 
and political events” (1995, p. 45).
12 As O’Regan contends, with Barnes, “central to the second or third generation Lutheranism was the 
notion of the translatio imperi in which Rome ceded authority to Germany at the dawn of the fourth and final 
age” (1995, p. 45).
The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of 
History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity, 
and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For Law is the objectivity of Spirit; 
volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law is free: for it obeys itself—it is 
independent and so free. When the State or our country constitutes a community of 
existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws—the contradiction between 
Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The Rational has necessary existence, as being the 
reality and substance of things, and we are free in recognizing it as law, and following it 
as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will are then 
reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole (PH, p. 39).
This passage stands nearly as a rebus for the interpretation of Hegel, in that issues and topics in 
need of decoding pile on top of one another. Here a philosophy of history, a purpose for 
philosophy, and a view of the history of philosophy all come together. To address the greatest 
obstacle to the serious study of Hegel, Popper and others castigate him for the formulation that 
the state is the divine idea on earth. What is most unfortunate is that critics target the 
divinization of the state and the absolution of a human institution, yet they fail to shift the 
statement dialectically and note the reciprocal way that it divests the divine of its 
transcendental status. Much like Durkheim’s notion that the moral community projects its 
consciousness of itself into religious symbols, Hegel here offers a quasi-projection theory of 
religion, one that Feuerbach will make even more explicit. Furthermore, if submitting to the 
law is read in a linear, top-down way, then this sounds authoritarian. However, if, as has 
happened more and more through the course of recent history, the content of the laws also 
include the means whereby the individual can respond to the juridical assemblage and reform it 
or shape it to the popular will, then this formulation simply translates into a community-specific 
description of life within the realm of the law. 
In a similar way, Hegel employs techniques to make the Reformation less a specifically 
religious phenomena, while simultaneously resacralizing modern political developments as so 
many movements toward the freedom of spirit. In essence, Hegel depicts  the emergence of 
freedom in the world as the movement of Spirit, the French Revolution achieved the freedom 
of conscience first articulated by Luther and launched in the Reformation. Because of the 
Augsburg compromise, the Reformation principle of freedom of conscience was again only a 
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principle for some, but not all, insofar as only the reigning princes freely exercised a choice 
regarding which faith to adopt. When the French people rejected not only their aristocracy, but 
also clerical rule, they made real in the world the emancipation from spiritual slavery that 
Luther had hoped would follow his revolt. 
The net effect of this kind of interpretation is to pursue an extra-ecclesiastical history, 
beyond the confines of the two cities or two kingdoms schema, that acknowledges the 
mutually reciprocal relations of sacred and secular orders. In doing this, of course, and 
attempting to narrate spirit’s march through history, Hegel makes these gestures of 
incorporating and speaking for the essence of Lutheranism, yet the audacity of his 
philosophical project pushes orthodox Lutheranism to the breaking point.  To address the point 
of greatest tension, Hegel’s positions regarding freedom are so one-sided in regards to the 
Lutheran paradox of absolute freedom and servility, how is it that Hegel can claim to be a 
Lutheran? That is, if the Reformation is now about formal freedom more than the content of 
faith, and even less about faith’s sacrifice of reason, one wonders how it is that Hegel can still 
claim to be a Lutheran?13 
One answer, touched on in the previous chapter, is the processual aspect of Luther’s 
faith. Luther’s prior asceticism was essential to prepare the way for his reception of the sola 
fides doctrine, for he had personally exhausted works as the primary avenue of righteousness, 
which he could then doctrinally negate. Like Luther, Hegel speaks of a true movement of faith, 
and like Luther this faith does not reduce to the content of a catechism, but involves the 
movement and struggle within the individual to attain a state of righteousness. Even more 
unlike Luther, however, Hegel is not content to depict this relation between soul and God as a 
paradox. Instead, Hegel seeks to map the movements of objective and subjective spirit in ways 
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13 In his letters, Hegel claims to be a Lutheran in many places, including his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion and in letters to peers and superiors (1984, p. 531).
that are akin to those of grace and justification, but instead of a paradoxical abyss one finds 
complex intermediary movements.
 To refer to this processual notion of faith, Hegel makes a distinction betwen original 
versus historical faith in the following passage from his History of Philosophy: 
The divine Spirit which is comprehended, is objective; the subjective Spirit 
comprehends. But Spirit is not passive, or else the passivity can be momentary only; 
there is one spiritual substantial unity. The subjective Spirit is the active, but the 
objective Spirit is itself this activity; the active subjective Spirit is that which 
comprehends the divine, and in its comprehension of it it is itself the divine Spirit. The 
relation of Spirit to self alone is the absolute determination; the divine Spirit lives in its 
own communion and presence. This comprehension has been called Faith, but it is not 
an historical faith; we Lutherans—I am a Lutheran and will remain the same— have 
only this original faith. This unity is not the Substance of Spinoza, but the apprehending 
Substance in self-consciousness which makes itself eternal and relates to universality 
(HP, p. 73). 
However close to Luther this language might appear, Hegel immediately takes his distance 
from Lutheran orthodoxy. Although reminiscent in ways of Luther’s “Bride of Christ” 
metaphor,14 the identity that he postulates transgresses the one-way flow of movement intrinsic 
to Luther’s notion of grace: 
The talk about the limitations of human thought is futile; to know God is the only end 
of Religion. The testimony of the Spirit to the content of Religion is itself Religion 
[and] this testimony, this inward stirring and self-consciousness, reveals itself, while in 
the enshrouded consciousness of devotion it does not arrive at the proper 
consciousness of an object, but only at the consciousness of immersion in absolute 
Being (HP, p. 74). 
 When Hegel states, as above, that “the active subjective Spirit is that which comprehends the 
divine, and in its comprehension of it it is itself the divine Spirit” (ibid., p. 73), Hegel imparts 
activity to the human in the the movement between subjective spirit and the divine, thus 
violating the Lutheran axiom of the utter passivity of the subject in need of divine grace. As 
O’Regan argues, 
[Hegel] essentially ignores consistent Lutheran polemic against knowledge, freedom as 
autonomy, and human presumptiveness and pride in thinking that human being is 
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14 Such an echo arises later in the same argument, when Hegel claims that, in the movement of faith, 
“This permeating and permeated Spirit now enters into conception; God goes forth into the ‘other’ and makes 
Himself objective” (HP, p. 74).
intrinsically capable of having a truly reciprocal relationship with God. As Hegel's 
complex vision—from the side of Lutheran orthodoxy in particular, arguably, mis-
vision—allows for the expansion of Christianity beyond the precincts of the ghettoized 
‘holy,’ it also allows Reformation Christianity to perdure into modernity, in fact, to be 
nothing short of its condition (1995, p. 43-44).
Lutheran faith thus teeters on the edge of philosophy. In mythology, picture-thinking, and the 
“enshrouded consciousness of devotion,” subjective spirit can only behold, but this religious 
truth adopts more adequate form as Hegel’s interpretive sublation brings it towards more 
adequate conceptualization. The true content of religion enters the true form of philosophy, 
since conceiving one truly has, and becomes, that which one worships. This leads to the 
apotheosis of human reason itself, a complete reversal of the sacrificial scenario Luther defines 
when faith’s first work is to sacrifice reason: “The man who speaks of the merely finite, of 
merely human reason, and of the limits to mere reason, lies against the Spirit, for the Spirit as 
infinite and universal, as self-comprehension, comprehends itself not in a ‘merely’ nor in limits, 
nor in the finite as such. It has  nothing to do with this, for it comprehends itself within itself 
alone, in its infinitude” (HP, p. 74). The proper conception of Christ Hegel links to a proper 
notion of reason, which allows one to conceive Christ as the unity of divine and human, and 
not merely picture it as the Crucifixion on the wall, or the dogma in the Creed. By redefining 
Luther’s achievement as the discovery and advocacy of the freedom of conscience. Hegel has 
to critique Luther at the same time that he connects to Luther’s authority, making his faith 
articulate by taking it into a post-religious language. 
Here we get further insight into the transformation in the notion of sacrifice that Hegel 
develops. To conceive the sacrifice of faith properly, it is no longer one capacity or faculty of 
the human counterposed to the other. Rather, it involves the determinate negation of 
particularity that spirit might mistake for universality. In favor of the true universal, the 
particular must be negated, i.e. sacrificed. This is the philosophical translation of Luther’s 
doctrine, yet the sacrificial object is no longer reason, but modes of understanding that posit a 
static configuration of Verstehen in place of the movement of Vernunft. As Verstehen 
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subsumes the particular sensation into a category of understanding, the distinctness remains, 
but the particular must be put in motion in the process of subjective interiorization. 
This articulation in the history of sacrificial rhetoric is decisive, and marked by a bold 
reversal even while maintaining authoritative links to a cultural hero. Still, this treatment is 
abstract in that we are dealing with the relations of the mind’s faculties both to one another and 
to its overall purposive activity. To understand better what this transition in sacrificial rhetoric 
means historically, it is better to turn to Hegel’s Philosophy of History and follow the 
trajectory there of spirit’s manifestations in ritual and sacrifice through the Crusades and 
leading up to the Reformation. Hegel downplays his distance from Luther in this text by 
duplicating Luther’s own disenchantment with sacrificial ritualism in the church as a historical 
development from the Crusades, through lay piety, to the Reformation. This will serve as a 
propadeutic as we move to the final analysis of Hegel’s logical and historical treatment in the 
Phenomenology, where we will analyze the strongest instance of sacrificial rhetoric. It is 
important to track the historical argument in detail, for I would suggest that this is Hegel’s 
second attempt at a transformative interpretation of history. The Phenomenology was the first, 
but it was so imbricated in a logico-deductive argument that the historical claims were difficult 
to track. Reading these in a reverse order, with the later but clearer historical exegesis as a 
propadeutic for the earlier, more heterogeneous argument, should allow for a fresh look at the 
stakes involved in Hegel’s sacrificial rhetoric. 
 Crusades and Medieval Religiosity
By treating history as at all relevant to the Reformation, Hegel adds the kind of 
particular complications that will allow him to reframe Luther’s insights into Christian worship 
and then reinterpret them in lines with his own speculative philosophy. When we read  Hegel’s 
type of historiography, we encounter not only all the fragmentation in the outcome of the 
Reformations, but also the events leading up to the Reformation as much more complicated. 
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More articulated than a simple fall from true dogma, where Hegel and Luther meet is a 
unifying, providential, vision at work in history, spirit as freedom moving through the world. 
Just as he explored the French Revolution by resituating it in broader historical trends 
originating with the Enlightenment, Hegel avoids the view that the Reformation represents an 
absolute irruption in history. Instead of Luther’s single fall of the one Church away from 
proper worship, Hegel presents a view of the Reformation prepared spiritually by preceding 
events, namely, the Crusades and the products of their disappointment, the Mendicant and 
Chivalric orders. One wants to add, of course, the development of nominalism, cultural 
nationalism, vernacular literacy, the conciliar movement within the church, and, of course, 
Renaissance humanism. But Hegel’s treatment of this historical progression does not depend 
upon elements that blend political, religious and philosophical elements. Instead, as if to 
produce a Lutheran view of history, not only do we read a history of the development and 
overreaching of papal power, most clearly indicated in Innocent III‘s call for the first Crusade, 
or of the so-called Agricultural and Commercial Revolutions that led to surplus production and 
the rise of urbanization and a literate middle class. In addition, Hegel tells a story of spirit’s 
disappointment in the pursuit of its realization in the objective and material world, then its 
movement towards its true terrain, the freedom of the self-conscious subject. The way Hegel 
narrates these developments thus stands as a complement to a historico-political account, but 
also as its higher meaning and truth. As Christ dies and the body disappears, we have an echo 
of the morning and evening sacrifice discussed in the previous chapter on Luther.
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel depicts the Crusades as prefiguring the 
Reformation, but in a negative way. With the Crusades first inspired by the call to sacrifice in 
the project of reclaiming the Holy City, the Crusaders were soon disappointed. Here the 
Protestant charge of fetishism against Catholic ritual worship gets directly linked to the 
misguided pilgrimage of the Crusades: “[T]he vast idea of the union of the Finite with the 
Infinite was perverted to such a degree as that men looked for a definite embodiment of the 
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Infinite in a mere isolated outward object [the Host]. Christendom found the empty Sepulchre, 
but not the union of the Secular and the Eternal; and so it lost the Holy Land” (PH, p. 393). 
Note especially the consequential “so”—Hegel here makes the geopolitical defeat of the 
Crusades a result of a false interpretation of doctrine. 
Although disappointed in their aims, the Crusaders did negate an error, and thus moved 
closer to the truth, which is essential to Hegel’s constructive use of skepticism. Hence, the 
Crusaders discovered a truth of sorts: “But in the Grave is found the real point of retroversion; 
it is in the grave that all the vanity of the Sensuous perishes. [...] In the negation of that 
definite and present embodiment—i.e. of the Sensuous—it is that the turning-point in question 
is found, and those words have an application: ‘Thou wouldst not suffer thy Holy One to see 
corruption’” (PH, p. 392-3).
Here finding and losing the divine, with the site of the Cucifixion recovered but the 
event long past and merely historical, moves the devotee to look beyond the material remnants 
of this religious truth, and incorporate it as a truth of subjectivity. In this dialectical movement, 
the negation of the divine embodiment casts Spirit back onto the embodied subject in the shape 
of the living human being. This dejection opened Christendom to better channels of lay piety 
than the macabre pilgrimages of murder and sacrilege. In Hegel’s eyes, the net result of the 
Crusades, despite their status as a corrupt endeavour and a geo-political distaster, was that 
Christendom
was practically undeceived; and the result which it brought back with it was of a 
negative kind: viz., that the definite embodiment which it was seeking, was to be 
looked for in Subjective Consciousness alone, and in no external object; that the 
definite form in question, presenting the union of the Secular with the Eternal, is the 
Spiritual self-cognizant independence of the individual (PH, p. 393). 
The attempt to re-realize the body of Christ in a substance or place is doomed. In the sacrifice 
of the body, one must not only kill Christ, the body itself must disappear totally to perform the 
determinate negation of sensuousness. Thus, not only the Crucifixion but the Resurrection is 
essential to Christian sacrifice, an emphasis that Luther sounded with his talk of an evening and 
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morning double sacrifice. Yet again, we see a formal similarity to Luther’s teachings, though 
the content has been tranformed in much more anthropocentric directions.
Hegel treats the disappointments of the Crusade as history’s attempt to teach the same 
lesson for a second time, for mythological and superstitious accretions had overgrown the 
original lesson. There had been a fall towards the sensuous and the particular in the Crusades, 
as if the divine were limited to a specific location. To Hegel,
Christendom was not to find its ultimatum of truth in the grave. At this sepulchre the 
Christian world received a second time the response given to the disciples when they 
sought the body of the Lord there: ‘Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not 
here, but is risen.’ You must not look for the principle of your religion in the 
Sensuous, in the grave  among the dead, but in the living Spirit in yourselves (PH, p. 
393).
Since the Crusades found the Holy Sepulchre empty, this discovery serves for Hegel as a 
second resurrection. Hegel here speaks the message of Spirit. The rejection of the community 
as a vehicle and embodiment of the divine led to the disastrous endeavour of the Crusades. The 
search for a finite and particular embodiment of the sacred, the referent of a demonstrative 
speech act—this search negates the role of the community and its customs. This negation of 
the living customs of a people in favor of a one-sided and intransigent critique: this is what 
links the Crusades with the French Revolution. 
 Just as the revolutionary negation of the French aristocracy, in then failing to maintain 
order, discredited the rule of Enlightenment reason, the Crusades discredited an outdated mode 
of authority. According to Hegel, 
Through the Crusades the Church reached the completion of its authority: it had 
achieved the perversion of religion and of the divine Spirit; it had distorted the principle 
of Christian Freedom to a wrongful and immoral slavery of men’s souls; and in so 
doing, far from abolishing lawless caprice and violence and supplanting them by a 
virtuous rule of its own, it had even enlisted them in the service of ecclesiastical 
authority (PH, p. 394). 
This corrupting ethos reaches its peak in a pilgrimage resulting in the slaughter of innocents, a 
piety in reference to this false basis, a blasphemy in regards to the freedom of conscience, and 
an evocation of a false versus a true sacrifice. There is in this again a double movement, the 
downfall of a false authority, and the initial restoration of the proper mode of worship.
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 To make the three-ages narrative a world-historical movement and not a story about 
the vicissitudes of Christendom, Hegel speaks of Spirit, and not the Popes, Crusaders, or 
Christians, as the protagonists of his story. Although in his opinion they are the carriers or 
avant-garde of this movement, the movement itself is Spirit’s own:
The fall of the Church was not to be effected by open violence; it was from within—by 
the power of Spirit and by an influence that wrought its way upwards—that ruin 
threatened it. Respect for the Papacy could not but be weakened by the very fact that 
the lofty aim of the Crusades—the satisfaction expected from the enjoyment of the 
sensuous Presence—was not attained. As little did the Popes succeed in keeping 
possession of the Holy Land (PH, p. 395). 
A false basis is self-corrupting, and thus self-overcoming. This insight into the nature of the 
Reformation project continues with the Phenomenology of Spirit. That is, this is the historical 
lesson explored in a different register in that text. Hegel turns the disappointing end of the 
Crusade into a religious and an epistemological as much as a political event. A literalist 
interpretation of sacrifice and fetishism of particularity ruined these projects in a way that battle 
with an imposing and hostile neighbor could not. A continuous concern with the self-validation 
of communal norms must become the basis for social life and freedom itself:
Thus the world attains the conviction that man must look within himself for that 
definite embodiment of being which is of a divine nature: subjectivity thereby receives 
absolute authorization, and claims to determine for itself the relation [of all that exists] 
to the Divine. This then was the absolute result of the Crusades, and from them we may 
date the commencement of self-reliance and spontaneous activity. The West bade an 
eternal farewell to the East at the Holy Sepulchre, and gained a comprehension of its 
own principle of subjective infinite Freedom (PH, p. 393). 
Hegel’s reference to the “West’s” principle contains the seed of this argument’s burden. How 
can one understand sacrifice in relation to this overarching principle? As with Luther, for Hegel 
the answer relates to the total interiorization of sacrifice, but with a radical shift in orientation. 
In reference to this “commencement of self-reliance and spontaneous activity,” Hegel indicates 
the efflorescence of lay piety and the mendicant orders in the wake of the first Crusades. As if 
a prefiguration or proto-Reformation, although still involved in ritual expression, Christian 
devotion turned away from material and particular objects towards a new or revived ethos of 
personal sacrifice through asceticism. 
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With keen historical insight, and against any proto-nationalist need to define and defend 
all things German, Hegel locates the origin of the Reformation in the movements of lay piety 
and the pursuit of the vita apostolica that gave history Saint Francis as well as the debacle of 
the Albigensian Crusades. As Hegel states it, 
Spirit, disappointed with regard to its craving for the highest form of the sensuous 
presence of Deity, fell back upon itself. A rupture, the first of its kind and profound as 
it was novel, took place. From this time forward we witness religious and intellectual 
movements in which Spirit—transcending the repulsive and irrational existence by 
which it is surrounded—either finds its sphere of exercise within itself, and draws upon 
its own resources for satisfaction, or throws its energies into an actual world of general 
and morally justified aims, which are therefore aims consonant with Freedom (PH, p. 
395).
Already at the end of the Crusades the practices consonant with freedom have taken hold, even 
if the principle itself will not appear until Wittenberg. Though the formulation of the “Ninety-
five” theses marks the customary start of the Reformation, and thus the division of Western 
Christendom, Hegel appears to place that division further back in time. 
After marking a break that sounds at this point every bit as decisive as the Reformation 
to come, Hegel claims that, with the end of the Crusades, “Christendom never appeared again 
on the scene of history as one body” (PH, p. 393). As a claim in the service of Hegel’s 
recontextualization of the Enlightenment, this reference to “one body” is an enigmatic phrase. 
Does Hegel mean a communion host? Does he mean the mendicant challenge to the church 
structure? Both make sense, for the Church and its monastic orders formed a coherent whole 
that fell apart as the vita apostolica movement turned positions akin to the Donatist heresy into 
a mode of ecclesiastical differentiation. If difference begins with the mendicants, then the 
fragmentation of the Church is no longer Luther’s fault, since it was already at work in 
Christendom centuries before his actions. Nonetheless, the “West’s” principle is the German 
principle, and remains so through the next course of its development. Though fragmentation 
ensues, and scission and misrecognition reigns in modernity, the greatest false and failed 
project of redemption dissolved under the weight of its own contradictions, and piety began to 
pursue a true path of self-realization as Spirit. Hegel thus sets the stage for the Reformation 
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with the rise of lay piety and mendicant apostolic devotion, “the means by which Spirit was to 
be prepared to comprehend the grand purpose of its Freedom in a form of greater purity and 
moral elevation” (PH, p. 395). After the Crusades it was clear that Spirit had to find its proper 
vocation in the transformation of subjectivity itself, in developing one’s own freedom or 
preparing for the development of others. 
 The Mendicants and the Sacrificial Knights
Between the Crusades and the Reformation Hegel emphasizes the historical importance 
of two channels for the rising tides of lay piety. Leading among the many responses to the 
disappointment of the Crusades, Hegel speaks of two movements which particularly embraced 
the emerging principle of subjective freedom as the essence of devotion:
To this class of movements belongs in the first place the establishment of monastic and 
chivalric orders, designed to carry out those rules of life which the Church had 
distinctly enjoined upon its members. That renunciation of property, riches, pleasures, 
and free will, which the Church had designated as the highest of spiritual attainments, 
was to be a reality—not a mere profession (PH, p. 395).
The negation of a profession here makes the mendicants sacrificial ascetics of a different sort 
than the monastics. As indicated in the critique of the incomplete nature of sacrifice in the 
Phenomenology, to make the routinized, mitigated form of sacrificial asceticism a profession 
and a means of livelihood is manifestly self-contradictory in the face of the renunciation that 
sacrifice is supposed to employ. Nonetheless, though beginning with strict vows of poverty, 
the Franciscan order, being an order, could not avoid the fall into professionalization. 
What is remarkable about Hegel’s assessment of the mendicant and chivalric orders is 
how closely Hegel attends to the originary principle here, as opposed to Luther. His 
reassessment  distinguishes the monastic from the mendicant orders and complicates Luther’s  
blurring of distinctions. That is, Luther separated the duties of monastic asceticism and 
scriptural education, then saved only the latter. Thus, while preaching was an aspect of 
mendicant life, he rejects the mendicant order as corrupted by the works doctrine of monastic 
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asceticism. Even though his preaching and exegetical work would continue in much the same 
way both pre- and post-Reformation, he would reject it as an element of ascetic practical but 
embrace it under the rubric of pastoral care. In short, Luther keeps the teaching side of the 
mendicant movement, but rejects it as too entangled with  professional asceticism. 
By Luther’s time, the mendicant friars were barely distinguishable from monks in 
regards to daily practices, though their vocations of preaching and teaching the people put 
them in the heart of cities and villages. The rising density of continental Europe accounts in 
part for this blurring of the differences between monastic and mendicant orders, the former 
having originally sought to flee the world to the countryside, and the latter striving to sacralize 
the urban setting and take the Word directly to the people. Thus, what began as opposed 
modes of devotion—or rather, mendicants opposed in principle and arose to answer and 
correct the other’s shortcomings of the monasteries—became, in practice, over time, closely 
aligned. This had to do with the overarching authoritative structure of feudal society. These 
ascetic orders, whether monastic or mendicant, could not escape this determination, and so fall 
back into positivism and subservience. 
Nonetheless, in the rise of the mendicants and the diffusion of lay devotion, the 
emphasis on the inculcation and development of subjective religiosity among the people 
marked a salubrious realignment of devotional practice. This reform movement stood out 
sharply from the received practices of the day, for  “[t]he existing monastic and other 
institutions that had adopted this vow of renunciation, had been entirely sunk in the corruption 
of worldliness. But now Spirit sought to realize in the sphere of the principle of negativity— 
purely in itself—what the Church had demanded” (PH, p. 395). In this passage Hegel 
understands the movement of negativity as identical with the movement of Spirit, which he 
thus connected to sacrificial asceticism. Nonetheless, monasticism makes renunciation a 
profession, a profoundly contradictory life. The mendicants, at least in their founding rules 
such as those of St Francis, made preaching and begging the essential activities. 
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Hegel, then, in contrast to Luther and truer to the facts, views the mendicant movement 
as itself a reform of monastic practices. Though founded on principles that elsewhere Hegel 
has expressed as contradictory and doomed to incompleteness, the improvement of this mode 
of life as a channel of devotion over the Crusades and traditional monasteries was immense: 
To counteract these evils [of corruption and worldliness], new monastic orders were 
founded, the chief of which was that of the Franciscans, or Mendicant Friars, whose 
founder, St. Francis of Assisi—a man possessed by an enthusiasm and ecstatic passion 
that passed all bounds—spent his life in continually striving for the loftiest purity.15 He 
gave an impulse of the same kind to his order; the greatest fervor of devotion, the 
sacrifice of all pleasures in contravention of the prevailing wordliness of the Church, 
continual penances, the severest poverty (the Franciscans lived on daily alms)—were 
therefore peculiarly characteristic of it (PH, p. 396). 
Hegel supplies the term, and indicates that negation and the consecration of life are essential to 
sacrifice. Hegel not only treats this as “sacrificial” in terms of the patristic doctrines, he also 
explicitly names it as such, not as doctrinally derived, but as such in essence.16 Hence, 
repeatedly we see Hegel invoking an orthodox sense of asceticism as sacrifice, which makes his 
eventual use sacrificial rhetoric all the more interesting.
In addition to the mendicants, there was another mode of self-sacrificial devotion, 
closer to martyrdom, that broke with feudal self-interest. From the feudal aristocratic 
bellicosity with its pursuit of honor and glory, an articulation took place as this blended with a 
sacrificial ethos to form the chivalric orders: 
The Orders of Knighthood were divided into three: that of St. John, that of the Temple, 
and the Teutonic Order. These associations are essentially distinguished from the self-
seeking principle of feudalism. Their members sacrificed themselves with almost 
suicidal bravery for a common interest. Thus these Orders transcended the circle of 
their immediate environment, and formed a network of fraternal coalition over the 
whole of Europe (PH, p. 397, emphasis added).
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_______________________
15 Hegel continues by distinguishing the Franciscan pursuit of penances and poverty with “the 
Dominican order, founded by St. Dominic,” whose “special business was preaching” (PH, p. 396). Although it 
is true that the Dominicans took preaching as their specialization, the Franciscans took preaching as an 
avocation as well.
16 “The mendicant friars were diffused through Christendom to an incredible extent; they were, on the 
one hand, the standing apostolic army of the Pope, while, on the other hand, they strongly protested against his 
worldliness” (PH, p. 396). Looking ahead to Weber, as opposed to a disenchanted bureaucracy, the army 
remains a sacrosanct body. 
Because we are here addressing historical instances of a sacrificial ethos in action, it is difficult 
to decide whether Hegel’s description of “suicidal bravery” as a sacrifice is his own view or 
that of the agents in question. At any rate, with this notion of sacrifice, which Hegel does not 
contradict or correct, the object and agent coincide. Here, the costliness of the sacrifice has 
reached its maximum, for the active register of martyrdom always remains as a residual 
potentiality that history might call again into actuality. 
Moving from the French Revolution to the Enlightenment, and from this to the 
Reformation and even, ultimately, the Crusades, for all the critiques of Hegel as a thinker who 
is obsessed with teleology, Hegel’s interpretive strategy here works backward. As Hegel 
dissolved the sense that the Revolution or the Reformation were eruptions of unforeseen 
historical forces, he takes the reader through several diverse historical trends. In doing this, 
according to O’Regan, 
One might see in the texts of Hegel’s mature period the presence of a trope that 
distinguishes Romantic discourse in general, i.e. the trope of metalepsis. In 
Romanticism this trope of adoption-substitution operates by apparently sanctioning a 
more standard religious language while emptying it, and substituting an immanent for 
its transcendent content. The result is a transcendent canopy for the immanent. In the 
third and final phase of Hegelian representation of the French Revolution, the trope is 
exercised on behalf of Christianity: adopted and absorbed by the Reformation, the 
secular, immanent content of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are 
hollowed out to be substituted for by a content which, if sacred, also has secular reach 
(1995, p. 47).
One might add, with the Crusades as well, Hegel adds the religious significance, but not the 
significance consciously carried by the Crusaders. Rather, Hegel speaks of history’s, or 
Spirit’s, lesson as taught through the Crusades. This metalepsis, and this agenda, thus serve as 
an essential rhetorical tool in the exposition of Hegel’s speculative outlook. Metalepsis 
captures well the doubleness of Hegel’s strategies. Working backwards will allow him to 
reframe the present, and the future, and, having thus revalorized the notion of sacrifice at work 
in Christendom, he can then claim it as his own. This is where we bridge forward to the 
Phenomenology where, no longer as isolated events or a single figure, all of world history and 
philosophy enters the text in order to provide the grist for this metaleptic mill. The religious 
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and the philosophical will become indistinguishable in content, and only in form will Hegel 
make clear which has a future and which will become a relic of the past. 
 The Heterogeneity of the Phenomenology
In the Phenomenology, Hegel shows the myriad ways that human knowledge has 
attempted to give an account of itself. Hegel knew, as Habermas noted, that his system 
required presuppositions. Since he could not prove them within a system and still have them 
provide the external support of presuppositions, Hegel in the Phenomenology would proceed 
by a process of elimination. In this text, all previous attempts to ground reason would meet 
their fate. As the argument moves from perception to understanding to reason to spirit, in each 
section the text demonstrates that more resources are necessary if knowledge’s self-
demonstration is not to end in contradiction and paradox. In the process, one by one, possible 
competitors get eliminated from the running, with the result that, by the end, the necessity of 
Hegel’s system is demonstrated by default. 
The resources that Hegel utilized to achieve this demonstration could not solicit 
skepticism, which meant that they had to be those most amenable to other positions as well. As 
Habermas notes, 
The critique of subjective idealism is at the same time a critique of modernity; only in 
this way can the latter secure its concept and thereby assure its own stability. In 
carrying out this project, critique can and should make use of no instrument other than 
that reflection which it encounters as the purest expression of the principle of modern 
times. If modernity is to ground itself, Hegel has to develop the critical concept of 
modernity through a dialectic residing in the principle of the Enlightenment itself (1987, 
p. 21).
Reflection here indicates not only self-consciousness, but also reflection on knowing as a 
process. This entails assessing not only objects of knowledge, but also the conditions and 
processes of knowing must become objects of knowledge. In this way, reflection  
acknowledges the sense that modern philosophy and thought has raised the self-conscious 
assessment of knowledge as a process to unprecedented heights. This knowledge achieved its 
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greatest wonders in experimental science, but other fields of knowledge as well. If Hegel could 
take the very essence of the Enlightenment, and the principle by which modernity understood 
itself as the emergence of subjective freedom, and launch a constructive critique of both the 
Enlightenment and naive notions of freedom, the way would be cleared for Hegel’s system to 
appear. 
More than the text’s own designs, the Phenomenology serves as the hinge that takes 
the reader from the rest of philosophy and introduces her to Hegel’s mature system, which, by 
the end of the text, is adumbrated but still on the other side of the horizon. The text is 
constructed as an experience whose increments are arranged on a ladder, and when each stage 
has been understood fully, the ladder is to be rejected. The Phenomenology begins with Mind 
struggling to know itself with only limited resources. It works through philosophical modes of 
grounding knowledge that attempt to build on the immediacy of sense-perception, on the 
understanding, on the reasoning individual, and finally on spirit alive in a community. In the 
course of this examination it becomes clear that te movement of spirit is essential. 
What is remarkable in this context is that, just as these adumbrations begin to announce 
the end of the text, it becomes clear that the path of the text is modeled on the stages of the 
Cross, for the text ends with an explicit crucifixion to announce the dawning of a new age in 
philosophy. What does this sacrificial rhetoric contribute to the text? How is it in keeping with 
its principles, and how is one to understand this within a genealogy of sacrificial rhetoric? If 
one understands the content of the Passion, how can one relate the orthodox  particulars of 
that ladder in relation to the content translated into a philosophical form? 
 Readers who come to this text either from Hegel’s more historically grounded 
lectures, or from his Logic, will each note the degree to which the Phenomenology 
intermingles the historical and the logical, the concrete and the abstract, the figural and the 
conceptual. Such juxtapositions encourage readers in search of a heuristic device to seek a 
dialectical logic implicit everywhere. However, if there is one architectural feature that unifies 
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this strange text, it has more to do with a very specific and unique formal features. The text 
includes a series of composite sketches that cohere and, once set in motion, proceed to fall 
apart, but which nevertheless gather into a series that produces at least the semblance of a 
coherent narrative. In this text, as opposed to his more systematic works, the reader 
encounters Hegel’s use of Gestalten or Bildern, which has direct relevance both to Hegel’s 
sense of the relation between philosophy and religion, and also to his use of sacrificial rhetoric. 
To the degree that the text does cohere, what is the narratological principle at work in 
the Phenomenology? Towards the end Hegel writes how, in contrast to the “becoming of Spirit 
[in] Nature” as “living, immediate Becoming” (PhG, #807, p. 492; p. 432), there is 
the other side of its Becoming, History, [which] is a conscious, self-mediating 
process—Spirit emptied out into Time [der an die Zeit entäußerte Geist]; but this 
externalization, this kenosis, is equally an externalization of itself [aber diese 
Entäußerung ist ebenso die Entäußerung ihrer selbst], the negative is the negative of 
itself. This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, 
[eine Galerie von Bildern], each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves 
thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its 
substance (PhG, #808, p. 492; p. 433). 
Far from serving as a rhetorical flourish in the text’s peroration (a reading which would 
anachronistically impute to Hegel the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy drawn most 
starkly by twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy), the co-implication of Bild 
[“picture” or “image”] and Bildung [“development” or “education”] is fundamental to Hegel’s 
textual practice in the PhG as a propadeutic to a more rigorously conceptual philosophical 
treatment.  As John Smith writes, “the metaphoricity, the Bildlichkeit, of the Phenomenology 
refers to the rhetorical formation of the text as a whole, to the very mode of presenting the 
Spirit’s development in varying guises and expressions” (1988, p. 182). The irreducibly 
rhetorical nature of this text, in particular in the transitions between Bildern, resists the kind of 
closure that Hegel’s critics impute to his “system” and, I dare say, given the pivotal role the 
Phenomenology plays in received ideas concerning this “system,” the text constitutes a part of 
his total production that makes such totalizing gestures impossible. To expand on this, there is 
both an inside and an outside to this system, but both relate to the system in ways that are 
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deeper than mere ornaments, insofar as the topics of rhetoric and representation at least form a 
prefatory problematic to Hegel’s later works. My argument hinges on this notion that the 
Phenomenology is both inside and outside the “system”, which makes the sacrifice with which 
it finishes incomplete, always at work in the world, a project about which we will never say, “it 
is finished.” 
Although the Bild method distinguishes the Phenomenology from other texts, its 
function within the text is both to unify and differentiate. For example, Bildern are used to 
bridge the divide between the “Reason” and “Spirit” sections. Stewart argues that the thematic 
unity between the two sections is supplied by the Bild method: “Just as the various moments of 
the dialectic before were unified in a single consciousness—thus making possible a comparison 
of consciousness with itself—so also here in ‘Spirit’ the various moments are unified in a 
closed self-correcting system of ethical substance” (2000, p. 298). That is, as Smith notes, 
“whereas the earlier chapters depicted ‘formations only of a consciousness’ (Gestalten nur 
eines Bewußtseins), this chapter contains ‘formations of a world’ (Gestalten einer Welt)” (p. 
192). In a move typical in the Phenomenology, the differences depend upon the inter-
relationship between community and history: “The role of the community in ‘Reason’ was 
static and abstract, whereas in ‘Spirit’ it moves through history, and this movement shapes the 
truth-claims of its people in a way that the ‘Reason’ chapter could not account for” (Stewart, 
p. 291). Since Hegel’s reading of Sophocles’ Antigone, for example, occurs at the cusp of the 
transition from “Reason” to “Spirit”, it marks a shift away from a focus on individual 
consciousness. It begins with the Greek Bild, wherein the individual has not yet fully emerged 
into history: 
In the essence we are considering here, individuality has the meaning of self-
consciousness in general, not of a particular, contingent consciousness. In this 
determination, therefore, the ethical substance is actual substance, absolute Spirit 
realized in the plurality of existent consciousnesses; this spirit is the community…. As 
actual substance, it is a nation, as actual consciousness, it is the citizens of that nation 
(PhG, #447, p. 267). 
Hegel’s readings in the “Spirit” section are detailed and illuminating, but also tendentious and 
constructed to achieve an overarching narrative effect. As Schmidt describes this schema, 
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each of the three “worlds” surveyed in the chapter on Geist corresponds to a different 
culture. The world of the “True Spirit. Ethical Life,” which for Hegel was exemplified 
by the Antigone, is Greek. The world of “Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture,” which 
stretches from rise of the absolutist state, through the Enlightenment, to the Terror, is 
French. The world of the “Self-Certain Spirit: Morality,” from Kant to the Beautiful 
Soul, is German (1998, p. 25).
From the Greeks to modern societies one can trace a movement of self-conscious communities 
developing, but in the former, no self-conscious individual. Instead, the individual 
consciousness is submerged in its role. This is made clear by the fact that the intention, as a 
private phenomenon and thus completely individual, counts for nothing in Greek ethical life—
the deed is all. Hence, in the Bild of Greek ethical life ethical consciousness is particular, not 
individual, consisting wholly in a role and its execution, and not in moral choice. With the 
Greeks, then, we can speak only of roles, not of full-fledged individuals. Liberty and freedom 
of conscience, translated as distance from the immediacy of roles, are not yet available at this 
stage, but emerge only with the transition to later Bildern, or, historically, as we move to the 
German Age. Because of the turn towards historically specific communities in the “Spirit” 
section of the  Phenomenology, the norms that prevail in any of the historically specific Bildern 
in the “Spirit” section cannot be universalized in such a way that one could abstract norms 
from them that would determine the ethical substance of other communities. Each makes its 
appearance on the stage to reveal its structure, then each dissolves under the burden of its own 
contradictions and incomplete resources to resolve them. 
The fundamental point that Hegel derives from this method is to look for truth, not in 
particular configurations of perception, knowledge, or customary norms, but to understand 
truth as the movement that Spirit makes through these instantiations, or, better, the dual 
movements of exteriorization and interiorization. One must then view the text, and the 
movement of history, as itself positing and negating a series of possibilities for knowledge to 
provide its own grounding, and for communities to develop their own resources for 
recognition and unification. Because the processual nature of knowledge takes center-stage, 
and not any particular form of Spirit, each determination of the form is nothing but a 
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magnitude vanishing into the totality of this truth which is the self-mediating movement of 
Absolute Spirit: “The true is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet 
because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent 
and simple respose” (PhG, #47, p. 27). The paradox in this complex metaphor is that, though 
he employs the synchronic image of the gallery, the text itself develops only diachronically. 
Such images, scattered here and there in the text, serve as metonymic figures of the text in 
which they occur. The most compelling and determining of these deploys a peculiarly Hegelian 
form of sacrificial rhetoric.
 The Phenomenology’s Post-Christian Passion
I have suggested earlier that, though not perhaps unique, it is a peculiarity of 
Christianity that it entertains a notion of sacrifice wherein the sacrificial agent and object 
coincide. This is because the moralization and interiorization of sacrifice shifts along the 
object- and transformational-axis to such a degree that the use of an external object seemed to 
miss the primary point of sacrifice, which was a radical reconfiguration of natural and received 
modes of subjectivity. Hence, for a rhetorician to keep sacrifice resonant with Christian 
sensibilities, the agent and object of sacrifice must coincide. Yet with Hegel, this coincidence, 
typically, moves toward a situation where the notion of each is evacuated. In the process 
suggested by Hegel’s sacrificial rhetoric, one finds no distinct agents or objects which could 
then coincide. Instead, “we” do not behold or engage in sacrifice, for Spirit itself moves by 
means of a sacrificial process. 
In this instance of Hegel’s rhetorical intensification of the text’s movement, the figure 
of sacrifice involves the collapsing of the rite’s two roles of sacrificial agent and object into one 
to the point that the distinction reveals itself as false, so that the erasure of the distinction 
between the sacrificial object and subject itself becomes sacrificial. The reason this is necessary 
is clear: the kind of coercion necessary for the sacrifice of an external object is clearly taboo 
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given the voluntaristic ethos of modernity, and Hegel made the Lutheran, modernist 
valorization of individual freedom of conscience a paramount achievement. This being so, the 
voluntary self-sacrifice, as modeled by Jesus, the martyrs, and the ascetics is the only sacrifice 
that does not elicit a sense of outrage, and violate individual liberty. Yet given Hegel’s position 
on rituals, asceticism, and even the hypocrisy of sacrifice, how could Hegel describe his own 
texts in sacrificial terms with so many disclaimers in his texts? 
Luther avoided a coercive notion of sacrifice by making reason the bestial part of man, 
so that no-one or nothing one else undergoes sacrifice, but only the bestial part of humans, a 
part that has nothing to do with grace and righteousness. Hegel achieves this conflation of 
sacrificial object and agent in addition to depersonalizing the sacrificial scenario altogether. In 
the last pages of the Phenomenology, Hegel describes the final approach towards Absolute 
Knowing, which is the recollection in self-consciousness of all the forms of Spirit experienced 
through history. As Spirit’s march through history is marked by both a triumphant emanation 
or exteriorization in plenitude as well as a humbling kenosis or hollowing out, the dialectical 
expenditure of Spirit’s forms takes shape as a continuous and self-reproducing sacrifice. 
History is a free contingent happening, an externalization (Entäußerung) of spirit 
whose meaning is restored through the process of internalization (Errinerung). The 
characteristics of freedom and contingency apply to history before its comprehension as a 
manifestation of spirit. After this, all the contingency undergoes transformation s and can be 
seen to move teleologically towards the necessary and universal recognition of Absolute Spirit 
as freedom. In the peroration of the text, Hegel describes this process in terms of a sacrificial 
process wherein both moments of Entäußerung and Errinerung coincide in a process that 
Hegel likens to Christ’s passion:
The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: 
to know one's limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself [sich aufzuopfern wissen].  This 
sacrifice [Aufopferung] is the externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its 
becoming Spirit in the form of free contingent happening…. The two together [history 
and the science of the changing forms of knowledge (die Wissenschaft des 
erscheinenden Wissens)], comprehended History, form alike the inwardizing and 
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Calvary [Schädelstätte] of absolute Spirit (PhG, #808, p. 492-3; p.433). 
The externalizations of Spirit here are the Bildern that Hegel depicts throughout the text as 
Gestalten to represent stages on Spirit’s way. The particular social formations that Hegel’s text 
moved through, both logical and historical, come to life, but then life departs, leaving them as 
mere shells scattered on the path to the Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes. The 
externalizations are of Geist but are not Geist, and thus become limiting particulars that mask 
Geist if one mistakes the externalized, particular Bild for the self-transforming movement of 
Geist. To be clear that one knows the difference, and the moving limit between Entäußerung 
and Errinerung, one negates and sacrifices the Bildern, the shells, of Geist. 
This sacrificial rhetoric was effective and essential to Hegel because it induces both 
cognitive and affective movements in the reader. This is due to Hegel’s sense that, unlike the 
Kantian depiction of a rational morality, the heart and the passions are essential to Bildung as 
moral cultivation. The pathos of the loss of Greek beauty, and the renunciation of a nostalgic 
longing for its return, all are important components of Hegel’s rhetorical effects. These shells 
of spirit in the process of externalization can and should be loved, and thereby acknowledged 
as other, for “as Spirit comes to self-consciousness it knows itself and its limit; knowing this, it 
is capable of sacrifice.” The acculturation process (Bildung) continues as the Bildern of 
Spirit’s various forms approach the “Calvary” or, better, “Golgotha” (“hill or place of skulls”) 
of Absolute Knowing. The process resembles an inverted Walpurgisnacht, or a sanctified 
version of the Witches’ Sabbath. All are invoked, in multiple registers, crucifixion, bacchanalia, 
Walpurgisnacht, symposium. Here, the past Bildern, including the ones that stir the most 
longing, such as the noble Sittlichkeit of ancient Greece, are recollected, but only at the cost of 
knowing them as lost and gone forever, and retained merely as a past shape of Spirit. Here the 
loss and gain of knowledge take place simultaneously, as the immediate experience of spirit 
embedded in a community gives way to the self-conscious reflection on practices and customs 
that Hegel sees ushered in with modernity. It is not too strong a metaphor to speak of these 
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transformations as the process of knowing as a form of sacrificing, with the cost a concrete 
index of the value of the knowledge achieved. Hence, it is not that a merely pathos-driven 
approach to self-knowledge is a necessary correlate of sacrifice, one also receives a cognitive 
dividend from Hegel’s sacrificial rhetoric.
In the Phenomenology the sacrificial movement happens textually, for the purpose of 
demonstration. Each reader re-enacts this and, as each reader participates as Geist, the 
sacrifice takes place again. Hegel’s sacrificial rhetoric does not lead to the conclusion that the 
text espouses a particular rite of sacrifice for the individual or society. We are always already 
sacrificing insofar as we participate in the movement of Geist in history, and Hegel’s 
interpretion of the Crusades and the French Revolution as nugatory sacrifices in history also 
demonstrates this truth. The starkest instance of this revalorization takes place in the double-
image of the Cross and the Guillotine. While the historical Entäußerung of the Terror took 
place as events whose meanings consumed themselves in a paroxysm of self-negation, in the 
text’s Errinerung these events become significant in relation to this overarching schema of the 
Phenomenology’s Passion. Christ’s sacrifice historically returns to invert the nihilism of the 
Terror so that even the Guillotine becomes a vehicle of meaning, in at least the negative sense 
of a demonstration of the impossibility of realizing Enlightenment as absolute freedom. In 
short, the historical Terror produced deaths devoid of meaning, but, via the alchemy of 
sacrificial rhetoric, these deaths undergo the restoration of their significance as sacrifices in the 
process of Geist’s self-realization. 
 Hegel’s Iconoclastic Sacrifice of Sacrificial Rhetoric
Despite the attention that the Phenomenology has garnered, and it remains Hegel’s 
most read, discussed and cited text, it it important to remember that he viewed it as a stepping 
stone to the perspective necessary to comprehend his system. Once the reader had traversed 
the path laid out in this text, she would be ready to accept the importance of  the Absolute as a 
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premise integral to philosophy’s proper business of unification. A key component of this 
unification was the incorporation of religion’s truths, but in a form that both preserved the 
content and made it more amenable to the needs of a post-Enlightenment world. When one 
thus takes into account Hegel’s distinction between philosophy and religion, this sacrificial 
rhetoric becomes a form unfit for the content, and it must give way to the more adequate form 
of philosophical conceptions, a shell that too must be sacrificed. 
Hegel returned to this topic in many places, but one can find perhaps the most succinct 
treatment of the issues involved in the History of Philosophy. There one reads, 
Philosophy stands on the same basis as Religion and has the same object—the universal 
reason existing in and for itself; Mind desires to make this object its own, as is done 
with Religion in the act and form of worship. But the form, as it is present in Religion, 
is different from what is found to be contained in Philosophy, and on this account a 
history of Philosophy is different from a history of Religion. Worship is only the oper-
ation of reflection; Philosophy attempts to bring about the reconciliation by means of 
thinking knowledge, because Mind desires to take up its Being into itself. Philosophy is 
related in the form of thinking consciousness to its object (HP, p. 63). 
Philosophy addresses the same content as religion, but instead of religion’s diminished sense of 
the human capacity for reason and its projection of universal reason onto a divine subject, 
philosophy rejects this self-abasement and achieves the understanding that the human being 
participates in Geist as well. Indeed, it is only insofar as humans realize the immanence of 
universal reason that the divinity of the human species itself becomes actual. 
Hegel does not let this distinction between religion and philosophy regress to a one-
sided Enlightenment caricature of both. As he continues, “the distinction between the two 
should not be conceived of so abstractly as to make it seem that thought is only in Philosophy 
and not in Religion. The latter has likewise ideas and universal thoughts” (ibid.). Nonetheless, 
though the content overlaps, the form of exposition differs remarkably. Here a brief detour 
through Hegel’s historical treatment of religious forms will make the necessity of Hegel’s 
iconoclastic rejection of religious rhetoric and devotional figures much clearer. 
 Returning to the origins of the concept that serves as the fundamental premise of his 
entire outlook, Hegel traces the Absolute back to its earliest formulations in the religions that 
contributed to Western civilization: 
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The Absolute is Mind (Spirit)—this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find 
this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate 
purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the 
impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that must explain the history of 
the world. The word ‘Mind’ (Spirit)—and some glimpse of its meaning—was found at 
an early period: and the spirituality of God is the lesson of Christianity. It remains for 
philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get hold of what was thus given as 
a mental image, and what implicitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not 
genuinely, and by rational methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not 
the theme and the soul of philosophy (EPM, #384, p. 18).
Hegel treats this not as an enabling fiction, or flattering conceit, but as a primordial discovery 
concerning the nature of the world, and the content that Geist-as-liberty unites. Thus, though 
one might conclude from its status as a premise to his system that Hegel treated it as an 
epistemological postulate, or, as with Kant, an Idea of Reason that serves a regulative function, 
in fact, much like the religions he examines, Hegel accords this a radical ontological status. 
Hegel is careful, though, to distinguish stages of Geist’s conceptions, so that this 
concept does not devolve to an abstract or dissolute Geistlichkeit or “spirituality.” These 
stages inevitably place the analysis on a track of progress from inchoate to more articulate 
forms: 
The highest definition of the Absolute is that it is not merely mind in general but that it 
is mind which is absolutely manifest to itself, self-conscious, infinitely creative mind 
[....] Just as in philosophy we progress  from the imperfect forms of mind’s 
manifestation delineated above to the highest form of its manifestation, so, too, world-
history exhibits a series of conceptions of the Eternal, the last of which first shows forth 
the Notion of absolute mind (EPM, p. 19-20). 
Geist thus must be treated not as an indistinct capacity of perception or conception, but as a 
form of knowledge which takes both itself and its processes of reflection as objects of 
knowledge. Both the transparency of these forms and their articulation provide the criteria by 
which they can be ranked in the religions and philosophies of world history. 
Once these rankings begin, it is little surprise to find Christianity possessing the most 
developed and articulated notion of Geist. Despite the religious chauvinism and the tendentious 
nature of the stages, they are not merely the residual markers of a bygone day of Western self-
regard, but contributed decisively to Hegel’s sense of philosophy’s role in world history. At the 
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first stage, “The oriental religions, and the Hebrew, too, stop short at the still abstract concept 
of God and of spirit (as is done even by the Enlightenment which wants to know only of God 
the Father); for God the Father, by himself, is the God who is shut up within himself, the 
abstract god, therefore not yet the spiritual, not yet the true God” (EPM, p. 20). Already, I 
would suggest, we have a subtle articulation in religious polemical language. If the God of 
these religion is not true, it is also that they are not yet true, for a cross-cultural movement of 
conceptual articulation has begun in which all human beings share. “God the Father” is not yet 
true, but not because this God does not exist, as some others do, or will. Rather, this God 
comes short of the articulation necessary to correspond to the ontologic-al premise of the 
Absolute that serves as the criterion for the truth of these religions. 
When Hegel turns to the Greeks, one finds a surprising reversal. In the history of 
Christendom, it has been rare indeed for a figure to place the pagan Greeks and their hodge-
podge collection of deities above the Hebrews and their monotheism. Yet this reveals that, for 
Hegel, unity is less a criterion of truth at this stage than articulation, manifestation, and 
determination. Thus, as was decisive for his break with Schelling, a determinate multiplicity 
marks an advance over an inchoate unity:
In the Greek religion God did, indeed, begin to be manifest in a definite manner. The 
representation of the Greek gods had beauty for its law, Nature raised to the level of 
mind. The Beautiful does not remain something abstractly ideal, but in its ideality is at 
once perfectly determinate, individualized. The Greek gods are, however, at first only 
representations for sensuous intuition or for picture-thinking, they are not yet grasped 
in thought. But the medium of sense can only exhibit the totality of mind as an asunder-
ness, as a circle of independent, mental or spiritual shapes; the unity embracing all these 
shapes remains, therefore, a wholly indeterminate, alien power over against the gods 
(ibid.). 
This is also an advance in that the Greek religion of the Beautiful draws on the entire human 
repertoire of responses in its worship. This is not a dessicated concept of the deity, but a 
sensuous apparition that begins to bridge the gap, which Christianity will decisively close, 
between the human and the divine. Christianity leaves behind the Greek dependence on 
sensation and its irresolvable disparities, for “in the Christian religion that the immanently 
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differentiated one nature of God, the totality of the divine mind in the form of unity, has first 
been manifested” (ibid.). The content has shifted, but the form of sensuousness and Verstehen 
remain. In his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel notes that, in representation, “the 
content remains for me something given—what is [called] positive and, to the extent [one is 
speaking] polemically, revealed, immediately given, i.e., not comprehended” (p. 249). The 
given, posited, revealed nature of representation remains, if not a scandal, then at least a 
provocation to philosophy. This content must be taken up by reason and its necessity made 
clear. As Hegel explained in relation to the representation of God as an existing being, “In 
representation there is a space. Thought demands to know the necessity of it. In representation 
there is [the content] ‘God is.’ Thought requires to know why it is necessary that God is” 
(p.406). In fact, religions lack the resources to transcend this form, with the result that “[t]his 
content, presented in the guise of picture-thinking, has to be raised by philosophy into the form 
of the Notion or of absolute knowledge which, as we have said, is the highest manifestation of 
that content” (EPM, p 20).
This then becomes the function of philosophy. In the modern division of labor, 
philosophy will take over from religion this content of Geist as Absolute, and will sacrifice its 
inadequate forms just as the Bildern of inadequate manifestations of Geist were sacrificed in 
history. Yet this description as a sacrifice too must give way to the sublimated language of 
Aufhebung (sublimation, sublation, abolishing, etc.), which, from an ambivalent and 
paradoxical term like sacrifice, keeps the positive and negative aspects not juxtaposed, but in 
living, constant motion. In describing philosophy’s work as both sublimating and canceling the 
truths of religion, one finds echoes of Byzantine and Reformation iconoclastic rhetoric. 
However, with Hegel’s agenda of negating picture-thinking from philosophy, it is not about 
any particular image, but a general formal transition from image to concept that philosophy, as 
Hegel sees it, must effect. 
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 Conclusion
Hegel’s discourse constructs a central place for philosophy and the philosopher in the 
modern world. Because so many of the problems in world history resulted from people acting 
on contradictory principles or false conceptions, philosophy must set about resolving the 
fragmentation produced both by the specialization of knowledge and the differentiation of 
professions. While religion had once played this integrative role, its time for most had passed, 
and it was the work of the philosopher to take over this function and raise it to a new level. 
Although I suggest that the sacrificial rhetoric at the end of the Phenomenology played a 
crucial and perhaps singular role in Hegel’s oeuvre, I would note that, though religious 
“picture-thinking”, figural language and rhetoric in general now should give place to explicit 
conceptualization in Hegel’s text, it is of course impossible to employ a completely literal form 
of language. Indeed, throughout his texts Hegel returns to religious themes and language to 
articulate the nature of the work he claims for the philosopher. In the Encyclopedia Philosophy 
of Nature, Hegel frames this task in terms of the post-lapsarian condition itself: 
Upon a closer inspection of the story of the Fall we find, as was already said, that it 
exemplifies the universal bearings of knowledge upon the spiritual life. In its instinctive 
and natural stage, spiritual life wears the garb of innocence and confiding simplicity; but 
the very essence of spirit implies the absorption of this immediate condition in 
something higher. The spiritual is distinguished from the natural, and more especially 
from the animal, life, in the circumstance that it does not continue a mere stream of 
tendency, but sunders itself to self-realization. But this position of severed life has in its 
turn to be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way to concord again. 
The final concord then is spiritual; that is, the principle of restoration is found in 
thought, and thought only. The hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which 
heals it (p. 43). 
Hegel’s interpretation of this myth well captures his method of relating philosophy to religion 
by means of an immanent critique: just as in the Phenomenology Hegel turned modernity’s 
own means against its one-sided Enlightenment principles, in that same text Hegel turns the 
ownmost notion of religion against it by deploying sacrificial rhetoric. 
To the religious specialists of his day, and most of those since, Hegel’s colonization of 
religion has seemed profanatory. To Bourdieu, this is an unavoidable result of the struggle 
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between the claimants to a community’s limited amount of cultural capital. Since it was 
primarily religious capital over which they struggled, this challenge could only appear to them 
as a profanation, for, from their perspective, philosophy of necessity had to remain an ancilla 
fides subordinated to religion. Given Hegel’s claim of philosophy’s superiority, to religious 
specialists the struggle with Hegel is cast in terms religious and ontological, not philosophical 
and epistemological, for
every dominated practice or belief is doomed to appear as profanatory, inasmuch as, by 
its very existence and in the absence of any intention of profanation, it constitutes an 
objective contestation of the monopoly over the administration of the sacred, and 
therefore of the legitimacy of the holders of this monopoly. In fact, its survival is 
always a resistance, that is, the expression of a refusal to allow oneself to be deprived 
of the instruments of religious production (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 13).
Hegel's unceasing claims to be a Lutheran made his contestation of the exegetical authority of 
the Lutheran ministers of his day an insurrection, and not an external attack. In laying claim to 
the tradition, Hegel arguably challenged their legitimacy and authority all the more effectively, 
which would allow the professor of philosophy to take over the reins of education just as 
Luther and Melanchthon had centuries before. As he sought to replace the representations of 
religion with the conceptions of philosophy, Hegel took a position in the iconoclastic tradition. 
If the university were to replace the church as the focal functional institution in the still-
forming nation-state, the philosopher would be ideally placed to facilitate the transformation of 
society from a mere aggregation of individuals into a dynamic and interactive assemblage of 
distinct estates and spheres of civil society, a living manifestation of Geist.
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4. The Ascetic, the Entrepreneur, & the Scholar:
Webers’s Disenchanted Sacrificial Rhetoric
 Introduction
This chapter takes the examination into the world of the scholar. No longer does the 
reader find explicit evocations of the sacred or the divine: in fact, Weber explicitly theorizes 
this disenchantment. This analysis will treat the divergent treatment of sacrifice and asceticism 
in two of Weber’s texts from two distinct periods, the pre- and post-war. In both texts sacrifice 
is useless expenditure, a figure of irrationality, though asceticism will receive very different 
treatment. Sacrifice plays no decisive role in the first text, the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (hereafter, PESC), but it does, especially in the peroration, of “Science [or 
“Scholarship,” Wissenschaft] as Vocation” [hereafter, “SaV”]. In addition to tracking the dif-
ferences in audiences and historical context, this analysis explores the stakes involved in these 
deployments of sacrificial rhetoric. I examine how Weber uses his typologies and historical 
hypotheses to intervene in contemporary social issues. Primarily, I analyze how it is sacrificial 
rhetoric that allows Weber to champion the entrepreneur and the scholar, and thereby issue a 
call for them to take up their place in history and thereby serve the needs of the German nation. 
As one of the first scholars to broach systematically the problems connected to com-
parative economic ethics, developmental economics, and the Realpolitik view of statecraft, 
Weber’s works form a pivotal node of influence in the history of scholarship.  In addition, 
when one takes into account his detailed typology of religious agents, bold comparative 
hypotheses, and ambitious speculations about world-historical trends, Weber holds a singular 
place in the pantheon of modern scholars of religion. When one assesses the number of 
heuristic and hermeneutical tools he makes available to the scholar of religion, it is no surprise 
  
  
that Geertz, in his influential essay, “Religion as a Cultural System”  names Weber as one of 
the “transcendent” figures who have set down the framework and principles for the future 
study of religion and culture (1973, p. 87). The number of scholars Weber has influenced 
directly is vast, and include Talcott Parsons, Peter Berger, Wolfgang Schluchter and Randall 
Collins. This influence extends even farther if one includes Weber’s employment of the “ideal-
types” method and his hypothesis of a world-historical transformation, the Entzauberung der 
Welt, or the “disenchantment of the world,” primarily known in anglophone sociology, via 
Berger, as the “secularization thesis.” Because of the prominence of these two aspects in 
Weber’s work, and because their elaboration has dominated the reception of Weber’s work, 
my analysis of Weber’s sacrificial rhetoric focuses upon the intersection of these two distinct 
but related theoretical contributions. This chapter will explore how Weber employs sacrificial 
rhetoric in a way that mobilizes his dramatis personae (the ideal-types) in order to produce a 
coherent and compelling sociological narrative of the development of rationality and its role in 
the emergence of Western hegemony.1 
In using the notion of sacrificial rhetoric to triangulate some of Weber’s ideal-types and 
his entzauberung-hypothesis, I hope to illustrate the way that, despite the implications of 
“rhetoric”, in this instance, as in many others, sacrificial rhetoric serves as the means to pro-
duce truth as well as obscure it, or, in other words, it allows the rhetorician and his auditors to 
achieve insight at the same time that it reproduces—and even creates—blindness. This type of 
analysis constitutes a rather atypical intervention in Weberian scholarship.2 Because of the 
world-historical role Weber attributes to the emergence of science, and the marked scientism 
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1As I will argue below, these two terms serve as the fault line separating a social-scientific from a 
rhetorical-aesthetic reading of Weber. To construct a coherent narrative Weber must employ his types, 
categories and processes with a minimal degree of internal tension and a maximum degree of consistency. To 
make the narrative compelling, however, beyond their concord with the aggregate of facts known about world 
history, the narrative must also present enough ironies, reversals, and theoretical return for the labor of 
redescribing historical facts into the sociological register to be worthwhile. Attending to the music made by 
these tensions and resolutions constitutes the primary objective of this chapter.
2 Jameson (1974), Hennis (1988) and Sica (2004) constitute noticeable precedents.
one finds in Weber’s texts, scholars have tended to treat Weber’s texts as neutral model-
bearing and hypothesis-promoting media, and have paid relatively little attention to their 
rhetorical infrastructure. When mention is made of Weber’s rhetoric the tone is either one of 
aesthetic admiration (one thinks of Gerth and Mills describing Weber’s sentences as resembling 
“gothic cathedrals” in their foreword to From Max Weber [1958]) or epistemic exasperation.  
Against this tendency to negate the medium of textuality in the name of a neutral transmission 
of knowledge, the topic of sacrificial rhetoric, which cuts across all these objects of investiga-
tion, has the advantages of addressing Weber's work as the interconnected system that it is. 
In studying this specific conjuncture of ideal-types and hypothetical trends, sacrificial 
rhetoric will allow us to track different aspects of Weber’s oeuvre in action. That is, one might 
analyze in isolation either the socio-religious agents described by the ideal-types, or the 
hypothetical trends to which they would wittingly or unwittingly contribute. By contrast, with 
sacrificial rhetoric as an organizing figure for the analysis, insofar as Weber uses it to describe 
the behavior of certain types of agents (the ascetic, the entrepreneur, and the scientist in partic-
ular) or applaud the progression of the trends that he hypothesizes (disenchantment, seculariza-
tion and rationalization, in particular), I provide a vantage-point on the margin of the Weberian 
world that allows the analyst to address the effects of systematicity produced by Weber’s 
oeuvre.  As with the other writers studied here under the rubric of sacrificial rhetoric, the 
rhetorical framework will help to uncover, in addition to its objective truth-claims, the dis-
cursive and polemical contexts of Weber’s work. The starting point thus involves a shift of 
perspective: against the scientism that exerts a persistent shaping force in Weber’s work, we 
shall attempt to read Weber's texts with close attention not only to their historico-sociological 
theses (the trends depicted and the typologies constructed), but also to their audience-specific 
rhetorical infrastructure and discursive effects. An initial premise of this analysis, then, is that 
texts are not merely the bearers of theories, and we must engage Weber's not only as vehicles 
of information, but also as works, as persuasive interventions that continue to influence and 
shape generations of scholars, and thus as discursive events that do not cease to take place.
  
 177 
In addition to the validity and promise I see in a rhetorical analysis of Weber’s texts, an 
analysis that utilizes literary theories and social scientific explanations of sacrifice to fore-
ground the figural networks of sacrificial rites opens many other possibilities. As a factor in the 
trends of Entzauberung and rationalization, Weber treats sacrifice and its close relative, 
asceticism, as major theoretical problems in his analysis, for few phenomena have so clearly 
contributed to the reign of culture over nature, and thus to world-historical developments, as 
these have.  To Weber, sacrifice is not written into the fabric of the natural world, but is simply 
a cultural projection and product of the religious imagination, and, as such, constitutes a reli-
gious practice that is entirely explained by his theory of magic. For this reason, Weber's theory 
of sacrifice and my concept of sacrificial rhetoric are closely intertwined in that the social and 
not the natural effects of the rite are of utmost concern. Hence, this investigation’s theoretical 
construct, sacrificial rhetoric, clearly shares much with Weber's Entzauberung-hypothesis, 
since its initial premise is that, in its modern Western variants, sacrifice is less an object of des-
cription than an object of designation, less a practice to be found than one to be created.
Nonetheless, although Weber deploys sacrificial rhetoric at crucial sites in his texts, he 
tended to treat sacrifice as an improper material residue that clings to more legitimate religious 
forms, and thus did not closely analyze the tissue of ritual forms and speech-acts that not only 
frame but constitute sacrifice as a rite distinct from mere butchering.  It is precisely this para-
dox, as with the other writers, that serves as the starting point for analysis: How could Weber 
engage in a mode of rhetoric whose organizing metaphor and figural networks invoke a prac-
tice that was invalid for him? In addition, from this outsider's perspective, can one draw the 
line between a neutral sacrificial theory and an interventionist sacrificial rhetoric? Also as with 
Luther and Hegel, their sacrificial rhetoric is not intrinsically interesting because it departs from 
communal usage (that is, though each does employ a unique usage of the term, for this usage 
to be rhetorically effective it cannot be unrecognizable to their audiences), but rather their 
usages are fascinating because in relation to their own premises and principles the term is 
anomalous. Thus, either as a strategic capitulation to their audiences, a necessary complication 
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of their positions, or a blending of both, where their theories deform in the face of con-
temporary social reception, their sacrificial rhetoric leaps off the page as a compelling object of 
scholarly scrutiny.
As a provisional response to these questions, it is clear that, whatever Weber thought 
of sacrifice, he was aware that it remained a compelling notion for his auditors, and thus con-
stituted an important element in his rhetorical repertoire. Like Hegel’s conceptual sublation, 
here the term is used for the express reason that the religious connotations are still intact. 
These remain even if the world no longer provides a place for its public practice, but only for 
the description and designation of events, acts, and processes that take place, as it were, “off-
stage”, as sacrifices. Although Weber refrained from using sacrifice in any speech act describ-
ing modern or contemporary behavior in the PESC, it plays an important role in “SaV” which I 
discuss later in this chapter. When addressing his fellow scholars as a distinct professional 
interest group, Weber does speak of sacrifice in both positive and negative terms but, finally, as 
something done by others, and to be eschewed by the rhetorical “us.”  Does Weber exploit his 
auditors’ desire to sacrifice, even as he turns the term against the practice, since a valid and 
worthwhile sacrifice “for them” precisely requires the revocation of sacrifice? In exploring this 
equivocal use of the term I will relate it to the different groups Weber addresses. 
As a preparation to the close-readings to follow, a few words at the outset are neces-
sary in order to situate “sacrificial rhetoric” as an object of scrutiny in relation to Weber’s 
hypothetical process, the Entzauberung der Welt. According to this hypothesis, the modern 
world is defined in relation to an age-old critique of “magic” which, though once mounted by 
various religions in their rationalizing and systematizing phases, has led to unintended con-
sequences. Unable to protect themselves againt the astringent skepticism of their own critique 
of magic, this unwieldy instrument has led to a gradual diminution of religion’s own explana-
tory power and social authority. The exact causal mechanisms of this putative process seems to 
shift according to the context of Weber’s discussion. However, as an example of the Ent-
zauberung der Welt, Weber cites the Protestant, and in particular Calvinist, rejection of the 
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sacraments as instruments of salvation: 
That great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic 
from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction 
with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to salvation as 
superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion. The genuine Puritan even 
rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and buried his nearest and dearest 
without song or ritual in order that no superstition, no trust in the effects of magical 
and sacramental forces on salvation, should creep in (PESC, p. 105).
For the contemporary scholar of religion, the argument that traces a development in many reli-
gions, at the outset, but which is illustrated solely by Judeo-Christian examples, presents many 
problems concerning the provenance of the comparative study. Are Judaism and Christianity 
but one religion among others? One might think that, for Weber in this instance, developments 
in Judaism and Christianity were exemplary for other religions as well.  Far from serving as a 
mere illustration of the general process, the Calvinist rejection of the sacraments is so 
thoroughgoing that that it is more than exemplary, and comes to serve as the ideal-type of the 
process. Nonetheless, the Calvinist, while the most methodical and total, does stand in a 
greater tradition, as Weber clarifies in a footnote: “The peculiar position of the old Hebrew 
ethic [...] rested [...] entirely on [...] the rejection of sacramental magic as a road to salvation” 
(PESC, p. 221-2).  The ideal-type of the Puritan thus emerges as the figure who represents the 
telos of a millenia-long process, and one that continues into modernity.3  
This prefigures a key point. Set in this context, the relation of this study to Weber’s 
hypothesis requires clarification. As demonstrated in an earlier chapter, Luther’s sacrificial 
rhetoric, which also effected a break with the sacramental mechanisms of the church and thus 
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3 One issue that remains unresolved is the exact relation between the religion’s displacement by 
science as the organon of knowledge concerning nature and society, and the loss of religion’s authority in 
modern societies: is one more the cause and the other the effect, or are they dialectically integrated? 
Furthermore, the mobility of the categories employed, and the way that the focus of analysis shifts from 
determinate (Christianity) to generic (“religion”) to indeterminate (“magic”), remains a problematic aspect of 
Weber’s texts, especially since most of the data for the Entzauberung-hypothesis, aside from inherited critiques 
of popular credulity in the ancient world and the religious discourses of the Far East, seems to derive from 
societies where Christianity is hegemonic.
paved the way for the Calvinist rejection of ritualism in general, forms a pivotal step in the Ent-
zauberung-process. At the same time, Luther employed the figure of sacrifice in his com-
mentary in order to preserve and revivify the reality of Jesus’s sacrifice as well as its role in the 
life of the Christian. The same kind of polyvalent effects we will discover at work in Weber’s 
text, for the following reason: insofar as sacrifical rhetoric is a mode of rhetoric, in the sense of 
not just a transmission of tradition but a self-reflexive elaboration of received idioms, it 
arguably constitutes an example of this trend of disenchantment; insofar as it remains stub-
bornly sacrificial, and preserves the idiom and scenario of sacrifice into a world that no longer 
sanctions the rite, sacrificial rhetoric consitutes a counterexample to the trend.  How will this 
tension between instrument and effect affect Weber’s use of sacrificial rhetoric? 
In several ways the Entzauberung-hypothesis stands in a paradoxical relationship to the 
rhetorical infrastructure of Weber’s own discourse. One hypothesis that I will argue here is 
that, just as, from Weber’s perspective, the historical religions employed disenchanting modes 
of discourse that validated their claims to authority vis-a-vis one rival phenomenon (namely, 
magic) but ultimately undermined that authority vis-a-vis another (namely, science), Weber’s 
use of sacrificial rhetoric in “SaV” both calls the community of scholars into being (or, what is 
the same thing, reaffirms the existence of a given collectivity by redefining its shared norms and 
goals) and also contradicts this complex speech-act in the very process of its performance.  If I 
can demonstrate how specific choices that Weber makes in his various writings shift from the 
descriptive to the prescriptive register, then one of the indicators of the Entzauberung-
hypothesis, the value-neutrality and objectivity of the scholar as a bearer of this emergent 
secular culture, will be seriously called into question. That said, my position is not that 
Weber’s discourse stands at odds to the express positions it espouses in a way that my dis-
course does not. Instead, I would argue that my text as well has blind spots and lacunae for 
which my discourse cannot account, and that this virtually defines the vocation of the scholar, 
and not, leaping ahead to the analysis to come, the raising of monuments that, though evanes-
cently glorious and complete, are doomed to decay. 
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To introduce the following readings, I have suggested how sacrificial rhetoric serves as 
both an instrument of Entzauberung and its enemy, an instance of its progress and a firewall 
against it.  Because of sacrificial rhetoric’s polyvalent proximity to Weber’s discourse, which 
both affirms and contests Weber’s Entzauberung-hypothesis, one needs to address Weber’s 
discourse on multiple terrains and with several itineraries. Hence, as opposed to an examina-
tion of Weber’s complete system of types and trends, this chapter will interrogate the obscure 
kinships that unite seemingly disparate phenomena. On one hand, we will attend to the com-
plex interrelations between sacrifice, asceticism, and rationalization in regards to the world-
historical roles they play in Weber’s developmental schemas. On the other hand, we will focus 
on Weber’s treatment of two figures from different social spheres but with marked affinities: 
the entrepreneur and the value-free, scientific scholar. In doing this, we will analyze the way 
that the Entzauberung-hypothesis informs Weber's sacrificial rhetoric, which he uses to endow 
these two types with a progressive world-historical value virtually unique in his typology of the 
division of labor. 
 The Entrepreneur
The two types we will examine in light of Weber's sacrificial rhetoric are late products 
of the historical division of labor, the entrepreneur and the scientific, wertfrei scholar. Far 
more than other figures in his cast of characters, these are the ones for whom Weber serves as 
a philosophical spokesman. According to the analysis in PESC and “SaV”, the entrepreneur 
and the scientist stand at the end of a long history of ascetic transformation.  Weber takes from 
Nietzsche the theme of the scientist as a descendant of the ascetic,4 but the entrepreneur 
understood in these terms is Weber's own contribution. In Weber’s analysis of the “heroic age” 
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4 Nietzsche’s interpretation of asceticism as a primary expression of the will to power became a 
running theme in many of his mature works. Articulating a position that would have a great deal of influence 
on Weber, Nietzsche depicted asceticism as a way of life with a future that would live on in the scholar and the 
scientist. On this debt, see Szakolczai’s Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel Life-Works (1998), a 
comparative study of Weber and Foucault and their responses to Nietzsche.
of entrepreneurial capitalism (beginning in the 16th, but culminating in the 17th and early 18th 
centuries) he speaks in terms of asceticism but not of sacrifice.  While building on the work of 
exponents of bourgeois ethics such as John Locke (1963, 1975) and Adam Smith (1976),5 who 
each underscored the market value of prudence and thrift in the new economic order, Weber's 
excavation of the religious basis of these ethics marked a creative departure in the study of the 
rising bourgeoisie. 
Weber chose to speak of the entrepreneur, and not the capitalist as an individual who 
has dispositional power over capital, or the bourgeoisie as an economic class. A question that 
emerges at the outset is, why speak of the entrepreneur and not, like Marx, the bourgeoisie? 
Liebersohn (1988) and Bendix (1962) each note that Weber worried considerably about the 
lack of a resilient middle-class faction in German politics. This is not to say that there were not 
owners of fixed and finance capital who could represent the propertied classes, but they tended 
to lack a historical perspective on the important role that the middle classes played in modern 
societies. That is, unlike their peers in France and England, the German bourgeoisie lacked the 
class consciousness to provide a counterbalance to residual aristocratic elements and the work-
ing classes. Bismarck’s Caesarism retained a place for aristocratic values in his consolidating 
nation-state, which only exacerbated the problems resulting from the fact that Germany never 
experienced its own bourgeois revolution. 
As a tactic in the political issues of his day, it is not too much to say that in the PESC 
Weber chose a framework to turn his study of historical economic change into a paean to the 
heroic virtues of the bourgeoisie before they consolidated as a class. The capitalist could stand 
in for the entrepreneur, but Weber chose to make the risk encountered in investment criterial to 
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5 It is difficult to underestimate the role that such philosophers played in articulating the rationale for 
middle class values.  In making “prudence” and “enlightened self-interest” not only legitimate but ascendant 
values, these bourgeois philosophers helped overcome the kind of group-centered ethics that distinguished 
between kin, family and neighbor versus the stranger and the outsider. As trade was greatly enhanced by these 
develpments, Weber makes this displacement of traditional communitarian values with bourgeois-economic 
values a key moment in economic rationalization. See Weber (1961).
his ideal-type, and the entrepreneur better carries this connotation. The capitalist, by contrast,  
could denote a simple relation of proprietorship, but the entrepreneur bespeaks a correlative 
mode of strategic behavior. Weber thereby avoids the marxian definition of the bourgeoisie as 
those who are factually determined by their relation to capital. Instead, Weber chooses to 
define them in relation to how they dispose of the capital, to distinguish the culture-bearers of 
emergent capitalism from the holdovers of feudalism. 
Aside from the semantic implications of the ideal-types, there is a more proximate con-
text to explain Weber’s preference this interpretation. Weber wrote in explicit opposition to 
Sombart’s depiction of the “quintessence” of capitalism. For Sombart, the privileged mode of 
behavior was the role of “calculation” in the rise of capitalism (1967, p. 125-9). Sombart’s cal-
culability runs the risk of making the investment of capital into a purely functional, deductive 
mode of behavior. Instead of a formal mode of relation to resources, Weber emphasized risk to 
make the analysis more sociological, as indicated by his reference to “spirit” to speak of a 
group of like-minded people who have to take each other’s motivations into account. To avoid 
speaking of a group that was only then in the process of forming, combining the term “spirit” 
with ideal-type analysis allows Weber to negotiate this difficulty.  Spirit indicates the trans-
formation among a group of people as they begin to take account of the innovations intro-
duced by disparate individuals among them and come to act in such a way that acknowledges 
the new parameters of behavior.  This reference to spirit shifts the analysis decisively from cal-
culability to the risk not only of venturing but of not venturing when the spirit of venture spurs 
one’s competitors.  
With the PESC, Weber sought to effect social change through a sociological examina-
tion of the “heroic” age of capitalism, but woven into the analysis one can trace an epideictic 
treatment, an element of praise for the calling of the ascetic Protestant entrepreneur. In the ser-
vice of this project, an exclusive emphasis on rationality and calculation would make the entre-
preneur too closely akin to the bureaucrat. Weber was greatly distressed by the contemporary 
lack of a bourgeoisie as a German class conscious of its interest and role in history. Without 
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this class as a modernizing force in German life, and representing a force of rationalization dis-
tinct from the bureaucracy, the ballast of an aristocratic residue6 kept German society moored 
to authoritarian modes of thought and behavior. By employing scholarship within this reformist 
project, with Weber the baton passes from the idealist philosopher to the empirical scholar. 
A more systemic reason, though, derives from the very nature of the PESC. In speak-
ing of Weber’s "Protestant-Ethic" thesis, there is no general agreement about its precise 
premises or scope. Weber offered numerous qualifications of any direct monocausal reading 
(the Protestants gave birth to capitalism),7 which led to his comparative project on the eco-
nomic ethic of the world religions, which would analyze the kind of brakes and hindrances 
these others maintained but Protestantism broke down. The problem with this, of course, is 
that it plants a nascent capitalism into the very heart of the human species, which religions too 
often hindered but which rationalization and disenchantment would inevitably overcome.  
 To study the interface of religion and economics, Weber emphasized the role of a 
specific type of individual. Weber did this in opposition to an economic determinism that dis-
counted the role of individual agents in the processes of socio-historical development. Weber 
thought the Marxists of his day viewed religion as a residual phenomenon, since the individual 
as insignificant compared to the vast systems in which she is interpellated. This is not to say 
that Weber did not traffic in a similar kind of trend-watching; however, for him, such world-
transforming developments must involve change in subjective orientation. Hence, in contrast to 
the vulgar marxism he opposed, religion for Weber is a critical cultural influence whose objec-
tive nature allows the sociologist to account for subjective responses and motivational factors 
that influence socio-historical development. 
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6 Weber surely had in mind not only the problem this class posed as a residual force in national 
politics, but also the groups that Smith excoriated with relish, the lackeys, sycophants, and other non-
productive types that tended to accrete around aristocrats.
7 For the final word on these qualifications, see Weber’s “Anti-Critical Last Word on the Spirit of 
Capitalism” (1978). For other assessments, see Gordon (1980), Hennis (1988), and Troeltsch (1986).
Although the preference of individual over class is intrinsic to Weber's methodology8, 
this is not to say that any one individual is overridingly important, even a Luther or a Calvin. 
Furthermore, the ideal-type does not focus exclusively on the psychological or the personal, 
but serves as shorthand for the agent shaped by social conditions and acting within a social 
environment. This is what the “spirit” in the title tries to capture: when a great number of inter-
acting individuals come to share a similar value-framework, and each becomes, if not calcul-
able, then at least predictable, on this basis. For this reason, after exploring the nature of the 
entrepreneur's asceticism, we then have the emergence of a new mode of normativity, one that 
retains the charisma of a pre-modern form of life precisely because of the connotations of 
sacrifice that Weber employs: the ascetic Protestant entrepreneur eschews the comfort of com-
modities to embrace the risks of capital, and capital one can only venture and accumulate but 
cannot hoard.  
In PESC Weber restored the individual to the center of the analysis, first, by focusing 
on ideal-types and the social shaping of individual motivation and, second, by focusing on the 
transformation of asceticism as a value-laden, motivational structure. Weber proposed that 
“[o]ne of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but 
of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born—that is 
what this discussion has sought to demonstrate—from the spirit of Christian asceticism” (p. 
180). In effect, this asceticism provided the values that catalyzed the gargantuan development 
of industry and capitalism in modern Europe and America. The Protestant form of asceticism 
allowed the scope of production to exceed the traditional limits of need and, since it tended to 
minimize consumption at the same time that it maximized production, promoted the reinvest-
ment of surplus production back into the production process itself.  Thus, it is characteristic, 
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8 This concern for subjectivity was a direct consequence of Weber’s social nominalism, a term 
Timasheff used (1955, p. 182) to describe Weber’s position on the “reality” of society. If Durkheim would be a 
social “realist” because he argued for the objective reality of “society”, would be a social “realist”, and Weber, 
who argued that “society” was only a secondary effect of the interaction of individuals, would be a social 
“nominalist”.
not to say criterial, of the entrepreneur to break with the immediate relation to natural desires. 
Living in accordance with the economic ethic of Protestant asceticism, the entrepreneur does 
not consume the proceeds of his labor, but reinvests the capital in his ventures. Labor and 
accumulation become parts of the entrepreneur's overall economic activity, but these do not 
become truly capitalist unless they culminate in investment that closes the ascetic-
entrepreneurial cycle. For Weber to describe the rising bourgeoisie's economic activity as 
“labor” and not such resolving moments as “investment” or “accumulation” is a choice whose 
rationale and consequences brings us to the topic of sacrificial rhetoric. This analysis seeks to 
show that it is only by way of Weber's sacrificial rhetoric that wholly plausible “sacrifices” of 
the underclasses9 are not described as such, while he casts the discoverers of a new form of 
voluptuous pleasure—which sees a mean in every end, the only end the accumulation of the 
means of accumulation—as the stoic agents of heroic asceticism.
 From Sacrifice to a Modernizing Asceticism
Weber closely linked the modernizing aspects of asceticism to the type of the entrepre-
neur.  Weber does this by explicating in detail the transformations of asceticism in pre-capitalist 
Christianity. Our analysis of Weber now shifts from the analysis of types to the explication of 
Weber’s historical hypotheses. Asceticism is a form of practice, but also, in Weber’s trends of 
rationalization and secularization, a topical hinge or mediating element between an archaic past 
and the most modern social activity.10 Although Weber regarded asceticism as ultimately irra-
tional, it was also one of the primary means of disenchanting magical practices. Weber treats 
sacrifice under the rubric of magic, understood as an anti- or pre-rational mode of worship. In 
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9 In the introduction I discussed Marx’s interpretation of Smith’s labor theory of value as 
fundamentally sacrificial. One could also point to Marx’s account of the primitive accumulation of capital 
during which the peasantry  made the inaugural sacrifice by means of which great parcels of capital in the form 
of land was made available for accumulation. 
10 Jameson developed this view that Weber employed “vanishing mediators” to make his historical 
trends more viable. See “The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as Storyteller” (1973).
the following quotation Weber depicts the change in ritual meanings as consequent upon shift-
ing conceptions of the deity, namely, as hinging upon the shift from divinities as arbitrarily-
motivated personages towards deities defined and rationalized in relation to an ethical code:
Suffering, voluntarily created through mortification, changed its meaning with the 
development of ethical divinities who punish and reward. Originally, the magical coer-
cion of spirits by the formula of prayer was increased through mortification as a source 
of charismatic states. Such coercion was preserved in mortification by prayer as well as 
in cultic prescriptions of abstinence. This has remained the case, even after the magical 
formula for coercing spirits became a supplication to be heard by a deity. Penances 
were added as a means of cooling the wrath of deities by repentance, and of avoiding 
through self-punishment the sanctions that have been incurred (1958, p. 274).
Rationalization of dogma and theodicy paves the way for ritual and practical changes.11 The 
function and goal of asceticism shifts from an irrational supplication towards an ethico-
theological practice of regulation and normalization.  By means of this shift from a tyrannical 
to a moral deity, the magical connotations of sacrifice give way to its ascetic components. 
Hence asceticism, despite its roots in a magical worldview, serves as a mediating factor 
between traditional (sacrificing) and modern (economic) world views. Asceticism is thereby 
able to change values— forward-looking in its sacrificial past, backward-facing in the present 
until it adapts completely to modern economic processes. In leaving this magical past, 
asceticism symbolizes the progressive capacity of religions. 
Among most world religions, but especially Judaism and Christianity, the entire reli-
gious essence is defined by a dynamic anti-magical tendency: “The peculiar position of the old 
Hebrew ethic, as compared with the closely related ethics of Egypt and Babylon, and its devel-
opment after the time of the prophets, rested […] entirely on this fundamental fact, the 
rejection of sacramental magic as a road to salvation” (PESC, p. 222). Sacrificial rituals first 
get rationalized because of the changing nature of their recipient, for as the ritual shifts along 
the efficacy-axis from magical to moral effects, it ceases to influence the world in a direct way 
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11 This primacy of the doctrinal foregrounds a rationalistic sense of religion that figures like Mauss 
would contest. For Mauss, doctrines develop as second-order descriptions and rationalizations of ritual changes, 
so that the doctrinal is not conceived as an autonomous or distinct mode of religious life. How this would 
change Weber’s sense of asceticism, and its role in history, is a compelling question. 
and becomes a type of utterance, a symbolic representation of obedience and a token of 
gratitude and penance.  Sacrificial rites then must become moral gestures and not material 
tokens expressing the relationship. 
Despite these doctrinal rationalizations, doxic conceptions of sacrifice’s magical 
efficacy persist, even as the ritual itself gets translated into mitigated and routinized forms of 
asceticism. With these developments forming a continuity between Judaism and Christianity, 
these two religions serve as the organizing pre-modern forces in Weber's postulated historical 
trends. Furthermore, because “sacrifice” gets outmoded by the trends of rationalization and 
secularization, one must read sacrifice as a term into Weber's rhetoric in the PESC. That is, 
sacrifice is an external but influential force at key junctures, with the result that one can trace 
the shape of its absence at key places. It will be absent because, as opposed to the utterly magi-
cal, irrational, and outmoded nature of sacrifice, Weber foregrounds the rationalizing and prog-
ressive side of asceticism while, at the same time, retaining its links to a magical past in order 
to pull this talisman out at key moments of his argument to support the irrationality of the call-
ing and the role of the religion in the development of capitalism.)  For these reasons, moderniz-
ing asceticism and outmoded sacrifice cannot mingle—until the two meet at key moments, 
such as the figure of the tradition-oriented laborer and the tragic future of the cage-bound 
entrepreneur, types whose social context comes to contrast and negate their express intentions.  
For Weber sacrifice was doomed to the past while asceticism had a future. That is, 
asceticism, in its mode as a mitigation of sacrifice, becomes a bearer of rationality. But at the 
level of the posited, often religious value spheres for which one cannot offer justifications or 
proof since they function as the ultimate principles from which one would deduce justifications 
and proof, there is a continuity between them, for each is only the historical instantiation of a 
Weberian socio-cultural constant: namely, the ultimate irrationality of every end that cannot be 
taken dialectically as some sort of means. Even as the process of rationalization reshaped the 
world, and capitalism took hold in the modern era, asceticism and methodological organiza-
tion, as the progressive element in practice, continued to give access to charisma, with all its 
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magical residue. Weber’s heroic treatment of the Protestant ascetic calls forth just such a 
charismatic—and thus magical—response. By casting the behavior of the entrepreneur as  
ascetic, Weber keeps a consecrating element of religiosity alive in capitalist practices.
 Asceticism Mediates Between Sacrifice & Calling 
Asceticism is one of the few terms to stay with Weber from pre-history to the present. 
Though it has magical origins, from sacrifice to asceticism to the calling it retains this 
irrationality even as it constitutes the primary means towards the rationalization of behavior..  
Through several distinct historical stages, “Christian asceticism […] has had a definitely 
rational character in its highest Occidental forms as early as the Middle Ages, and in several 
forms even in antiquity. […] In the rules of St. Benedict, still more with the monks of Cluny, 
again with the Cistercians, and most strongly the Jesuits, it has become emancipated from 
planless other-worldliness and irrational self-torture” (PESC, p. 118, [emphasis added]). With 
the Cluny and Cistercian reforms, the mode of monastic asceticism turns from physiological 
hardship to organized economic behavior.12 By sharpening the distinctions between irrational 
and rational asceticism, Weber even gives the impression that, in confronting these irrational 
aspects, asceticism overcomes the negative elements on its own, under its own impetus, 
without the impingement of social factors.13  Asceticism so understood would be a microcosm 
of the rationalizing world as a whole, insofar as the disciplined tension it involves constitutes 
the very interface between a rationalizing agency and the irrational, resistant res of the subject. 
In the same passage as above, Weber quickly turns from the irrationality asceticism 
overcomes to describe the beachheads of rationality it has gained:
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12 For a view that complicates Weber’s treatment of monasticism as a force in economic development, 
see Silber (1993), Kalberg (1990) and Kaelber (1998).
13 A more specific treatment would see the various modes of rationality developed within the monastic 
institutions as pegged to the type of clientele (the aristocracy at some, the trading classes in others, reformed 
sinners of all classes in still others).
It had developed a systematic method of rational conduct with the purpose of over-
coming the status naturae, to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his 
dependence on the world and on nature. It attempted to subject man to the supremacy 
of a purposeful Will, to bring his actions under constant self-control with a careful con-
sideration of their ethical consequences (PESC, p. 118-9).
Nevertheless, asceticism, as a rational transformation of sacrifice, still carried forward an irra-
tional core. Because of its paradoxes it is useful: though worldly as opposed to other-worldly 
asceticism is defined by its methodical means, it still posits ends that are ultimately irrational, 
which forestalls the need for Weber to ascribe an end to the individual’s calling. What is 
rational in asceticism is its methodicalness: indeed, it would seem to reside entirely in—and 
as—its methods and means as these shift from otherworldly to worldly ends.  The utter dis-
junct between the means that one employs (worldly work) and the ends that one desires (other-
worldly salvation) constitutes the heart of the Protestant scandal, and the irrationality of every 
call.14 
From these brief passages we get the essential elements of Weber's Protestant 
asceticism: the rationality of a methodical and disciplined lifestyle, coupled with the 
irrationality of an end pursued so single-mindedly that it is scandalous from the perspective of 
natural or earthly values. In the course of delineating the contributions to capitalism made by 
the Protestant mode of asceticism, Weber provides only the briefest hints that other conditions 
were on hand to permit the development of capitalism to proceed. That is, in order to empha-
size the role of Protestant asceticism, Weber has to take other elements necessary to the devel-
opment of capitalism for granted. These elements have a history too, though, and Weber offers 
a more or less arbitrary historical demarcation regarding the inaugural moment of capitalism. 
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14 Though scandalous on many fronts, the Protestant ascetic entrepreneur reaches a peak of 
irrationality and scandal because, if one measures rationality in terms of means-end propriety, or the 
adjustment of one to the other, then monastic ascetics, who believed in their works, were more “rational” than 
Protestant ascetic entrepreneurs, whose means (ascetic worldly behavior) explicitly could not achieve the 
posited end (salvation).
 Asceticism Contra Eudaemonism
After examining asceticism in its relations to magical practices such as sacrifice, which 
it rejects and replaces, and to rational capitalist enterprise, whose emergence it prepares, it 
would be tempting to think that we have an adequate grasp of the phenomenon. The pursuit of 
a methodical and disciplined way of life, however, seems hardly specific enough to distinguish 
asceticism as a unique historical force. A brief comparison with Catholic monasticism and 
pagan husbandry should help us delineate the contours of Protestant asceticism more clearly. 
In keeping with his treatment of ideal-types in the PESC, when he discusses 
monasticism Weber does not describe the feudal system and the monastery's place within it, 
nor the forms of discipline that shaped the days and years of the monks.15 Instead, he describes 
the effect on the religious imagination of the monk as an ideal-type: 
the most important thing [among Catholics] was the fact that the man who, par 
excellence, lived a rational life in the religious sense was, and remained, alone the 
monk. Thus asceticism, the more strongly it gripped an individual, simply served to 
drive him farther away from everyday life, because the holiest task was definitely to 
surpass all worldly morality ( PESC, p. 120-121).
One way that Weber denies the continuity of ascetic practices in favor of the singularity of the 
Protestant form is to insist that everything changes once the ideal figure of the monk is rejected 
by the Reformers. Yet according to Weber's ideal-type analysis, this totalizing gesture, the 
desire to overcome desire and reject the world entirely, remains a part of asceticism even in its 
Protestant variety. With Protestant asceticism, however, the totalizing gesture changes value: 
instead of rejecting the world as a whole, the test becomes the degree to which one can 
embrace it and adjust to its demands. But the ideal persists, only with changed methods. 
Once Catholicism and its self-punishing, irrational element is left behind, asceticism 
leaves the monastery and serves for Weber as a short-hand term for behavior that is methodical 
and planned as well as prudential and anti-appetitive, for “[t]his worldly Protestant asceticism 
acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, 
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15 This is the gap that both Silber (1993) and Kaelber (1998) address.
especially of luxuries” (PESC, p. 170-1). Unlike otherworldly asceticism, with Protestant 
asceticism the project is not at all about going hungry to be an entrepreneur. Instead of a 
rejection of consumption, the Protestants discovered temperance, a rejection, not of consump-
tion, but of the pleasure that accompanies consumption. This rejection of pleasure and luxury, 
however, was not an otherworldly end in-itself, but was instead the dynamic interface between 
the rational and the irrational in the ascetic project:
The campaign against the temptations of the flesh, and the dependence on external 
things […] was […] not a struggle against the rational acquisition, but against the irra-
tional use of wealth. But this irrational use was exemplified in the outward forms of 
luxury which their code condemned as idolatry of the flesh, however natural they had 
appeared to the feudal mind. On the other hand, they approved the rational and 
utilitarian uses of wealth which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and 
the Community [anstatt der von Gott gewollten rationalen und utilitarischen Ver-
wendung für die Lebenszwecke des einzelnen und der Gesamtheit] (PESC, p. 170-1; p. 
145).
To Weber, the Protestant problematization of economic behavior reduced to a critique of 
certain modes of consumption and investment, not a rejection of property or gain. It is telling 
that here we see Weber refer to rational versus irrational uses, not of “wealth”, but of 
“expenditure” [Verwendung], a term that blurs the distinction between liquid or fungible assets 
like money or consumer goods and capital as an instrument of wealth accumulation. One 
wonders how one would distinguish a rational from an irrational investment of capital, for 
instance, since every such venture entailed risks by definition. Is this rhetoric of “rationality” 
only a way to describe the successful entrepreneur as more rational—and thus more 
deserving—than the unsuccessful one? If so, beyond the transition from the focus on the indi-
vidual to the group as it develops through the interaction of isolated individuals, it is very dif-
ficult indeed to clarify the distance between Weber’s description and the agent’s own report 
concerning the significance of this success, other than, of course, a translation into a social 
scientific idiom. 
Another point of contention arises from the binary relation between the “natural” 
modes of consumption regnant in feudalism and the rational modes of asceticism in early 
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Protestant capitalism.  For purposes of illustration this simplifies things for Weber, but never 
has there been a culture which accepts at face value a “natural” mode of consumption. In every 
cultural formation there is acceptance and rejection of varying modes of consumption, and 
usually these are not categorical but matters of degree. In comparing the feudal mansion and 
the bourgeois household, which might be similar in scale, a scold could see distinctions that are 
more aesthetic than ethical. Of course, from the Protestant viewpoint, since the aesthetic 
appreciation of worldly goods was regarded as seductive and sinful, the aesthetic cannot be 
separated from the ethical, but the economic significance of these aesthetic distinctions are 
mixed at best.
At another level, it is somewhat obscurantist to frame the emergent Protestant entre-
preneur against the feudal mode of social organization. The feudal mode of social organization, 
defined in relation to the three estates of the oratores, bellatores, and laboratores, or the 
clergy, the aristocrats, and the serfs (Duby, 1968, 1980), was altered almost beyond recogni-
tion by the rise of the towns and an urban middle class during the agricultural and commercial 
revolutions of the tenth to thirteenth centuries. Nevertheless, the contrast for Weber and the 
Protestants he discusses is too telling to pass over. As Weber puts it, “over against the glitter 
and ostentation of feudal magnificence which, resting on an unsound economic basis, prefers a 
sordid elegance to a sober simplicity, they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle-class 
home as an ideal” (PESC, p. 171).  Weber frames the opposition with the Protestant middle-
class against aristocrats, not the peasantry, since from the view of the latter the Protestants 
might appear more opulent than ascetic. When Protestants defined their social principles 
against “feudal” forms, as Weber did in the passage above, it was against the residues of feu-
dalism which had been slowly passing for centuries. Hence, a more illuminating contrast would 
be with the banking families of the Italian peninsula, the Fuggers or the leading members of the 
Hanseatic league. But then again, the distinctions here would be faint and marginal at best, and 
such a comparison would put Weber too close to the conclusions of Sombart, for whom capi-
talism began not with the Protestants but precisely with such refinements in monetary calcula-
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tion and financial instruments. Weber compares the Protestants with their perceived predeces-
sors, the aristocrats from whom they self-consciously strove to distance themselves, and not 
their contemporary competitors, which makes the Protestant ascetics seem more unique, per-
haps, than they really were.
 Instead of such a comparison, I would like to take Weber at the very level of analysis 
that he desired: that of the methodical rationalization of behavior in the quotidian pursuit of 
wealth. For such a comparison, given Weber’s emphasis on the Protestant household rather 
than any one individual, the closest type of organization in the West would be, not the feudal 
estate, but the Greek oikos, or household. Comparing these we might discover other dis-
tinguishing features as we analyze the relative singularity of the institution.  Whether one turns 
to the eudaemonistic ethics of Aristotle16 or the depiction of the ideal practitioner of husbandry 
in Xenophon, the adult male Greek as the manager of familial resources stands in favorable 
comparison to the Puritan as a hands-on and diligent steward of wealth.17 Despite the similarity 
between the eudaemonistic Greek husband and the ascetic Protestant father, Weber nonethe-
less depicts Protestant asceticism as deeply opposed to any eudaemonic ethics: 
the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with 
the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid 
of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so purely as an 
end in itself, that from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the single 
individual, it appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational (PESC, p. 53).
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16 Briefly, happiness (eudaemonia), rightly construed, is the highest good. To be happy, though, one 
must live a philosophically sound and socially honorable life. Thus, far from hedonism, pagan eudaemonia is 
not hedonistic in the slightest, and incorporates a complex social ethic as well. When Weber virtually equates 
the two in the following excerpt, he is being disingenuous. It is virtually unheard of for a society’s ethic to 
embrace any and every natural desire.
17 In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Ischomachus instructs Socrates on the particulars of running a well-
ordered estate. For the husband to run it well requires immense energy, methodical application, and an attitude 
that embraces constant learning. On the topic that Weber saw as pivotal to the development of capitalist wage-
labor, conscientious workers motivated by incremental wages and not a fixed sum, Ischomachus places the 
burden on the master and not the workers: “truly great is the man who can accomplish great deeds by the 
strength of his mind rather than by muscle, [...] for ruling over willing subjects, in my view, is a gift not wholly 
human but divine, because it is a gift of the gods: and one that is obviously bestowed on those who have been 
initiated into self-control” (1994, XXI.8-12, p. 209).
How then might one account for the surface similarities of pagan husbandry and Protestant 
entrepreneurism?  If the Protestant ascetic rejects the happiness of eudaemonism, it is because 
of his anxiety about salvation, not because he rejects the goods that make life livable. Thus the 
Protestant ascetic rejects “happiness”, but rejects it abstractly, and not materially.18 For this 
reason Weber rejects the term “self-denying” as a description of Protestant asceticism.  This 
allows Weber to avoid overt sacrificial connotations with this asceticism, for it is not the self 
that is denied, but the self that does the denying—saying no to the haphazard, the short-term, 
the dissolution represented by any pleasure that is an end in and of itself. In other words, the 
ascetic transposition of any action or goals into means reaches towards an ever-receding 
horizon of ends, a problematic that instantiates, in novo, the crisis of instrumental rationality. If 
the Protestant ascetic rejects happiness, he does so more in theory than in practice, or, better, 
more in the dispositional way he affirms his economic success, not by avoiding it. 
For the Protestant ascetic, then, the given natural goods of life have to be rationed but 
not denied beyond every concern with health or well-being. However, when one accumulates 
capital and commodities but rejects the pleasures of accumulation and possession, when, in 
short, the economic agent pursues the means to satisfy well-being but rejects that end, in what 
way precisely is this ascetic? When one rejects gluttony, but does not embrace fasting, is this 
not to embrace the Aristotelian mean?19 In what way does this asceticism differ from the mean-
ethic of Aristotle, which purposefully pursues the highest good as happiness? Or the marks of 
the good husband in Xenophon?  Thus, again, we see the rejection of eudaemonism in theory 
but not in practice. The reason for this is that, rhetorically, ancient eudaemonism is not sacrifi-
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18 This position stands in sharp distinction from the realism of Aristotle’s ethics, where the minimal 
necessities of life are regarded as essential to the pursuit of virtue. 
19 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses a triadic ethical model that is fundamentally distinct 
from the dualism that is endemic to Judaism and Christianity. In it, between any two excessive forms of 
behavior, say cowardice and rashness, there is a third term, courage, that constitutes the ethical ideal. My point 
here is that this ethic is not so different from the rational, methodical ethic of the Protestant ascetic. This 
Christian sacrificial pathos defined against the Aristotelian tradition requires more exploration.
cial, and does not convey any sacrificial pathos.  To reject this helps Weber construct his paean 
to a supposedly non-eudaemonistic, unprecedentedly ascetic entrepreneurial class. Of course, 
the pagan husband practiced sacrifice in a much more literal sense than the Protestant father, 
but this practice was a delimited and specific religious practice, as opposed to the diffused and 
pathos-laden sacrificial asceticism that Weber attributes to the Protestant entrepreneur. If the 
behavior, a methodical and rationalizing pursuit of wealth, did not differ much between the 
two, then the primary difference seems to be the emotion and pathos of the Protestant condi-
tion, which the pagan would have rejected, if not on ethical, then at least on aesthetic grounds. 
Once asceticism has left otherworldly monasticism behind and has become this-worldly again, 
we have a Christian ethic that approaches … the heights of pagan ethics, but with a bonus—
the surplus-value of ascetic charisma produced by the effective use of sacrificial rhetoric . 
 Asceticism or Addiction?
It is this same type of abstract rejection of happiness and pleasure on principle, while 
pursuing its material conditions in practice, that allows Weber to describe the entrepreneur, 
maniacally committed to the accumulation and investment of capital, as a nouveau ascetic. To 
do this Weber employs a narrow definition of desirable goods, whereby consumer goods are 
desirable in that they satisfy “natural” needs but forms of capital as means of investment and 
accumulation are not. In this way, Weber defines investment capital as an unnatural and 
undesirable object so that its avid pursuit can remain ascetic. The desire for capital accumula-
tion is thus tacitly depicted as an irrational end, to distinguish it from simple, eudaemonistic 
greed. But it would be as legitimate to describe the Protestant pursuit of capital as the dis-
covery of a new mode of desire, one that is unfettered by the physiological constraints of 
satiety or need. In this light, the Protestant ascetic would be a member of the libertine avant-
garde, a figure of delirious desire, an addict.20  It is not difficult to find passages where 
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20 Because of the machinic nature of capital in its manifestations of fixed capital, the notion of the 
unconscious as a machine connects directly here. The pursuit of delire and jouissance as an integral element of 
Nietzsche excoriates the pathological basis of Christian asecticism, and this diagnosis could 
certainly extend to Weber’s entrepreneur. Even if one were to dismiss the polemical edge to 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis, current discourse in sexuality studies and queer theory also underscore 
the unstable nature of the subject, not the autonomous governor of a free will. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, for one, has taken the lead from Foucault’s History of Sexu-
ality volumes to write provocatively about the category of the “addict” as an unstable and 
expansive element of contemporary juridico-medical discourses. She writes of the fundamental 
changes in the taxonomies that circulate in the natural sciences once they overlap with the 
medico-juridical categories in which the expanding nation-state invests. At first, the notion of 
addiction was tied directly to a specific type of substance: “From as far back as Mandeville,” 
she argues, “the opium product, [...] the cartel-vulnerable commodity crop for export as 
opposed to the subsistence crop for home use, was seen as having a unique ability to pry the 
potentially unlimited trajectory of demand, in its users, conclusively and ever-increasingly apart 
from the relative homeostasis of need” (1993, p. 135). Opium, capital, religion—all are objects 
of desire whose consumption is unbound by merely physical needs.
But this substance was really only the focusing point for an aspect of subjectivity. As 
addiction traveled from a relation to a substance towards putatively “aberrant” forms of sexu-
ality, as with Kraft-Ebbing, new aspects of addiction came into view. If not bound to a sub-
stance or a physiological response, “then the locus of addictiveness cannot be the substance 
itself and can scarcely even be the body itself, but must be some overarching abstraction that 
governs the narrative relations between them” (p. 131). The name of this abstraction, distilled 
from the subject, is a will that should be free but is not. Sedgwick locates a launching point for 
the mobilization of the will which will soon single out the addict in the Reformation, a particu-
larly ironic notion since Luther explicitly proscribed this notion in his polemic against 
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capital tells us more about its operation than the capitalist hero construed as rationalizing ascetic. On this topic, 
see Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1987).
Erasmus’s De libero arbitrio, entitled De servo arbitrio, or The Bondage of the Will. The 
framework of belief and assent, however, entails certain notions of the freedom of the will that 
Luther’s theological strictures were not able to contain. As Sedgwick argues, 
So long as an entity known as “free will” has been hypostatized and charged with ethi-
cal value (a situation whose consolidating moment in the Reformation already revealed, 
at the same time, the structure of its dramatic foundational fractures and their 
appropriability to the complex needs of capitalism) [...] for just so long has an equally 
hypostatized “compulsion” had to be available as a counterstructure always internal to 
it, always requiring to be ejected from it (p. 133-4).
After these complications, when the topic does return to the fixed object, the narratives that 
accrete around these objects matter much more than before. Sedgwick well captures the power 
of these cultural narratives, and the obvious interest in avoiding becoming an object of them:
In the taxonomic reframing of a drug user as an addict, what changes are the most 
basic terms about her. From a situation of relative homeostatic stability and control, she 
is propelled into a narrative of inexorable decline and fatality, from which she cannot 
disimplicate herself except by leaping into that other, even more pathos-ridden narrative 
called kicking the habit. From being the subject of her own perceptual manipulations or 
indeed experimentations, she is installed as the proper object of compulsory institu-
tional disciplines, legal and medical, that, without actually being able to do anything to 
“help” her, nonetheless presume to know her better than she can know herself—and 
indeed, offer everyone in her culture who is not herself the opportunity of enjoying the 
same flattering presumption (p. 131).
Once medico-juridical discourses have taken this identity-construct as the object of their prac-
tices, it is sure to have a role to play in society at large. Indeed, the figure of the addict has 
become such a mobile entity that its moorings loose from any particular substance (such as 
opium, alcohol, or other intoxicants) or behavior (such as homosexual acts, crime, gambling, 
etc.). This unmooring of the addict from any particular substance or behavior in the world goes 
so far that we have the strangest entity of them all, the exercise addict. As Sedgwick con-
cludes, “if exercise was addictive, nothing couldn't be; the exercise addict was really the limit 
case for evacuating the concept of addiction, once and for all, of any necessary specificity of 
substance, bodily effect, or psychological motivation” (p. 132).  Even though the addict was 
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once the figure of a subject whose exercise of will was lacking or insufficient, now “the asser-
tion of will itself has come to appear addictive” (p. 133).21
Her essay succeeds in destabilizing the dichotomy of addict/free subject, and 
proliferates moments of compulsion and voluntarism along the axes of two types of narrative, 
that of becoming-addicted and kicking-the-habit. If the Protestant ascetic could be depicted 
within the narrative of “kicking the habit” of a eudaemonistic pursuit of consumer goods and 
other satisfactions, the Protestant ascetic would simultaneously fit into another narrative, that 
of “becoming addicted” to the pursuit of the accumulation of capital. We would thus have to 
split the unity of our singular ideal-type of the “entrepreneur” and speak instead of different 
species embedded in different narratives, the ascetic consumer as opposed to the addicted 
entrepreneur.
With Sedgwick we shift from the ascetic entrepreneur to the addict or libertine, to the 
point that we now have the simultaneous addict and kicker. This underscores the arbitrary but 
powerful effect of sacrificial rhetoric, even when it strives to cover its tracks and employ cog-
nate terms like “asceticism” and abolish the term “sacrifice” altogether. The moral credit that 
accrues to the entrepreneur by virtue of Weber's rhetoric can reverse to a debit by employing 
the simple tactic of re-describing a form of abstinence as an inverse mode of desire, which 
monastic practices taught quite well. It is only Weber's deft handling of asceticism against the 
irrationality of sacrifice, and his insistence on the terminology of asceticism, with its sacrificial 
overtones, that keeps more unflattering depictions of the early Protestant entrepreneur fore-
closed. The entrepreneur-as-ascetic requires a narrative to provide the values and framework in 
which to understand his monomaniacal pursuit of wealth accumulation as an instance of a 
certain form of ethical model, that of asceticism inflected in the Protestant ethos. This also 
requires a second-order abstraction, rationalization, which situates asceticism in a broad frame-
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21 Sedgwick turns to habit as an outside of the addiction/voluntarism dichotomy. Even though she 
dismisses Nietzsche along the way, he has much to say about the effect of habit in the mode of a rhetoric that is 
significantly deflated from that of sacrificial rhetoric.
work to allow it to partake both of the magical charisma of the religious sphere and the sober 
rationalism of the economic sphere.
This is not to impugn Weber’s treatment of the ascetic Protestant entrepreneur, for the 
historical context made his advocacy of the middle class bear a different polemical value than 
this analysis carried after its translation into an American context. Nonetheless, the addicted 
entrepreneur has benefited from numerous normalizing discourses, with the effect that the 
queerness of this type of behavior has been effectively masked. Weber’s text contributed to this 
normalization greatly, of course, even as he pushed the heroic figures of the ideal-type of the 
entrepreneur into the past. In adition, by speaking of spirit, Weber situates the entrepreneur, in 
both ascetic and addicted aspects, in relation to other such entrepreneurs, and their numbers 
lead each to think the others normal, indeed, as embodying the norm of this way of life as com-
pletely than him or herself. This projection of venturesome rationality and steadfast meth-
odicalization onto others contributed as much to developing the spirit of enterpreneural self-
consciousness as any of Calvin’s strictures on salvational mechanisms. Thus, Weber’s turn to 
the “spirit” of capitalism—a kind of collective mentality that is both shared to a degree but also 
attributed to others when there is no counterindicating evidence to block the attribution22—is 
both a sociological description and the pleased self-regard of this class, their “tale of the tribe” 
that Weber developed and then related in various narratives. 
This is no more rhetorical, moreover, than the Protestant redefinition of worldly ends 
as mere means toward the proof of otherworldly salvation. To make an end a means—is this 
rational, irrational, or sacrificial? It depends upon one's rhetorical resources.  By positing 
asceticism as a second-order mode of life structured in sharp opposition to merely natural 
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22 In a way, Weber’s movement from individual to spirit is never more true than when we speak of 
capital, for its use-value is defined in relation not to one’s own needs, but to those of untold and unknowable 
others. The only limits to capital’s use-value in any particular instance involves not only estimates regarding 
the scope of the market (with one widget per person) but an intensive estimation including the effect of 
advertising. Thus capital, just like opium, becomes a consumer product whose demand-curve has little to do 
with the physiological needs of any one individual.
drives, and not as the re-education of the body or the redefinition of values—that is, not as one 
mode of acculturation among others, but as anti-nature itself—asceticism retains a sacrificial 
aura, even while engaging in the same earthly pursuits as those eudaemonistic others. Such is 
the power of sacrificial rhetoric. 
Again, this is not to say that Weber’s account of the Protestant entrepreneur as an 
ascetic is wrong, or a misattribution. In describing these Protestants as themselves subjectively 
voluntaristic but actually operating according to iron laws of rationalization and secularization, 
Weber attributes an ersatz normativity to entrepreneurial behavior which my analysis, borrow-
ing from Sedgwick, would undermine. At the very least, both narratives, that of ascetic 
rationalization and addictive libertinage, apply equally well to the Protestant entrepreneur, 
though the former better captures this subject’s own ideals.
 I have argued that by means of sacrificial rhetoric Weber was able to purify the behav-
ior of the Protestant entrepreneur by connecting it to the rigors of post-monastic asceticism.  
Although arguably more methodical and systematic than the behavior of other economic agents 
in different historical contexts, Weber describes the economic role of the Protestant ascetic as 
unprecedented precisely because he conjoined two seemingly opposed principles, the sacrificial 
ethos of the religious virtuoso  and the pecuniary motives of the capitalist entreprenuer. 
Although I argued that the figure of the ascetic is inherently unstable, and easily transforms 
into its moral opposite, the addict, by his canny usage of sacrificial rhetoric Weber is able to 
prevent this flip in polarity and keep his rational ascetic capitalist from becoming a libertine 
addicted to an emergent form of accumulation. Nonetheless, with a more nuanced account of 
the sacrificial nature of asceticism, which takes into account Sedgwick’s contribution (and thus 
also Foucault’s, Freud’s and Nietzsche’s), I argued that Weber’s static and artificial depiction 
of putatively “natural” needs and desires, against which he employs his sacrificial rhetoric, 
allows him to normalize the queer and even perverse behavior of these agents whose methodi-
cal behavior bespeaks equal parts reason and obsession.  
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 The Scholar’s Ascetic Renunciation of the Sacrifice of Intellect
My previous analysis read the PESC through the lens of sacrificial rhetoric and traced a 
specific path through that well-traversed terrain.  Weber’s portrait of the scholar, however, 
does not rely as exclusively as the PESC on asceticism as a form of sacrifice  that is both 
mitigated (because rationalized in relation to its magical origins) and valorized (because a 
means of rationalization itself), but instead employs an even more explicit sacrificial rhetoric, 
albeit one quarantined as merely figurative usage. The lens of sacrificial rhetoric that we have 
been elaborating will place Weber’s understanding of scholarship and the fateful consequences 
of its ethos of specialization in a direct relation to the PESC and the various historical trends 
that Weber theorized in many of his works.
In his lecture entitled Wissenschaft als Beruf, or “Science as a Vocation” (hereafter, 
“SaV”), Weber’s employment of sacrificial rhetoric stands out from that of the the two pre-
vious authors we have discussed, but in a way marked by accretion and elaboration less than 
deviation. That is, in Weber’s texts we find sacrifice addressing a condition of subjectivity, as 
with Luther, as well as Hegel’s deployment of sacrifice as instrumental in the differentiation 
and articulation of socio-historical possibilities. With Weber’s usage, however, when he depicts 
those who would abandon the stringent call of scholarship in favor of the Siren song of religion 
as making a “sacrifice of the intellect,” we must read this sacrificial rhetoric as more fully 
ambivalent than either of the two previous authors conveyed. Sacrifice’s dual registers as 
“sanctioned” in the sense of both prescribed and proscribed come into full effect with Weber. 
As I will show, despite a superficial reading according to which Weber would simply excoriate 
those individuals weak-minded enough to stay within the value-sphere of traditional religions, 
Weber in fact deploys distinctions and oppositions in such a way as to make this option fully as 
viable, and, in many ways, even more desirable, than the choice to follow the life of scholar-
ship. It is mainly because such a sacrifice is literally impossible for some individuals that Weber 
weaves tragic pathos through the essay. This reading, then, will work through the various 
dichotomies that Weber deploys so as to keep this sacrifice ambiguous, and his auditors torn 
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between the options of “sacrificing the intellect” and ascetically rejecting, or sacrificing, that 
sacrifice.
This essay is also distinctive in that here Weber employs sacrificial rhetoric even more 
explicitly than in the PESC. They are tightly linked by a common influence, since for both of 
the types depicted, the entrepreneur and the scholar, Weber credits their rationalization and 
discipline to the influence of asceticism. However, in neither essay could one speak of Weber 
as describing the afterlife of asceticism as if it were a thing of the past, for it is much more a 
case of asceticism’s reincarnation as a perennial mode of rationalization, and its migration into 
new socio-cultural spheres. This spirit, once evicted from the monastery, was set to roam 
about the world. Nonetheless, whereas Weber saw the Protestant ascetic entrepreneur as a fig-
ure from the past, the scholar, though beset by challenges, Weber views as a type with a future. 
There are also methodological differences between the two texts that readers must bear 
in mind. In the former, the reader encounters a scholar’s treatment of the theological motiva-
tions of the early Protestant entrepreneur; in the latter, a scholar’s address to his own com-
munity through the medium of a rhetoric that treads the balance between descriptive and pres-
criptive registers, even though its prescriptions entail the proscription of all speech-acts but 
description and demonstration. Furthermore, though delivered as one scholar addressing 
others, it incorporates a rich tapestry of religious voices, from the prophet to the ascetic to the 
pastor. In fact, much of the text’s rhetorical effect derives precisely from employing familiar 
forms to convey content that is explicitly at odds with what Weber’s auditors have learned to 
expect. Because this serial courting and trumping of expectations is in many ways isomorphic 
with the procedures of experiment and research, the delivery of this lecture performs an initia-
tion to the scientific vocation itself. 
 The State of Scholarship in Post-WWI Germany
The historical context that Weber faced in the time of his “SaV” lecture was fundamen-
tally different than that of just a few decades ago. When Weber was composing the PESC, the 
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greatest problem facing Germany was the lack of a middle class element to provide a ballast 
between the authoritarian residual aristocracy and an increasingly militant and organized work-
ing class. As Bismarck’s “Caesarism” gave way to less skilled politicians and more short-
sighted leaders, the duties of leadership called out for a firmer base than the judgment of a 
single individual. Where was the class who could steer the state in a contentious world? The 
PESC was written in such a way to awaken the slumbering propertied classes to their historical 
role and the contemporary duties as the bearers of cultural values that were essential to the 
health of the state. In the wake of the war, the state itself had suffered an ignominous defeat, 
and all the institutions and disciplines that had contributed to the German state’s rise now 
experienced their own doubts and crisis. If the university and knowledge in general could no 
longer count on the overarching value of the nation-state as the guarantor of its own validity, 
where could the working scientist look to justify his life and his work? Could scholarship pro-
vide its own legitimation apart from its role in producing an educated populace devoted to the 
glories of the nation?  In this crisis of science, much of these worries centered upon a renewed 
debate concerning the fact-value distinction. 
By the time Weber matured as a scholar, the structure of the German university system 
was well-established. The disciplines had attained coherence in terms of their objects of study 
and their methods of investigation. In a way analogous to the European colonial scramble for 
territory in the global south, the disciplines had parceled the natural and cultural worlds 
between them, and each stood ready to defend its claims to this territory. In Weber’s usage, as 
we will see, the fact-value distinction does not rest on the faultline between the Naturwissens-
chaften and the Geisteswissenschaften.23 Instead, all the disciplines in the university were 
forms of Wissenschaft, or organized knowledge, and all had to commit themselves to the 
laborious process of establishing and verying facts. Traffic in values, as we will see, was firmly 
exiled from Weber’s university.
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23 The locus classicus for this distinction is Dilthey (1988).
As befits the neo-Kantianism that was nearly hegemonic in Germany in the early 
twentieth century, Weber offers what is in effect analogous to Kant’s critique of reason. In this 
essay, Weber endeavours to produce a critique of scholarship that will circumscribe its domain 
of inquiry and legitimate its proper authority. In line with this analogy, the deployment of 
sacrificial rhetoric to define the scholar’s duties against competing interests simply underscores 
the sacrificial subtext of Kant’s deontological ethics.24  Moreover, it offers an overlooked con-
nection between Kant’s epistemology and his ethics, or between the first and second Critiques.  
Unlike Kant, however, Weber will manage to double the individual scholar’s duty with the the 
interest of scholars as a group, in such a way that the two levels align and scholars can present 
a united front in the charged milieu of a post-war state in crisis. That is, the scholar’s individual 
disinterestedness does not come into conflict with the pursuit of the group’s interests.  
At the outset, one point to emphasize is that, despite the connotations of the phrase 
“objective science” since Nagel as the “view from nowhere,” Weber’s Wertfrei science does 
not entail a scientific perspective analogous to an archimedean point as an essential precondi-
tion of analysis.  In fact, I suggest that it is precisely to oppose such “otherworldly” depictions 
of scholarship that Weber begins his lecture with an insitutional and comparative analysis of 
scholarly labor. Furthermore, both in regards to quotidian scholarly practice and advocacy as a 
group, far from disinterestedness, Weber seeks to awaken in his audience a sense of their 
shared interests, and thus call into being the spirit of the group, the community of scholars.
At the end of the first world war, facing the problem of an America new to but tri-
umphantly treading the world stage, Weber raised the specter of the Americanization of the 
university. This historical juncture frames Weber’s lecture, and provides the moral impetus for 
his treatment of the scholar as not only an ideal type, but also as a figure who can intervene 
against—or at least resist, even in the face of tragic failure—the inexorable tendencies that 
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24 Kant’s moral philosophy pivots on the subject committing to a duty that is legislated entirely by 
reason, without any admixture of interest, for the sine qua non of a properly moral action is to act only with the 
aim of fulfilling one’s duty (1956). For an authoritative treatment of this topic, see Wood (1970).
Weber depicts in his work. Weber calls on the community of scholars to form an arriere-garde 
group, as it were, to stem the tide of dissolution and preserve some guild-like regulations as a 
barrier to educational marketization. The starting point of this rhetorical performance, then, is 
a quest for the correct set of distinctions that will allow this group to become aware of its com-
monality and, as a result, become actively self-policing proponents of their own shared inter-
ests. What, then, is the spirit of scholarship that binds them together as a distinct social group? 
To answer this question, Weber weaves structural and individual issues together, and, to do 
this, sacrificial rhetoric provided much-needed resources. 
Weber begins with the university as an economic structure and system. In it in Weber’s 
day there were two processes of note: its role in a social system means that statistical regu-
larity, probabilities and, hence, mediocrities override individual charisma and achievement; 
moreover, the guild-like structures of the traditional university were getting replaced by 
market-driven practices, to the point that few students conceived of education as an 
apprenticeship, and instead began, like the Americans, to feel that they were purchasing knowl-
edge.  Nonetheless, unlike markets, according to Weber the university is neither demotic nor 
democratic, but an intellectual guild that holds a monopoly on an increasingly important com-
modity in the nation-state—value-free knowledge.  Thus, Weber acknowledges the university 
and the disciplines as owners—and thus accumulators—of a form of capital, who seek to stave 
off expropriation. Self-knowledge on the part of scholars, who cannot be reduced to 
bureaucratic office-holders or entrepreneurial profit-seekers, might, if won, perform just such a 
function. 
Weber’s disenchanted view of truth as a function of discourses embedded in institutions 
provides a starkly material basis to his descriptions of scholarship as a vocation. Painfully 
aware of the contradictory status of the scholar’s position, Weber limns the ways that the 
guild-like aspects of the discipline come into conflict with evaluations prevailing in the social 
milieu, especially in America. The dispossession of the scholar is like the expropriated 
peasantry who do not merit a mention in the PESC. Because the value of a product in capitalist 
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society is determined by market forces, the scholar’s work regarded as a unit of output from a 
delimitable process is bound to seem ephemeral and unimportant, especially since the march of 
science will soon make even the most provocative advance obsolete. This commodification of 
knowledge-production accords neither with a labor theory of value, which apportions value 
according to the amount of labor that went into the process of its production, nor with what 
Arendt has depicted as a pagan or aristocratic mode of valuation, which acknowledges the 
ephemeral nature of every achievement as the precondition for its possible immortality, pre-
cisely because of these sacrificial qualities.25  At this point Weber begins to employ a sacrificial 
rhetoric to inculcate in his auditors a mode of self-valorization tailor-made for the paradoxi-
cally prestigious but marginal figure of the scholar. 
 Art, Science, Fate
To frame the specific features of scholarly production, Weber turns to art for a 
provocative and telling juxtaposition. In this contrast, art has a dual role to play: it both stands 
as science’s opposite, and contributes to its development. To begin with the former, according 
to Weber, science by definition progresses, but art does not.26 As opposed to the artist, the 
scientist does not achieve distinction by fashioning a singular and perfect work, but by con-
tributing to an ongoing process. This means that the work itself is conceived as a self-
surpassing project that does not seek the singular and unsurpassable irruption, but rather a con-
tribution to an ongoing process. Weber underscores the ephemeral nature of scientific work by 
contrasting it with that of the artist:
A work of art that truly achieves “fulfillment” will never be surpassed.[...] [N]o one 
will ever be able to say that a work that achieves genuine “fulfillment” in an artistic 
  
 208 
________________________
25 The discussion of these opposed modes of valuation, and their relation to work and labor, is in 
Arendt’s The Human Condition (1959).
26 This notion hardly accords with the latter role that art plays for Weber, for there art serves as a 
means of rationalization in the progressive conceptualization and explanation of nature. That is, this non-
progressive notion of art would seem to contradict or at least complicate his depiction of renaissance art as 
providing the experimental approach to nature that would pave the way for science.
sense has been "superseded" by another work that likewise achieves “fulfillment.” 
Contrast that with the realm of science, where we all know that what we have achieved 
will be obsolete in ten, twenty, or fifty years. That is the fate, indeed, that is the very 
meaning of scientific work (“SaV”, p. 11).
Without explicitly invoking sacrifice in this passage, Weber poses as starkly as possible the 
opposition, the currency of which extends to the ancient Greeks and beyond, of a valorized 
distinction between the permanent and the transitory. While works of art partake of 
permanence in their singular achievements, the scientific work is not only contingently subject 
to the vicissitudes of the transitory world, they are only produced to be superseded by way of 
their relation to other such works both as precedents and descendants.27 I would argue here 
that the contrast is implicitly a sacrificial one, and, what is more, is explicitly rhetorical. This 
distinction is not an ontological claim, for it is virtually impossible to argue that any cultural 
product achieves a “timeless” or “universal” status, in that any possible status only holds in 
relation to the changing evaluations of a community of interpretation, which are always marked 
by complex relations of continuity and discontinuity.28 Works of art whose appreciation seems 
to persist longer than others merely have certain aspects that more persistently register as 
valued according to relatively more persistent criteria. From this observation, one derives not a 
categorical notion of universality or fulfillment, but a quantitative notion of longevity. By con-
trast, Weber invokes a putatively universal, classical criteria of art as geared towards perfec-
tion. Thus, art here serves as a rhetorically constructed counter to the scientist in order to pose 
such stark dualities as eternal-ephemeral, permanent-evanescent, and fulfilled-truncated in 
order to evoke a proper frame of mind in his audience for the impact of his sacrificial rhetoric. 
In contrast to the artist, whose work can possibly attain the status of universal 
relevance and “fulfillment”, the scientist produces work whose level of completion can only 
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27 Causabon, the scholar of religion in George Eliot’s Middlemarch, embodies the untimeliness of 
much scholarly work, since one can only study what is contingently available in one’s social milieu at a given 
point in time.
28 For early, agenda-setting works that deal with the problem of aesthetic reception, see Iser (1974, 
1978) and Fish (1980).
ever be relative, finished by the scientist but a merely contingent contribution to the field as a 
whole. By defining the work of art in terms of a teleological notion of perfection. Weber can 
depict scientific achievement as, by contrast, a species of work defined in reference to its trans-
cience.  So pivotal is this notion of scientific evanescence that Weber employs the telling 
device of underscoring its undemonstrated status, since demonstration is unnecessary when 
“we all know that what we have achieved will be obsolete” (“SaV”, p. 11).29  For this to be so, 
Weber would need to exclude all nomothetic sociological projects, as well as all paradigm-
shifting works that set the stage for generations of scholars to come. In other words, this 
rhetoric of obsoletion depends upon a wholly positivistic sense of science as the accretion and 
revision of data in the form of established facts.
As the price of this rhetorical construction, Weber offers a sociologically “thin” con-
ception of artistic production.30 One gets little sense from his description that artistic produc-
tion involves acculturation, training, the transmission of knowledge, and, eventually, strategic 
efforts to situate one’s work in relation to expectations produced by a received tradition.  
Nonetheless, in relation to science Weber informs his audience that there were two great leaps: 
the Platonic concept as a window onto being and the experimental apparatus as a means of 
unearthing the secrets of nature. Since art as a means to knowledge plays a part diachronically 
in Weber’s synchronic distinction between art and science, if these factors are taken into 
account, the categorical distinction between scientific and artistic work constructed by means 
of criteria such as permanence and transience becomes problematic, a matter of degree, per-
haps, at most. Instead, Weber invokes the artist’s ideology of artistic production, the art-for-
art’s sake of fin-de-siècle modernism. Of course, this is not merely a case of simplification for 
the sake of comparison, for the markers of permanence and transcience are essential to 
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29 The most extreme example of this viewpoint among social scientists is Stark’s SSSR Presidential 
Address, “Putting an End to Ancestor Worship” (2004). 
30 Contrast this with Bourdieu’s analysis of the artistic “field” of production, a viewpoint which more 
closely parallels Weber’s treatment of the scientist (1995). 
Weber’s sacrificial account of scientific labor. The slide from “fateful” to “sacrificial” takes 
place precisely as a result of the weak sociological account of art, for, unlike art, whose 
ideologically-projected possibility implies immortality, science, like all human endeavours, 
entails impermanence, which relates the pathos of personal finitude to that of one’s work. 
After defining scientific work in its specificity as a labor of transient and relative value, 
Weber takes a further step to make this condition not merely contingent, but essential to the 
scientific ethos. He literally gives voice to the scientific work in a way that underscores its 
alienation in relation to the “will to permanence” that Weber imputes to the scientist: “Every 
scientific ‘fulfillment’ gives birth to new ‘questions’ and cries out to be surpassed and rendered 
obsolete [jede wissenschaftliche “Erfüllung” bedeutet neue “Fragen” und will “überboten” 
werden und veralten]. Everyone who wishes to serve science has to resign himself to this” 
(“SaV”, p. 11; p. 85, emphasis added).  The resignation here requires one to give up the lust 
for permanence, what Arendt spoke of as the pagan thirst for this-worldly immortality. This 
raises a question to hold in reserve as we proceed through the lecture: does this sense of resig-
nation31 or asceticism imply a more Christian sense of self-sacrifice than Weber’s professed 
“polytheism” might lead one to suppose? By invoking this desire for immortality as precisely 
what the scientist must overcome, Weber moves very close to a Nietzschean contrast between 
a Greek (or, at least, pre-Socratic) aesthetic construed as the affirmation and “metaphysical” 
overcoming of individual finitude (1967), and the Christian ascetic attitude that negates indi-
vidual interest in the pursuit of a ratified form of subjectivity, the one true faith.
This Christian sense of sacrifice gets underscored by Weber’s use of a weighty oppo-
sition, that between fate and goal. Such language would surely resonate with an audience who 
just lived through World War I. Towards the end of the passages contrasting art and science, 
Weber insists that “to be superseded scientifically is not simply our fate but our goal. We can-
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31 In her biography of her husband, Marianne Weber quotes a student’s moving account of Max’s 
sense of scholarship as cross-bearing (1975, p. 663).
not work without living in hope that others will advance beyond us” (“SaV”, p. S 11). This 
transition from fate to goal imputes a sense of ownership to the scholar, with the the effect that 
Weber attributes an immortality of sorts to the process of scholarly production writ large, even 
if the individual scholar’s work gets swallowed in anonymity.  In this contrast—between fate 
and goal, between the blind force of pagan destiny and the providential future in an andro-
centric cosmos—one can read an isomorphic form of Weber’s spirit/cage rhetoric, and, indeed, 
the basis of his sociology. That is, for Weber an essential movement takes place when the sub-
ject registers the objective structure of the world and incorporates these facts into the value-
spheres that determine the desires and motivations of that subject. By sifting through history 
and its transformations in search of the world-historical figures whose motivational structures 
best encapsulated the trends dominating their day, Weber makes the subjective transformation 
of fate into goal32 the most important category of objective facts both for the entrepreneur and 
the scholar, and for a sociology that would reserve a place for human initiative in the face of 
overdetermining social structures. 
Among the facts defining this perspective that we must address is that of the scientist’s 
fate as defined by Weber. If Weber’s depiction of art forms a telling contrast with the scholar, 
and if science from the point of view of the individual producer is evanescent and replete with 
signs of alienation, on what model of progress does this depiction depend? It must be one 
where all inversions of Weltanschauungen are complete, all possible laws discovered, with no 
second Copernicus on the horizon and no more prophets to call for reform.  Indeed, this is 
isomorphic with the end of the age of revelation which Calvin and others decreed in order to 
put an end to the radical flare-ups of the Protestant Reformation.  Thus, a positivistic sense of 
science confronts and confirms a canonical sense of “real” religion, both of which are condi-
tions for the mediation of distinct spheres of fact and value upon which so much of Weber’s 
epistemology and, dare one say, cosmology, depends. That is, Weber’s notion of science and 
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32 This closely resembles Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati, but with much less exuberance.
religion are both intrinsic to the fatefulness that Weber describes.
 Weber’s Trajectory of Scientific Development
Weber lived in fateful times, and his audience for this lecture likely had a keen thirst for 
pronouncements concerning the contemporary world and its future. Of the many works assess-
ing Western civilization and its fate, Spengler was only the most famous. Indeed Nietzsche’s 
pronouncements regarding the fate of the West was one of the key components of his surging 
popularity. Yet whether or not this hunger for fateful pronouncements was prevalent in his 
audience, it is a key organizing conceit of his lecture that such a thirst was prevalent in the uni-
versities of the day. Further, since education was quickly losing its guild-like structures and re-
organizing around market mechanisms,  Weber saw a great many of his peers who were all too 
willing to don the mantle of the prophet and provide the supply to meet this demand.33 
In many ways, then, Weber’s assessment of the current state of scholarship and society 
comes very close to meeting this demand as well.  One factor that makes his ruminations on 
the Zeitgeist different from those of his rhetorically constructed others is that he addresses 
these proclamations as problematic because of the Zeitgeist. That is, Weber problematizes the 
conjunction of the prophecy-supplying professors and their student clientele, and yet in many 
ways his discourse meets this problem on the same terrain. Weber’s correlation between the 
incremental and linear progress of science and the end of revelation hinges upon his hypothesis 
that he and his audience were witness to the acceleration of a process that was coming to 
define the world ever more decisively:
Thus the growing process of intellectualization and rationalization does not imply a 
growing understanding of the conditions under which we live. It means something quite 
different. It is the knowledge or the conviction that if only we wished to understand 
them we could do so at any time. It means that in principle, then, we are not ruled by 
mysterious, unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle control 
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33 Weber’s language changes to describe this type, but two og his common labels are 
Kathederprophetien (“lectern prophets”) and Professorenprophetien (“professor prophets”). Both capture the 
problematic juxtapositions of opposed modes of authority that such figures deploy. Generally,  I will speak of 
“prophet-scholars” to underscore with the hyphenation the same kind of hybridity.
everything by means of calculation.That in turn means the disenchantment of the world 
(“SaV”, p. 13).
In posing the Entzauberung-hypothesis, Weber necessarily transitions from the historian to the 
sociologist, which in his view involved the pursuit of nomological or nomothetic claims, a law 
that persists and achieves a limited, context-sensitive generality. That is, this hypothesis is not 
only a more or less adequate description of the past as seen from the vantagepoint of the his-
torian. Instead, it is a logico-inductive hypothesis with which Weber not only intended to 
account for history until that time, but also to predict, probabilistically, the future, and thus 
rival the prophet-scholars.34 These epochal hypotheses connect with others that, together, map 
out a fractured and fragmented world. As we will see, even his trajectory of the rise of science 
is built upon the necessity of these fractures. 
The similarities between the predictive-hypothesizing scientist and the prophet-scholar 
were not lost on Weber, but he explicitly cannot acknowledge them for Weber lambastes the 
value-promoting professors as the simulacra of religious prophets.35 Though he meets them on 
their ground, Weber cannot underscore their similarity at risk of becoming undifferentiated—or 
at best rival siblings—in the eyes of his audience. This tension runs throughout the lecture, 
since to confront one’s opponent is simultaneously to approach them and court the risk of 
entanglement and ultimate indistinguishability. 
Nonetheless, though Weber resembles his scholar-prophet opponent when he  assesses 
the age, it is precisely his theory of science, which has incorporated Hume’s critique of the 
notion of causal law, that makes his pronouncements less prophetic than those he opposes. But 
the fact that he can speak of sociological laws at all raises another risk: the very same 
nomothetic mode that allows him to speak of the fundamental facts of the present and future 
ages, also undermines the pathos of his tragic depiction of science as an anti-art beset and 
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34 For an excellent account of Weber’s methodology, see Ringer (1997) and Kalberg (1994).
35 One could make the case that these are indeed the simulacra, and the wertfrei scientist is the true 
copy, but which would be the original, the priest, or the prophet? 
defined by its ephemerality. For there is a permanence of achievement possible, even if not as a 
“final word.” If science is not defined by its humble evanescence, the sacrificial framework of 
this prophet of the post-prophetic trembles.
To return to the decisive steps that Weber mentions in the history of science, Weber 
cites the Platonic concept as a window onto being and the Renaissance development of experi-
mentation in art and science. In the experiment there is an implied dialectic here between the 
comparison and segregation of phenomena into concepts coupled with the attention to particu-
lars endowed with the capacity to challenge and re-order the conceptual framework. If we 
typify these two elements as taxonomy and technology,36 the problem with the humanities that 
Weber surely understood is that they are almost wholly dependent upon the taxonomic opera-
tions of science, which is why he attributed such a prominent role to the ideal-type as a com-
ponent of a comparative project conceived under the rubric of experimentation. 
Because of this dependence on taxonomies, scholars in the humanities are particularly 
susceptible to the desire for the “set of all sets” and other utopian projects, such as disovering 
the essence of literature or other arts, art as the essential expression of humanity, etc.  Unlike 
Plato, for Weber the conjunction of the good, the beautiful and the true in the realm of the 
Ideas or Forms would be a monistic fastasy where true sacrifice is not only unnecessary, it is 
impossible, for if the world is monistic, nothing is lost, and thus truly sacrificed, if one gains 
standing in light of the one true God,37 Weber not only separates the true, the good and the 
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36 While these terms denote two discrete phenomena within science of such specificity that they cannot 
account for the whole of science, if defined largely enough, given Weber’s choice of terms, they will suffice. 
Taxonomy, as the production of systematic tables of classification that map out a delimited sphere of 
particulars, species or exempla in a coherent way, here stands metonymically for all the practices that would 
bring order to the plethora of particulars. Technology, by contrast, must incorporate experimentation and 
observation since both more abstract practices have decisively contributed to, and progressed through 
developments in technology. The impact on human life is felt most clearly in reference to technology, yet the 
impact of taxa and types on Weltanschauungen is difficult to overestimate. 
37 On this topic too Weber takes his distance from Plato. This transition and bridge between a 
terrestrial erotics and transcendent truth had great currency in Christian neoplatonism through the ages, but it 
is a framework that Weber opposes with his sacrificial rhetoric. This is not to say that Christian neoplatonism 
does not court its own mode of sacrificial rhetoric, one in which the costs of love in this world becomes a 
beautiful, he sets them at odds with one another. Concepts are not subsumed into a monistic 
ideality, but each remains a candidate for a competing and irreducible sphere of values.38 
 Polytheism Versus Systematic Religious Ethics
Faced with this audience of scholars, still reeling from the chaos and disappointment of 
the war, Weber explicitly addresses their fears, and science’s inability to assuage them. To 
introduce the fact-value distinction, which plays such a central role in the production of 
Weber’s polytheistic world and in scientific practice, Weber clarifies the proper service that the 
scientist can render to the political realm, specifically, and society in general.  To frame the 
utter incapacity of science to decide issues of value, Weber raises the specter of nationalism, an 
especially charged topic in the aftermath of the war. He states:  
I do not know how you would go about deciding “scientifically” between the value of 
French and German culture. Here, too, conflict rages between different gods and it will 
go on for all time. It is as it was in antiquity before the world had been divested of the 
magic of its gods and demons, only in a different sense. Just as the Greek would bring a 
sacrifice at one time to Aphrodite and at another to Apollo, and above all, to the gods 
of his own city, people do likewise today. Only now the gods have been deprived of the 
magical and mythical, but inwardly true qualities that gave them such vivid immediacy. 
These gods and their struggles are ruled over by fate, and certainly not by “science” 
(“SaV”, p. 23).
If the role of the gods is to serve as projections and guarantors of a given society’s self-
conception, the passage is remarkable for the continuity that persists on this level despite the 
centuries of disenchantment that separate Athens and Sparta from the warring nations of 
Europe.  That is, despite the disenchantment of the world, nothing has changed regarding the 
inevitability of international struggle or the necessity of sacrificing to a national deity. If science 
cannot adjudicate the competing claims of exclusive nationalism, or extol cosmopolitanism or 
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necessary precondition of achieving love of the transcendent. In fact, Kierkegaard notes that is is the case in 
regards to Abraham’s offering of Isaac (1983).
38 This is relevant to the stakes in his argument against the “vulgar marxists” of his day, as well as the 
“economic ethicists,” for if all is reducible to economics, there is no need for the disciplines, specialization, and 
the university as a whole. 
the idea of a “greater Europe,” might it help to establish the truth of other value-spheres?  
Unfortunately, Weber explicitly proscribes the scientific analysis of the truth of values, 
although he does open science to the analysis of their validity.39
To illustrate further the fact-value distinction, Weber makes the rhetorical choice of 
citing perhaps the most consequential rhetorical event in the history of Christendom, the 
“Sermon on the Mount.” In reference to this Weber illustrates the firewall that separates those 
who investigate and prove facts and those who hold or espouse values: 
What man will take it upon himself to provide a “scientific refutation” of the morality 
of the Sermon on the Mount, and in particular its dictum “Resist not him that is evil” or 
the metaphor of turning the other cheek? And yet it is clear that, regarded from a 
worldly  point of view, what is being preached here is an ethics of ignoble conduct. We 
must choose between the religious dignity that this ethics confers and the human code 
of honor [Manneswürde] that preaches something altogether different, namely, “Resist 
evil, otherwise you will bear some of the responsibility for its victory” (“SaV”, p. 23).
In this passage Weber presents the religious ethics of Christianity in opposition to a “worldly” 
or “human code of honor.” To keep the dualisms isomorphic, Weber describes the religious 
ethic as, not “non-noble” or offering an alternative vision of human accomplishment, but as a 
contrary and “ignoble” from the worldly perspective.  Weber thus builds upon a contrast which 
ignores the very particularity of religio-cultural complexes that he explores in his comparative 
work, in favor of  a dualistic portrait apparently derived from an intra-religious opposition of 
“this-worldly” and “other-worldly” phenomena.  For his purposes here, true religion is truly 
otherworldly, and not one other variant of a Manneswürde that was developed to serve partic-
ular interest groups and subjugate others. As we will see, when Weber underplays the 
quotidian nature of intra-religious struggle, he keeps the prophet-scholar clearly outside the 
religious realm, instead of depicting him as the rival sibling of the priest who would engage the 
latter in hopes of redefining the very notion of religion. With Weber’s reduction of religion to 
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39 Science stands as means-testing, but never ends-positing. This restriction avoids but does not 
overcome the crisis of instrumental reason itself, and what Nietzsche saw as the instability of the relation 
between ends and means, indeed, their reversibility one into the other.
individual otherworldliness,40 the scholar can neither approach nor take an indifferent distance 
from religion, but must draw away with regret, longing, or hostility.
Weber appears to speak less as a scholar of religion than as a member of a community 
speaking to an audience of his own people, a group that is predominantly either explicitly 
Christian or Christian acculturated. This leveling of all social ethics in contrast to the other-
worldly ethics of Christianity reveals how closely Weber’s rhetoric hews to the Christian world 
view general among his audience, a dualism according to which opposed principles must either 
be of God or the Devil:
According to his point of view, each individual will think of one [ethic] as the devil and 
the other as God, and he has to decide which one is the devil and which the God for 
him. And the same thing holds good for all aspects of life. The awe-inspiring 
rationalism of a systematic ethical conduct of life that flows from every religious 
prophecy dethroned this polytheism in favor of the “One thing that is needful.” Then, 
when confronted by the realities of outer and inner life, it found itself forced into the 
compromises and accommodations that we are all familiar with from the history of 
Christianity (“SaV”, p. 23).
Between the imperative of individual choice, and a history of degradation and compromise, 
Weber protects the integrity of the prophetic voice. Yet with all the decisive framing of options 
in this passage, there is an ambiguity to address. Is “this polytheism” which prophecy 
dethroned simply the ad-hoc nature of deciding for oneself, or is it the polytheistic world itelf? 
Because Weber insists on multiple objects of individual devotion, we must prefer the former 
reading.41  While the world might have become polytheistic again with the sharpening of the 
fact/value distinction, the prophetic principle that depends on the necessity of single-minded 
devotion remains as the gold-standard of individual attainment.  On this matter, then, a subtle 
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40 Perhaps the Lutheran “priesthood of all believers” vision of religion determines this opposition, in 
that it allows Weber to excise the role of priestly will to power from “true” religion concerned only with the 
individual’s relationship to ultimate—and ultimately otherworldly—ends.  If so, this would be quite effective as 
a rhetorical move, given his audience, though for the scholar of religion it is a dubious simplification to make 
religious struggle important only between religion and other religions, or irreligion, and ignore the fact that the 
site of religion in and of itself is always a contested site of struggle as well. 
41 The following portion of my arguments draws from multiple sources, but in particular from 
Kalberg’s essay entitled “Weber and Rationalization in Religion.” There he argues that, for Weber, a dualistic 
world view is an essential general precondition for rational religious action (1990, p. 81). 
but essential point regarding the conditions of sacrifice need clarification.  Owen and Strong 
suggest that Weber depicts a pluralistic world where sacrifice is not only possible, but neces-
sary.  It is only in the face of many plausibly valid recipients of an individual’s sacrifice that one 
can truly speak of sacrifice. Against this view, however, I would suggest that, while the world 
might be pluralistic or “polytheistic” in the sense that there are many possible value-spheres to 
inhabit and principles to uphold, according to Weber no individual can or should be 
polytheistic if one would be an individual in the robust sense that Weber implies.42 Hence, 
Weber himself cannot be said to be polytheistic, for there is only one god or value for the “us” 
that Weber constructs in the course of his lecture.  For Weber’s fateful, sacrificial rhetoric, 
only a monotheistic temperament will suffice. Now, after the death of God, with the return of a 
polytheistic world (produced, ironically, by the fact-value distinction as handed down by that 
arch-Protestant, Kant) coupled with the criteria of ascetic consistency– only now is true 
sacrifice possible. With the soul of the scholar split between intellectual cleanliness (more than 
conscientiousness, this term connotes the prohibitions of hygiene that stimulated the early 
ascetics, together with the will to truth) and the religious commitments of one's native com-
munity, only now is the scholar’s true sacrifice—the sacrifice to truth of any value-sphere that 
requires the sacrifice of truth—both possible and necessary.
Here, then, Weber rejects as “polytheism” a kind of situational ethics that could shift, 
depending upon circumstance and occasion, between the ethos prescribed by an otherworldly 
religious prophecy and the noble ethos of “human” honor.  Weber narrates in the course of the 
paragraph the irruption of a prophetic utterance and its ethical consequences, its agonistic 
encounter with and eventual displacement of a merely human ethos, and the subsequent fall 
back into polytheistic compromise that ensued with the institutionalization of the Christian 
  
 219 
________________________
42 The relations between received notions of Bildung and Weber’s notion of individuation and 
Persönlichkeit are exceedingly complex. Suffice it to say, Weber opposed the sense that scholars needed to 
shoulder the burden of forming “individuals” through a broad program of Bildung. Indeed, this essay is 
expressly framed against the idea that scholarship is capable of forming a total response to the needs of the 
developing individual. On this topic, see Mommsen (1987) and Ferrarotti (1987).
church. This narrative is nearly identical in trajectory to that told by Protestant reformers such 
as Luther and Calvin, as well as scholarly theologians such as Troeltsch (1971, 1977, 1986).  
What is revealing here is that the narrative is a Christian one, but Weber treats the transition 
from the “Sermon on the Mount” to the imperial Church as an instance of a larger pattern by 
an act of sociological redescription. From Christian versus pagan Weber turns to speak of 
“religious prophecy” versus “the human code of honor,” as if the two were only ever in oppo-
sition and not dialectically related, since the prophet’s voice would not carry far if both the 
prophet and the message were not recognized as consonant articulations of prevailing notions 
of honor and prestige. That is, though the “awe-inspiring rationalism of a systematic ethical 
conduct of life” that emerges from the religious, other-worldly prophecy does fall back into the 
merely human by means of “compromises and accomodations,” there is little sense here that 
the religious prophecy itself emerged as an articulation of the resources provided by this very 
same human code of honor.  In extrapolating away from the historical transition from Christ to 
Christendom in such a way that mimics a disenchanting, social-scientific explanation, all the 
while preserving the very claims to otherworldliness and absolute origination that Christianity 
claims for itself, Weber marks out a space where invocations of sacrifice echo in both scientific 
and religious registers. Though redolent with a universalistic image of pre-institutional Chris-
tianity, a longtime image for those who advocate Christian ecumenism, Weber uses this to dis-
miss the prophet-scholars as agents of compromise and accomodation. 
This is especially powerful in the way that it depicts the prophet-scholars as serving 
two masters, reason in the university and faith in the church. In opposing the polytheistic situa-
tional ethic of one who might either resist evil or not, depending, not upon a prior devotional 
decision, but upon prevailing circumstances, the rationalism that here inspires awe is essentially 
monotheistic in nature. Consistency in the face of changing circumstances, devotion to system-
aticity instead of disparate tactics or strategies: these are taken for granted as the absolute 
norms to which the rational subject should submit, and not only in the realm of the laboratory 
or within the confines of the constructed experiment, but in the very subjection to the calling of 
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science , and in the conduct of life in its entirety. To drive the point home, and, in a sense, 
close the circle that moves from religious history to sociological redescription to moral inquiry 
and back to religion, Weber situates the moral principle that he develops in relation to Chris-
tianity, for consistency is the norm that governs one’s choice of ethical perspective, or, figura-
tively, of which god to worship.  Weber thus re-enacts the early Christian encounter with 
pagan religions and, in taking not the Church and its compromises and accomodations but the 
prime prophetic instance of Jesus’s teaching as the gold standard, Weber breaks with the 
desultory moralism that allows a person to utilize a multiplicity of means and ends in blending 
prophecy, scholarship, and demagoguery.
 The Moralization of Logical Consistency
Although Weber’s temperament and his ethical position can be described as 
monotheistic, it is not a monistic world that he describes.  To respond to the issues prevalent in 
the society of his day, such as the rise of intransigent political factions, ambivalent attitudes 
towards the war, and the unstable relations between democracy and authority, Weber keeps his 
discourse situated at the point where polytheism and monotheism were both plausible options 
for the individual, which was also, of course, the time when martyrdom, and its sacrificial inter-
pretation, was also a real danger that one had to face.  Against this, Weber turns to 
the last contribution that science can make in the service of clarity, and at the same time 
we reach its limits. We can and should tell you that the meaning of this or that practical 
stance can be inferred consistently, and hence also honestly, from this or that ultimate 
fundamental ideological position.  It may be deducible from one position, or from a 
number—but there are other quite specific philosophies from which it cannot be 
inferred (“SaV”, p. 26).
“Meaning” in Weber’s italicized sense he treats as a function of consistency. Consistency and 
honesty (the latter of which Weber treats as the logical consequence of the former) form the 
basis for science’s contribution to society.  The scientist, then, serves as the guarantor of the 
various truth claims in circulation both inside and outside the university.  It is not by chance 
that Weber depicts this as a species of divine devotion, nor that it occurs here quarantined 
explicitly under the rubric of figural language:
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To put it metaphorically [emphasis added], if you choose this particular standpoint, 
you will be serving this particular god and will give offense to every other god. For you 
will necessarily arrive at such-and-such ultimate, internally meaningful conclusions if 
you remain true to yourselves. We may assert this at least in principle. The discipline of 
philosophy and the discussion of what are ultimately the philosophical bases of the indi-
vidual disciplines all attempt to achieve this. If we understand the matter correctly 
(something that must be assumed here) we can compel a person, or at least help him, to 
render an account of the ultimate meaning of his own actions (“SaV”, p. 26).
Weber here emphasizes sacrifice’s theological context, but this could also serve as a meta-
phorical explanation of the most explicitly economic concept, opportunity cost. Weber gives 
science the same role in the society that Hegel assigned to philosophy in the university, namely, 
to adjudicate between truth-claims and resolve the conflicts that inevitably follow from both 
specialization and the division of the world of knowledge into distinct disciplines.  The scientist 
must therefore expose the fault lines between and within value spheres in order to preserve the 
charged, polytheistic form of the world, and thus the possibility of sacrifice. Sacrifice here 
serves as the figure for the intractable gap between fact and value, conduct and concept. 
Indeed, it is along the pathway canalized by Luther’s rhetoricalization of sacrifice, and the sub-
sequent hypertrophy of sacrifice’s interior and private as opposed to its external and public 
aspects, that Weber can connect devotion to a god with a rational account of one’s actions and 
motivations, which would be the sanctioned, public form that this private phenomenon of 
sacrifice would take.
From this scenario, a paradox ensues: science helps preserve polytheism (the multi-
plicity of valid perspectives and value-spheres) even as it serves the monotheistic principle of 
consistency. As Weber puts it, “in nonfigurative language, life is about the incompatibility of 
ultimate possible attitudes and hence the inability ever to resolve the conflicts between them. 
Hence the necessity of deciding between them” (p. 27).43  The scientist can assess the system-
aticity and coherence of value-spheres, each with a view toward their consistency.  Yet the 
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43 I find in this emphatic embrace of the intractability of choice many points that echo Schmitt’s 
“decisionism” (1985), a connection that Mommsen acknowledges as well (1974, p. 7). This is not to say, of 
course, that this reveals some latent fascist element in Weber’s politics, but it could suggest a shared diagnosis 
of political ills that were then besetting Germany.
ultimate god which one would serve resides at the level of logico-conceptual analysis, and for 
Weber these gods are represented more by Aristotle and Kant than by Plato and Hegel. Indeed, 
the very possibility that the so-called laws of identity and non-contradiction might themselves 
be culturally relative Weber excludes without so much as an argument.  However, since Hegel, 
the Aristotelian principles of identity and non-contradiction have at least been called into ques-
tion, and according to the strongest interpretation have been reduced to one value sphere—or 
view of philosophy—among others, and can no longer serve as the universal criteria by which 
propositions and principles might be judged. By denying the dynamism and transformation of 
categories in favor of a static, taxonomic model of conceptual structures, Weber is able to blur 
the boundaries between the natural and social sciences, as well as between the sciences and the 
humanities. The net effect of this is to give the scientist the opportunity to assess the validity of 
disparate value spheres, either confirm their coherence or illuminate their inconsistencies, and, 
finally define the precise type of sacrifice they would require.
The greatest difference between Hegel’s coronation of philosophy as the queen of the 
disciplines and Weber’s depiction of the scholar’s vocation is that, whereas Hegel’s sense of 
philosophy is clearly triumphant, Weber deploys a sense of humility in regards to the treatment 
of value spheres, a humility that simultaneously reserves the right to assess the validity of each 
value position.  It is precisely in approaching the ultimate religious significance of his position 
that Weber most closely courts paradox:
the inner needs of a human being with the “music” of religion in his veins will never be 
served if the fundamental fact that his fate is to live in an age alien to God and bereft of 
prophets is hidden from him and others by surrogates in the shape of all these profes-
sorial prophets [Kathederprophetien]. The integrity of his religious sensibility must 
surely rise up in rebellion against this (“SaV”, p. 27; p. 106).
Weber here invokes a distinction between true and false religions.  Because the age of revela-
tion and true prophecy is over, Weber disavows his own prophetic undertones when he speaks 
of the future fate of scholarship and society. That is, Weber offers a prophetic denunciation of 
false prophets, the scholar whose prophetic aspirations degrade into demagoguery.  The lec-
ture thus achieves an isolation of the enemy, the professor-prophets, which is not an ideal-type, 
  
 223 
but the sophist in a new form and in a new institutional setting. For Weber, the distinction is 
not, as with Luther, a doctrinal difference. Instead, as with Weber’s definition of the state as 
the monopolization of violence within a circumscribed territory, Weber’s indignation here 
derives from a concern with the regulation of social space, and reason’s legitimate monopoly 
of rhetorical force in the classroom.
What is most important here, however, is to note that, according to Weber's 
hypothesis, the time for prophets and religious revival is over. Furthermore, though apparently 
a “scientific” claim, Weber will not treat this as evanescent and soon to be superseded, but as 
the final word regarding an epochal, world-historical trend. Because this is “an age alien to 
God and bereft of prophets,” any professors or other prophesying surrogates who muddy this 
clear if tragic vision of the contemporary and future situation are not only sinning against reli-
gion, they are violating the calling of the scientific scholar. 
To summarize, Weber verifies his distinction between true and false religions by assert-
ing unequivocally that the epoch of prophecy is over. In addition to the epochal rejection of 
contemporary prophecies, Weber offers a sociological explanation, to the effect that a true 
prophet is only such to the extent that she is recognized as such by a genuine community,44 for 
he claims that “academic prophecies can only ever produce fanatical sects, but never a genuine 
community” (“SaV”, p. 30).45 Weber apparently makes the validity of the prophet hinge upon 
the validity of the community from which he emerges or that coalesces around him. 
The fundamental problem that Weber’s position raises is that it begins a regress of 
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44 This recourse to communal recognition marks a significant continuity between Weber and Hegel, 
but one distinction is that Hegel invokes a functional difference while Weber invokes an epistemological one. 
That is, while Hegel in the Phenomenology assesses the validity of different value-spheres or instances of 
Sittlichkeit in reference to the community’s ability to resolve conflict and avoid collapse, he typically avoids the 
binary distinction between true and false or authentic and inauthentic in favor of a more verifiable distinction 
between degrees of functionality, whether the societies resources for negotiating tensions and contradictions are 
workable or not.
45 Although Weber’s treatment of the charismatic figure in Economy and Society often seems to  
separate the charismatic figure from the group, Weber also speaks of charismatic education, so there are many 
transactions between individual and group to track, a point Tyson has made on several occasions.
authentification from one social phenomenon towards another, for one would also need to 
know what makes a community genuine. The classroom as a contingent gathering of merit is 
only different in degree from the voluntary, self-selecting organizations that Durkheim and 
Weber both saw as essential to ameliorating the stark dichotomies of society and individual. 
But how is one to distinguish the inauthenic “fanatical” from legitimate and genuine?  Does this 
allow one to grant any legitimacy to new religious movements?  Might it be that this is a 
polemical construction that Weber keeps distinct from his sociology of religion, with the effect 
that its polemical use-value is to describe as “fanatical” the student-disciples that the prophet-
professors gather? That is, what would authenticate the community itself, if the quality of the 
prophecy that it recognizes as such cannot serve as a criterion?  Weber does not here say, 
except insofar as he derives from the epistemological distinction between true and false religion 
a value-distinction between “fanatical” and “genuine” communities, not true or false dogma. In 
this way, Weber seems to make a judgment concerning the very fabric of the community itself. 
 Faith, Commodities, and Iconoclastic Rhetoric
To delineate further the distinction between religion and science, Weber turns to theol-
ogy as that aspect of religion which best represents the rationalizing element at work within the 
irrational sphere of religion.  Despite its rationalizing function, Weber rejects  theology’s 
scientific pretensions by distinguishing between different modes of transmitting and possessing 
knowledge: 
Note that for theology these assumptions lie outside the realm of “science.” They are 
not “knowledge” in the sense ordinarily understood, but a form of “having.” Whoever 
does not “have” them—faith or the other requisites of holiness—will not be able to 
obtain them with the help of theology, let alone any other branch of science. On the 
contrary, in every “positive” theology46 the believer reaches the point where St. 
August-ine's assertion holds good: “Credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est.” The 
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46 “Positive” is here in the vernacular sense of affirmative or optimistic, but in the technical sense that 
Hegel also employs, as non-rational, authoritative, and imposed 
talent for this virtuoso achievement47 of “sacrificing the intellect” is a crucial character-
istic of men with positive religion48.[...] [T]he tension between the value spheres of 
“science” and religious salvation cannot be overcome.  Properly speaking, it is only the 
disciple who makes a sacrifice of the intellect to the prophet, and the believer to the 
church (“SaV”, p. 29-30).
It is thus a first principle for Weber that tensions between religion and science are unresolvable. 
But first principles and axioms of all kinds serve as initial “articles of faith” in any logical 
demonstration or argument. To avoid having the axiomatic religion/science opposition become 
a mere article of faith, Weber has to make the means of arriving at such first principles criterial. 
Theology might formulate religious experience into logical concepts, and rationally systematize 
religious doctrine, but the starting point, religion in its primitive form, involves some form of 
revelation, and thus reduces to a mode of faith that one either has or does not. Positive reli-
gion, in the sense of authoritatively posited, forms the base and precondition of every theology, 
and no theology can exist without the presuppositions provided by the imposition of positive 
religion.  Thus, while science involves a complex process of hypothesizing, experimenting, 
negating and validating, religion and its primary means of knowledge production, sacrifice, 
both reduce to a simple form of human expropriation and divine appropriation. In this way, 
Weber employs a quasi-Lutheran notion of sacrifice, where sacrifice as a proper act of devo-
tion does not involve work but a sharp rejection of human forms of achievement, the highest of 
which, to Weber, was reason and science.  
In another, more familiar turn, Weber converts sacrifice into a negationist term meant 
to decry the fetishization of faith and its prophetic vehicles. Because positive religion and 
sacrifice belong to the category of having, they are especially vulnerable to critiques that depict 
them as commodities.  The irony here is that, though this notion of sacrifice revolves around 
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47 I would suggest that this ascription of virtuosity to the sacrifice of intellect illuminates a great deal 
of the overall strategy of Weber’s rhetoric here.  This “virtuoso act” might be one that the constructed “we” can 
recognize and even appreciate, but must at the same time reject outright as an indefensible act. Nonetheless, it 
is its very indefensibility that can be applauded and honored.
48 Note that Weber puts in quotation marks what is not in the quotation: there is a direct translation of 
faith into sacrifice here that closes the circle with Luther.
entirely interior phenomena, this invisibility provides a tabula rasa for a multitude of illustra-
tions and depictions. Weber’s critique of contemporary sacrificial agents, who quite literally 
know not what they do, employs a scathing image of shoppers for antiques who seek to “fur-
nish” their barren souls: 
many modern intellectuals experience the need to furnish their souls, as it were, with 
antique objects that have been guaranteed genuine. They then recollect that religion 
once belonged among these antiques. It is something they do not happen to possess, 
but by way of a substitute they are ready to play at decorating a private chapel with pic-
tures of the saints that they have picked up in all sorts of places, or to create a sur-
rogate by collecting experiences of all kinds that they endow with the dignity of a 
mystical sanctity—and which they then hawk around the book markets. This is simply 
fraud or self-deception (“SaV”, p. 30).
The prophetic proclamation regarding the end of prophecies here adopts another mode of 
expression.  Employing a theme that has had currency since Plato at least, to impugn one’s 
opponents it is enough to mention their mercenary motives. In his Sociology of Religion, 
Weber noted that the prophet, unlike the priest or the magician, performs his calling without 
remuneration.49  The object of Weber’s critique, “modern intellectuals,” can include both the 
professorial prophets and their disciples, and the deflating language of a marketplace for 
spiritual goods has lost none of its potency since Luther’s day—or indeed, since Socrates’. As 
with Plato’s depiction of the sophists, one will always win by pitting the mercenary against one 
who, like Socrates, was willing to sacrifice for the truth.  
This imagery of markets and old trinkets constitutes an iconoclastic rhetoric that 
echoes Hegel, as well, in aiming not at the production of images, but at the realm of doctrines. 
This rhetoric has the exact effect of defining what it means to be a scholar: to refuse to confine 
oneself to palatable ideas, and to exile oneself from the primary value-sphere. But various his-
torical religions have adopted the tenets or iconography of previous traditions, precisely 
because of the authority that derives from their antiquity. The correlation between antiquity 
and authority was particularly strong in the Hellenic world, with the effect that Christianity’s 
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49 The status of the magician is defined both in relation to a world whose forces are open to influence 
or manipulation, and in relation to other individuals who can employ him for their purposes. 
incorporation of the Hebrew Bible into its canon constitutes a process not dissimilar to the one 
that Weber depicts in the passage above. What Weber wants to legislate, however, is that such 
sifting through the relics of past faiths is now no longer legitimate.  The normative effect of 
this language is that the very possibility of new religious movements becomes impossible, so 
that religious creativity in the contemporary world could only take the form of sect-formation 
in relation to received religious traditions. The true prophet’s voice cannot call for others to 
follow along paths toward revelations leading to new religions, for the age of such new begin-
nings is over.
Like the familiar charge of mercenary motives, the accusation of a lack of integrity also 
conjures the spectral figure of the sophist, he who speaks well but without sincerity, or, in 
Weber’s term, “seriousness”:
To anyone who is unable to endure the fate of the age like a man we must say that he 
should return to the welcoming and merciful embrace of the old churches—simply, 
silently, and without any of the usual public bluster of the renegade. They will surely 
not make it hard for him.50 In the process, he will inevitably be forced to make a 
“sacrifice of the intellect” [“Opfer des Intellektes” zu bringen] one way or the other. 
We shall not bear him a grudge if he can really do it. For such a sacrifice of the intellect 
in favor of an unconditional religious commitment is one thing (“SaV”, p. 31; p. 110).
There is a fascinating distinction at work here. By implying that one might make a “false” 
sacrifice of the intellect, whereas some can “really do it,” what is Weber stating about his 
opponents?  In addition to a familiar charge of insincerity made against the sophist and the 
false prophet, Weber could here invoke a narrative about the nature of knowledge the connota-
tions of which would surely not be lost on his audience. Once the intellectual has bitten the 
apple, there is no going back, and any pretensions towards faith and religiosity only reveals the 
demagogue dressed in the robes of the priest.
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50 Unless one can be like a man, one must sacrifice one’s intellect. The gendered reference to those 
who would avoid equivocation in contrast to those who inhabit a liminal position between religion and science 
surely deserves scrutiny. The connection of women with mediation and liminality, and the further connotation 
that such propensities are degraded and inferior to the capacity to inhabit a single sphere and work within its 
specialized strictures, one cannot regard as a merely contingent turn of phrase. On the relations between gender 
and sacrifice, see Jay (1991) and Kristeva (1982).
Against insincere and false sacrifices, Weber holds up the true sacrifice which, though 
proscribed for him and his audience, they can at least recognize as authentic:  
But morally, it is a very different thing if one shirks his straightforward duty to preserve 
his intellectual integrity [intellektuellen Rechtsaffenheitspflicht]. This is what happens 
when he lacks the courage to make up his mind about his ultimate standpoint but 
instead resorts to feeble equivocation51 in order to make his duty less onerous. And that 
embracing of religion also ranks higher to my mind than the professorial prophecy that 
forgets that the only morality that exists in a lecture room is that of plain intellectual 
integrity (“SaV”, p. 30-31; 17.111).
There is an implicit phenomenological basis to this sociological explanation. As the basis for an 
authentic community in the classroom, seriousness here would have less to do with sincerity 
than the systematic adherence to protocols which would bring certain types of speech into their 
appropriate social spaces. The argument, as above, is that religious innovation in its true form 
can only derive from the proper spaces, ones that allow for the play of recognition and critique. 
While one might think such play could take place in the lecture room, the guild-like structures 
of the German university system of Weber’s day made it much too authoritarian for a dialogi-
cal or critical exchange between professors and students ever to take place. For this reason, 
Weber sought to construct a firewall that would keep demagoguery and prophetic enunciations 
outside of the university’s walls, a move that seems correlative to his notion of the nation as 
spatially delimited.  Weber posits a stark demarcation between the world and the lecture room: 
the latter must be kept sacrosanct, with all the echoes of a religious invocation of the sepa-
ration of the spheres that this implies. The problem for Weber is that the spatial delimitation of 
the types will not suffice, for, as my analysis of Weber’s lecture has shown, nomadic speech 
acts transgress the boundaries of disciplines and institutions, even in Weber’s own lecture. 
Each instance of Weber’s discourse—and in this his lecture is not exceptional—is so imbri-
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51 It seems as if the meaning here is that one must either devote oneself to science, or sacrifice one’s 
intellect in an act of faith. Either is legitimate and possible given the character of the individual, but any 
attempt to do both is illegitimate. But aside from the professor-prophets, demagogues and other contemporary 
sophists, there seems another category: that person who would or will inhabit one of the value spheres, but 
cannot yet decide which to choose. What is the status of this equivocation? a “dark night of the soul”? One 
must have always already decided which god one would serve? How does one make a legitimate place for 
conversion, the series of vacillations this entails? 
cated with description and prescription, scholarly analysis and prophetic utterance, that it is 
impossible to quarantine all traffic in values and other “extra-scientific” phenomena.
If one doubts, at this point, the very possibility of value-free science, one can readily 
recognize the problems that flow from value-professing scientists.  To combine piety and the 
pose of the renegade is what Weber seems most to oppose.  Any bridging of religion and 
science thus becomes “feeble equivocation,” for one would thereby fail to recognize the full 
force of the scientist’s atheistic vocation. One can either shirk this calling or heed it: these are 
the only options available in reference to such mortally opposed value-spheres, for a double-
game like that of the professor-prophets subverts the state’s pursuit of the pure functionality of 
its sanctioned roles.  Thus, Weber wholly rejects those who would play multiple language 
games at once in order to accrue the dual prestige of the prophet and the scholar. The paradox 
that Weber’s lecture enacts, however, is that his discourse blends the prophetic with the 
scientific in exactly the same way as would the proscribed prophet-professor’s, the difference 
being that Weber here designates the blending as a problem.  Though this performance cannot 
achieve perfect modal consistency, it is not therefore in any sense a failure. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely this heterogeneity of its speech acts that Weber’s lecture was rhetorically successful. In 
this light, it constitutes a lasting contribution precisely because it is a problematization that 
does not escape the structure of its problematic.  
 The Scholar’s Ascetic Rejection of Sacrifice
In addition to the iron cage of market forces, Weber also spoke of the “intellectual 
sacrifice” that defines the scholar’s relationship to the value commitments that give comfort 
and orientation to the non-scholar. Because the rejection of this sacrifice defines the minimal 
condition for non-prejudiced, objective scholarly work, a bifurcated sense of sacrifice comes 
into play in the same essay. Needless to say, Weber’s attempts to cultivate an ethics of special-
ization by means of sacrificial rhetoric still speak to the contemporary scholar, and to the 
scholar of religion perhaps foremost among them. 
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Weber’s rejection of religion and values in the classroom, in connection to a  rejection 
of any “sacrifice of the intellect,” is especially poignant when one reads this back onto the 
starting point of “Science as a Vocation.” The contemporary scholar is in the midst of an 
expropriation that harks back to those of the landed peasantry in pre-Reformation England. As 
the scholar gets stripped of the means of production becomes an intellectual proletarian herself, 
once the library and laboratory are gone all that is left is this “intellect” and the conscience 
necessary to reject its sacrifice.  Weber endorses an ascetic outlook by inveighing against any 
who would make a sacrifice of intellect and seek to ally the mortal enemies of science and reli-
gion. The comfort that follows from sacrificing the intellect to rejoin them is unworthy of those 
who would not shirk their vocation, while the nostalgic desire to return to religion that the 
intellect sacrifices to “face up to fate” is all but worthless, an object of disdain in the 
aristocratic ethos of the scholar.  Here the genetive reversal is prevented: one can sacrifice 
one’s intellect, but true intellect cannot make a sacrifice, though the professor-prophets might 
mimic one.  To sacrifice one’s intellect means not only rejecting the primacy and autonomy of 
intellect itself, but also the intellect’s intimation that no god exists to receive the sacrifice. 
Weber thereby makes a move along the production-axis from a Tylorean gift-sacrifice to a 
Maussian productive one, for in sacrificing the intellect one actively rejects the fatefulness of 
the disenchanted world and actually produces the place for God—even if only an absent place-
holder, as Weber makes clear—in the course of the sacrificial process itself. A great deal of the 
“fateful”, pagan pathos of Weber's rhetoric has to do with this sense that participating in the 
prevailing spirit of the age is to live in an iron cage. 
A final mode of sacrificial rhetoric comes into play in regards to the pathos of Weber’s 
writing. Here and elsewhere this stems largely from the fact that, as indicated by his quotation 
from Isaiah at the end of “SaV,” Weber cannot seem to operate in line with his own scholarly 
strictures. That is, even Weber’s hypertrophied ascetic propensities do not prevent him from 
succumbing to the metaphorical seduction, or the prophetic and apocalyptic tone. With Weber 
sacrificial rhetorizing both employs the figure and proclaims its obsolescence. 
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 Far from being a singular failure or an idiomatic contradiction that besets Weber’s 
texts alone, this reveals a constitutional paradox at the heart of discourse, what one might call 
the inherent and intractable rhetoricality of discursive production. 52 Whenever a speaker 
addresses an audience and seeks to persuade it, she inevitably traffics in norms and values that 
she cannot ratify in the self-same discourse, for they must serve as the implicit conditions of 
possibility of this specific discursive instance. Insofar as Weber’s discursive production inter-
feres performatively with the very phenomenon it seeks to describe and validate (the 
inevitability of world-historical trends of disenchantment and specialization, the necessity of the 
scholar’s ascetic renunciation of religious consolation and the charisma that accrues to those 
who employ the prophetic mode of enunciation, the impossibility of any rapprochement 
between facts and values, science and religion), I believe that, instead of a unilinear trajectory 
of disenchantment and secularization, a more dialectical notion of the relation between the 
secular and the sacred is necessary to address the role of auto-authorizing texts such as 
Weber’s, and the way that they transform received idioms of religious authority into new 
modes of hegemony and power. 
I hope that my treatment of Weber’s discourse illustrates something criterial about the 
nature of scholarship, viz. that the relation between scholars is mutually-supplementing 
because each text, argument and concept is rhetorically self-corrupting, and for this reason 
critique and eventual refutation is not a tragic fate that befalls the scholar’s work (pace 
Weber), but its very condition of possibility.
This view would not simply reject, but would treat as situationally responsive, and thus 
strategically determined, the pathos-rich distinctions (fact-value, science-religion, and, more 
abstractly, infinite-ephemeral, meaningful-meaningless, etc.) that Weber employs to articulate 
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52There is a temptation to speak of the conditions of possibility of discourse in general, but there is 
only ever “discourse in general” as a referent of specific discourses. That is, there is no such thing as “discourse 
in general,” scientific or otherwise, excecpt as an interpellated fiction from within specific instances of 
discourse.
the structure of the scholar’s vocation.  Weber’s use of sacrificial rhetoric was essential to this 
project. By placing science and religion on the same plane in reference to asceticism, but at 
odds by means of sacrificial rhetoric, Weber counters the prophet-scholar who would collapse 
the two, or seek some sort of value-bearing synthesis.  In putting them both on the same level 
as possible perspectives that the individual might adopt, Weber does not treat science as an 
archimedean point from which one might judge religion. Instead, he speaks to the gathered 
scholars as if to a group of peers, an interest group or faction that needs to become aware of 
its shared interests and perspectives. Because every discipline presupposes its object, Weber’s 
lecture emphasizes the type of topics and projects that cannot fall within the scholar’s domain. 
In fact, this process of border-construction is so emphatic that Weber in effect calls the com-
munity of scholars into being around this fundamental exclusion. 
 
 An Aesthetic Conclusion
In light of Weber’s emphasis on the human response to the prevailing structures and 
trends that determine the world as an objective fact, some scholars have emphasized the impact 
that Nietzsche had on Weber’s thought.  Nietzsche’s impact on Weber depended on the fact 
that he was a predecessor whose concerns closely resembled Weber’s own, and, consequently, 
whose positions Weber must address.  Because these positions were not only limited matters 
of conjecture on scholarly matters but addressed the nature of civilization as a whole and the 
future course of human nature and society, this shadow was especially long.  David Owen and 
Tracy Strong, for instance, read Weber’s account of the modern world as fated to become 
more and more cage-like in reference to the pathos stirred by Nietzsche’s claims regarding the 
putative “death of God.”  In reference to the scholar in particular, they hold that,
Weber's view that the turn to religion under modern conditions involves a ‘sacrifice of 
intellect’ and his commitment to a ‘polytheism’ of ultimate orientations to life simply 
expresses his acknowledgment of Nietzsche's account of the death of God. Against this 
background, Weber's stress on the importance of intellectual integrity should be seen as 
an endorsement of Nietzsche's claim that honesty expressed as intellectual probity is the 
preeminently necessary modern virtue (2004, p. xxxiii)
On some of these points I largely agree with Owen and Strong, for one can readily verify that 
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the repercussions of mixing Christian asceticism with the article of faith that God is truth led to 
the bastard offspring of modern science, where the self-denying practices of the ascetic 
coupled with the “will to truth” of the scholar led to the figure of the scientist as the dis-
interested producer of truths. After this correlation, however, Owen and Strong continue, stat-
ing that 
the pathos with which Weber invests this virtue, namely, that it is our very truthfulness 
that deprives us of the illusions (for example, illusions concerning the meaning and 
value of science) from which we might otherwise draw comfort, precisely echoes 
Nietzsche's own recognition that it is the commitment to truthfulness cultivated under 
the aegis of Christianity (or, more strictly, the ascetic ideal) that undermines Chris-
tianity (ibid.).
Here I believe that Owen and Strong are in danger of overestimating Weber’s proximity to 
Nietzsche, especially when they suggest that Weber’s “pathos” in the lecture “echoes” 
Nietzsche’s. First, Nietzsche stages, provokes and revokes pathos on so many topics from so 
many different perspectives that this generalized mention of a singular, intertextual 
“Nietzschean pathos” arouses skepticism. Furthermore, while there is certainly much pathos in 
Weber’s lecture, it is of a different texture than Nietzsche’s, one less prone to  ironic treat-
ment, one where nostalgia for the days before the death of God is not scorned, as often hap-
pens in Nietzsche’s texts, but is courted in order to undergo a transformation.  Thus, a more 
sufficient reading needs to account for the textured aesthetic effects of Weber’s asceticism.  
Indeed, the notion of sacrificial rhetoric provides essential resources to Weber’s “pathos-
transforming” discursive project.  
The topic of Weber’s proximity to Nietzsche is a provocative one. Because of their 
shared Greek idiom of fate and tragedy, and the sacrificial origins of Greek drama, so much is 
shared that the strongest distinctions emerge more clearly. Between Nietzsche and Weber there 
is a sharp difference in aesthetic response to the tragedy of the “death of God.” For Nietzsche, 
this world-historical event provokes a “Dionysian” response, a joyful affirmation of its neces-
sity, while for Weber, the death of God becomes an objectively fated conjunction between 
ascetic self-discipline and the will to truth whose consequences will be ambiguous at best, and 
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thus the cause of anxious reflection.  In this lecture Weber, like the Greek tragedians, produces 
a sense of ambivalence by invoking the evanescent fate of humans and their desire for 
immortality, specifically through the pathos of the scholar caught in these inexorable develop-
ments, all in order to conjure an identification with and between the members of his audience. 
The passions he stirs Weber will channel into the service of their collective self-interests.  
The framing of paradox remains one of the most persistent tools Weber employs to 
provoke a response in his audience. In fact, a great deal of his lecture aims precisely at drawing 
the net of antagonistic trends and irresolvable conflicts as closely about each member of the 
audience as possible.  In doing this, Owen and Strong suggest that 
Weber is, carefully and precisely, specifying the fateful character of scientific activity 
and commitment to that activity. In other words, Weber is specifying the conditions of 
“love of scientific fate” in all its difficulty.  From this Nietzschean perspective, Weber's 
concern with what it is to have a vocation for science is a concern with what it is to 
love one's fate as a scientist, that is, to embrace our condition of being thrown into the 
world as it is (p. xxxiv).
The first part of this assessment, regarding the connection to Nietzsche, and Weber’s variation 
on amor fati, is patent and clear.  But the authors’ invocation of the world “as it is” blurs a 
fundamental point. If we are to retain the agnosticism that makes the polytheism of ultimate 
perspectives more than simply a species of liberal tolerance, then we must speak not of the 
world “as it is,” but of the world as Weber rhetorically constructs it, a world where sacrifice 
and the conflict of values are essential to its very fabric.  In other words, my difference here 
with Owens and Strong is that they treat the lecture as purely descriptive, whereas I would 
view it as a type of performance wherein the speaker, the audience, and the world as a whole 
are constructed anew. To treat the lecture as a straightforward description of the scholar’s 
predicament is to adopt the perspective that Weber constructs for his audience. While I do not 
seek an “outside” of this lecture, or an objective perspective on it, I do seek an analysis that 
does not read the text solely from the perspective of the addressee-position constructed by 
Weber’s rhetorical gestures. In short, this reading must assess the degree to which any 
scholarly reading remains within the parameters that Weber sets, but also avoid the wholesale 
adoption of the perspective that Weber constructs
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I noted at the outset that Weber’s aesthetic achievement was quite distinct from 
Nietzsche’s provocative assessments of the scholar’s genesis and condition. To assess Weber’s 
distinctive treatment, one must go back to his words about passion as the sine qua non of an 
individual’s life work. Here we have the paradoxical picture of a speaker attempting to 
describe the universe as disenchanted and cold, in order to elicit the spark of passion from the 
audience. In a passage from The Gay Science entitled “On the aim of science,” Nietzsche 
addresses the dialectical relationship between the ascetic and the voluptuary, 
What? The final aim of science should be to give man as much pleasure and as little 
displeasure as possible? But what if  pleasure and displeasure are so intertwined that 
whoever wants as much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the 
other.... Even today you still have the choice: either as little displeasure as pos-
sible,.... or as much displeasure as possible as the price for the growth of a bounty of 
refined pleasures and joys that hitherto have seldom been tasted. Should you decide 
on the former, i.e. if you want to decrease and diminish people's susceptibility to pain, 
you also have to decrease and diminish their capacity for joy (1974, p. 37-38).
Nietzsche presents an account where options range from a still point of minimal oscillation to a 
life swinging from extremes of jubilation and suffering. What I would take away from this is 
that the entire range would, for Nietzsche, fall under the concept of asceticism. Here 
Nietzsche, and Weber after him, will attempt to wrest the history and practice of asceticism 
from the possession of Christianity, since both recognize that asceticism as a mitigated and 
strategic form of sacrifice formed a set of practices with a future far beyond that of any partic-
ular religion. Indeed, not only will this future extend beyond Christianity, it will extend, 
according to Weber, beyond religion in general, into the domain of science.  As with Weber’s 
paean to passion, Nietzsche opposed a simplistic image of scholarly asceticism as cold and life-
denying: 
With science one can actually promote either of these goals! So far it may still be better 
known for its power to deprive man of his joys and make him colder, more statue-like, 
more stoic. But it might yet be found to be the great giver of pain!—And then its 
counterforce might at the same time be found: its immense capacity for letting new 
galaxies of joy flare up! (ibid, p. 38).
Weber too employs strategies so that his rhetoric produces a specific effect: faced with 
Weber’s depiction of a world for the scholar approaching absolute zero, he counts on his 
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audience’s commitment to produce their own warmth, to undertake the alchemical process of 
turning that fact into a value. For the scholar,53 as Weber and Nietzsche depicts him, the point 
becomes not the cool, neutral position of the observer, or the blase attitude of Simmel’s 
metropolitan. Weber wants to awaken the group to their interests and direct their passions 
towards these interests, and not others that are actually opposed. Weber heats up the scientific 
ethos in a way opposed to the positions of the prophet-professors.  This is the tightrope that 
Weber walks by describing the world as cold and tragic in reference to scientific production in 
order to elicit great pathos in the heart of the scientist as a producer. 
In regards to the aesthetic rendering of this sacrificial pathos, Nietzsche often empha-
sized the myriad ways of expressing the “will to power,” whereas Weber continues in a key 
more appropriate to an audience whose members have just lived through a sacrificial undertak-
ing of the worst kind, total war.  Weber calls on his fellow scholars to become more ascetic, to 
undertake greater but different sacrifices, in becoming ascetic enough to forego sacrifice as it 
has been inflected since Luther, at least, as the production of faith. In this, Weber perhaps 
knew his audience a bit more than Nietzsche knew his, though, of course, the latter insisted 
that he wrote (and lived) posthumously.  Weber’s sacrificial rhetoric remains compelling, 
though the changing nature of the university and the nation-state have led to different problems 
than the prophet-professors of Weber’s day. 
Weber’s wish, the decentered engine of his lecture, is to engage an audience composed 
of individuals, each of whom was capable of making the transition from accurate facts to 
appropriate values for themselves, without Weber finding it necessary to pepper the facts with 
evaluations and other prophetic elements.  Both in his comparative studies and in the construc-
tion of his lectures.  was this soul of the other, understood as a black box where commitments 
are conjured and motivations born, that so preoccupied Weber. Weber wanted to address indi-
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53 Wittgenstein defines this rejection of the cool for the opposites of hot and cold as indicative of the 
religious sensibility (1979). Perhaps here we should expand this to speak of sacrifice and asceticism.
vidually, and call into being as a group, these adepts at the negotiation of facts and values, in 
particular those who were committed to the view that the former never derived from the latter.  
That is, as a conscientious scholar, Weber’s great fear was that his peers would be seduced by 
prophet-professors into adopting invalid value-spheres.  From within these spheres, they would 
shirk their scholarly duties by deriving their facts from their values instead of, as he thought 
every conscientious individual must, their values from the facts.  By focusing so obsessively 
throughout his career on the problem of the social construction of subjectivity and the subject’s 
motivated response to these determining social structures, this aporia became the needle that 
he would attempt to thread. Weber’s sacrificial rhetoric flags facts with values (the transition 
from magic to religion and feudalism to capitalism as positive developments of a process of 
rationalization) and disguises values as facts (the goal of Wertfrei scholarship as a firewall 
against the demagoguery abroad in a defeated and dejected nation), in such a way that, in the 
very act of prohibiting this blurring, Weber offers a virtuoso performance in their mutual 
imbrication. 
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5. Conclusion
In this text I have set out to study an astonishingly long-lived, effective and flexible 
mode of persuasion. The notion of “sacrificial rhetoric” as an object of scrutiny has provided 
the lens to analyze a certain kind of claim about the world, a claim that, at its limit, would 
address the genesis of value and the nature of being. As persuasive as this type of discourse 
can be, the framing device of “sacrificial rhetoric” has helped us cast a cold eye on its resources 
and effects. Insofar as sacrificial rhetoric is a mode of rhetoric, understood not only as 
persuasive speech but also as the self-reflexive elaboration of received ideas, this concept 
arguably constitutes an example of a disenchanting instrumentalization of religious phenomena. 
However, insofar as this rhetoric is obdurately sacrificial, and preserves the idiom and scenario 
of sacrifice into a world that no longer sanctions the rite, sacrificial rhetoric constitutes a 
mystifying discourse that promotes the consecration of misrecognitions. For these reasons, this 
investigation has haunted a crossroads where paradoxes are not only contingent, they are the 
necessary counterparts of this linguistic deployment.
This study has shown that, far from serving as a simple figure of speech, or a veil of 
values cast over a fact, sacrificial rhetoric has served as an instrument for considerable work in 
the world. With it, Luther reined in the aspects of the Reformation that most troubled his 
aristocratic patrons, legitimated the pastor as a distinct figure of authority over the laity, and all 
the while avoided recanting his proclamation of the “priesthood of all believers.” Hegel, by 
contrast, used sacrificial rhetoric to marshal all the pathos and devotion of religion and channel 
it into the socio-ethical, nation-building program of his speculative system, and at the same 
time stave off charges of impiety and atheism from the clergy whose authority he siphoned 
away. Weber, finally, employed sacrificial rhetoric to cast the entrepreneur and the scholar as 
  
  
heroic figures adept at assessing the fateful nature of factuality and rationally adapting their 
behavior, and even their values, to meet the demands of the day. 
Furthermore, I have shown how sacrificial rhetoric, as a rhetoric, constructs its own 
other in order to stage the triumph of its values. If in each case it was, respectively, the pastor, 
the philosopher, and the scholar who truly sacrifices, it was the sophist who sacrifices truth. In 
addition to this feature of sacrificial rhetoric, in the introduction I developed a model that 
could account for two of the most important effects of sacrificial rhetoric, namely, 
disaggregation and consecration. Luther disaggregated faith from reason and consecrated both 
the supremacy of faith and the function of the pastor. For his part, Hegel disaggregated truth 
as the movement of spirit in the world from its Bildern and other fixed manifestations, then 
consecrated this movement as the dynamic liberty of humans, history and Geist. Finally, Weber 
disaggregated the ascetic entrepreneur from the greed-driven adventurer and the scholar from 
the prophet-professor, then consecrated the entrepreneur and the scholar as well as the 
historical movements they represent, the disenchantment and rationalization of the world. Each 
of these figures used sacrificial rhetoric to situate themselves within the social structure and a 
dynamic division of labor, and they did this by speaking of sacrifice in such a way that they told 
a story about themselves in a conflictual and costly world. 
If this investigation has revealed anything to me, it is that the disciplines in the modern 
university are historical products, and there are innumerable trajectories that one could follow 
to narrate their emergence. Indeed, it is imperative that scholars interrogate the received 
narratives of their field's disciplinization. Recently, this necessity became clear at a public 
forum. At the fall 2005 convention of the American Academy of Religion, Slavoj Žižek, always 
the provocateur, asked rhetorically if we—not only scholars of religion, but all cosmopolitan, 
ironic, cynical scholars—if we have connived to “outsource belief”? Does the entire scholarly 
enterprise pivot upon the notion that there are people in the world who inhabit a simpler form 
of subjectivity than our own, one less prone to skepticism, sudden flashes of insight and 
reversals of perspective? Have we projected onto others a “natural” way of inhabiting the 
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world, of believing in the world, that we then take it upon ourselves to study, to analyze, and 
explain so that we cosmopolitan adepts can then utter the truth of the faith that only others 
actually live? 
This question could not have been directed towards a better audience. Whether as 
citizens or scholars, how reassuring it is to participate in this game of projection and 
(mis)recognition, a game where our expectations are always fulfilled? This investigation has 
attempted to trace the route that led us to this place. If we scholars value our ascetic 
commitments to truth, our refusal to “sacrifice our intellects,” from what can we derive this 
value except from the conviction that somewhere someone else has in fact made such a 
sacrifice? If in today’s society the priest and the scholar stare at one another from across an 
abyss, how might this change if one narrates a story of how these rival siblings came to this 
impasse? 
This investigation sought to show, first, that the way people speak about sacrifice is 
consequential, and to show this it examined the sacrificial rhetoric of three of the great 
hierophants (to use Eliade’s term) of the modern age. Second, this investigation has shown 
that, because a sacrifice is not a thing but a process, not an object but a movement, it serves as 
a resource for the generation of narratives. In particular, this study has shown how, by 
invoking the values of the nation-state as a value sphere, and situating their work in reference 
to its well-being, Luther, Hegel and Weber, as pastor, philosopher and scholar, each 
constructed a sacrificial narrative of their own authority. 
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 Appendix 1. Greimas Square of Gift, Theft, Exchange and Sacrifice
  
  
Appendix 2. Summary of the Axes of Variation
Axes of Variation Asymptotic Endpoints
practical-axis ritual < > rhetoric
object-axis inflation < > mitigation
valence-axis sacralization < > desacralization
production-axis gift-relation < > consecration-effects
transformational-axis objective < > subjective
efficacy-axis magical < > moral
referential-axis indicative < > performative
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